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




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THE HISTORY OF GREECE





THE
HISTORY OF GREECE

FROM
ITS COMMENCEMENT TO THE CLOSE OF
THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE
GREEK NATION

BY
ADOLF HOLM

TRANSLATED FROM THE GERMAN

IN FOUR VOLUMES
VOL. II
THE FIFTH CENTURY B.C.

London
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AND NEW YORK

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PREFACE

IN the second volume of my History of Greece I have endeavoured, as in the first, to bring into clear relief, firstly, old and trustworthy records, secondly, additions made thereto by biassed contemporaries or in later antiquity, and thirdly, the conclusions of modern research. My attempt to draw as sharp a distinction as possible between theories and facts has, as I gratefully acknowledge, met with the approval of my critics, especially of those in England. In the history of the fifth century B.C. the important point was to form a definite idea of the value of Herodotus, Thucydides and Xenophon on the one hand, and of contemporary partizans and later historians on the other. The reader will find that I have allowed the results of these considerations to exercise a decided influence on the narrative.

What I have had to do in this volume was to exhibit the historical progress of the Greek people in the fifth century by means of a narrative founded on the facts. In the performance of this task I have arrived at many conclusions which differ from the views which have hitherto been generally accepted. Among them I would specify the following:—

the position of Aristides and Themistocles respectively, the aims of Pericles, the importance to be assigned to the responsibility of the mover of a resolution in the Athenian democracy, the peculiarities of the Athenian character, the absence of any marked difference of culture among rich and poor in Athens, and the different currents of civilization in the Greek world as a whole. On many of these points I find myself in agreement with Oncken's excellent work *Athen und Hellas*, without, so far as I am aware, being indebted to him for my views, which impressed themselves on me as right and necessary in the course of my labours.


I have to thank Mr. J. P. Six for the correction of a note on p. 15 of this volume. He informs me that the coins of Euelthon, owing to the thickness of their shape, undoubtedly belong to the middle of the sixth century, and that it is therefore quite justifiable to ascribe them to the potentate mentioned by Herodotus. On p. 233 it should be added that the larger non-Athenian silver coins of the Athenian empire are extremely rare. There is still much to be done for the numismatic history of eastern Greece and Greece proper, whereas that of Sicily, for instance, is pretty well settled.

For p. 170 cf. the interesting collection of drawings relating to the *Iliu persis* of Polygnotus in Plates x.-xii. of the *Wiener Vorlegeblätter für archäologische Uebungen*.

My wish and hope is that the contents of this volume may be examined in the kindly spirit with which my critics have treated the first. The reviews of the first volume which


have come under my notice have supplied me with a welcome incentive to perseverance in the same path, and my attention has been drawn to certain faults which I have endeavoured to avoid in this volume. There will be no lack of defects of detail on this occasion also, but I trust they may be of such a kind as not to seriously interfere with the value of the performance as a whole.

A. H.



NOTE

THE translators wish to express their obligation to the Author for some corrections and additions, and they have also to thank Mr. Frederick Clarke, late Taylorian Scholar in the University of Oxford, for thoroughly revising the MS. of their translation, and correcting the proofs.



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CHAPTER I

THE IONIC REVOLT

IT now becomes our task to chronicle events of great importance in the history of the world. We are on the eve of the mighty conflict between the East and the West, called by the name of the Persian Wars, the first and one of the greatest of all those waged by the kingdoms of the East against Europe. The crisis finds a parallel in the Middle Ages, when Islam hurls itself against Christendom. The onslaught does not proceed from a single point; the East seeks to enfold European civilization in its grasp from two sides, from Asia and from Africa. What Bagdad and Kairouan were to Christendom in the tenth century A.D., Susa and Carthage were to Hellenism about the year 500 B.C. But in one respect the two epochs under comparison differ completely. In the Middle Ages the opposing forces are of a similar character; fanaticism is arrayed against fanaticism, numbers against numbers, strategy against strategy. This is not the case in the struggles between the East and the Hellenic world. It is precisely in this respect that sharp contrasts are clearly discernible. The East enters on the contest with all the accessories of power and splendour, while Greece presents an unimposing appearance. The East is conspicuous for the multitude of its warriors and the brilliance of its equipments; its vast hosts move at the beck of a

single power, whether it be a despotism or an oligarchy, both of which consider men as mere instruments of their will and use them accordingly. In the West, on the other hand, the challenge is taken up by a mere handful of men belonging to a widely-scattered people, but they are full of self-confidence and stubbornness, they hate despotism above all things, they rely on the protection of their gods, but not less on the trained force of their own strong arms. They are the picked combatants of a race in the prime of its strength, endowed with striking qualities, but also exhibiting many faults, full of enthusiasm for the beautiful and gifted with rare refinement of perception, yet liable to sudden changes even in matters of importance, and split up into communities which can hardly ever remain at peace with one another, and are not united even in the present juncture. But in spite of all this Europe wins the day. The result is the same as in so many great contests; mind triumphs over matter, discipline over mere numbers, and life over routine.

The conflicts between the East and West are directed towards a common aim, but they are not immediately connected with each other, and their progress has to be traced on two different scenes of action. The Greeks of Hellas proper encounter the Persians, the Syracusans and Acragantines the Carthaginians. The former contest is of much greater importance and of far higher dramatic interest than the latter. In the East the opposing forces are clearly outlined one against the other; the struggle is between the most important representatives of civilization, between the leading races themselves. In the West the colonies of each combatant meet, offshoots of the Greeks and offshoots of the Phoenicians, who are dependent on Persia; in the West, moreover, it is not merely a question of Greek principles defeating Orientalism, for there the leader of the victors is a tyrant, although the most popular of his class and the one who has done most real service to Greece.

The direct cause of the war between Greek and Persia was the Ionic revolt, which in its turn was a consequence of the restless ambition of Greek despots. Darius, after crossing the Danube in his adventurous campaign against the Scythians, had left the tyrants of the Ionian cities as guards of the bridge of boats which he had built.¹ Herodotus mentions as the most distinguished among them Daphnis of Abydos, Hippoclus of Lampsacus, Herophantus of Parium, Metrodorus of Proconnesus, Aristagoras of Cyzicus, Ariston of Byzantium, Miltiades of the Chersonese, Strattis of Chios, Aeaces of Samos, Laodamas of Phocaea, Histiaeus of Miletus and Aristagoras of Cyme. Some Scythians presented themselves to them with the proposal that they should take up the bridge, adding that the king would then be cut off and destroyed and the Greeks would be free. Miltiades was for complying with the request of the Scythians. The others, however, upon the advice of Histiaeus, decided in favour of remaining loyal to the Persians. But for appearance sake they removed a portion of the bridge adjoining the Scythian bank. The Persians were saved, for the Scythians, who were looking for them, missed them in the wide steppes, and the Persians reached the spot where the bridge was. But they arrived there in the night and, not being able to see it, were in some anxiety. An Egyptian, who had the loudest voice in the army, shouted the name of Histiaeus across the stream. Histiaeus heard him, brought up all the boats and restored the bridge. If this is true, Darius had every reason to be grateful to Histiaeus. And probably he really had good cause for gratitude. For even if in this fabulous narrative,—in which Histiaeus mounts guard in person and the Persians apparently arrive at the river's bank all together like a troop of fugitive cavalry, and look in vain for the bridge which is to save them,—the real events are crowded together as in a scene of Shakespeare, and if, moreover, it would appear that the danger to the Persians was not so great as Herodotus

makes out, and that the Greeks were not certain of compassing the destruction of the Persians by the removal of the bridge, yet the upshot of the whole story is that Histiaeus was the best friend of the Persian king among the Ionians. As a reward he received a place on the lower course of the Strymon in Thrace, named Myrcinus, which he converted into a fortress. These fortifications, however, were represented to the king as a dangerous undertaking by Megabazus, the Persian satrap in Europe, and Darius summoned the Greek to Susa, ostensibly to do him honour, but in reality to render him harmless. Histiaeus was obliged, much against his will, to reside at the Persian court. He saw that he would never get away again unless disturbances broke out in the West. If they did, he thought the king would despatch him thither to effect a pacification, and as none arose of their own accord, he set to work to contrive them himself. In this he was assisted by the fact that a man who was in his confidence was desirous for other reasons of a revolt in Ionia.²

A son-in-law of Histiaeus, Aristagoras, was governing Miletus as his representative. Some exiled aristocrats of Naxos came to him and implored aid. Aristagoras was favourably disposed towards the undertaking, by which he hoped to make himself tyrant of Naxos, but he considered the power of Miletus insufficient, and wished to avail himself of the strength of Persia. He laid the matter before Artaphernes, satrap of Sardis, saying that Naxos could be taken with a hundred ships of war and that this victory might lead to greater things, the conquest of Euboea, for instance. Artaphernes reported the matter to the king, who gave his consent to the project and appointed his relative Megabates to conduct the campaign. The enterprise, however, failed, apparently because a quarrel broke out between Megabates and Aristagoras on the voyage, and the offended Persian betrayed the plot to the Naxians. The latter were thus

enabled to make preparations and sustain a four months' siege of their city with success. When Aristagoras returned to Miletus he began to think his position very critical, not so much because he had lost a large sum of money, but because he had not been able to fulfil his promises to the Persians. He might in consequence be punished, he might even be deprived of his tyranny. Should he not attempt to revolt? While he was occupied with thoughts of this nature, a slave presented himself, who brought word from Histiaeus that his head was to be shaved. Upon it was tattooed the message that Aristagoras was to raise an insurrection. He communicated everything to his friends, and begged them to join him in carrying out the design. They were all ready to do so, with the exception of the historian Hecataeus, who pointed out the difficulties of the enterprise and advised them, if they really did decide on risking it, at least to secure the treasures of the Temple of Apollo at Branchidae. They could not make up their mind to this step, but the revolt was carried into execution. Aristagoras resigned the tyranny in order to win over the people, and Miletus became free. There were, however, on board the fleet which had returned from Naxos, some tyrants who were devoted to Persian interests, Oliatus of Mylasa, Histiaeus of Termera, Coes of Mytilene, Aristagoras of Cyme, and others. They were taken prisoners and handed over to their respective cities. Coes was stoned by the Mytileneans, the rest escaped scot-free.

The next step was to obtain allies. For this purpose Aristagoras paid a visit to Greece, and went in the first place to Sparta. There the most influential man was King Cleomenes, who has been mentioned in Chap. xxvii. of Vol. I. Aristagoras came before him with a brass tablet, on which the land, the sea and the rivers were depicted, a geographical map, no doubt the work of the learned Hecataeus. Aristagoras said it was a disgrace for the Ionians to be slaves, a disgrace which the Greeks ought not to tolerate, especially

the Spartans, the leaders of the Hellenes and the bravest of them all. The barbarians, he continued, could easily be conquered, for they are neither brave nor well-armed. Then he enumerated the principal peoples dwelling between the sea and the city of Susa, where lay the treasures of the king, the prize of victory. Cleomenes deferred his answer till the third day, and then asked Aristagoras how long the march to Susa was. The Ionian incautiously replied—for, as Herodotus remarks, he could and should have told an untruth—that it would take three months. Thereupon Cleomenes would have nothing to do with such a far-reaching design. Aristagoras then played the part of a suppliant, so that Cleomenes was forced to give him further audience. The Milesian offered the king money in order to gain him over, at first ten talents and gradually more. At last he rose to fifty talents, whereupon Gorgo, the little daughter of Cleomenes, who afterwards became the wife of Leonidas and who was present at the interview, exclaimed: “Father, if you do not go away the stranger will corrupt you”! Cleomenes went into another chamber, and Aristagoras was obliged to leave Sparta. Here again the narrative has been dramatically worked up, but we can guess what went on behind the scenes. Probably there were some Spartiates who were not averse to the undertaking. Still there was too little support to justify the venture. The word of an Aristagoras was no guarantee that assistance would be forthcoming in Asia. A state professing the principles of Sparta could not admit that the treasures of Susa were a worthy object of a campaign, and Cleomenes, as we have seen in Vol. I., evidently had little inclination for expeditions beyond the seas. Hence a pretext was sought for breaking off the negotiations which had been already begun, and it was found in the length of the march to Susa. The excuse was a hollow one, for if it was a question of the Persian treasures, there was no definite object at all, while the Ionians could be liberated without such a march.

But neither Aristagoras nor the Spartans gave a thought to the emancipation of the Ionians.³

Having thus met with a rebuff in Sparta, the Milesian turned to Athens. Things had completely changed since the days of Croesus. He also had applied first to Sparta and with the same flattery had called the Spartans the first of the Hellenes. He had been well received there, while the appeal of Aristagoras was rejected. But how different must the two cases have appeared to the practical Spartans. Then it was the wealthiest monarch in the world who applied to them, now it was a deposed tyrant, who might betray the Greeks just as he had betrayed the Persians. In Athens the position was different. Athens was not on good terms with the Persians, and Hippias, who was now living at Sigeium and Lampsacus, was in favour with them. Artaphernes, satrap of Sardis, had even requested the Athenians to reinstate Hippias.⁴ By way of answer to the intrigues of the Peisistratidae, Hipparchus, a relative of the tyrant's family, was ostracized by the Athenians. Besides, the Ionians were considered colonists of Athens, and Athens was on most intimate terms with Miletus. The Athenians therefore granted the desired assistance; they despatched twenty ships under the command of Melanthius, while the Eretrians, who were old friends of Miletus and Athens, sent five. The campaign was then begun. Aristagoras marched troops by way of Ephesus and Mount Tmolus to Sardis, which fell into the hands of the Greeks, with the exception of the citadel, where Artaphernes made a stand. The lightly-built houses of the city were consumed by fire, the result of which was that the Lydians assembled in the market-place and offered a successful resistance. The Greeks were thus unable even to hold the city they had conquered; they were compelled to retreat without taking any booty with them. The Persian troops in the west of Asia Minor now united and pursued the Greeks as far as Ephesus, where they inflicted a defeat upon them, in

which the Eretrian leader fell. The Athenians then gave up the whole affair and returned home. Matters looked bad for Ionia, and the country was lost at this early stage if new allies could not be found to draw off the Persian troops from that quarter. Allies, however, were forthcoming; the ball had been set rolling, and the idea that now at last was the time to throw off the Persian yoke, excited the liveliest enthusiasm among the Greeks and semi-barbarians. In the north, Byzantium and some towns on the Hellespont joined the revolt, and in the south the Carian cities, whose rulers were not so dependent on the Persians as were the Ionians. Even the important island of Cyprus revolted, with the exception of Amathus. The leader of the Cypriotes was Onesilus, brother of King Gorgus of Salamis, who himself had gone over to the Persians.

When Darius received the news of the rebellion of the Ionians, his wrath was especially great against the Athenians, of whom he is alleged not to have heard before. He prayed that Zeus would grant him vengeance on the Athenians, and he ordered a slave to call out to him at every meal: "Sire, remember the Athenians."⁵ He sent for Histiaeus, told him what had happened, and asked him his opinion, adding that there was strong suspicion against him of having caused the revolt. Histiaeus replied that on the contrary the reason of the revolt was his absence, for he could have prevented it, and he promised that, if the king would send him there, he would reduce the whole country to submission and make many new conquests, Sardinia even—the El Dorado of that age! The king dismissed him after entrusting him with the desired mission.

Meanwhile matters had taken a course highly favourable for the Persians. Fighting began in Cyprus, where some Ionians had arrived and were helping the Cypriotes. But Persian aid came from Cilicia, the Cypriotes were defeated, and Onesilus slain. The Ionians, who had undertaken to

keep the sea against the Persians, returned home after winning a naval battle. Thus the Cypriotes after one year's freedom became Persian subjects once more, and Gorgus was reinstated in Salamis.⁶

In the north the course of events was the same. Daurises, a son-in-law of Darius, seized Dardanus, Abydos, Percote, Lampsacus, and Paesus. Then he received intelligence that the Carians had seceded and he marched against them. The Carians fought bravely; after two defeats they succeeded, under the leadership of Heraclides of Mylasa, in defeating the Persians, and it was not till after the fall of Miletus that Caria again became Persian.⁷ But the resistance of the Carians had little influence on the course of the war in general. The Persian generals Hymaies, Artaphernes, and Otanes, who had succeeded Megabazus, and had already conquered some towns on the Bosphorus as well as Lemnos and Imbros, took the Aeolian cities and Clazomenae. Aristagoras now despaired of success, and consulted the leading Ionians as to what was to be done. His own opinion was that they ought to proceed to Sardinia or Thrace: Hecataeus advised the temporary surrender of Miletus, and the occupation of the island of Leros, opposite Branchidae, so as to return to Miletus on a favourable opportunity. But on this occasion also he was not listened to. For the present it was decided to do nothing. Thereupon Aristagoras gave up the struggle and retired to Thrace, where he wandered about as a freebooter, and was soon afterwards slain. Histiaeus, who now went to Sardis and thence to Ionia, and even attempted to intrigue with the Persians in Sardis, was turned away everywhere, even in Miletus, till at last he induced the Mytileneans to allow him eight triremes, with which he carried on piracy from Byzantium.

In this way the revolted Greeks had rid themselves of their impure elements, but the cause fared no better in consequence. The Ionians and Lesbians still held together. On

the promontory of Mycale at the Panionium it was resolved that Miletus, which was especially hard pressed, should be defended by the Milesians alone, but that at sea all with their united forces should offer resistance to the Persian fleet, which was equipped and manned by Phoenicians, Cypriotes, Cilicians, and Egyptians. The Greek fleet accordingly assembled at the island of Lade, opposite Miletus; there were 80 ships from Miletus, 12 from Priene, 3 from Myus, 17 from Teos, 100 from Chios, 8 from Erythrae, 3 from Phocaea, 70 from Lesbos, 60 from Samos—in all 353—a proof of the great strength and wealth of these communities at that period. Opposed to them were 600 Persian vessels. The Persian generals did not believe in the possibility of subduing the Greeks by force, and therefore opened negotiations with the separate contingents through their former tyrants. At first this policy had no success. On the contrary, the Greeks made an attempt to turn their fleet into an efficient engine of war. The energetic leader of the Phocaeans, Dionysius, offered his services for the purpose of training all the crews. The offer was accepted, and for a week great ardour prevailed throughout the fleet. When, however, the charm of novelty had worn off, the feeling of trouble and fatigue alone remained, and as everything was determined by voluntary agreement, and people did not see why the city which had furnished the smallest contingent should supply the commander-in-chief, the crews preferred to spend the hot days on shore in idleness. Under these unfavourable conditions a battle was fought in which the Samians, with the exception of eleven ships, deserted their post and sailed away. They had been worked upon by their former tyrant, Aeaces, in favour of Persia, and had come to the wise conclusion that a fleet so badly commanded could accomplish nothing. The example of the Samians induced the Lesbians to do the same. The rest fought bravely, especially the Chians, but under these circumstances the Greeks had to suffer defeat. The Chians met with

exceptional ill-fortune after the battle. They left their remaining ships at the promontory of Mycale, and made their way by land farther north. But as they were marching by night through the territory of Ephesus, which had not taken any part in the war, they were taken for a band of robbers. The Ephesians apparently thought that this troop of brigands intended to fall upon the women of Ephesus, who were just at that time celebrating the Thesmophoria, and consequently slew most of them.

Dionysius, on the other hand, showed what audacity could do even under the most adverse circumstances. He took three Phoenician war-ships and sailed to Phoenicia, where he captured some merchant vessels, and then proceeded to Sicily, whence he made buccaneering expeditions against the Carthaginians and Etruscans in the western seas. Both the egotist and the patriot, Histiaeus and Dionysius, when the cause they had fought for was lost, spent the rest of their lives as freebooters. Miletus had now to surrender. It was taken by the Persians in the sixth year of the revolt. Of the inhabitants the men were nearly all put to the sword, the women and children were removed to the city of Ampe at the mouth of the Tigris; the sanctuary at Didyma was plundered and destroyed.⁸ Great was the grief at the fate of Miletus among her friends, especially her old ally Athens. When the poet Phrynicus produced the tragedy "The conquest of Miletus" on the stage, and moved the citizens to tears, they imposed upon him a fine of 1000 drachmae because he had reminded them of their sorrow. They were ashamed of not having given more effective assistance to Miletus.⁹ Histiaeus continued his freebooting life for some time, laying waste Chios and plundering the Aeolian mainland. There he fell into the hands of the Persians. To obtain his liberty, he mentioned his name, but that was of no avail. Artaphernes and Harpagus (the Persian who had taken him prisoner) had him crucified at Sardis. His head was sent to

Darius, who, however, disapproved of his execution, and had the head buried with due honours, saying that it was the head of one of Persia's benefactors. As a matter of fact no one knows whether he was really an opponent of the Persian supremacy in Ionia, or merely of certain satraps.¹⁰ In the year after the capture of Miletus, the other Ionian towns on the mainland which had revolted were taken and burnt, and their inhabitants reduced to slavery. Of the islands a like fate befell Lesbos, Tenedos, and Chios, where men were hunted to death like wild beasts. The Persians behaved there much in the way that the Turks did in modern times. Samos alone was spared on account of her services to Persia, but had to accept Aeaces as tyrant. This was the end of the Ionic revolt.

In this narrative we have followed Herodotus, and have reproduced his explanations of the course of events. He has concentrated the whole story in a dramatic way, and has emphasized personal characteristics. If we take into account certain allusions which we find in his work, especially with regard to Hecataeus, we may give the internal history of the revolt somewhat as follows. There was a patriotic party in the Ionian towns which worked to free their country from the Persian yoke. This party had its headquarters in Miletus, and was strongly represented in educated circles, which cherished the recollections of their national history, and were well informed as to the weak points of the Persian empire. The most prominent representative of this party was Hecataeus. But these men were too cautious to attempt a hopeless revolt, and moreover the cities were governed by tyrants, without whose co-operation nothing could be done, and whose interests demanded rather the maintenance of the Persian supremacy. Chance would have it that the Milesian tyrants of all others were offended with the Persians, and they, to compass their own personal ends, made overtures to the most powerful party, the patriots. Aristagoras, who as tyrant knew something of diplomacy, undertook to provide allies,

and was obliged to consent to the emancipation of all the cities. At first he kept the conduct of the war in his own hands. But he managed it badly, and when after the retreat of the Greeks the Persian troops advanced on the Ionian cities, the command slipped from his grasp, and he and Histiaeus betook themselves to piracy. The undertaking was then carried on in a better spirit, but unfortunately without any discipline. Thus the war terminated unsuccessfully, the southern allies, especially the Cypriotes, being the first to succumb, which enabled Persia to direct nearly the whole force at her disposal in Asia Minor against Ionia. The want of unity and the absence of even a mediocre commander turned the scale in favour of the Persians. Inefficiency degenerated into treachery, and the secession of Samos involved the ruin of Ionia.

The Persians subdued the cities on the Hellespont, the Propontis, and the Bosphorus ; Byzantium and Chalcedon were deserted by their inhabitants, who fled to Mesambria, and the cities themselves were burnt. Miltiades, who shortly before had taken possession of Lemnos and Imbros for the Athenians, was forced to flee to Athens.¹¹ Artaphernes then organized the civil government of the reconquered districts, giving them, as Herodotus says, some very useful laws. He compelled the cities to make treaties with one another, by which the citizens of the various communities were bound in future to submit their differences to judicial arbitration. He also had a survey made of the country, and from it determined the tribute, which, according to Herodotus, was in force even in his time. The result was that the Ionians were henceforth, so far as they had an independent existence, placed on a more favourable footing as regards trade and commerce. The Persian government proved its talent for organization even in its treatment of these Greek coast towns, and seems really in many respects to have protected Ionian interests better than the Ionians themselves.

The supremacy of Persia, which was thus extended and consolidated in the north, made progress also in the south. The Battiad Arcesilaus III. of Cyrene (vol. i. p. 417) submitted to Cambyses, and when he was murdered at Barca, his mother Pheretime invoked the aid of Ariandes, the Persian satrap of Egypt.¹² Barca was conquered, and the enemies of Pheretime punished with great cruelty. The Persian army penetrated still farther westwards as far as Euesperides. The dynasty of the Battiadae continued its rule in Cyrene up to the middle of the fifth century B.C., under the nominal suzerainty of Persia.

NOTES

Our authority for this Chapter is Herod. 5, 28—6, 42, though one must apply the canon of criticism which endeavours to distinguish the manifestly fabulous element in the various narratives current among the people. We may, however, try to conjecture the motives of the actors when they are not given by Herodotus. Part of the story of Herodotus may be founded on information supplied by Hecataeus. There are some interesting remarks in Diod. Fr. 10, 25. For the events treated in Chapters I-VII., cf. Cox, *Lives of Greek Statesmen*, I. Lond. 1885.

1. March of Darius against the Scythians and description of that people, Herod. 4, 1-144. Its date, Duncker, 4,⁴ 491, Busolt, 2, 12, 513 B.C. For the state of Scythia, cf. Neumann, *Hellenen im Skythenlande*. The Scythians, according to Neumann and others, are Mongolians; according to Zeuss and others, Aryans; cf. Busolt, 2, 15. Detailed criticism of Herodotus' strange narrative in Duncker, 4,⁴ 498 seq.; according to his view Darius marched northwards (not eastwards) along the Pruth as far as the swamp on the upper Dniester. Of recent works cf. G. Mair's 3. *Schulprogr.* von Saaz, 1884-86, *Das Land der Skythen und der Feldzug des Dareios*. The bridge over the Bosphorus was built for Darius by the Samian Mandrocles, Herod. 4, 88.

2. The Ionic revolt, Herod. 5, 28—6, 42. Weissenborn, *Der Aufstand der Ionier in Hellas*, Jena, 1844, 2, 87 seq. Cf. Posselt, *Quae Asiae minoris orae occid. sub Dareo fuerit condicio*, Königsb. 1879; Krumbholz, *De Asiae minoris satrapis persicis*, Lpz. 1883. The very uncertain chronology according to Duncker, 7,⁵ 30:

petition of the Naxians, 501 ; battle off Lade, 496 ; capture of Miletus, 495 ; in Busolt, 2, 26, on the other hand : petition of the Naxians, 500 ; battle off Lade, 497 (Busolt, 2, 29) ; capture of Miletus, 494. We can only say for certain that Miletus fell six years after the beginning of the revolt.—The improbability of the supposition that Megabates betrayed the plot is shown especially by Duncker, 7⁵, 34.

3. The opening passage in the speech of Aristagoras (Herod. 5, 49), in which the liberation of the Ionians is advocated, is somewhat bold in the mouth of a tyrant who had just wished to subjugate Naxos. But this change of front might win applause as a tribute to the strong national aspirations of the Greeks. Duncker, 7, 40, in blaming Sparta for her neutral policy, calls her "pusillanimous" and "short-sighted." But if Sparta had acted otherwise, she must have been prepared to take the field alone against Persia, for Aristagoras after all was too unreliable as an ally.

4. Herod. 5, 96.

5. Wrath of Darius with the Athenians, Herod. 5, 105.

6. Cyprus had again submitted to Cambyzes. After the reign of Darius it belonged with Phoenicia and Syria to the fifth satrapy. Gorgus was the successor of one Euclthon (Herod. 5, 104) and there are still coins extant of an Euclthon : Head, Hist. Num. 625. But it must be a later ruler of that name, and not the predecessor of Gorgus.

7. The fate of Caria in Herod. 5, 121 and 6, 25. Cf. Busolt, 2, 34.

8. The bronze statue of Apollo, the work of Canachus, was brought to Ecbatana : Paus. 1, 16, 3, and elsewhere.

9. Herod. 6, 21.

10. Herod. 6, 4, suggests the conjecture that Histiaeus was intriguing only against Artaphernes.

11. Herod. 6, 140 and 6, 34, 40, 41. The date of the conquest of Lemnos and Imbros is uncertain. I am inclined to think that the archaic tetradrachm of the Attic standard from the Thracian Chersonese described by Head, H. N. 222, the reverse of which has a head of Pallas, and which he places between 500-480, is a memorial of the rule of Miltiades in those regions.

12. For events in Cyrene, Herod. 4, 145-167, 200-205 ; Busolt, 2, 21 seq. The march to Barca took place at latest in the autumn of 518.

CHAPTER II

MARATHON

THE Persian war of revenge on Greece soon began. Mardonius, the young son-in-law of Darius, came from the interior of Asia to Cilicia, and conducted the fleet in person from that province to Ionia, while the army was led by other generals to the Hellespont. After having established democracies in place of the tyrannies¹ in the Ionian cities, he marched by land to Macedonia, the fleet accompanying him along the coast. Macedonia was on this occasion (493 B.C.) reduced to submission; an earlier attempt of Megabazus to make the Macedonians subjects of Persia had miscarried, owing to the arrogance of the Persian envoys and a stratagem of the heir to the throne, Alexander.² The ostensible object of the campaign was to chastise Athens and Eretria, but the real aim was to extend the power of Persia generally. Herodotus tells us in his third book how at the time of the Scythian expedition the mind of Darius was already directed towards Greece, and how the famous physician Democedes of Croton, who was in high favour at the Persian court, got himself sent as a spy to the West, and then deserted in southern Italy.³ This was why Mardonius at once attacked Thasos, which had never committed an act of hostility against the Persians, but was known to be very rich. But the campaign soon came to an end. As the fleet was rounding the promontory of Mount Athos, a storm destroyed 300 ships, and more than 20,000 men

perished, some of whom, as Herodotus asserts, were devoured by the fishes; the army also suffered from a night attack of the Brygi, in which Mardonius was wounded. The Brygi were of course conquered, but Mardonius abandoned the expedition and returned to Asia. Two years afterwards (491) the Persians completed the subjection of Thasos, which had obtained a yearly revenue of from two hundred to three hundred talents from its gold mines, which were partly in the island itself and partly on the opposite coast of Thrace. The Thasians were obliged to raze their walls and send their ships to Abdera. The whole country up to Macedonia became a tributary province of Persia, and fortresses and harbours were constructed on the Chersonese.

Darius now began to make preparations for a fresh expedition to Greece by equipping an army at home and despatching envoys to demand earth and water from the Greeks as a token of submission. Many inhabitants of the mainland and all the island-states, among them the Aeginetans, complied with the request. The Athenians, who, like the Spartans, had thrown the Persian heralds into a pit—saying that they might fetch earth and water from there⁴—availed themselves of this to accuse the Aeginetans to the Spartans, the leaders of the nation, of treachery to the fatherland. King Cleomenes went in consequence to Aegina, to arrest the ringleaders. The Aeginetans, however, resisted, and one of them, Crios, said that Cleomenes had been bribed by the Athenians, and that they need not regard the command of only one of her kings as the expression of Sparta's policy. This remark had been prompted by Demaratus, the colleague of Cleomenes. The latter, being unwilling to proceed to extremities, withdrew without accomplishing anything, but with the firm determination to get rid of Demaratus. He brought forward a half-forgotten story, that Demaratus was not the son of King Ariston, but of the first husband of the queen. This had been stated before in Sparta, but no one had made a serious question

of it. Leotychides, the head of the younger branch of the Eurypontidae, confirmed the truth of the statement on oath, whereupon the Pythia Periallos was requested to give her decision and declared that Demaratus was really the son of a private individual. The Spartans therefore deposed him, and appointed Leotychides king in his stead. Shortly afterwards Demaratus fled to Persia, but Leotychides accompanied Cleomenes to Aegina, and they took away ten noble Aeginetans as hostages, whom they gave into the keeping of the Athenians (probably in 491 B.C.)⁵

Darius placed his nephew Artaphernes and the Mede Datis in command of the new expedition. The number of triremes composing the fleet is said to have been 600.⁶ The route this time from Ionia was not along the coast, but direct to the Cyclades, because, as Herodotus conjectures, the Persians did not think it advisable, after their previous experiences, to sail round Mount Athos, and because the goal, Hellas, was thus reached all the more speedily. Naxos was taken, and its inhabitants reduced to slavery, but Delos, in memory of the birth of Apollo and Artemis, was spared.⁷ The Persians landed in Euboea. Here Carystus, the ally of Athens and Eretria, joined them after some hesitation; Eretria, however, remained loyal. There were some Athenian auxiliaries there, who, however, withdrew on the advice of the Eretrian Aeschines, so as not to be implicated in the inevitable fall of the city. Eretria held out for six days, and then by the treachery of Euphorbus and Philagrus fell into the hands of the Persians, who plundered and burnt the city and made slaves of the inhabitants. They were removed to Ardericca near Susa. The Persians now crossed over to Attica where, by the advice of Hippias who was accompanying them, they landed near Marathon. Here, the country being level, they were able to use their cavalry to the best advantage. It was, besides, the district in which the Peisistratidae had long had their adherents.⁸

When the Athenians heard that the Persians had landed, they marched to meet them. They were led by the ten Strategi, of whom one was Miltiades, the man who as tyrant of the Chersonese had shown his hostility to Darius on the Danube, and who had been compelled to relinquish his tyranny in consequence of the advance of the Persian power. When he returned to Athens, he had been impeached on account of the character of his rule, and the punishment in case of condemnation would have been death. But he was acquitted, no doubt on account of his hostile attitude towards Persia, and because he had acquired the important islands of Lemnos and Imbros for Athens. The people had now made him one of the ten Strategi; he knew the Persians, and was a soldier of proved capacity. If he is the Miltiades who was first Archon in 524 B.C. he was at least sixty-five years of age in the year 490. The nominal and still more influential commander-in-chief of the army was the Polemarch Callimachus. While they were in Athens the generals despatched the fast runner Philippides to Sparta with a request for immediate help. Athens, as we saw in the Aeginetan affair, practically recognized the Spartan hegemony. The god Pan called out to the messenger on Mount Parthenion near Tegea that the Athenians might rely on his aid, in consequence of which they founded a sanctuary in his honour beneath the Acropolis after the victory. Philippides reached Sparta on the second day and delivered his message. The Spartans promised their help, but were obliged, as they said, to await the full moon, as they could not take the field earlier.⁹ Thus the Athenians in their struggle with the Persians were compelled to do without assistance from Sparta. But help came to them from another quarter, while they were encamped in the sacred precinct of Heracles near Marathon. They were joined by the full military strength of Plataea, a thousand fighting men. With these they were, according to later accounts, ten or eleven thousand strong. The Athenians reached the plain of Marathon by the northern spurs of

Pentelicius, from which they could distinguish the Persians encamped on the shore, the ships in the bay, and the mountains of Euboea. They took up a position probably in the valley now called that of Avlona which stretches northwards from Vrana, so that their flanks were protected by precipices. The Persians were encamped to the east of them, with their rear on the swamp lying to the north and the sea, thus facing the Athenian position somewhat obliquely. When the Athenians saw the great numerical superiority of the Persians, they were doubtful whether they ought really to hazard a battle here, *i.e.* whether they should make an attack or not. As it appears, there were five generals for it and five against, and consequently no majority in favour of the attack.¹⁰ Miltiades was of opinion that such an attack was absolutely necessary, and went to the Polemarch representing to him that the welfare of all depended on a battle with the Persians, otherwise disturbances might arise in the city and unpatriotic individuals might betray it into the hands of the Persians. Callimachus voted in the council of war in favour of the attack, and under the circumstances his vote turned the scale. The Strategi who had voted with him surrendered their day of office to Miltiades — for each had the chief command for one day. Miltiades, however, delayed the attack till his day had come to him in the usual course, and then prepared his forces for battle. The Polemarch, according to custom, was on the right wing, the ten Phylae stood next to one another in their order, and the Plataeans were on the left wing. After the herald had offered up prayer for the Athenians and Plataeans, the Greeks broke into a run, as Herodotus says, towards the enemy, who are alleged to have been drawn up eight stadia (about one mile) distant, and probably had to turn their front somewhat from south-west to west, in order to stand exactly opposite the Athenians. To the Persians it seemed madness for so small a number of warriors without cavalry or archers to attack them at the charge. But they soon realized with whom they

had to deal. It is true that they repulsed their assailants in the centre, where their best fighters, Persians and Sacae (from the country of the Oxus), were stationed, and where the ranks of the Athenians were thinnest; but the Greeks were victorious on both wings, and after having driven their opponents partly on to the shore and partly into the swamp, they wheeled inwards from both sides upon the centre and routed it as well. The Persian army fled to the ships. The Greeks could not prevent their departure, and took only seven ships. Cunegirus, son of Euphorion and brother of Aeschylus, seized a ship and held it fast till his hand was cut off. Many Persians were pursued into the swamp lying to the north of the plain. The Persian loss in the battle amounted to 6400 men, that of the Athenians to 192, among whom were the Polemarch and the strategus Stesileus. The Persians now sailed round Cape Sunium in a westerly direction, hoping to reach Athens quickly and take it by a *coup de main*. When they had embarked they saw, as Herodotus states, a shield set up on the summit of Pentelicus, no doubt a preconcerted signal, although we do not know by whom or for what purpose it was given. But the victorious army was on the spot before them. From the Heracleum at Marathon they marched without a halt to the Heracleum in the Cynosarges near Athens, and when the Persians arrived at Phalerum and saw that Athens was prepared for defence, they thought it better not to land but to return at once to Asia. After the full moon the Spartans, to the number of 2000 men, came to Athens by forced marches (in three days they covered 1200 stades, about 140 miles, a wonderful performance on the bad roads). Being too late for the battle, they expressed a wish to see the Persian dead at Marathon, and when they had seen them they praised the Athenians for their bravery and returned home.

These are the main features of the narrative of Herodotus, the simplest account of one of the greatest exploits of the Greeks. There are many gaps in it. What was the strength

of the two armies? Why did the Persian cavalry not join in the engagement? Still it gives the leading facts. It says that a small force of Greeks charged the Persians, who were far more numerous, at the double, routed them, and pursued them to their ships, and that the same men were at their posts again after a march of about eighteen miles, which they must have begun on the day after the battle in the early morning when the enemy threatened them from another quarter. Different versions of the affair were given in later antiquity, the glory of the Athenians being either magnified or depreciated for party views or other reasons. According to some, when it came to a question of defence, there was no hesitation in Athens—although we can clearly read between the lines of Herodotus' account that there was—but incredible lightning-like activity; according to others, no regular battle took place at Marathon at all, but only an unimportant skirmish. Neither of these versions deserves credence. We must keep to the account of the earliest authority, Herodotus, and he leaves no doubt that the determination and activity of the Athenians and the genius of Miltiades decided the day. We know from Pausanias that a grave was dug on the field of battle for the fallen, the Athenians and Plataeans being buried apart.¹¹ The Athenian tomb was thirty feet high in the second century A.D. Up to this day a cone-shaped mound of about that height, called *Soros*, is to be seen on the spot; but when excavated it was found to contain only stone arrow-heads. The best poets of the age, notably Simonides, vied with each other in elegies and inscriptions in honour of the fallen. The Athenians dedicated a tenth of the booty to the Delphic Apollo, to Athene, and to the "glorious" Artemis in Athens.

Every Athenian who had taken part in the battle bore henceforth the honourable appellation of Marathonomachus. The greatest honours were paid to Miltiades. Two statues were erected to him, one in the Prytaneum at Athens, another

at Delphi. But he was not destined to enjoy his glory long, and that through his own fault. He announced to the people that if they would entrust him with seventy ships, an army and money, he would make a conquest which would bring great wealth to the city. Miltiades was in such high favour with the people that he obtained what he asked. With it he made a descent upon the island of Paros, the inhabitants of which had sent one ship to take part in the campaign of Datis, and demanded a hundred talents from them. But they preferred to defend themselves, and did so with such success that the attempt of Miltiades failed. The upshot of the matter is related by Herodotus from Parian accounts only. Miltiades effected an understanding with a female captive who served in the temple of the Chthonian deities outside the city of Paros. This woman gave him advice, the exact nature of which is not indicated, and in pursuance of it he penetrated by night into the sacred precinct of Demeter. It is supposed that he intended to steal the image of the goddess, on the possession of which that of the city perhaps depended. But he was seized by a sudden panic, and as he was hastily leaving the temple he injured his leg in climbing over a wall. He now raised the siege, which had lasted for twenty-six days. On his return to Athens he was impeached on a charge of deceiving the people, the penalty demanded being death.¹² His chief accuser was Xanthippus, husband of Agariste, a niece of Cleisthenes, and consequently an Alcmaeonid. Miltiades was very ill, his wound having got worse ; he was unable to conduct his own defence, and was obliged to lie on a bed and listen while his friends spoke for him and laid stress on the services which he had rendered to Athens as victor of Marathon and conqueror of Lemnos. The people pronounced him guilty of the charge of deceiving them, but differed from his accusers as to the punishment, and condemned him to pay a fine of fifty talents. Miltiades was unable to pay, and only survived his condemnation a short time ; he died soon afterwards of his

wound. Subsequently his son Cimon paid the fine, and thus restored the honour of the family.

We cannot tell whether the punishment was a just one. That party hatred prompted the accusation, we may conclude from the circumstance that his chief accuser Xanthippus was closely allied to the Alcmaeonidae, who were credited with treachery at the time of the battle of Marathon, and thus Miltiades may have been more severely punished than he deserved. But this much is clear, that the expedition was a sad failure, and that in that case, according to Athenian ideas, Miltiades alone was bound to pay the penalty. The personal responsibility of the authors of important measures was greater in Athenian public life than it is with us, and than it was with the Romans. Consequently if punishment had to be inflicted at all, no one but Miltiades could suffer it. And we may say that it was in the interest of the Athenian state that the attempt of Miltiades not only proved a failure, but was also punished. For what could be the result if it became customary to entrust a fleet and army to a general without his being obliged to say for what object he needed them? Such a policy would undoubtedly lead to a tyranny. Miltiades would have done better if he had not made such a demand, and the people in any case acted wrongly in granting his request.

NOTES

Herodotus is again the principal authority for this chapter, 6, 94 seq. Charon of Lampsacus had also related the first campaign of Mardonius in his *Περσικά*. Of subsequent authors we have traces of the narrative of Ephorus in the Miltiades of Nepos, and of the view of Theopompus in a fragment (167 Müll.) The former has exaggerated, and the latter disparaged, the merits of the Athenians. That Herodotus is to be preferred as an authority has been best shown by Swoboda (see note 8); even Delbrück (*Die Perserkriege und die Burgunderkriege*, Berl. 1887), who endeavours to enforce the version of Ephorus, does not mean to emphasize his authority as an original source; he only points out that there existed a view

similar to his as early as the fourth century. Delbrück's final review of the authorities (pp. 257-259) quite corresponds with our own views. In our opinion Nepos and Plutarch (Themistocles, Aristides) can only be used to supplement Herodotus, not to contradict him. The ideal representation of the blinding of the Persians on the so-called Darius-vase at Naples is remarkable. Curtius and others have noticed it, and now Baumeister makes some brief remarks on it, *Denkm.* 1, 408, with a drawing on Pl. vi. A different version of the end of Miltiades' life given in Ephorus (*Fr.* 107) and consequently in Nepos, Miltiades, 7, 8.

1. The general character of the proceedings of Mardonius is rightly called in question by Duncker, 7⁵, 69. But a clever Persian might very well consider it a matter of indifference how the Greeks were governed so long as they belonged to Persia. Of the early Persians Mardonius was the one who made the most concessions to Greek ideas.

2. Herod. 5, 17-22.

3. Democedes, Herod. 3, 129-138.

4. Herod. 7, 133. There is no need to doubt the fact. Many, Duncker among others, 7⁵, 108, believe that it did not happen in Athens. No satisfactory reason seems to me to be given for this opinion.

5. The chronology of the Aeginetan complications is not clear from Herod. 6, 85 seq. See below in Chapter III.

6. The number of the Persians according to Duncker, 7⁵, 114, was 70,000 soldiers, 90,000 sailors; Bus. 2, 64 assumes 60,000 soldiers. Delbrück's (p. 161) estimate is from 10,000-15,000 archers and 1000 cavalry, evidently much below the mark.

7. Apollo might be considered by the Persians as the representative of their god of light. They did not, however, always treat him with consideration, and therefore policy was probably at the bottom of their conduct on this occasion.

8. The earliest account of the battle of Marathon is in Herod. 6, 102-120. A different version is given in Nepos' life of Miltiades, evidently borrowed from Ephorus; the account in the *Rhetoric of Justin*, 2, 9, is worthless. That Herodotus' account must alone be taken as a basis is well shown by H. Swoboda in his *Die Ueberlieferung der Marathonschlacht*, *Wiener Studien* 1884. Recently the battle of Marathon has been the subject of much study, especially from four points of view—that of the criticism of the authorities, that of the internal probability of the recorded facts, the topographical, and finally the military point of view. The most important works are: Curtius, *Gr. G.* II.; Campe, *De pugna Marathonica*, 1867; P. Devaux, *Mém. sur les guerres médiques*, *Mém. de l'Ac.*

roy. de Belgique, T. 41, Brux. 1875 ; Wecklein, Tradition der Perserkriege in the Sitzungsberichte of the Munich Academy, 1876 ; Lolling, Topographie von Marathon, in the Athen. Mitth. 1876 ; Noethe, De pugna Mar. Susat. 1881 ; Casagrandi, La batt. di Maratona, Genova, 1883 ; Fleischmann, Die Schlacht bei Marathon, Bl. f. bayr. Gymnasialw. 19 ; Löhr, Jahrbuch f. kl. Ph., Bd. 127 ; Duncker, Gr. G. VII., and his Strategie und Taktik des Miltiades in the Sitzungsberichte of the Berlin Academy, 1886 ; Hptm. Eschenburg, Vortr. in the Berl. Arch. Ges. 1886 (cf. Phil. Woch. 1887, No. 3) ; H. Delbrück, Die Perserkriege und die Burgunderkriege, Berl. 1887. The most important problems treated in these works, apart from the question of authorities, are as follows : (1) Why did the Persian cavalry, for the sake of which the plain of Marathon had been chosen as the place of landing (Herod. 6, 102), not take part in the engagement ? (Suggestion of Curtius, that they had just embarked ; Devaux, thinking of Isocr. Paneg. πρόσκρονσμα βραχὺ τοῖς βαρβάροις ἀποβάσιν, supposes that they had not disembarked. Delbrück, p. 67.) (2) Where did the battle really take place ? (Cf. especially Lolling and Eschenburg.) (3) Has Nepos in following Ephorus really given, as Delbrück (p. 68) assumes, a more credible military narrative ? (The Persian attack anticipated by the Greeks at the last moment.) Then follow a number of questions of secondary importance : (4) When, where, and to what effect did the Athenian generals take counsel ? (Cf. Bus. 2, 75.) (5) How were the Phylae drawn up ? (Cf. Bus. 2, 71 and 77, following Aeschylus in Plut. Symp. Qu. 1, 10, 3.) (6) What was the object of the signal of the shield ? (Cf. Cox, Greek Statesmen, 2, 106 seq.) (7) When did the Athenians march back to Athens ? (Cf. Müller-Strübing, Jahrb. f. klass. Phil. 119, p. 444 seq.)

9. Herod. 6, 106 with Stein's notes. The Spartans always knew how to make skilful use of the duties of religion for worldly objects, but during their festivals they really did ostentatiously abstain even from expeditions which might have been profitable to them ; cf. the fall of Pylos, Thuc. 4, 5 and Thuc. 5, 75. Nevertheless they once postponed a festival in order to carry out a campaign when the latter appeared to them of more importance, Thuc. 5, 82. The Corinthians once delayed an expedition on account of the Isthmian games, Thuc. 8, 9. Cf. Bus. 2, 69.

10. Herod. 6, 109. In the council of war it was a question only of attacking or awaiting an attack ; a retreat was not mentioned. Waiting appeared to Miltiades to be fatal ; cf. Duncker, 7⁵, 125, n. 1. Miltiades met the danger of an attack of the Persian cavalry by taking the offensive at once. Herod. 6, 112 says that the Athenians at Marathon were the first Greeks who δρόμῳ εἰς


τοὺς πολεμίους ἐχρήσαντο. That a portion of the Persian army was driven into the lagoon is only known from the description of the picture in the Ποικίλη given by Paus. 1, 15, 3. Delbrück, who thinks that 10,000-15,000 Greeks fought against 15,000 Persian archers and 1000 horse, does not believe in a continuous charge of eight stadia. He assumes that the Persians advanced to attack the Greeks who were waiting in a protected position, and that thereupon the latter anticipated the Persians by charging them at the double ("A defensive battle with wings advanced," p. 86). But other cases of attack *δρόμῳ* may be mentioned: in Xen. Anab. 1, 8, 17, 18 at the battle of Cunaxa, in the plain, no doubt a march breaking only gradually into a run, and in Thuc. 6, 97, at Syracuse, when it certainly was not known if the enemy was on the high ground which was reached *δρόμῳ* (6-7 stadia). Thus the attack at Marathon will always remain a remarkable performance. There are, however, two points to be noticed, firstly, that it was precisely in running that the Greeks excelled (the race at Olympia took place in the fiercest heat of summer), and secondly, that in this case, the Greeks ran downhill, at least for the first part of the charge, a fact which Delbrück, as it seems, has not taken into account. I therefore believe in the run, for it must be borne in mind that we do not know what the pace was. That the ranks were thrown into confusion by it, a point to which Delbrück alludes, was of no consequence. The Persians merely shot their arrows, and therefore did not wish to come to close quarters; the Greeks consequently had time to re-form at the last moment.

I do not share the usual doubts of modern writers caused by the absence of any mention of the Persian cavalry. As a general rule cavalry did nothing against the Greeks, as was shown by the battle of Plataea. At Marathon the rapid onset of the Greeks prevented their being used. The astonishment of the Persians probably made it impossible to give the necessary orders or bring them into the field quickly enough, and when the hand-to-hand combat began, the opportunity for employing them had passed by. As regards the question of the efficiency of the cavalry the results of Delbrück's investigations of the Persian wars must probably be modified. He assumes that the Persian cavalry might have done serious damage to the Greek Phalanges (or lines) from the flanks and from the rear, while the Swiss with their rectangular formation were accustomed to defend themselves from all sides. Of course there is a difference, but if the most reliable troops were placed on the wings in Greece, the reason no doubt was that these well-disciplined men could in case of need also defend themselves from a flank attack, by turning their spears in that direction. In that

case the Persian cavalry would not have been so formidable to well-led Greeks as Delbrück supposes. I believe that Delbrück has, generally speaking, drawn a very accurate picture of what the result would be if every general made good use of the means at his disposal. But this does not always happen, and probably did not in the Persian wars. It is easier for us now to form an opinion of the possibilities of the case than it was for the generals of that age, who had not the theoretical education of the generals of to-day, and therefore very often did not act as we should now act. If one of them rose superior to all apparent difficulties, he proved that he possessed the insight of genius, to which I should be disposed to lay claim for Miltiades. Cf. *Athenaeum*, 1892, No. 3380, p. 186.

11. Paus. 1, 32, 3. Cf. Duncker, 7, 143, 144, where the other details of the battle, which have been handed down from antiquity but are not related by Herodotus, are discussed. According to Just. 2, 9 (consequently according to Ephorus) Hippias is said to have fallen at Marathon. For the mound, cf. Bus. 2, 82. The battle probably took place in August, 490, Bus. 2, 83.

12. Duncker (7⁵, 154 seq.) is particularly severe on Xanthippus and the Athenians. The remarks of Cox (*Greek Statesmen*, 1, 113 seq.), who draws a comparison with the end of Sir Walter Raleigh, are worthy of note. I shall revert subsequently to the principle of responsibility of statesmen in Athens, which explains this case as well. To an Athenian there was nothing out of the way in such treatment of a statesman. Men who wished to take a prominent part in public life knew what fate awaited them under certain circumstances: money fines, exile, or death. For the fining of Miltiades cf., among others, Duncker, 7⁵, 159; Busolt, *Die Lak.* 1, 372.



CHAPTER III

THE YEARS 489-481

AFTER the glorious victory of the Athenians dissensions broke out afresh among the Greeks, between the states as well as the various communities. At Sparta Cleomenes had just won a victory over his colleague and rival Demaratus, and deposed him; retribution now overtook him. The Delphian Cobon, who was said to have influenced the Pythia against Demaratus, was banished from Delphi, and the Pythia removed. At Delphi the opponents of Cleomenes had now the upper hand. A similar revulsion of feeling was to be expected at Sparta. For this reason Cleomenes left the city and went to Thessaly, and thence to Arcadia, where he formed an Arcadian League, which placed itself under his guidance. They swore by the sacred waters of the Styx to follow him whithersoever he should lead them. The Spartans became alarmed, and treated Cleomenes as they did Pausanias afterwards; they summoned the dangerous man to Sparta, to keep him under surveillance. He actually did return home, where he behaved like a madman; among other things he struck people who met him in the face with his stick. He was consequently thrown into prison by his relations. There he managed to obtain a knife, and committed suicide by cutting himself open. In the opinion of the Greeks a death of this kind was a punishment for a godless life. But opinions differed as to the specially impious acts by which he merited

his fate. He had committed so many outrages in his life that no one knew which of them all was most displeasing to the gods. Cleomenes was a remarkable character — shrewd, violent, and eccentric, it is not unlikely that he did lose his reason at the last. A man who had done what is ascribed to Cleomenes—made a whole people swear allegiance to himself, at a time when he was an object of strong suspicion to his own state—could not have returned to his own country if he had been in his right senses. Cleomenes was one of those men to whose ambition Sparta offered no scope, and who consequently, whether sane or not, could not help coming into conflict with their own countrymen. He was a man of the stamp of Pausanias, of Agis, and of the last Cleomenes. The true Spartan was bound not to have ideas beyond those of the authorities, *i.e.* of the Ephors; but these four men wished to govern the state themselves.¹ So it is probable that the Helot who supplied Cleomenes with the knife did not incur very strong disapproval. He was succeeded by his brother Leonidas (487 B.C.)

The Spartans now wished to overthrow Leotychides, the friend of Cleomenes. He had acted with Cleomenes in handing over the Aeginetan hostages to the custody of the Athenians. Now that his star was not in the ascendant, the Aeginetans demanded that he should be surrendered as a compensation for the hostages. He was placed in their hands for removal. If they took him, the city would be rid of him. But a Spartan secretly warned the Aeginetans that it was no simple matter to carry off a Spartan king, even if Sparta gave him up, for the Spartan people might easily change their mind, and then the Aeginetans would have to pay the penalty. The latter, therefore, considered it advisable to accept the proposal of Leotychides, who offered to go to Athens and demand the restoration of the hostages whom he had taken there. But in spite of his fine speeches he failed in his mission. His comparison of the hostages to a deposit of money, which an honest

man ought to return on demand, made but little impression. The Athenians refused to part with the hostages.² The Aeginetans now seized a Theorian vessel, on board of which were some Athenian citizens of note. The Athenians in return arranged with an Aeginetan named Nicodromus for the betrayal of the island, but the attempt failed, because the Athenians, who with the help of the Corinthians had increased their fleet to seventy ships, were not on the spot at the appointed time. Thus the hatred between the two states, especially on the side of the weaker Aegina, was intensified. The aristocratic party in power at Aegina executed 700 democrats, even violating in so doing the right of asylum of the temple of Demeter.³ In the war which now broke out the Aeginetans were at first defeated by the Athenians at sea. Afterwards Argive volunteers came to their assistance, and the struggle was continued with varying fortune by sea and on the island itself. In one naval battle the Athenians lost seven ships.

At Athens, too, there was no unity, although the course of events there was not marked by scenes of violence. The city possessed two influential statesmen: Aristides, son of Lysimachus, a man of good family, who had been a supporter of Cleisthenes, and Themistocles, son of Neocles, of the ancient and noble family of the Lycomidae, but by a foreign mother, in consequence of which he had not been allowed to frequent the gymnasium of the Academe, but only that of the Cynosarges.⁴ The former was characterized by calmness of manner and adherence to beaten paths; the latter was of an impetuous disposition, eager for reform, and not always conscientious in the choice of his means. And it was the choice of means in the widest sense of the word, the method of making use of circumstances, which alone really separated the two men, and not their political aims, in which they were agreed. Both were democrats, and Aristides, as far as we know, was not an opponent on principle of the great policy

conceived by Themistocles, the realization of which secured the safety of Greece and made Athens great for a long time to come. But he did nothing to further its execution, and so Themistocles might well consider him an opponent.

The achievement of Themistocles was the fortification of the Piræus by a wall, a measure which he carried when Archon Eponymus in 493 B.C.⁵ It was a scheme of great importance. The Athenians had hitherto used the Bay of Phalerum as a harbour, a long beach which offered little protection against storms or enemies. It was completely exposed to the south-west, and of the two promontories which enclosed it, the Phalerum on the south and the Piræus on the north, only the latter afforded some shelter. It was a harbour on a par with those possessed by so many Greek cities, a roadstead which might do at a pinch for trading vessels, but was of little use as a naval port. Yet there was a much better one close by. The rocky peninsula of the Piræus presented on its eastern side towards the Bay of Phalerum two small well-sheltered harbours, and on its western side a large one with a narrow opening. This could be made into the principal harbour of Athens. The two small harbours on the eastern side of the peninsula (Munychia and Zea) belonged more to Phalerum, as they opened upon it. Still they could be brought into closer connection with the large western harbour (the Piræus) by surrounding the whole line of the peninsula with a wall. The construction of this wall was the plan of Themistocles. The work was commenced at once, but it was not completed till much later.

In the Piræus Athens obtained an excellent naval port; and the possession of one could alone enable her to become a great naval power, which she was bound to be if she wished to retain a leading position in Greece. Of all Athenian statesmen Themistocles was the one who grasped this fact most firmly. He designed the plans which were carried out by his successors. The service which he rendered was so obvious to

the Athenians and the Greeks generally, especially in the fifth century, that they said that Themistocles made the Athenians a sea-faring people. But this is a gross exaggeration. They had long been a maritime people ; in the Piræus Themistocles provided them with the means of remaining so with success.

When the Persians came to Attica in 490 B.C. the building of the wall had made no great progress, and when they were repulsed Themistocles decided to commence the realization of his great design in another way. The wall round the Piræus was intended to provide shelter for the Athenian fleet. But the fleet was by no means large enough. Athens must have a large permanent fleet, not, like the other Greek states, one of constantly varying size. But if Themistocles was convinced of the necessity of having a large permanent fleet, how was he to bring it home to the people? How could he induce them to create something which was perfectly new in Greece? A standing army was unknown, how could his countrymen be familiarized with the idea of a permanent fleet?⁶ He gained his point in a roundabout way, by placing in the foreground an object which was only of secondary consequence in his own eyes. He represented to the Athenians the great advantage to be derived from a permanent fleet in the war with the hated Aegina. In his own judgment the danger threatening from Persia was a factor of still greater importance, but this reason did not appeal so immediately to the masses. And as a matter of fact the necessity of a large fleet for the war against the Persians could by no means be taken for granted. Themistocles could no doubt say that the Persians would most certainly return, and that it was equally certain that they would come with a stronger force than on the previous occasion, and these two facts being granted he could develop his argument in the following manner. If they came straight across the sea, the Athenians would prevent them from landing by fighting them at sea, and for this purpose a very large fleet was required ; if, on the other hand, they marched

through Thrace, as Mardonius did, the Persian fleet would always be one of their chief engines of war, the destruction of which would endanger even the largest army. But the reply to these arguments was that if the Persians advanced through Thrace and Macedonia, the defence of Greece must be carried on chiefly by land, and how could that be done if all their strength were spent on their naval power? According to Plutarch,⁷ complaint was made against Themistocles that as a result of his endeavours to increase the naval forces of the state oars and cushions had become the badge of the Athenian citizens instead of lance and shield. This much is true, that Athens could not be great in both, in land as well as sea power. If she gave a preference to the fleet, the development of the hoplites was bound to go to the wall.

And the men who urged these considerations against Themistocles (as no doubt many did) had a good case, which was supported by the experience of the immediate past. At Marathon the hoplites, and not the fleet, had saved Athens; why should they suddenly alter a well-tried system and exchange certainty for uncertainty? Themistocles certainly had no easy task in combating the adherents of the old system. It has been usually assumed, for very intelligible reasons, that the principal opponent of his plans for the fleet was his famous rival Aristides. This in itself is not impossible; it is, however, nowhere recorded, although ancient writers had sufficient opportunity of saying it. Plutarch, on the contrary, says that Miltiades was an opponent of these schemes of Themistocles, but even if he really did oppose the plan for the fleet, he could not have continued his opposition long.⁸ It may be that Aristides was chiefly to blame for the fact that Themistocles' plans were not immediately put into execution; but certainly not so much through direct opposition, which ancient writers would assuredly have mentioned instead of that of Miltiades, as because in this as in other respects he did not support the projects of his rival.

Themistocles now proposed that the revenues from the silver mines at Laurium, which belonged to the state, should not be divided, as hitherto, among the citizens, but should be spent in building ships of war.⁹ He thought it advisable and possible to bring the number of triremes up to 200. Their number at that time was only seventy,¹⁰ and even that total had only been reached by the help of the Corinthians. The net yearly return of the mines in the last few years before 480 had been fifty talents.¹¹ This sum was sufficient for the creation of a large fleet. In the fifth century, and even at a later date, the building of a trireme cost the state about a talent; its equipment, as far as the state was concerned, cost a like sum; thus, in four years, with an expenditure of fifty talents a year, a hundred ships of war might be provided, and if they began in 484, at least 170 ships would be ready in 480, which in point of fact was the case. This calculation is only made to show that the plan was practically feasible; it rests of course on conjecture, but throughout this Chapter the meagre accounts of the ancients have to be supplemented by conjectures.

The success of the views of Themistocles resulted in the banishment of Aristides by ostracism (483 B.C.) And as a matter of fact, if the schemes of the former were to be carried out, it was better that Aristides should be at a distance, as he evidently had only a solemn shake of the head for every measure proposed by his rival. The story is well known that he had to write his own name on a potsherd for one of his fellow-citizens, and that, on asking what objection the fellow had to Aristides, he received for reply: "I am tired of constantly hearing him called the Just." The man was unfortunately not altogether wrong. It was not a just so much as an able leader that Athens and Greece needed at this juncture.¹²

NOTES

The principal authority for this Chapter is Herodotus 6, 131 seq., and the beginning of Book 7. But Herodotus is not sufficient here, because these ten years are taken up with preparations of the Athenians for a fresh struggle with Persia and with internal dissensions, into which he does not enter. Thus we have to use the biographies as well, especially Plutarch's Aristides and Themistocles; but these too are quite inadequate for the period between 490-480. In the first place, very little is recorded of this period by contemporaries, and secondly, later historians have introduced incorrect theories. This has been especially shown in the case of Themistocles by A. Bauer, *Themistocles*, Merseburg, 1881. Cf. also the note to Chapter VII. Theopompus seems especially to have perverted the truth here.

1. Similarly in Venice the Doges Faliero and Foscari.

2. For the chronology of the Atheno-Aeginetan war, cf. Busolt, *G. G.* 2, 62. Busolt assumes that this war, which is related in Herod. 6, 87-93, took place, with the exception of the facts narrated in ch. 90, before the outbreak of the Persian war of 490. But this is not certain. Cf. also Curtius, *G. G.* 2⁶, 809.

3. Cruelty, such as was afterwards so often practised in the Peloponnesian war, Herod. 6, 91. The Corinthians now helped Athens against Aegina, because the latter at that time was the more dangerous rival. Afterwards they feared and hated Athens, when she had destroyed Aegina and become powerful in the western seas.

4. Aristides was an able member of his party, and at the same time of particularly upright character; Themistocles had an original independent mind. For Themistocles, cf. especially the above-quoted article by A. Bauer, and his *Plutarchs Them. für quellenkrit. Uebungen kommentirt*, Lpz. 1884. The mother of Themistocles, according to Plut. Them. 1 and Nep. Them. 1, was a Thracian or a Carian or an Acarnanian. The last is most probable, because in this way we can best account for the relations of Themistocles with Western Greece.

5. Them. 1, 93, if the Archon of the year 493-2 is the famous Themistocles and not another of that name. Many authors, following K. W. Krüger, place the archonship of Themistocles conjecturally in the year 482-1. But the creation of the fleet by Themistocles must have been begun before this year. Is it possible that he did not think of the naval port until after he had provided for the fleet? Cf. Busolt, 2, 126 and Curtius, 2⁶, 811 and 814.

6. We are of opinion that the creation of a large permanent fleet was one of Themistocles' greatest achievements. Up to that time the Greeks, even the Corinthians and Aeginetans, had only maintained fleets of any size during a war. Themistocles was evidently the first to create a large permanent fleet for Athens; by this means Athens became great. Arsenals and docks on a large scale in eastern Greece seem to have been first introduced in Athens at this time. Formerly the ships had been simply surrounded by fences on the shore; the beach on the Bay of Phalerum sufficed for Athens, in fact, it was better than a shore with deep water, since the ships could be drawn up more easily. I believe that the practice of having docks, in which vessels could lie in a certain depth of water and at the same time be covered, is owing to Themistocles. Gelon introduced similar arrangements in Syracuse about the same time.

7. *Plut. Them. 4.* Plutarch quotes Plato, and is thinking of *Legg. 4, 706 seq.*, where, however, the importance of the battle of Salamis is totally denied in an unseemly manner. Plato was not a historian or a politician, and is no authority for such matters. The glory of Themistocles and the battle of Salamis have made the ancients and also many of the moderns almost forget that Athens was powerful in the Hellespont as early as the time of Solon, and consequently one of the first naval powers in Greece in the sixth century.

8. *Plut. Them. 4,* according to Stesimbrotus. Miltiades was considered an advocate of the land-force, because he was the victor of Marathon. The rivalry between Themistocles and Aristides is recorded by Herod. 8, 79, but only in general terms. Plutarch also in *Arist. 2* and *Them. 3* only makes general remarks. *Plut. Arist. 2,* it is true, calls Aristides an aristocrat. But he says himself that Aristides was a friend of Cleisthenes, and he was anything but an aristocrat, though Plutarch calls him one in *Cim. 15.* At the same time he calls Aristides an admirer of Lycurgus, and this juxtaposition of Cleisthenes and Lycurgus shows that accurate political definitions are not involved here. In reality, Aristides completed the democratization of Athens begun by Cleisthenes. That Themistocles was a democrat and Aristides an aristocrat, are inventions of the rhetorical school of history (in this case no doubt Theopompus), which worked with certain conventional rules, in accordance with which definite attributes were ascribed to events and individuals. This system makes the just Aristides an aristocrat, and the apparently unscrupulous Themistocles a democrat. In reality, the facts were quite different. It is plain that Aristides did not support Themistocles' naval policy, but it is by no means

demonstrated that he exerted himself to frustrate it, and the fact that he did not support it would not prove that he belonged to another party. He was unable to take an interest in it, and this was sufficient to make his temporary absence from Athens desirable. The correct view that Themistocles directed the attention of Athens especially to the sea (Plut. Them. 4 and 19) was very soon greatly exaggerated, for instance, by Herod. 7, 144 ἀναγκάσας θαλασσίους γενέσθαι τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, and by Thuc. 1, 93 καὶ αὐτοὺς ναυτικοὺς γεγενημένους, for the Athenians were already θαλάσσιοι and ναυτικοί, almost to the same extent as the Corinthians and Aeginetans. But the exaggeration appears to have proceeded from Themistocles himself if Plutarch's statement (Them. 2) is true which makes him say that he understood πόλιν μικρὰν καὶ ἄδοξον παραλαβὼν ἔνδοξον καὶ μεγάλην ἀπεργάσασθαι. This remark, if it referred to Athens, was a great piece of swagger. If, as Plut. Them. 22 hints, he often behaved in this way, we can imagine that many Athenians found him an unpleasing contrast to the modest and correct Aristides. If, as we believe, the traditional characteristics of the party politics of the time come from Theopompus, then modern writers have been wrong in endeavouring to maintain them in the teeth of the facts, and they will require considerable ingenuity to explain how the aristocratic Aristides became a democrat in the end; as a matter of fact, he had all along been a democrat.

9. Herod. 7, 144 πανσαμένους. Thus the revenue had hitherto been divided.

10. Herod. 6, 89, 132.

11. Herod. 7, 144, with Stein's notes; Polyæn. 1, 30, 6, following a passage of the Ἀθ. πολ. of Aristotle, preserved in a fragmentary state, according to which the hundred richest citizens received one talent apiece, with the obligation of building a trireme. Fifty talents as the net yearly income from the mines at Laurium is certainly not too much; cf. Thasos. The point, however, is not generally conceded. Cf. Duncker, 7⁵, 182, n. 1. Cf. Busolt, 2, 123, and the correct remarks of Curtius, G. G. 2⁶, 814, 815.

12. Xanthippus, the father of Pericles, was also banished at that time. Heracl. Pont. Respubl. Athen. 7.

CHAPTER IV

THE YEAR 480

THE next Persian attack did not come so soon as was expected. Darius wished to appear with the greatest possible *éclat*, and consequently ordered extensive preparations which occupied the years 489-487. In 486, however, Egypt revolted, and that country had to be subdued first. Besides this a quarrel broke out between his sons as to who should be his successor, Artobazanes, the eldest, or Xerxes, the first-born of Atossa, daughter of Cyrus, whom Darius had married after his ascension. Atossa won the day. Darius died in 485, and Xerxes ascended the throne. The first task of the new king was the subjugation of Egypt, which he accomplished in 484. Then the expedition against Greece occupied his attention. Herodotus gives an account of a meeting of the Persian magnates, *i.e.* the members of the royal family, the nearest relatives of the Seven, and the satraps, at which Xerxes unfolded his plan, and stated among other things that he intended to throw a bridge over the Hellespont, and take his army over it into Greece. This shows that the overland route was to be adopted, as on the first occasion, when Mardonius was general. Mardonius agreed; probably he was the originator of the plan; he wished to repeat his old undertaking on a larger scale, and he pursued it up to his death. Artabanus, however, the uncle of Xerxes and brother of Darius, was opposed to the whole expedition, pointing out the difficulties which

the valour of the Hellenes both by land and at sea would place in the way of a Persian victory. This opposition aroused the ire of Xerxes, but at the same time shook his confidence. However, he twice had the same dream in which he was encouraged to undertake the expedition, and when at the king's desire, though against his own wish, Artabanus lay in the king's bed, after having sat on the throne in royal garments, he saw the same tall handsome man, who had appeared to Xerxes, and who reproached him for having given bad advice to the king. This converted Artabanus.¹ Preparations were commenced for the campaign, which was to be the grandest the world had yet seen. According to Herodotus these preparations occupied four years (484-481). The zeal of the satraps, to provide the troops required of them as well equipped and as speedily as possible, was further stimulated by the promise of rewards. Xerxes also at once set about a work which appeared to him imperatively necessary—the cutting of the isthmus connecting Mount Athos with Thrace, a design which shows that Mardonius was the author of the whole project. A canal was to be made to avoid the promontory which had proved so disastrous to the fleet of Darius. The canal was completed to a length of twelve stades, and, as a later historian states, with a breadth of 100 feet. The Phoenicians especially distinguished themselves by their skill in the works.² It was also deemed important to secure the passage of the Strymon, and the necessary steps were taken for building a bridge over it. The chief pre-occupation was the victualling of the army on the march. It was accordingly resolved that provisions should be stored at certain places on the route—in Leuce Acte on the Propontis, in Tyrodiza in the territory of Perinthus, in Doriscus on the plain at the mouth of the Hebrus, in Eion on the Strymon, and in Macedonia on the Thermaic Gulf. The land-forces were mustered at Critalla, a town of Cappadocia, and marched from there to Sardis by way of Celaenae, where Pythius, son

of Atys, and perhaps a grandson of Croesus, entertained Xerxes and the whole army. He was a Lydian of immense wealth, possessing 2000 talents of silver and four million staters of gold (about four million sterling in hard cash), besides slaves and landed property. From Sardis, whence the king again summoned the Greeks, with the exception of Athens and Sparta, to send him earth and water,³ he advanced in the early spring of 480 to the Hellespont, which he had bridged over between Abydos and Sestos. The first bridge was destroyed by a storm, in consequence of which the king had the waters beaten with rods and fetters thrown into it. The second attempt was successful. Two bridges were made of penteconters and triremes, the one of 360 ships, the other of 314. They were anchored, and over them were stretched six enormous cables, more than 30 inches thick, and on these were laid beams, planks, and finally earth. Thus there were two complete roads, both of which were also provided with high railings on each side. On arriving at Abydos, Xerxes took his seat upon a marble throne, which had been placed on rising ground, and surveyed his army and fleet from it.

The army crossed in safety, and the march now proceeded from Sestos, at first in a north-easterly direction through the Thracian Chersonese, and then south-west along the coast of the Thracian Sea. In the plain of Doriscus, on the further side of the Hebrus, the king counted his army, 10,000 men being enclosed in a square, and the square being filled again and again. In this way they were only obliged to count the men once, and yet attained, as Xerxes was led to believe, an approximate correctness. The square was filled 170 times; there were thus 1,700,000 fighting men. The number of troops provided by the various provinces is not known to Herodotus. The army consisted of the following elements, and Herodotus gives a graphic description of their external appearance. First of all came the Persians, armed

with lance, bow and sword ; then the Medes, similarly armed ; Cissians, Hyrcanians and Assyrians, with brass helmets and, besides other weapons, wooden clubs tipped with iron ; Bactrians with javelins of cane and with spears ; Sacae with pointed caps, swords and battle axes ; Indians with cotton garments, bows, and arrows made of reeds ; Arians, Parthians, Chorasmians, Sogdians and Gandarians armed for the most part like the Bactrians ; Caspians with fur coats ; Sarangae with coloured garments and high boots ; Pactyes, Utians, Mycians, and Paricanians ; Arabians with long robes and bows ; Ethiopians from Africa, clothed in skins of panthers and lions, and equipped with long bows and arrows with stone-heads, with spears, the points of which were made of antelope horns, and with clubs studded with nails. Their bodies were painted half red and half white. Other Ethiopians from Asia (these are the modern Brahui of Beloochistan) wore for a helmet the hide of a horse's forehead with the ears standing upright, and used the skins of cranes as shields. Libyans were there with spears, the points of which had been hardened in the fire ; Paphlagonians with high boots ; Ligyes, Matienians, Mariandynians, Syrians, Phrygians and Armenians ; Lydians who were armed like the Greeks, Mysians, Thracians with fox-skin caps, coloured clothes and boots of deer's hide ; Asiatic Thracians with brass helmets, ornamented with brass horns and ears, the legs wrapped in coloured cloth ; Lasonians, Milyae, Moschians, Tibarenians, Macrones, Mossynoeci, Mares, Colchians with wooden helmets and cow-skin shields, Alarodians, Saspirians, and islanders of the Persian Gulf. The officers were in command of 10, 100, 1000, or 10,000 men. Each tribal contingent was under the orders of a Persian nobleman. The commanders of the whole force of infantry were Mardonius, Tritantaichmes, son of Artabanus, Smerdomenes and Masistes, brother of Xerxes, Gergis, and Megabyzus, son of Zopyrus. Only the 10,000 picked troops, the so-called Immortals who were always kept up to their full

strength, who were best equipped, and who took the field with all the luxury of wives, servants, and baggage, had a special commander, Hydarnes. The above comprised the infantry.

The cavalry, 80,000 in all, was composed of Persians, including 8000 Sagartii armed with the lasso, Medes, Cissians, who also had chariots drawn by horses and wild asses, Bactrians, Caspians, and Libyans, all with chariots. The Paricanians and Arabians on swift-footed camels were not included in the 80,000. The commanders of the cavalry were Aramithres, son of Datis, and Tithaeus.

The number of triremes was 1207. They had been furnished in the following proportions:—the Phoenicians with the Syrians of Palestine 300, the Egyptians 200, the Cypriotes 150, the Cilicians 100, the Pamphylians, who were armed in the Greek fashion, 30, the Lycians 50, the Asiatic Dorians 30, the Carians 70, the Ionians 100, the Islanders 17, the Aeolians 60, the Hellespontines 100. There were also 3000 triaconters, penteconters, boats and horse transports. Every ship carried Persians, Medes, or Sacae as soldiers, and the commanders of the fleet were of course Persians, Ariabignes and Achaemenes, sons of Darius, and Prexaspes and Megabazus, under whose orders were placed the representatives of the various nationalities. Among these the highest position was held by a woman, Artemisia, daughter of Lygdamis, who had contributed five ships from Halicarnassus, Cos, Nisyrus and Calydnus. In a later passage, on the occasion of the battle of Thermopylae, Herodotus supplements his account of the number of men and ships which took part in the expedition, and which was still further increased in Europe. The 1207 ships of war carried 241,400 men, 200 to each ship, the crews being composed of the nations who had provided the ships, with 36,210 Persians, Medes, and Sacae, thirty to each vessel, as reliable guards and fighting-men; there were, besides, 240,000 men on the 3000 other vessels. The

above, with 1,700,000 infantry, 80,000 cavalry, and 20,000 men on chariots and camels, made up a total of 2,317,610 from Asia. The additional force in Europe was supposed to be as follows:—120 ships with crews to the number of 24,000 and 300,000 troops from Thrace as far as the Magnetes, which would make 2,641,610 men. In addition, Herodotus reckons a similar number of servants, etc., thus bringing the figures up to 5,283,220. The cooks, bakers, and camp-followers of all kinds may, he says, be added at will. No wonder that 110,000 bushels of corn were consumed daily, and that whole rivers were drunk dry.

It is evident that these figures are enormously exaggerated. Want of space alone would have made it impossible for the expedition to have reached such numbers as Herodotus gives. Besides, the great majority of the soldiers did not have a servant apiece, and even if the superior officers had a good many, that would leave the total very much below the estimate. The number of the ships' crews, too, is probably much above the mark. Of course the contingent from the Hebrus to Thermopylae could not have amounted to 300,000 soldiers; it could not have been more than 30,000 at the most. But even if very great reductions are made, it still remains one of the most terrible invasions known to history—a regular swarm of locusts which descended on Greece to devour her.⁴

From Doriscus Xerxes marched to Acanthus at the beginning of the peninsula of Athos, whence he made the vast host proceed in three divisions to unite again on the Thermaic Gulf. From Therma Xerxes beheld Thessaly stretching before him in the blue distance, with its huge mountains Olympus and Ossa divided by a ravine, through which, as he was told, flowed the famous Peneius. As the army was not to pass by the vale of Tempe but to cross the mountains, he wished at all events to see this valley, and went there by sea. There he obtained information concerning Thessaly, which had submitted to him, and received the reports of the heralds who

had been sent to Greece. They informed him that his supremacy had been recognized by the Thessalians, Dolopians, Aenianians, Perrhaebi, Locrians, Magnetes, Malians, the Phthiotic Achaeans, and all the Boeotian communities, except Thespieae and Plataea. It is remarkable that these are all peoples who were expressly entitled to a vote in the Amphictyonic League; and as a matter of fact they formed exactly three-fourths of its members, for of the twelve, with the exception of the fractional part of Boeotia, only three are missing, the Phocians, Dorians, and Ionians, these last two no doubt being the most important of all.⁵ The Dorians and Ionians, that is to say, Sparta and Athens, were the flower of the patriotic half of Greece, which could justly consider itself the true Hellas, the headquarters of their League being on the Isthmus. These Greeks resolved that the Hellenes who had submitted to the Persians should be compelled to pay a tribute to the Delphic god after the hoped-for victory of the Greeks. The Dorians were the most numerous of the patriotic Greeks; but the incentive to a vigorous resistance did not proceed from them, but from the Ionians, *i.e.* from Athens.⁶

It is true that the Athenians were most directly threatened; but it is not improbable that, had they so desired, they could have come to an understanding with the Persians at the expense of the rest of Greece. The verdict of Herodotus no doubt holds good, that Greece owed her liberty to the Athenians.⁷ In a campaign by land, if Xerxes played his cards well, the Greeks might be crushed by the numerical superiority of the Persians, especially as the fleet enabled the latter to make flank attacks and diversions in the rear. The safety of Greece therefore depended on her fleet, and it was the Athenians who had an adequate number of good ships and good naval commanders. But among the Athenians the chief merit is due to Themistocles. He was the author of the fortification of the Piraeus, and had effected the increase of

the fleet, and now when the Pythia did her utmost to discourage the Athenians and facilitate the victory of the Persians, he managed to twist and turn the unfavourable utterances of the oracle in a way that made an impression on the people and furthered his own plans. "Only the wooden walls will remain intact," declared the Pythia; "The wooden walls are our ships," said Themistocles. But the oracle concluded: "Divine Salamis, thou wilt destroy the children born of women." Did not this mean that they would be defeated at sea? "No," replied Themistocles, "it is not the Greeks but the Barbarians who are threatened with destruction, otherwise the oracle would not have said 'divine' but 'ill-omened' Salamis." Even if it is improbable that the Pythia mentioned Salamis—for she could not have foreseen the battle impending there—if therefore this part of the oracle was not added till the last moment, and in the interests of a defence by sea, yet it is evident that the Pythia, as usual, expressed herself ambiguously, and that she really would have discouraged the Athenians had not Themistocles proved more cunning than the priestly college at Delphi.

While Xerxes was at Sardis it was resolved, in an assembly held on the Isthmus by the representatives (Probuli) of the patriotic Greeks, that all internal feuds should remain in abeyance, especially that between Athens and Aegina, that spies should be sent to Sardis, and that the Argives, Gelon of Syracuse, Coreyra and Crete should be invited to join the Greek cause. The spies were of course captured, but Xerxes allowed them to inspect everything, so that they might report it at home.⁸ He seems on the whole to have had a fair share of common-sense. Thus at Abydos he allowed ships with cargoes of grain, destined for the Peloponnese and Aegina, to proceed unmolested, for they were carrying the grain, as he said, thither for him. The message to Argos was without effect. The descendants of the first-born of the Heraclidan brothers expressed their readiness to join in the campaign

against the Persians, even if they were not allowed the supreme command, but on condition of being placed on an equal footing with Sparta, and they demanded as security peace with Sparta for thirty years. The Spartans made no objection to the last point, but could not yield in the matter of the supreme command. Their refusal, however, was expressed in the regular hair-splitting, or, as it would afterwards have been called, sophistical fashion of the Greeks: the Argive king was to have the same powers as each of the two kings of Sparta, *i.e.* practically a minority vote, which could not be accepted by the Argives. Many believed at that time that negotiations were pending between Argos and Xerxes, and that Xerxes had sent ambassadors to Argos. The Argives at any rate did not openly take sides with Persia, and that was a great point gained. The Greek embassy to Sicily was equally unsuccessful. Here also, according to Herodotus, the refusal came in the form of a counter-demand. Gelon signified his willingness to help with 20,000 hoplites, 2000 cavalry, 2000 archers, 2000 slingers, 2000 light infantry, 200 triremes, and provisions for the whole Greek army, if he might be made commander-in-chief of the Greeks. On this proposal being rejected by the Spartan envoy, he asked for the supreme command of either the land-force or of the fleet. This was refused by the Athenian envoy. Thereupon, according to Herodotus, Gelon dismissed the ambassadors, saying, that if they were obliged to dispense with his help they would be able to say that their year had had no spring.⁹ The tyrant of Syracuse had probably very little idea of what the spring of a nation was. According to others, Gelon had already made up his mind to assist Greece, but was prevented from doing so by the Carthaginian invasion, which took place at that very moment. It is possible that the battle of Himera had been fought when the Greek envoys arrived, and if so, he could certainly have hastened to the assistance of the Greeks. But in that case he had already done his duty to the Greek world, and if it is true

that the battle of Himera was not fought till the year 480, he did it well then.* As a matter of fact Sicily had plenty to do at home. The Corcyreans gave the fairest promises, and ordered out sixty vessels, but did not let them go further than Cape Malea, so that in case of the defeat of the Greeks they might still keep in with the Persians.¹⁰ Lastly, the Cretans are said to have allowed themselves to be frightened out of declaring against the Persians by an oracle from Delphi.¹¹

The Thessalians sided with the Persians, but only under the force of circumstances. Their chief princes, the Aleuadae, were in favour of Persia; the people in general were not. The latter even applied for aid to the Probuli assembled at the Isthmus. The Greeks sent 10,000 men to Tempe under the command of the Spartan Euaenetus and the Athenian Themistocles.¹² But they only remained there a short time, being induced to withdraw by messengers from King Alexander of Macedonia, who told them of the size of the Persian army, or more probably, as Herodotus thinks, because they heard that the Persians could easily outflank them on the route across the mountains. Thus the Thessalians also joined the Persians at the last moment.¹³

There still existed the possibility of making a stand on the southern frontier of Thessaly, and the Greeks decided to do so.¹⁴ Here a good position could be taken up both by land and sea, the latter off the promontory of Artemisium, the former at the pass of Thermopylae. Southward of the mouth of the Spercheius the range of Mount Oeta comes quite close to the coast at a point where there are some hot springs, not far from the temple of Demeter at Anthela. On this spot there was a pass enclosed both eastward and westward of Anthela by narrow approaches, through which led the only good road from Thessaly to central Greece. This pass was capable of being defended by a handful of men against greatly superior numbers. The island of Euboea stretches from the

south just up to this point, and terminates to the north-east in the promontory of Artemisium, which lies opposite the broad southern end of the Magnetes country and Mount Pelion. For the Greeks this strait was favourable for a naval battle, as in this way they could prevent the Persian fleet reaching Thermopylae and taking part in the land contest. It is true that the Persians could not be forced to fight here. They might leave Artemisium and Euboea on the right, and continue their voyage round the long island. But if the Greeks awaited the Persian army at Thermopylae, could the Persian fleet leave it in the lurch? On the contrary, it was intended to accompany their land-force. It was therefore to be expected that the Persians would attempt to force a passage at Artemisium. The Greeks therefore occupied both these points, Artemisium and Thermopylae, but in very unequal strength. The whole Greek fleet was stationed at Artemisium, and only a small fraction of the army at Thermopylae. In the fleet the Athenians held the command, though not without difficulty; the Spartans, who were deliberate both in thought and action, commanded on land. This was the position of the forces in the engagements which took place at the close of August 480.¹⁵

The Greeks despatched three ships to reconnoitre, one belonging to Corinth, another to Aegina, and the third to Athens; but all three were lost, the two former with all hands, while the crew of the Athenian vessel escaped. The Greeks then sailed to Chalcis, where the strait is narrowest, no doubt in order to be ready to repulse an attack from either side. When the Persian fleet arrived nearly opposite the promontory of Artemisium, a violent storm arose, which raged for three days and did great damage among the Persians. An immense number of transports, and at least 400 ships of war were lost. The Greeks, who did not suffer at all, returned thanks to Boreas for his favour, and returned to Artemisium. The Persian fleet ran for shelter into the

Pagasæan Gulf near Aphetae, but fifteen Persian vessels fell into the hands of the Greeks.

We now turn, with Herodotus, to the course of events on land. We have described the character of the country at Thermopylae, which bears an entirely different aspect at the present day, the soil brought down by the Spercheius having extended the coast-line so much that the two narrowest points are now four miles broad ; but in the year 480 there was not a hundred feet of firm ground there. Xerxes was encamped to the west of the pass, in the district of Trachis, while the Hellenes were stationed between the two narrowest points of it. Their force consisted of 300 Spartiates, 1000 Tegeatae and Mantineans, 120 Arcadian Orchomenians, 1000 other Arcadians, 400 men from Corinth, 200 from Phlius, 80 from Mycenæ, 700 from Thespiæ, and 400 Thebans, who had been brought as hostages, besides the whole force of the Opuntian Locrians, and 1000 Phocians, in all 5200, not counting the Locrians, whose numbers we do not know. They were commanded by the Spartan king Leonidas. The Spartans could have sent more combatants to the pass, but they did not do so, ostensibly because they were prevented by the festival of the Carneia, at the close of which the whole force was to follow. The rest of the Greeks also had a reason for not coming in greater force or for absenting themselves—the Olympic festival. Both were mere pretexts. To save their country the Greeks have often done greater violence to their religion than would have been effected by neglecting these festivals. Besides they held, and rightly, that the best form of worship consisted in the defence of the gods of their country. The real reason on this occasion was that the majority of the Peloponnesian Greeks had no inclination to protect the northern frontier of central Greece. Their opinion was that the Peloponnese, and with it the whole of Greece, ought to be defended at the Isthmus, and that their fellow-countrymen to the north of it must submit to their fate for

the nonce. This is the reason why even the Spartans came in such small numbers. They saw that their nearest allies had no wish to occupy a position which was open to the same objections as Tempe, and they themselves were not convinced that the defence of Thermopylae was necessary. But it was not becoming for Sparta to leave the members of the League outside the Isthmus altogether unprotected, and they therefore, with equal heroism and shortsightedness, decided to adopt half-measures. They sent their king thither with 300 picked men, who left descendants behind them in Sparta; thus it would be a sad result if all perished, but still the future was saved. If there had been a real army at Thermopylae, as there was a year later at Plataea, Xerxes would perhaps never have reached central Greece. For such an army would have been better able to occupy the pass, across which Ephialtes conducted the Persians, and a prolonged resistance on the part of the Greeks would perhaps have made the Persian force break up, by means of its unwieldiness. It must, however, be borne in mind that the overpowering character of the attack made it difficult for the Greeks to take as calm a view of the situation as we can do now, and that if the Persians had entered the Euripus from the north-east, they might have taken the Greek position at Thermopylae in the rear by landing their troops.¹⁶

Xerxes reconnoitred the Greek position, and was told that the Spartans, without troubling their heads about the Persians, were practising athletic exercises and combing their hair as if they were going to take part in a festival. He waited four days after this and then ordered an attack to be made, in the first place by the Medes and Cissians, which was unsuccessful. Then the Immortals were sent to the front, but they also gave way. Their spears were shorter than those of the Greeks, and they received wounds without being able to inflict them. The Spartans, moreover, were so well drilled that even in the face of these picked troops they executed their manoeuvre

of a pretended flight, ending in a deadly attack upon the pursuing foe. Xerxes, who was watching the battle from his throne, is said to have sprung up twice in horror. On the following day matters were much the same. Xerxes was in great perplexity. At this juncture a Malian came to him, by name Ephialtes, who promised to lead the Persians by a mountain path to the rear of the Greeks. Xerxes entrusted to him Hydarnes and his division. They started at nightfall and reached the top of the pass at dawn. It was guarded by 1000 Phocians, who offered no resistance and retreated to the summit of the mountain. The Persians took no heed of them and completed their outflanking movement. When the Greeks heard what had happened, they consulted as to what was to be done. Most of them withdrew; only the Spartans and Thespians remained of their own accord, and the Theban contingent was compelled to stay by the Spartans.¹⁷ Whilst the troops led by Ephialtes were still at a distance, those who had remained of their own free-will advanced once more into the plain to attack the Persians, continuing the fight even with broken spears. Leonidas fell. When they were completely surrounded, they retired to the space between the two defiles, took their stand on some rising ground, and fought the last fight of despair with swords, hands, and teeth. They were killed to a man. Among the Spartans special glory attached to Dieneces, who is said to have answered the complaint that the Persian arrows darkened the air with the words:—"Good, then we shall fight in the shade."¹⁸ But severe censure was passed upon Aristodemus, who had remained in Alpeni near the field of battle on account of an eye-complaint, and so saved his life; but he sacrificed it at the battle of Plataea. When the combat became mortal the Thebans withdrew to one side and begged for mercy. Some, however, were cut down in the confusion, the rest escaped with the stigma of disgrace, among them their general Leontiades. Xerxes inspected the heaps of dead, and when

the corpse of Leonidas was shown him, ordered the head to be cut off and the body to be crucified. There was now nothing to prevent the advance of the Persian army.¹⁹

At sea, however, the following events had happened. The Greek fleet consisted of 127 ships from Athens, 40 from Corinth, 20 from Megara, 20 from Chalcis, supplied by Athens, 18 from Aegina, 12 from Sicyon, 10 from Lacedaemon, 8 from Epidaurus, 7 from Eretria, 5 from Troizene, 2 from Styra, 2 from Ceos (and 2 penteconters from Ceos), and 7 penteconters from Locris, in all 271 triremes and 9 penteconters. The Spartan Eurybiades was in command. The command ought to have been given to an Athenian; but the allies, mostly Dorians, refused to obey an Athenian, and Athens was patriotic enough to place the salvation of Greece before the satisfaction of well-founded claims. When the allies saw how numerous the Persian fleet was, they became inclined to return home. In vain did the Euboeans, who in that case would be lost, beseech Eurybiades to give the order to remain. Thereupon, as Herodotus states, they bribed Themistocles with thirty talents, and he undertook to satisfy their wishes. Eurybiades received five talents, and three were given to the Corinthian admiral Adeimantus, who had agitated most strongly for a return home.²⁰ Themistocles kept the lion's share for himself. Those who received money from him thought it came from the Athenian treasury. The Greeks stuck to their post. The Persians now conceived the idea of capturing the whole Greek fleet at one blow, and for this purpose sent 200 ships round Euboea, which even made the tour of the island of Sciathos. The Greeks heard of it from a diver of Scione. They determined to go to meet the 200, but first of all to give battle to those that were left behind. In this engagement they took thirty ships, and displayed great tactical skill, placing their own vessels in circular formation with the prows pointing outwards, and then suddenly dashing out singly on

the surrounding enemy.²¹ On the following night another storm broke out and destroyed the Persian division which was sailing round Euboea. This was announced on the following day by fifty-three Attic ships which joined the Greek fleet. On the next day the Persians began a fresh battle, which was indecisive. Clinias, the father of Alcibiades, who had equipped a ship and manned it with 200 men at his own expense, particularly distinguished himself in this engagement. The Greek loss was considerable; half of the Athenian ships were damaged. A retreat was already being thought of when news came of what had happened at Thermopylae, and the fleet sailed away at once. Themistocles gave orders that wherever there were springs on the coast of Euboea, at which the Persian crews were obliged to land, invitations to the Ionians and Carians to join the Greeks should be written on the adjoining rocks. Even if they did not do so, at all events they would become objects of suspicion to the Persians. But this stratagem was not successful.

After the battle of Artemisium, Xerxes made the crews of the fleet visit the field of Thermopylae, where all the Persian dead, with the exception of 1000, had been hidden away. Here it was that he asked what the Greeks were doing, and was told that they were celebrating the Olympic festival, in which a wreath was the sole prize of the victor. The army then marched in a southerly direction. As the Thessalians had medized, their hereditary enemies the Phocians took the patriotic side. The Thessalians conducted the Persian army through the territory of the Dorians, who submitted, into Phocis, which was thoroughly devastated. The attempt to plunder the Delphic shrine was unsuccessful. When the force which undertook it arrived at the temple of Athene Pronoia, wonders took place. Rocks fell from Mount Parnassus, the enemy took to flight, and two native demigods, Phylacus and Autonus, cut down the fugitives. The Persians now advanced towards Attica.²²

The Greek fleet sailed to Salamis, at the request of the Athenians, who had taken no measures, because they thought that the Persians would be resisted in Boeotia.²³ They were now obliged to provide for their own safety themselves. They would not and could not await the enemy in Athens, which could not be defended. They therefore sent their women and children to Troizene, Aegina, and Salamis, while the men went on board ship. The distress of the Athenians on leaving the city was diminished by the announcement of the priestess of Athene, that the serpent of the citadel which lived in the Erechtheum had also departed, and had not consumed its monthly cake on this occasion.²⁴ At Salamis a larger fleet assembled than at Artemisium. There were 16 ships from Lacedaemon, 40 from Corinth, 15 from Sicyon, 10 from Epidaurus, 5 from Troizene, 3 from Hermione, 180 from Athens, 20 from Megara, 7 from Ambracia, 3 from Leucadia, 30 from Aegina, 20 from Chalcis, 7 from Eretria, 2 from Ceos, 4 from Naxos, 2 from Styra, 1 from Cythnus, and a ship from Croton under the command of the victor at the Pythian games, Phayllus, in all, as Herodotus says, 378, besides penteconters from the Malians, Siphnians, and Seriphians. The Persians occupied Athens. A few persons had remained behind in the citadel, trusting in their interpretation of the oracle regarding the wooden walls. They held out for a time till the Persians succeeded in climbing up by the grotto of Agraulus on the north side of the citadel and opening the main gate from inside. The citadel was then occupied, those who had remained were slain, and the shrines burnt. But it was considered a good sign for Athens that the sacred olive-tree in the Erechtheum, which had been burnt, put forth a branch an ell in length in the short space of two days.

The news of the taking of Athens made the Greeks of the fleet all the more desirous to get away from the dangerous spot where they were. For if they were defeated between Salamis and Aegina, whither could the crews escape? Even

Themistocles, it is said, began to despair of being able to persuade the Greeks to fight at Salamis, when a man of his deme, named Mnesiphilus, encouraged him to make a last attempt.²⁵ In the council of war held under the presidency of Eurybiades, he argued that the Peloponnese, which was especially precious to the others, could be best defended from Salamis, for the numerical superiority of the enemy would not make itself felt so much here as in the open sea near the Isthmus, and moreover here they were also protecting Aegina and Megara. The remark of the Corinthian Adeimantus, that the Athenians had lost their country and were, therefore, not entitled to a voice in the matter, he disposed of in a dignified manner. If the Athenians, he said, were to withdraw, and occupy the Siritis in Italy, as they were at liberty to do, they would be much missed in Greece. The threat that Athens might refuse to injure herself by pushing the forbearance she had hitherto shown to extreme limits, proved effectual, and Eurybiades gave the order to remain.

The Persians also were desirous of bringing matters to a conclusion at Salamis, and had no misgivings as to the result. Artemisia alone was opposed to it. Her view was that the conquest of Greece would be more certain if the king were to advance on the Isthmus with his land-forces, without troubling himself about the Greek fleet. Xerxes, however, considered a defeat of his fleet impossible, and determined to fight a naval battle at once.

In the meanwhile irresolution still prevailed among the Greeks. The Peloponnesian troops, which were led by Cleombrotus, a brother of Leonidas, had taken up a position on the Isthmus and fortified it; the force consisted of Spartans, Arcadians, Elians, Corinthians, Sicyonians, Epidaurians, Phliasians, Troizenians and Hermioneans. Filled with anxiety for the fate of their native land and their own homes, the Peloponnesians in the fleet insisted once more on bringing the ships to the Isthmus, and this would certainly have been

done had not Themistocles resorted to a stratagem as a last expedient. He despatched a servant, Sicinnus, for whom he afterwards obtained the rights of citizenship at Thespieae, to the Persians to inform them that the Greeks were meditating flight, and that now was the moment to destroy them at one blow. Xerxes, to whom the betrayal of their country by Greeks was no novelty, believed the advice to be genuine. The fleet, which was stationed in the Bay of Phalerum, took up its positions. One part of it almost bridged over the sea from Munychia close up to Salamis, another, consisting of the Phoenicians, stretched along the Attic coast in a northerly direction up to the foot of Mount Aegaleus, which projects into the sea between Athens and Eleusis, while a third section—this point in the Persian plan of operations is not mentioned by Herodotus but is gathered from Aeschylus—was ordered to sail round the island of Salamis, and so cut off all possibility of escape from the Greeks.²⁶ Aristides, who had just been recalled from exile, brought the Greeks the news of this impending blockade. He communicated it to Themistocles, who told his fellow-generals. The seemingly incredible report was confirmed by the crew of a Tenian vessel which had just arrived, and with a Lemnian vessel brought the number of the Greek fleet up to 380. The Athenians were on the left wing opposite the Phoenicians, the Peloponnesians on the right opposite the Ionians. The number of Persian ships must have been at least double that of the Greeks. In this battle also (probably the 27th or 28th of September, 480), the superior discipline of the Greeks, who were fighting for freedom and for their religion, prevailed over the horde of Asiatics collected by the caprice of a despot, and with no common intellectual tie to unite them, although Herodotus remarks that they fought better on this occasion, under the eye of the king, than they did at Artemisium. Little is known of the details of the battle. It does not even appear that the Greek commander-in-chief made any particular

dispositions for it. Each did his best without orders; and as the Greeks fought with ardour from the centre outwards towards the circumference, as at Artemisium, enthusiasm probably compensated for the deficiencies in tactics. The Persians were beaten and retreated to Phalerum. They had previously occupied the little island of Psyttaleia lying between Salamis and the mainland. The issue of the battle cut off the garrison, and Aristides landed with some troops and despatched the enemy.

The Greeks, who spent the night on the beach of Salamis, prepared to renew the battle on the following day; but when morning dawned the Persian fleet had departed. Towards the end of the battle Xerxes had summoned a council of war, in which Mardonius proposed that the king should return to Asia with the fleet, and also send home the bulk of the army, which had proved of no use, while he himself should be left in Greece with 300,000 picked troops to complete the subjugation of the country. Artemisia supported the proposition with reasons which flattered the autocrat, and Xerxes ordered the fleet to depart forthwith.²⁷ As soon as the Greeks saw this they gave chase but were unable to overtake them, and on reaching Andros they held a council of war. Themistocles proposed that they should sail straight to the Hellespont and destroy the bridge. Eurybiades objected, saying that they must not drive the Persians to despair. Themistocles yielded, and even pretended, according to Herodotus, that the abandonment of the pursuit of the Persians had been voted on his own motion, and sent Sicinnus a second time (according to others a certain Arnaces) to Xerxes, who was still in Attica, to inform him that Themistocles had rendered this service also to the king.²⁸ The deliberation of the man, who endeavours to ingratiate himself with his opponent immediately after a brilliant victory, has something uncanny about it. Herodotus also states that he extorted money by means of threats from the

Carystians and Parians, and perhaps from other islanders also, that the Andrians would not submit to this treatment, and therefore had to endure a siege as friends of Persia.²⁹

NOTES

The principal authority for this chapter is Herodotus, VII. and VIII., then Diod. 11, 1-26, and Plutarch in his biographies of Themistocles and Aristides, with the Persae of Aeschylus, and the epigrams of Simonides. In Herodotus' treatment of the events of 480 there is an obvious endeavour to follow popular tradition by making the power of Persia as great as possible, for which reason his figures are unreliable. Diodorus is (following Ephorus) rhetorical, and gives many incredible details, *e.g.* in ch. 10, about the last struggle of Leonidas. Nor can I admit that Ephorus made such good use of the local antiquarians that his account is for that reason more valuable than that of Herodotus. Yet it is quite possible that Diodorus (Ephorus) may describe a particular incident more accurately than Herodotus, for instance, some of his details regarding the battle of Salamis may serve to supplement the account of Herodotus. I have followed Herodotus in many passages which are unauthenticated, and probably even untrue, because they reproduce the popular tradition of the Greeks. The latter reveals itself also in many of Plutarch's anecdotes, for it is just about the year 480 that the heroic figures of the Greeks begin to be clothed with flesh and blood.

1. Dramatic concentration of long and continuous deliberations is also clearly discernible here; the people told each other these stories in Asia Minor, and Herodotus repeated them. In other respects, it all corresponds exactly to the character of Oriental despotisms, as we see it in the Old Testament.

2. Herod. 7, 23, 24. Cf. Duncker, 7⁵, 199, on the question as to whether the canal was really completed, which many have doubted.

3. Herod. 7, 133. Cf. Plut. Them. 6 on the execution of the interpreter of the Persian message on the motion of Themistocles, and the punishment of Arthmius of Zeleia with ἀτιμία, because he brought Persian gold to Greece. For the bridge cf. Bus. 2, 135.

4. Criticism of the numbers in Duncker, 7⁵, 206, who concludes that there were 800,000 infantry and cavalry, 200,000 baggage-men at most, and that the crews of the fleet amounted to 250,000. There were perhaps 30,000 men besides from Thrace and Macedonia. Later writers, especially Ctesias, Ephorus quoted by Diodorus,

Nepos and Justin put the figures at 700,000 men, Nepos, Them. 2, adds 400,000 cavalry. Cf. Bus. 2, 143. There is no doubt as to the number—1207—of the ships of war. Delbrück (p. 164) arrives at much lower figures: 45,000-50,000 combatants, and 100,000-200,000 baggage-men. The decisive facts for Delbrück are that there was nothing like enough space for manœuvring or provisions for the enormous numbers assumed by tradition, and, according to his view, barely enough of either for the numbers accepted by him. This is probably an exaggeration. For it was of no consequence whether the baggage-train had enough to eat, or sufficient space to move in, and more than double the number of combatants (90,000-100,000) could have been handled and fed. With regard to the method of counting, it evidently has the same value as the counting of supers who march across the stage dressed as soldiers, for the same men might have been put in the square as often as the generals liked, and they naturally wished to please the king. The only accurate method of counting would have been the enumeration of the men belonging to the several contingents, but in that case it would not have been so easy to swell the figures.

5. The fact that in Herodotus 7, 132, only races which are expressly recognized as members of the Amphictyonic League are mentioned as submitting to the Persians, taken in conjunction with the unpatriotic policy followed by the Delphic oracle at that time, proves that the Persian party, which indisputably existed in Greece, attempted to betray their country to the Persians by means of the Delphic Amphictyony and the Delphic Oracle. It is of the greatest moral significance that of the twelve Amphictyonic votes nine were in favour of Persia and only three against her, and of these three only two decisively so. The Delphic priests did not venture to express their sentiments openly; but they seem to have done their best by indirect means. Some of the discouraging utterances may have been invented subsequently, but they could not have been attributed to the oracle, if it had not been notoriously lukewarm. It is therefore a proof of the strength of the conservative religious sentiment of the Greeks, that they allowed the Amphictyonic League and the Delphic Oracle to survive this severe test. The moral authority of the latter was henceforth a thing of the past, though outwardly it suffered no detriment. It may even be asserted that the cleverness of the patriotic Greeks contributed to prevent the oracle from openly compromising itself, which would have done great harm to the Greek cause. The Greeks assembled on the Isthmus offered the Delphic god a very large reward (*δεκατεῖναι* Herod. 7, 132) in the event of victory; it is true that payment was never made, but the promise attained its object. With these

favourable prospects in view, and, moreover, being at first cut off from the Persians, the priests became converts to the national cause, and the god performed miracles on its behalf. The fact that they did not afterwards receive their tithes is not in itself surprising, for the Greeks had a habit of considering their own advantage in the interpretation of their vows, and besides the priests had to take good care not to complain. The Spartans were afterwards desirous of reforming the Amphictyonic League, but the Athenians prevented them from doing so.

6. The decisions taken on the Isthmus (Herod. 7, 132) are now no longer questioned by Bus. G. G. 2, 129. Cf. Curtius, 2⁶, 817.

7. Praise of the Athenians (Herod. 7, 139)—important at a time when they were usually regarded merely as the tyrants of their allies.

8. Herod. 7, 145 seq.

9. Acc. to Ar. Rhet. 1, 7 and 3, 10, the same illustration was used in a funeral oration of Pericles, and with more point. But that is no reason why it should be wrongly ascribed to Gelon. It may have been a common figure of speech of the day.

10. Cf. Busolt, Laked. 1, 403.

11. The oracle from Delphi to the Cretans is suspicious on account of its metre (a trimetre), but see above, note 5. If we consider that there was no great enthusiasm even among the Achaeans in the Peloponnese (Herod. 8, 73), and that many even in Arcadia were lukewarm, all the greater credit is due to the patriotism of the Spartans and Athenians and their allies.

12. Cf. Bus. G. G. 2, 137.

13. The actual representatives of the various states for the common conduct of the war were the Strategi (Bus. G. G. 2, 139, 140), who took the place of the Probuli. The Strategi held their *συνέδριον* when necessary.

14. Herod. 7, 175.

15. Busolt, 2, 145, where he refers to the chronological conclusions to be drawn from the assertion that there could be no advance on account of the Carneia and Olympia. We must not attach such weight to these assertions as to use them for the exact determination of a date.

16. For the question why Thermopylae was defended with such a small force, cf. Busolt, 2, 148. Sparta was bound "at all events to make a show of good intentions." Leonidas was "in reality sent on a forlorn hope and sacrificed by the Ephorate with his force to the interests of the Peloponnesian policy of Sparta" (Busolt, 2, 149). Cf. Curtius, G. G. 2⁶, 817. Delbrück admits that the defence of Thermopylae was "a mistake, a half-measure," from a

purely military point of view. The position could be surrounded by the enemy, and was therefore a hopeless one. But the Spartans wished to do something, and Leonidas merely carried to extremes what Delbrück (p. 89) designates as "a piece of shortsighted heroism." This remark is just, but deserves to be applied in cases where Delbrück does not apply it. Is it right to say that Thermopylae was the only place where the Greeks were "shortsighted and heroic," and that at Marathon and Plataea, on the other hand, they were the good strategists which Delbrück considers them to be, carefully considering the nature of the troops on both sides, and then taking the defensive and offensive in a way that exactly suited the circumstances?

17. Duncker, 7⁵, 257, doubts that the Thebans would have remained on compulsion, and suggests that they were volunteers for the patriotic party. "How could Leonidas have managed to detain the Thebans if they had not been willing to remain, and he did not choose to fight the Thebans instead of the Persians?" But an order from the Spartan king was sufficient to ensure the obedience of the Thebans. Four hundred Thebans with guilty consciences would certainly not venture to oppose 300 Spartans. It is incredible that volunteers should have come from Thebes to hold Thermopylae, when even the Spartans only defended it as a point of honour. The account of Herodotus therefore holds good (even against Busolt, 2, 147).

18. The remark attributed to Dieneces has also a real meaning. The shower of arrows had no effect to speak of on the mail-armour of intrepid Greeks calmly awaiting an attack.

19. For the date, cf. Duncker, 7⁵, 249; Busolt, 2, 153. The three days' engagement at Artemisium began one day before the three days' fight at Thermopylae.—Uncertainty of the amount of the losses at Thermopylae, Duncker, 7⁵, 251; according to Herodotus 20,000 Persians and 4000 Greeks.—The high moral significance of the sacrifice of the Spartans is emphasized by Busolt, *Laked.* 1, 429.

20. Criticism of the assertion that Themistocles was bribed, Duncker, 7⁵, 239. Themistocles may have handed over the rest of the money to the Athenian treasury.

21. Duncker, 7⁵, 241, prefers the account of these deliberations in Diod. 11, 12, to that of Herodotus. I cannot find any new facts or reasons in it, but merely rhetorical embellishment of what has been said by Herodotus. Cf. also Busolt, 2, 155.

22. Xerxes had nothing to do with the attempt on Delphi (Herod. 8, 35). Cf. Busolt, 2, 161, for the different views of modern writers on this expedition.

23. Wiegand (*Plat. zur Zeit des Einfalls der Perser in Böotien*, Progr. Ratzeb. 1886) has propounded views as to the fate of the city of Plataea after the battle of Artemisium with which we do not agree.

24. How elastic the interpretation of omens was! The departure of the gods from the city might just as well have been a bad sign!

25. The influence of Mnesiphilus (Herod. 8, 57 seq.) is now rejected. Busolt, 2, 119.

26. For the battle of Salamis, besides Herod. 8, 83-96, the account of Aeschylus (*Pers.* 376 seq.) and that of Ephorus in Diodorus 11, 17 seq. may be used. I am strongly of opinion that the latter are right, and that an attempt was made by the Egyptian ships (Ephorus) to sail round Salamis. The idea was so natural, and had besides been put into execution at Artemisium. For the date of the battle: the end of September, not the 20th, Busolt, 2, 174. As regards the disposition of the fleets on both sides Duncker, 7⁵, 284 seq., has advanced a theory which cannot be accepted. He thinks that the Athenians on the left wing extended as far as Eleusis (p. 288), but the passages quoted by him in support of this view do not say so. His calculation of the space occupied by the ships when placed side by side (150 ft. to each ship, and consequently 45,000 ft. for 300 ships) is purely fanciful. The battle certainly took place quite close to the city of Salamis. The Persians advanced chiefly from the south, from the open sea, towards the Greeks, as Loeschke (*Ephoros-Studien*, 1, N. Jahrb. 1877) rightly emphasizes; as, however, the Greeks were to the westward, in front of the island of Salamis, the battle on the left Greek wing was carried on more from the west towards the east. Diodorus 11, 19 is probably right in conjecturing that the Ionians on the Persian left wing held out the longest. For further details of the battle of Salamis, cf. Breitung, *Jahrb. f. kl. Phil.* 129, 859 seq.; Bauer (*Die Ionier in der Schlacht b. Salamis*) *N. Rh. Mus.* 39, 624 seq.; and Lolling's *Topogr. Aufsatz in den hist. und phil. Aufs. E. Curtius gewidmet*, p. 1 seq.; for the number of ships cf. Beloch, *Die Bevölk. der gr.-röm. Welt*, p. 508 seq. I have not seen Goodwin's *Battle of Salamis*, *Papers of the American School of Athens*. I confess that I do not think that the question as to the position of the Persian ships at the beginning of the action has been satisfactorily determined. Wecklein (*Ueber Themistocles und die Seeschlacht bei Salamis*, *Sitzungsber. der k. bayr. Akad. der Wiss.* 1892, 1st No.) has now proved that the stratagem of Themistocles in sending to Xerxes brought about a change in the plans of the king, who attacked the Greeks at once from the south

only, to prevent them from escaping. This removes the difficulties attaching to the old interpretations of the incident.

27. Duncker and Busolt, 2, 180, assume that the departure of the fleet did not take place till the second night. I do not believe this, for what would the Greeks have done the whole of the next day? Both historians also assume that the council of war, which Herodotus places at Andros, was held at Salamis.

28. Herod. 8, 109. Duncker, 7⁵, 296, and Busolt, 2, 182, believe that Themistocles, in sending word that the Greeks would not go to the Hellespont, wished to make the king believe the contrary, because Themistocles had deceived him once already, the consequence of which would be, and as a matter of fact was, that the king beat a hasty retreat. I do not consider this view correct. Why should the king believe that Themistocles had deceived him the first time? The gist of his message was that the Greeks wanted to escape, and that was true. Themistocles therefore could hardly anticipate that the king would entertain ideas of this kind. Duncker wrongly considers the account of Ephorus (Diod. 11, 19) a "plainer" one, and that of Herodotus "diffuse." Ephorus is merely inexact, for he makes the message consist only of the words, *διότι μέλλουσιν οἱ Ἕλληνες πλεύσαντες ἐπὶ τὸ ζεύγμα λύειν τὴν γέφυραν*, while Herod. 8, 110, says that Themistocles *ἔσχε τοὺς Ἕλληνας*, which Duncker also (296) takes to be true; thus the more important half of the message is not given by Diodorus.

29. Herod. 8, 112, certainly uses language which leads to the conclusion that Themistocles collected the money for himself; but if he did it by means of the same messengers (*διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν ἀγγέλων*) who delivered official announcements, how can Herodotus have believed that he wished to keep the money for himself?

CHAPTER V

PLATAEA AND MYCALE

A FEW days after the battle Xerxes withdrew with the army from Attica, and was accompanied as far as Thessaly by Mardonius, who there selected his 300,000 men, which included the Immortals, 1000 Persian cavalry, many other Persians, and then mostly Medes, Sacae, Bactrians, and Indians. Xerxes returned in safety to Asia by the same route by which he had marched to Greece; the army suffered further considerable loss by sickness on the march. The details of this retreat were, however, so little known that Herodotus reproduces an account, which he did not believe himself, to the effect that Xerxes went from the mouth of the Strymon by sea, that the ship was endangered by a storm, and that Xerxes requested the Persian nobles in the vessel to jump into the sea in order to lighten it, which they did. Afterwards the helmsman received a golden wreath as a reward for the safety of the king, but was then beheaded because so many Persian noblemen had perished on the voyage under his guidance—a good specimen of the stories which the Greeks told each other, and sometimes with truth, of Oriental despotism.¹

In consequence of an eclipse of the sun (2nd October, 480) the Greek army, under Cleombrotus, gave up the original plan of attempting to cut off the retreat of the Persians from Attica, while the fleet returned, after its attempt on Andros and

after devastating the territory of Carystus, to Salamis in order to divide the spoil. It was resolved to send the Delphic god a statue 12 ells in height. They then proceeded to the Isthmus to decide on the distribution of the prizes of honour. When the voting tablets, which had been laid on the altar of Poseidon, were taken up, it appeared that each general had adjudged the first prize to himself, and that most of them had given the second to Themistocles. The Greeks displayed their thirst for glory without any of the hypocrisy which is usual in such cases nowadays, and incidents of this kind do not appear even to have raised a smile in those times.

Themistocles then went to Sparta, where high honours were paid him. He received, as did Eurybiades, a wreath of olive, and was presented with the finest chariot in Sparta. On leaving the city he was escorted by 300 mounted citizens to the frontier of Laconia. Artabazus, who had followed Xerxes as far as the Hellespont, returned thence to Mardonius, and on the way took Olynthus, which he handed over to the Chalcidians; Potidaea, however, he was unable to take, in spite of the understanding which he had with some of the inhabitants. The Persian fleet collected at Samos to protect Ionia; the Greek fleet, now only 100 strong, assembled at first at Aegina, under the command of King Leotychides. The Athenian contingent was commanded by Xanthippus, an opponent of Themistocles, while the Athenian army was placed under the leadership of Aristides.² Some Ionians, most of them from Chios, now came to the Greek admirals with the request that the Greeks would set free the Chians and their other brethren in Asia. But the Greeks said that the voyage to Samos was like a journey to the Pillars of Hercules.³ They did sail in an easterly direction, but only as far as Delos. They were apparently afraid of the Persians; fortunately the Persians in Samos were really afraid of the Greeks.

In the meanwhile Mardonius opened negotiations in Greece,

in order to facilitate his task. He consulted various oracles through a Carian, and, what was more practical, sounded the Athenians through Alexander of Macedon, who was known as their guest and benefactor, as to whether they were inclined to come to terms with the Persians. Athens was to become an ally of Persia. The Spartans heard of this attempt, and counteracted it by sending a special embassy. Thereupon the Athenians solemnly declared that as long as the sun held on its old path, they would remain loyal to the Greek cause and to the gods and heroes, whose sanctuaries the Persians had impiously burnt. The Spartans had offered, in case Athens were compelled to fight again, to take all the non-combatants under their protection. But the Athenians insisted that it would be better for the Spartans to be ready for action with their army at the right moment in Boeotia. And, as a matter of fact, they would have spared their allies much suffering if they had put in a more punctual appearance during the Persian wars.

In the spring of 479 Mardonius marched in a southerly direction. The Boeotians wanted to keep him in their country; but he wished to take Athens a second time. The Athenians left their city at the mercy of the Persians, and went to Salamis as in the preceding years. Mardonius sent a Hellespontine, by name Murichides, to summon them to submit, and an Athenian, named Lycides, advised that his proposal should be taken into consideration. But he was stoned by the enraged populace, while the Athenian women fell upon his wife and children and stoned them also.⁴ When the Athenians retreated to Salamis they sent messengers to Sparta, with a request, which was supported also by the Megarians and Plataeans, that the Spartan army should be despatched at once against the Persians. But the Spartans and the rest of the Peloponnesians were engaged in building the wall across the Isthmus, and put off their answer from one day to another. They maintained that they could not start

on account of the Festival of the Hyacinthia. Finally the Tegeate Cheileus, whose authority was great in Sparta, induced them to put an end to all delay and to despatch a large army under Pausanias, the cousin and guardian of the young king Pleistarchus, son of Leonidas. The Spartans used their tardy determination to produce a dramatic effect. They quietly made the Athenian envoys deliver their request once more, and then replied that the army had already reached the frontier. The concealment of the start, the possibility of which is a striking proof of the efficiency of the Spartan military organization, had the special advantage that the Argives were unable to throw any obstacles in the way of the expedition, and had to be content with informing Mardonius of the accomplished fact. Mardonius destroyed what was left of Athens, laid waste Attica, made a flank march to Megara, either to cut off a division of the Lacedaemonians or merely to make his withdrawal appear less like a retreat, and finally returned to Boeotia, which seemed to offer a better field for his cavalry. He pitched his camp on the Asopus east of Plataea, while the Greeks encamped opposite him in the neighbourhood of Erythrae. All the Persians did not look forward with confidence to the issue of the impending combat. At a banquet given in Thebes by Attaginus to the leading Persians, one of them told an Orchomenian sitting beside him that he feared that only a few would soon be left of all the Persians present and of the whole Persian army in Boeotia. Herodotus also relates how Mardonius had an opportunity of becoming acquainted with the Greek character. A thousand Phocian hoplites had joined the Persian army under compulsion. Mardonius had them surrounded by his cavalry, as though he intended to slay them. But they showed no fear, and prepared quietly for battle. They thought that their hereditary foes, the Thessalians, had instigated it. Mardonius thereupon said that he only intended to give them an opportunity of showing their intrepidity. The Ten Thousand

afterwards made a similar impression on the Persians in Asia.

The first engagement was with the Persian cavalry.⁵ Their leader Masistius fell in it, which naturally caused great dismay among the Persians. The Greek army now changed its position by moving more to the westward near the fountain of Gargaphia, where it faced to the north-east. Its disposition was now as follows:—The Spartans were on the right wing with 10,000 hoplites, of whom 5000 were Spartiatae, attended by 35,000 armed Helots, then 1500 Tegeatae, 5000 Corinthians, 300 Potidaeans, 600 Orchomenian Arcadians, 3000 Sicyonians, 800 Epidaurians, 1000 Troizenians, 200 Lepreatae, 400 Mycenaeans and Tirynthians, 1000 Phliansians, 300 Hermioneans, 600 Eretrians and Styrians, 400 Chalcidians, 500 Ambraciots, 800 Leucadians and Anaactorians, 200 Paleans and Cephallenians, 500 Aeginetans, 3000 Megarians, 600 Plataeans, and lastly 8000 Athenians, who formed the left wing under Aristides. There were in all 38,700 hoplites, besides 69,500 light-armed troops, altogether 108,200 fighting men. Besides these there were 1800 unarmed Thespians. The army of Mardonius is estimated by Herodotus at 300,000 barbarians and 50,000 Hellenes. The Persians were opposite the Lacedaemonians and the Athenians opposite the Greeks, especially the Boeotians, Locrians, Malians, Thessalians and Phocians.

The omens on both sides were favourable for defensive tactics, and not for attack. They decided to wait for better ones. Mardonius meanwhile made a raid towards the passes of the Cithaeron range, where he intercepted a Greek convoy. The armies remained opposite one another in this position for ten days. On the eleventh Mardonius determined to give battle against the advice of Artabazus. During the night Alexander of Macedon, who acted a part on the Persian side similar to that of Themistocles on that of the Greeks, informed the Athenians of what was going to happen, and they

told the rest. Thereupon Pausanias ordered that the Athenians and Spartans should change places in order that the Greeks who were acquainted with the Persian mode of fighting should be opposite the Persians. Mardonius heard of what was going on and made the corresponding movement on his side, whereupon Pausanias reversed his original movement and Mardonius did the same. Mardonius made a herald deliver a mocking challenge to the Spartans to fight, but no one answered. The Greeks, who suffered from scarcity of water, the Persians having filled up the spring of Gargaphia, again changed their position. They determined to retire to a point called "the island," near the town of Plataea and the mountain passes, but the centre, which consisted of the small contingents, executed the movement so badly that it came much farther to the south-west than had been intended. Pausanias followed with the Spartans, but not so quickly as he wished, because the Spartiate Amompharetus, who was commanding a division, considered it disgraceful to retreat before the enemy, and refused for a long time to obey, but at last he moved with his men. The Athenians now wanted to join the Spartans, in accordance with the justifiable wish of Pausanias, in order to fill up the gap produced by the incorrect movement of the centre. They tried to find them, but not being able to do so, remained in the plain. At this point Mardonius discovered that the Spartans were no longer in their old position, and he marched after them to attack them. Pausanias sent word to the Athenians to come to the rescue, but he was obliged to join battle before they could arrive. And in fact they were unable to come, for they were attacked about the same time by the Hellenic allies of the Persians. As the sacrificial omens were not favourable at first, the Spartans were obliged to endure the showers of Persian arrows for a time without defending themselves, which they did with admirable calmness. They then charged the Persians, who had formed a light barricade by massing

their shields together, and thus were in the unfortunate position of people who are badly armed themselves and have to withstand the impetuous attack of a brave, active, and well-armed enemy. The Persians were defeated, and Mar-donius himself was slain. Some of the Persians escaped for the moment to a wooden entrenchment on higher ground, and others fled to Thebes. Artabazus fled with a considerable body direct to Phocis, and thence retreated with all speed to Asia. In the meanwhile the Athenians were defeating, but not without difficulty, the Greek allies of the Persians. The Corinthians, Megarians, and Phliasians, who had gone too much to the south, as far as the Heraeum at Plataea, were unable to contribute towards the victory, and were even forced farther back by detachments of the enemy. The Greeks could not carry the wooden entrenchment, in which many Persians had taken refuge, until the Athenians had finished their struggle and were ready for fresh work. For it was a kind of siege, and only the Athenians were at home in such matters.⁶ Herodotus relates that of the 260,000 Persians who took part in the battle, not 3000 remained alive, while of the Greeks who had contributed to the victory only ninety-one Spartans, sixteen Tegeatae, and fifty-two Athenians fell. This estimate evidently only includes hoplites.⁷ The disproportion between the loss of the victors and that of the vanquished is often enormous in antiquity. The practice was the same in those days as in the *Iliad*; no prisoners were made. But the military capacity of the Greeks must have been overwhelming in comparison with that of the Persians. The booty was very great. All the wealth which the Persians brought with them fell into the hands of the Greeks. According to the custom of Asiatic peoples, their only object in waging war was booty, and their habit was to live in splendour and luxury even in time of war. The Greeks devoted a suitable portion to the gods and to the general Pausanias; the rest they divided among them-

selves, so far as it was not fraudulently appropriated for private use. For the Aeginetans were accused of having, like good merchants, secretly purchased a quantity of gold at a low price, as if it were copper, from the Helots who were collecting the booty.⁸ A golden tripod was sent as a votive offering to Delphi, mounted on a pillar formed of three brazen serpents. This pillar, which Constantine brought to Constantinople, is still there on the At-meidan, and bears to this day the name of the Hellenic communities who presented it to the god. Pausanias had had his own name placed upon it as its dedicator, but the Spartans removed it.⁹ In Plataea a great festival, called the Eleutheria, was founded by Pausanias, and, as it appears, in consideration of it a sort of neutrality was conceded to the Plataeans, similiar to that enjoyed by Olympia.¹⁰ The city of Thebes held out against the Greeks for a long time, but surrendered at last. The ringleaders gave themselves up and were executed in Corinth, the Attaginus who had given the banquet alone escaping.

On the same day on which Xerxes' army was destroyed at Plataea, according to the legend, which delights in coincidences of this kind, the remainder of the splendid Persian fleet was destroyed on the coast of Asia Minor.¹¹ The Hellenic fleet under Leotychides was, as we know, at Delos, and the Persian fleet at Samos, and near them on Cape Mycale was a Persian army 60,000 strong. The Greeks really had no wish to carry the war farther. It has been justly conjectured that it was not the interest of the Athenians to attack the Persian fleet before Mardonius was defeated, for its destruction would necessarily have made the Spartans less anxious to follow and attack Mardonius beyond the Isthmus, because without the aid of the fleet he would hardly prove dangerous to the Peloponnese, while the one aim and object of the Athenians was that the constant threatening of their city by Mardonius should cease. And in the fleet the votes of the Athenians naturally had great weight.¹² But at this juncture mes-

sengers came from Samos with a request for aid. Leotychides complied with their request and sailed eastward. The Persians no longer considered themselves safe in Samos and withdrew to Mycale, where they entrenched themselves. But the Greeks followed them there, carried the entrenchments, defeated the enemy, and burned their ships. The Athenians especially distinguished themselves in this action.

The Samians attained their object. They were received into the Greek alliance, as also were Chios, Lesbos and some smaller islands.¹³ Even cities on the Asiatic continent were desirous of entering the League. But this did not take place. The majority of the Greeks did not wish to have anything to do with them, considering them to be too exposed to danger. The Spartans were of opinion that the best mode of safeguarding the national existence of the Ionians of Asia Minor and the islands, was to remove them from their present homes and settle them in the cities of the Greeks who had medized, in Thebes for instance. The Thebans would then have had to seek an abode elsewhere. But this plan was opposed by Athens and was not put into execution. The Athenians considered themselves the natural protectors of their Ionian kinsmen, and acted in this spirit; but in doing so they saved their bitterest foes, the Thebans. We shall shortly come across another attempt of the Spartans to punish the unpatriotic Greeks, which was also frustrated by the Athenians. After this the Spartans did not trouble their heads about these matters and became good friends of the Thebans; considerations of prudence were paramount on both sides.

The Greeks now turned to the Hellespont, whence the Peloponnesians under Leotychides returned home, while the Athenians, with the Ionians and Hellespontines and under the leadership of Xanthippus, continued the struggle against the Persians and captured Sestos. With this incident Herodotus brings his immortal work to a close.¹⁴

NOTES

The principal authority for the year 479 is Herod. 8, 113 seq. and 9, 1 seq. Compared with him neither Diodor. 11, 30-33 nor Plutarch in his *Aristides* are of importance. The former has borrowed from Ephorus, who in his turn has used Herodotus and to a certain extent embellished his narrative. Cf. Bauer, *Jahrb. f. klass. Phil. Suppl.* 10, 320. Plutarch's *Aristides* I deal with below in Chapter VII. His account of the battle of Plataea is of little value for the battle itself; it is only of importance for its Boeotian views and local history. Pausanias gives some details on the subject of the dedicatory offerings. The inscription on the serpent column in Constantinople is given by Röhl in the *I. Gr. A. No. 70*, and the reading of the introduction is corrected by Fabricius in the *Jahrb. des arch. Inst.* 1, 175 seq. Delbrück (pp. 163, 164) assumes that the Greek army numbered 35,000-40,000 actual fighting men, that of Mardonius a little more. Delbrück's arguments are partly based on the silence of Herodotus, and are therefore not conclusive, which cannot be proved in detail here.

1. For the accounts of the retreat of Xerxes, cf. Bus. 2, 184; for the eclipse of the sun, 2, 186.

2. Cf. Bus. 2, 189. Themistocles was thus pushed on one side, acc. to Diod. 11, 27, because he was believed by the Athenians to have been bribed by Sparta. Even if this is untrue it may be said that a continued concentration of the forces of Athens at sea, such as Themistocles probably recommended, was now more likely to do harm to Athens, whose chief object was the defeat of Mardonius, for which purpose she was bound to send her best men into the field on land. Thus Aristides was now the man of the situation. We have seen in the account of the battle of Mycale that Athens could have had no interest whatever in destroying the Persian fleet before Mardonius was defeated. But it does not necessarily follow from this that Sparta bribed Themistocles to make him send all the forces of Athens to sea.

3. Her. 8, 132. This could only have been the opinion of some of the people from inland. The Greeks generally knew perfectly well that Samos was not far off. Herodotus evidently says it with a touch of irony.

4. Her. 9, 4, 5.

5. For the battle of Plataea (end of July or beginning of August, 479 B.C. acc. to Bus. 2, 197) I have followed Her. 9, 28-89; see above. Cf. Bus. 2, 197-214. For the localities cf. Vischer, *Erinnerungen und Eindrücke aus Griechenland*, p. 533

seq. The νῆσος, of which Herod. (9, 51) speaks, cannot now be traced. The road from Athens to Thebes goes over the pass Τρεῖς κεφαλαὶ or Δρυὸς κεφαλαὶ (Herod. 9, 39), now called the Pass of Gyphtókastro; see Baedeker, Griechenland, 2nd ed. p. 177. Many think that Herod. 9, 52, 54, 69 is too severe on the Lacedaemonians and the other Greeks; it is difficult to say whether, as Bus. 2, 203 imagines, he really does injustice to the Thebans in ch. 40. Wecklein endeavours to justify the generalship of Pausanias, as also does Delbrück (p. 108 seq.), who lays stress on the difficulties of the Herodotean account, and explains the movements of both armies on the basis of correct military principles. He assumes (esp. at p. 265) that Mardonius and Pausanias showed great judgment in remaining on the defensive. But the following points are worthy of note. The struggle between the Greeks and Persians at Marathon, at Plataea, and afterwards under Alexander the Great, was one of skill, discipline, and superior equipment against brute force under bad leadership, a struggle between civilized people and semi-barbarians. The Persians were, as Delbrück says, mainly archers and cavalry; the Greeks were well-handled bodies of heavily-armed infantry. This quite accounts for what is apparently such a poor result in the battle of Plataea: the Persians advance to within shooting range, then halt and make a slight entrenchment, and then let themselves be attacked and cut down by the hoplites. The Persian cavalry ought at all events when this charge was made to have fallen upon the Spartan rear, but they could not even do this. The Persians were in reality only dangerous to a small body of troops, and to those who were intimidated by a shower of arrows. But this was not known until the experiment had been tried, and for that very reason it is a great credit to the Greeks that they were not afraid of their enemy, who was comparatively unknown and reputed to be so formidable, but found out his weak point and defeated him—the Athenians at Marathon by a rapid attack, the Spartans at Plataea by their coolness on the defensive.

6. Where had the Athenians learned this? Stein, in his notes to Herodotus, says: "The Lacedaemonians had no fortresses, and therefore were ignorant of siege tactics." But the other allies had fortresses. The Athenians must have acquired practice in these matters on occasions of which we know nothing. The genesis of the power of Athens is in fact too little known. The wars of emancipation have thrown all preceding events into the shade.

7. Herod. 9, 10. Acc. to Plut. Ar. 19, 1360 Greeks fell (acc. to Bus. 2, 212, a statement emanating from Clidemus).

8. Σπ. Λάμπρος, Ἡ ὑστεραία τῆς ἐν Πλαταίαις νίκης in his

Ἱστορικὰ μελετήματα, Ἀθ. 1884, who pronounces against the truth of the charge brought against the Aeginetans.

9. For the votive offerings, Bus. 2, 210.

10. Plut. Ar. 21. At the beginning of the Peloponnesian war the Plataeans appealed to the exceptional position guaranteed to them, Thuc. 2, 71, 72; 3, 68. But they probably exaggerated their privileges. The assembly of the Greek army could make binding promises, but not enter into international obligations. In spite of Busolt (Laked. 1, 467) I do not believe in the resolutions respecting the Hellenic League with a centre at Plataea, and now he himself is no longer in favour of it (G. G. 2, 213). In the joy of victory such a proposal may have been made and carried by acclamation, but afterwards no one thought anything more about it. Plutarch, however, has collected everything that could contribute to the importance of his Aristides and his own country Boeotia.

11. The battle of Mycale was probably a little later than that of Plataea, Bus. 2, 214.

12. Cf. Nitzsch, Rh. Mus. 27, 258 seq.; Bus. 2, 190.

13. Herod. 9, 106.

14. Herod. 9, 114, Thuc. 1, 89. The capture of Sestos took place in the spring of 478; cf. Bus. 2, 321.—In concluding our account of the Persian wars we should like to point out once more that even if the popular accounts, which Herodotus gives, do not prove that the Persians were very much more numerous than the Greeks (Delbrück has specially emphasized this), yet the fact that the Persian force was a levy of the people and not trained mercenaries makes it probable that their numbers were very large. Potentates like the Persian kings, if they do not employ mercenaries, are not only inclined but bound to trust in numbers. The question whether there was half a million or two million has to be decided on grounds of probability. The Carthaginian army, which attacked the Greeks of Sicily about the same time, had quite a different character to the Persians; it was an army of mercenaries. We find at this period and even later three kinds of armies: (1) the national army in undisciplined masses (Persia); (2) the organized and well-drilled national army (Greece); (3) the army of mercenaries (at Carthage and in Greece as a supplement to the national army). But what did Xerxes accomplish with his masses? At Thermopylae the best troops, the Medes and Cissians, the first in the enumeration of Herod. 7, 61, 62, were sent to the front, and next to them the Persians and the Immortals. All the other picturesque tribes were thus absolutely superfluous, and Xerxes was on the brink of destruction. The thousands who joined him in Europe are not even mentioned. The millions,

therefore, accomplished nothing. The results for historical purposes are as follows. The masses which, according to tradition, Xerxes took to Greece did nothing from a military point of view. The numbers are unsatisfactorily authenticated and improbable in themselves. But the following considerations prevent us from making such a large deduction from the numbers as Delbrück does (p. 139 seq.) Of the great mass of tribes besides the Persians Mardonius only retained the greater part of the Medes, Sacae, Bactrians, and Indians, and very few of the rest (Herod. 8, 113); are we to assume then that there were hardly any of these latter? Moreover, the fact that Xerxes advanced as far as Thermopylae without meeting with any resistance proves that the army was a very formidable one. Finally, the remarks of Delbrück (pp. 139 and 142) are applicable to people who are imbued with the principles of exact scientific warfare, but not to a Xerxes who, as Orientals generally do, not only wished but was compelled to attain his object by sheer weight of numbers. The criticism of details, as applied by Delbrück (according to him the number of the Persians could not have been great, or they could not have accomplished the marches which Herodotus ascribes to them), would reduce Darius' march against the Scythians to an expedition of about 5000 men—for when they arrive at the bridge in the night, of what use could it have been to them, if they were so numerous? These details are legendary, and cannot be used for the criticism of other statements. The fact that the figures of the Burgundian army are exaggerated is only additional proof of what we suspected before, viz. that we must not pay attention to the recorded numbers of the Persians; but the difference will always consist in this, that the Persians were obliged to come in large masses, while the Burgundians could not do so.

CHAPTER VI

SICILY AND THE CARTHAGINIANS

SIMULTANEOUSLY or almost simultaneously with Xerxes' attack on the Greeks in the East, came that of the Carthaginians on the Greeks of Sicily. And in the West the onslaught of the Orientals was repulsed with the same success as in the East. In order to fully comprehend the events which took place there we must go back a little farther into the history of Sicily.

About the year 500 B.C. the most important cities of the island had fallen into the hands of tyrants, with the exception of the principal city, Syracuse. But Syracuse was destined to undergo the same fate. The fact that, at a period when tyrants had ceased to exist in Greece, there was hardly a free city in Sicily is a consequence of the peculiar character of the Sicilian cities, which on the one hand had a somewhat mixed population—Greeks of varied extraction and natives—and on the other hand, in their capacity of young communities, could frame their constitutions more in accordance with considerations of expediency than the old Greek cities, which had always to take ancient tradition into account. And sometimes the rule of a capable despot would seem advantageous, especially on an island swarming with barbarians. Since 505 B.C. Cleandrus had ruled in Gela; upon his murder in 498 he was succeeded by his brother Hippocrates, a prince of great enterprise, who extended his dominion far to the east and

north-east, by subjugating Callipolis, Naxos, Leontini, and even Zancle, the important city which commanded the straits. Here, however, he appointed a governor, a certain Scythes, who after the destruction of Miletus invited the Ionians to Sicily to colonize a point on the north coast called Kalé Acté. Some Samians and Milesians accepted the invitation, but turned their arms against Scythes, at the instigation of a craftier tyrant. This was Anaxilas, ruler of Rhegium (since 494), a man of Messenian extraction, who pointed out to the Samians that it would be still more advantageous for them to occupy Zancle itself. They made themselves masters of the city at a time when Scythes was away. Scythes applied to his suzerain Hippocrates, but the latter thought it better to sell his too-distant possession to the Samians for hard cash, and throw his governor Scythes into prison as a reward for his previous services. Scythes escaped to Darius. The Samians, however, were outwitted by Anaxilas, who made himself master of Zancle; the city was henceforth called Messene, and afterwards Messina. In the selfish life of that age the man who had some scruples left always succumbed to his more unscrupulous opponent. Anaxilas used his strong position as master of both sides of the straits for a beneficial purpose. He built a military port near Scyllaeum, and would not allow the Etruscans to pass through the straits, which prevented them from carrying on piracy to the southward.

Hippocrates, who had been successful in many things, did not succeed in the undertaking which he looked to bring him the greatest profit. He wished to take Syracuse. He actually defeated the Syracusans on the river Helorus, but could not take the city, owing to the interference of Corinth and Corcyra, who were united on this occasion. He obtained only the Syracusan colony of Camarina. He was killed in 491 B.C., in a war against the Sikelian Hybla. He was followed as ruler of Gela by his best general, Gelon, who succeeded in the great undertaking without even resorting to force. Dissensions prevailed

between the nobles and the lower classes in Syracuse. The former were expelled and appealed to Gelon, who managed to get the Syracusans to take back the nobles, the so-called Geomori, and himself with them. He thus became tyrant of Syracuse in 485 B.C.

He now made Syracuse the capital of a kingdom which included, besides Gela and Camarina, places north of Syracuse such as Euboea and Megara, and thus extended over the south-eastern third of the island. To make the capital populous he removed half of the Geloans, all the Camarinaeans, and the nobles of Euboea and Megara to Syracuse; the lower classes of the last-named towns he sold as slaves. It was thus that the mildest of the Greek tyrants, the man who was called a king, treated men and cities. Syracuse was enlarged and Gelon created a large army, which consisted partly of spearsmen (of whom many were Arcadians), and a considerable fleet. Both were soon destined to stand the island in good stead.

But besides Anaxilas and Gelon there were two other tyrants on the island, the one friendly and related by marriage to Anaxilas, the other to Gelon. Terillus of Himera was father-in-law of the tyrant of Rhegium; Theron, who had been tyrant of Acragas since 488, stood in the same relationship to Gelon. The enmity existing between Terillus and Theron was the cause of a formidable conflict. Theron drove out the tyrant of Himera, and Terillus and Anaxilas, who felt they were not a match for the rulers of Acragas and Syracuse, asked the Carthaginians for help.

The west of the island was, as we have seen, in Semitic hands. Motye, Panormus, and Soloeis were ancient Phoenician colonies. But in the sixth century the Carthaginians had established a province there, on which the Phoenician cities were dependent for protection. Towards the end of the century Carthaginians, Phoenicians, and Elymi had frustrated the attempt of Dorieus, the son of the Spartan king, to found a kingdom in the district of Mount Eryx upon

territory alleged to belong to the descendants of Heracles. Dorieus lost his life. Having been thus successful in the defence of their own, the Carthaginians were prepared to act on the offensive when a favourable opportunity offered. The opportunity which presented itself at this moment was two-fold: the appeal of the tyrants, and the request of Xerxes, which the Phoenicians, who were subjects of the king, conveyed to the Carthaginians, to support the Persian attack upon Greece by a simultaneous attack upon Sicily.¹

The Carthaginians are said to have taken three years to make their preparations, about as long as Xerxes had taken for his. The magnitude of the result corresponded to the time employed. Carthage invaded Sicily with a force said to have amounted to 300,000 men, a motley multitude collected from every shore of the western Mediterranean, from Spain, Gaul, Liguria, Sardinia, Corsica, and Africa; the fleet which conveyed them consisted of 200 ships of war and over 3000 transports. The commander-in-chief was one of the two kings, Hamilcar, son of Hanno. The troops landed at Panormus, and advanced on the neighbouring Himera, which was defended by Theron. But Theron was not a match for the Carthaginians either in power or ability. He appealed to Gelon, who rendered timely aid with 50,000 foot and 5000 horse, and displayed remarkable generalship. After some minor successes against the Carthaginians he was victorious in a great battle, in which he destroyed the whole Carthaginian army as well as the fleet, which had been drawn up on land. King Hamilcar himself met his death by plunging, as it was said, into the flames of the sacrifice which had not been able to avert the wrath of the gods. A few of the troops took refuge in the Phoenician province which belonged to Carthage; of the fleet, twenty ships which had not been drawn up on land sailed to Africa, but were destroyed by a storm, and only a single boat returned to Carthage to report the catastrophe. Pindar was certainly right when he placed the victory of

Himera on a level with Salamis and Plataea, and thus crowned the Syracusans with the same wreath as the Athenians and Spartans. Pindar, it is true, did not say that the victory in Sicily was more the result of skilful generalship and good military organization than of patriotic enthusiasm, for there were many mercenaries in Gelon's army.

The results, too, were not quite the same in the West as in the East. In the East the movement continued even after the battles of Salamis and Plataea, and the Persians were soon forced farther back than before the Ionic revolt; moreover, no peace was concluded. In the West the *status quo* was maintained as the result of a formal peace between Carthage and Gelon; the tyrant had rightly come to the conclusion that it was not to the interest of the Greeks in Sicily to have more barbarian subjects in the west of the island. The Carthaginians had to pay a war indemnity of only 2000 talents. The booty, in gold and silver, arms and slaves, which fell into the hands of the Greeks was enormous, quite equal to that of Plataea. No prisoners were made in the battle, but those who escaped might hope to be let off with slavery. Several Acragantine citizens thus became the owners of 500 slaves, which represented a value of at least £4000. The bulk of the slaves and money which thus fell to the share of the Syracusans and Acragantines was devoted by them to the construction of public works on a grand scale, such as temples, aqueducts, and the like. Gelon's fame was shared by his wife Damarete. A coin, probably a silver decadrachm, was stamped to commemorate the occasion, and called Damareteum after her. There are still some specimens of the coin extant. Gelon's golden tripod in Delphi was a pendant to the tripod of Plataea, and the inscription written for it by Simonides placed the victors of Himera on a level with those of Salamis and Plataea, as Pindar had done.

The victory over the Carthaginians made Gelon's position in Syracuse stronger than before. He had often acted as a

despot; the 10,000 mercenaries, whom he had made citizens of Syracuse, were naturally a thorn in the side of the old citizens, who had been obliged to part with landed property and houses. When, however, on one occasion he appeared unarmed among the armed citizens and rendered an account of his actions to the people, he received an ovation, and was called king, not tyrant.² He had, like Leopold of Belgium in the year 1848, saved his own position by a prudent recognition of the sovereignty of the people. Affable and with a frank soldierly manner, Gelon had points of resemblance to his younger contemporary Cimon; and perhaps Miltiades, who had also been a tyrant, may have had a similar character.³ Gelon died in 478. His funeral gave the Syracusan people another opportunity of showing their devotion to their able prince.

He was succeeded by his younger brother Hieron, who was able to enjoy the fruits of Gelon's labour at greater leisure, and who made a name for himself by the brilliancy of his court and by his patronage of the poetic art. The third brother, Polyzelus, ought really to have shared in the government, but this could not be arranged, and he fled to Theron at Acragas, in consequence of which a quarrel nearly broke out between Hieron and Theron. Hieron might, in case of war, have been able to count on the aid of the Himeraeans, who had revolted against Theron. But the two potentates made up their differences, and each surrendered his *protégés* who were obnoxious to the other, as despots generally do in such cases.

Hieron's love of display showed itself in his discontent with his position at Syracuse, which was only a secondary one as compared with that of Gelon. He aspired to the honour of being founder of a state, and consequently a hero. This he achieved in a very simple manner. He expelled the inhabitants of Catana, and gave their property and houses to 10,000 new citizens, partly Syracusans and partly Pelopon-

nesians, who henceforth honoured him as a hero. Catana was now called Aetna for a time, and Pindar has celebrated in beautiful language the Aetnean Hieron, who introduced the institutions of Hyllus, *i.e.* of the Dorians, into the new city. The only trace of this caprice of a despot is to be found in coins ;⁴ Hieron was certainly a suspicious tyrant, susceptible to flattery, but that there was something more in him than this is shown by his conduct in Italy. Here he displayed his power in two places, at Locri and Cyme, and at Cyme he did really useful work for Greece.

Locri, which had always been on intimate terms with Syracuse, he protected against Anaxilas, the tyrant of Rhegium and Zancle (477). Pindar has referred to this in the second Olympic ode. But far more noteworthy and important was the protection he extended to Cyme.

The following events had taken place here about the 64th Olympiad (524 B.C.) This advanced post of Greek civilization in Italy was threatened by a huge coalition of barbarians, who lived more or less near the city. Tyrrhenians, *i.e.* Etruscans, Umbrians and Daunians are mentioned by Dionysius of Halicarnassus as enemies of the Cymaeans. The aboriginal Italians thus joined the immigrant Etruscans for the destruction of Cyme. Their forces are said to have amounted to not less than 500,000 infantry and 18,000 cavalry, to which the Cymaeans, who had to guard their city and man their fleet, could not oppose more than 4500 foot and 600 horse.⁵ In spite of this the barbarians were defeated.⁶ Aristodemus, called Malacus, had specially distinguished himself in this war ; he now became the head of the democratic party of this aristocratically-governed state.⁷ Twenty years after the battle there came an appeal for help from the inhabitants of Aricia against Aruns, son of Porsena. Aristodemus, of whom the aristocrats wished to rid themselves on this occasion, was despatched with 2000 men to the Latin coast. He was, however, victorious, and on his return to Cyme made himself

master of the tyranny. Tarquinius Superbus, when banished from Rome after losing the battle of Lake Regillus, took refuge with him. The Roman king made Aristodemus his heir. According to the highly-coloured party accounts of Dionysius, Aristodemus ruled very despotically. He was overthrown and cruelly murdered in a sudden attack by the sons of the aristocrats put to death by him, who had been brought up in the country, and had taken refuge in the mountains. This probably happened about 485. Some ten years later we find Cyme hard pressed by the Etruscans. It is difficult to see our way clearly in all these events, but two assumptions seem probable, firstly, that the barbarians, either Etruscans or Italians, always aimed at the possession of Cyme; and secondly, that the period after the overthrow of Aristodemus, when the aristocracy had been reinstated in Cyme, may have appeared to the Etruscans particularly favourable for an attack, not only because Cyme was itself weakened by the revolution, but because they probably thought they could cope with the aristocracy more easily than with a clever tyrant. So they pressed Cyme hard, and Cyme appealed to Hieron for aid. Hieron came with a fleet and defeated the Etruscans at sea, off Cyme itself (474 B.C.) Pindar has celebrated this victory also in the first Pythian ode. And there is further evidence of it in a bronze helmet found at Olympia and now preserved in the British Museum, which was sent by Hieron to Olympia out of the Etruscan booty. The victory at Cyme caused a considerable decrease of the Etruscan power. The Etruscans soon afterwards were compelled to conclude an unfavourable truce for forty years with the Romans, whom they had harassed so much, and Greek commerce and Greek communities had no further occasion to suffer at their hands. In consequence of his victory Hieron built a fortress in Aenaria (Ischia), which he had evidently procured from the Cymaeans as a reward for his assistance. But earthquakes and eruptions soon drove the Syracusans out of the island.

By his victory at Cyme Hieron completed the work which Gelon had begun at Himera. The Carthaginians and Etruscans were the ancient enemies of the Greeks in the West—we need only recall the case of the Phocaeans, who were unable to maintain their settlement in the Corsican Alalia against these two foes. The Carthaginians, in obedience to the commands of Xerxes, hurled themselves against the Greeks of Sicily; the Etruscans made use of the opportunity to make a descent upon the Greeks of Italy. Gelon and Hieron preserved the western Greeks from the fate which the eastern Greeks escaped through Miltiades, Leonidas, and Themistocles. But in conformity with the character of the western Greeks, who were a mixed and motley multitude, the result was accomplished in the West by brave and clever tyrants, whereas in the East it was achieved by popular enthusiasm under patriotic leadership.

Before we mention the last and less important intervention of Hieron in Italian affairs, we must refer to what had happened meanwhile in Sicily. The tyrant of Messana and Rhegium, Anaxilas, died in 476 B.C., and the freedman Miccythus acted as regent for his sons. This involved no complications at first, as was the case on the death of Theron in 473. Theron was succeeded by his cruel and incapable son Thrasydacus, who was foolish enough to begin a war with Hieron. He was conquered. The Acragantines obtained their liberty as did the Himeraeans; and Pindar alludes for this reason to Zeus Eleutherios in an ode composed in honour of a Himeraean victor (Olymp. Od. 12). The emancipated cities submitted to the peaceful influence of Hieron, who exercised also a kind of protectorate over the territory of the sons of his father-in-law Anaxilas. Rhegium is said to have been hard pressed in 473 by the Iapygians, who had defeated an army from Tarentum and Rhegium—the Iapygians are even alleged to have penetrated into Rhegium. This proves that the Greeks were still far from having a decided superiority in these districts. But the Iapygians were not really dangerous for the moment, and

the reverse had no permanent results. Afterwards Hieron induced his brothers-in-law to demand an account of his administration from Micythus. The latter acquitted himself most satisfactorily, and then retired to Greece, where he died at Tegea in 467. In the same year (or 466) Hieron also died. We shall relate subsequently the course of events in Syracuse and Sicily after his death.⁸

NOTES

Of contemporary or nearly contemporary authorities for the events of this Chapter, besides some inscriptions enumerated by Busolt 2, 218, the Odes of Pindar referring to Sicily and dedicated to Hieron (Ol. 1, Pyth. 1, 2, 3), to Theron (Ol. 2, 3), to Chromius (Nem. 1, 9), and to Xenocrates (Pyth. 6, Isthm. 2) are of importance, and the Scholiasts, whose historical information comes mostly from Timaeus. Herodotus has some occasional information, and there is a little in Thucydides in the Introduction to Book VI. (following Antiochus?). Only fragments remain of this Sicilian historian, and of the works of his countrymen Philistus and Timaeus; Timaeus is the basis of a great part of Diodorus' notices of Sicily (Book XI.); but Diodorus made use also of Ephorus. Some incidents are also given by Polyaeus; very little that is of use by Trogus Pompeius in the extracts of Justinus. Of modern writers cf. Holm, *Gesch. Sic. im Alterthum*, 1, 171 seq., O. Meltzer, *Gesch. der Karthager*, 1, 142 seq., Busolt, *Gr. G.* 2, 218 seq. especially 249 seq.; the latter's collection of passages quoted and summaries of the various conjectures of modern writers are particularly instructive. Against the arguments of Busolt 2, 265 it may be remarked that the accounts which are traceable to Timaeus deserve consideration on account of his Sicilian extraction. Compare also Curtius, *G. G.* 2⁶, 861 seq., where we may note that the artists' inscriptions on Sicilian coins mentioned at p. 863, but really belonging only to the end of the fifth century, have been exhaustively discussed by R. Weil in the Berlin Winkelmanns-programm of 1884. The numbers of the Carthaginian army are certainly exaggerated.

1. Schol. Pind. Pyth. 1, 146 following Eph. Fr. 111, and Diod. 11, 1 and 20, also following Ephorus. The occurrence is so natural that there is no need to doubt it. In the same way the next Carthaginian attack on Sicily in 409 B.C. is closely connected with the renewed intervention of the Persians in Greek affairs which had just taken place at that time. We do not know what form the adherence

of the Carthaginians to the projects of the Persians took, whether it was a command or a request on the part of the Persians. The Etruscans, the third in the League, were not conquered till 474.

2. The 10,000 mercenaries were probably conveniently distributed among the sovereign people.

3. Unfortunately the accounts of the character of Miltiades are very vague. The individual is eclipsed by the general, his long previous career by Marathon and Paros. It is remarkable that the anecdotes, which are often so instructive, do not begin in the case of Athens till about 480 B.C. To a certain extent it was not till then that the Greeks, especially the Athenians, were stirred up, and began to develop an appreciation of individual character. Hitherto characters had only been studied in the cases of various tyrants and philosophers; the republican citizen was originally hardly intended to be an individual.

4. These are the coins which Curtius, G. G. 2⁶, 863, following Leake, assigns to Aetna-Inessa, but which really belong to the Catana of Hieron's time; cf. Holm, Catane, Lüb. 1873, pp. 42 and 44 and Head, Hist. Num. p. 114.

5. Etruscans, Umbrians, and Daunians are certainly not Oscans, whose home was in Campania. But is it not likely that these latter also took part in the war against Cyme? Dionysius of Halicarnassus, who narrates these wars (7, 2 seq.), has probably taken his materials from Timaeus.

6. Yet the already hellenized towns of Suessula and Nola certainly submitted to the barbarians at this time.

7. Dion. Hal. 7, 4 *δῆμον προστάτης*. Dio C. quoted in Zon. 7, 15, calls the first Roman tribunes of the people *προστάτας* of the people. It is not impossible that the institutions of Cyme had some influence on those of Rome, where at that time instead of a *δῆμον προστάτης* they were introducing a college of *δήμαρχοι* and entertained, not without reason, a special dread of a tyranny.—Cf. Bus. 2, 275, and for the chronology besides Schwegler, R. Gesch. 2, 192 seq. and 350 seq., Holzapfel, Röm. Chronol. pp. 149, 150.—The battle off Cyme took place probably in 524 B.C., that of Aricia in 504. When Aristodemus was in the 14th year of his reign Roman ambassadors came to Cyme (D. Hal. 7, 12), consequently about the years 491 or 492. According to D. Hal. 7, 9 (*in re* the children of the murdered men) Aristodemus reigned about 20 years, as some of these youths were over 20 years old. The double mention of the period of 20 years (7, 5 and 9) is certainly somewhat suspicious. Cf. also Schw. 2, 72 seq.—Just as the *tribunatus plebis* is a legal determination of the position of the *δῆμον προστάτης* of the Greeks, so we shall find in the *tribuni*

militares cons. pot. a similar determination of the position of the Athenian Strategi. Only the Romans always adopted more precise definitions for all their constitutional ideas than the Greeks.

8. I once more draw attention to this important contrast: in the East a national army encountered a national army; in the West tyrants with mercenaries encountered mercenaries. In the West the hostile armies were in the main similarly organized; in the East the Greeks were far superior to the Persians in equipment, discipline, and enthusiasm for their cause. Hence in my opinion Xerxes was bound by the nature of the case to carry out his invasion with vast masses of men.

CHAPTER VII

SPARTA AND ATHENS AFTER 479 B.C.

THEIR victorious struggles in the East and in the West gave the Greeks half a century of comparative repose, in which they were able to devote their energies to the works of peace, and attain in them a height which is unique in history. And this burst of mental activity still continued when other great conflicts, on this occasion civil war, broke out. We shall describe the great intellectual achievements of the Greeks in the fifth century B.C. in three separate divisions, which correspond to the three periods of the political history of Greece at this time. For just as in politics the personality of Cimon at first, and afterwards in a more marked degree that of Pericles, gave the age its distinctive tone, whereas towards the close of the century the differences between men and parties became more and more sharply defined, so we may, from an intellectual point of view, call the first period that of Aeschylus, the second that of Sophocles and Phidias, and the third that of Euripides, Aristophanes, and Socrates. The description of these great achievements of the intellect will be interrupted by the narrative of political events.

Of the patriotic states of Greece, Athens had suffered most heavily. The city had been laid waste and the temples burnt. Everything had to be rebuilt. And here arose a great difficulty, which came upon the Athenians somewhat unexpectedly. They wished to build new and more extensive

walls. But the Spartans were of opinion that it would be better for no city outside the Peloponnese to possess walls, so as to prevent an enemy establishing himself within them as the Persians had done in Thebes. It would therefore be advisable, they urged, not to build any new fortifications, and even to pull down those already in existence. At all events Athens had better remain unfortified.¹ Such was the patriotic pretext. The selfish reality was that the Spartans wished to keep their allies more under their own control. The Athenians were naturally averse to complying with their request. It is difficult to understand the presentation of a demand of this kind to a free state, but it shows that Sparta regarded Athens as a member of her league. The question could only be, what form the refusal should take. Themistocles advised a reply to the effect that they would send a special embassy to Sparta. The Spartans were satisfied with this. Themistocles then offered to conduct the embassy himself, but begged that he might be sent on first alone, and that in the meanwhile the construction of the wall, for which all preparation had been made, should be pushed on by every means in their power, with the aid of even women and children, so as at all events to make it capable of resisting an attack in as short a time as possible. On his arrival at Sparta, he denied that the wall was being built, and invited the Spartans to send ambassadors to Athens themselves if they wished to be convinced of the truth of his assertion. This was accordingly done, and thus the Athenians had, as he took care to inform them, hostages for the safety of himself and his colleagues, Abronichus and Aristides, who had arrived in the meantime. On hearing from the latter that the wall had reached a sufficient height, he told the Spartans the truth; and they were wise enough, as they had been duped, not to show their annoyance, but to say that they had only wished to give a piece of advice.

It is very doubtful whether the trick so cleverly carried out

by Themistocles, in which even the upright Aristides had a hand, was really necessary. It injured its author's influence with the Spartans considerably, and, what was worse, disturbed the good relations which existed between the two states.

The wall of Themistocles embraced a wider circumference than the old one; it crossed the summit of the rocky heights to the south-west of the Acropolis (the observatory, the so-called Pnyx and the Museum), then to the north-west it included the still visible Dipylon gate, and, approaching the Ilissus and receding from it again, enclosed the citadel in a fairly wide circuit. Thucydides says that the gravestones and other still earlier monuments worked into the wall showed the haste with which it had been constructed, and his statement has been proved to be correct near the Dipylon gate. Nothing was done at this time for the fortification of the Acropolis. On the other hand, the work begun in the Piræus was continued. Themistocles had pointed out to the Athenians the necessity for this wall, and commenced the works; he lived to see its completion. It is true that the wall round the Piræus only reached half the height intended; but it was of considerable thickness ($3\text{--}3\frac{1}{2}$ yards), and moreover the height was sufficient for practical purposes.

The Spartans were at first inclined to continue the war against the Persians. They sent Pausanias on an expedition, and the accounts that we have of it—they are only of a fragmentary nature—show that he accomplished a great deal. With the aid of Peloponnesian, Athenian, and other ships, he conquered the greater part of Cyprus, a fact of considerable importance, if we remember the close relations existing between this island, which lay in the remotest corner of the Mediterranean, and Syria and Cilicia, and consider what a good point of vantage it was for watching and attacking the coasts of the two latter countries. He then proceeded northward and took Byzantium, which was of even greater import-

ance to the Greeks than Cyprus. But at this point the character of the man underwent a change. He ruled so despotically in Byzantium that the allies were estranged from him and from Sparta, and besought the Athenians to take over the command against Persia.² Of course there were no Peloponnesians among these allies; they might complain about Sparta, but would never wish to have Athens as a leader. But Pausanias had at that time already made treacherous overtures to Persia. He set free some relatives of the king who had been taken prisoners at Byzantium, and commenced a correspondence with Xerxes by means of a confidant, the Eretrian Gongylus, in which he offered to make Greece subject to him, and asked for the hand of one of his daughters in marriage as a reward. Xerxes sent a friendly reply, and appointed Artabazus, the satrap of Dascylium, to negotiate with him. Pausanias even adopted Oriental dress, and on his journey through Thrace was escorted by Median and Egyptian bodyguards. The complaints of his conduct which reached Sparta at last induced the Ephors to recall him, and he obeyed. He was impeached for treason, but not found guilty. But he was not sent as Spartan representative to the Hellespont again, a certain Dorcis being despatched in his place. The allies, however, refused to obey Dorcis. The result was that Sparta withdrew from Asiatic affairs. No more Spartans were sent thither, and naturally the rest of the Peloponnese held aloof. But Pausanias proceeded to the East on his own account. He came to Byzantium on board a ship from Hermione, and installed himself there as tyrant. But the Athenians could not tolerate this. They no longer had to respect him as the representative of Sparta, and felt that they were themselves masters of those regions. They accordingly drove him out of this important place, which he had probably held for seven years.³ He then settled at Colonnæ in the Troad, whence he continued his negotiations with the Persians. Thereupon the Ephors ordered him to return

home, or he would be treated as an enemy, and he obeyed, hoping to disarm his opponents by bribes. He was thrown into prison at Sparta, but the court dismissed the charges against him, and he was accordingly set free, and continued to live in his native country. The Spartans came to the conclusion that he cherished a design of inciting the Helots to revolt, and this may have been true. But there was no definite evidence on which they could take action against him. This was supplied by the information of a man from Argilus, who had been sent by Pausanias as a messenger to Artabazus, but had not delivered his message because he was told that none of the previous messengers had returned. He was struck with the fact, opened the letter, and read in it a request to Artabazus to have him killed. This letter he handed over to the Ephors. But even with this proof they were unwilling to proceed against the victor of Plataea. They wanted to have a confession of his guilt from his own mouth, and therefore set a trap for him. The Argilian was made to assume the character of a suppliant and take refuge in the sanctuary on Mount Taenarum, and then send word to Pausanias to visit him there. At this interview he reproached Pausanias with his conduct, and the Ephors, who were in hiding close by, heard the king admit the truth of the charge. They could now proceed against him. The Ephors wished to arrest him in Sparta, but, as they advanced to seize him, he perceived their intention and fled to the sanctuary of Athene Chalcioicus. Here he was inviolable. But they walled up the exits, removed the roof, and left him to die of starvation (probably in the summer of 468).⁴ The corpse was buried in the neighbourhood of the Caiadas, the cavern into which criminals were thrown. They had carried him out of the sanctuary just before his death, but nevertheless violence had been used, and so Sparta was obliged to dedicate two statues of him to Athene Chalcioicus.

The accounts which have come down from antiquity leave

no doubt of the guilt of Pausanias. His whole behaviour, moreover, shows that he undertook things which he was not in a position to carry out. He was too conceited in prosperity, and wanting in prudence when under suspicion. For if he maintained a treacherous correspondence with Artabazus, it was foolish of him to refer to the fate of the messengers in one and the same letter. Whether he was a good general or not, we cannot say; at Plataea he only distinguished himself by his defensive tactics, the conduct of the battle was not in his hands. His death was no loss whatever either to Sparta or to Greece.⁵

But his fall involved that of a great man. The Spartans wished to make political capital out of this disagreeable incident. If disgrace attached to them, others should incur it too, and injury into the bargain. They sent to Athens and accused Themistocles of having been an accomplice in the treacherous intrigues of Pausanias.

The close of the Persian wars had left Themistocles a great man, both in Athens and throughout Greece. But after them he accomplished nothing but the completion of the fortifications of Athens and of the Piraeus. He was not allowed to do more. After a time he was banished by ostracism, it is not known exactly in what year, probably in 471 B.C. Thus long years elapsed in which his active mind must have been occupied with many matters of importance, without being able to execute any of them. But his own projects and the policy of his political opponents who obstructed him are alike unknown to us. The comments of later antiquity on the party politics of Athens in those days are to a great extent unwarranted, and the construction placed on them in modern times improbable. Later tradition mentions Cimon and Aristides as rivals of Themistocles,⁶ and defines his political tendency as an extravagant encouragement of democracy, which Aristides is supposed to have resisted. But no facts are advanced in proof of the last assertion; on the contrary, it

is a fact that Aristides gave the finishing touches to democracy in Athens. Hence the only argument in support of this tradition would be the widely-held opinion that a statesman who increases the maritime power of a country promotes democratic tendencies more than one who attaches greater importance to her military power, the contrast, in fact, between hoplites and sailors, which was used even in antiquity to characterize the rival aspirations of Aristides and Themistocles. But as a matter of fact, increase of maritime power and democracy are two things which have nothing to do with each other. The preponderance of naval power in England did not exercise the slightest influence upon the strengthening of democracy in that country, while democratic North America maintains no fleet of any importance. As a rule, sailors are not keen politicians. We should therefore first have to prove that Themistocles, in turning the attention of the Athenians to naval matters, intended at the same time to give the sailors greater political privileges than they previously enjoyed, before we could interpret the favour he showed to the navy as a strengthening of the democracy. But there is no trace of anything of the kind.⁷

The reasons given by the ancients for the exile of Themistocles are of quite a general character; he is accused of ambition and insolence.⁸ And as a matter of fact the cause of his banishment must be looked for in conduct which his enemies could characterize in this manner rather than in the pursuit of a definite political aim differing from that of the other popular leaders.

Themistocles was a man who aspired to rule and who knew how to command; he had his own well-founded opinions as to what constituted a sound policy for Athens, especially a foreign policy, but he had not really any party behind him to which he could look for permanent support. This was due partly to circumstances and partly to his own character—to circumstances for the following reason. Since the Peisistra-

tidae had disappeared, and the old conservative party of the nobility had lost its importance after the death of Isagoras, there were only two parties, which were led by two powerful families. In the middle of the sixth century in Athens there had been Diacrii under Peisistratus, Pediaei under Miltiades and Lycurgus, and Parali under Megacles. After 480 there were only two parties left, the Pediaei under Cimon, the son of another Miltiades, and the Parali under Aristides, the friend of the Megaclic Cleisthenes, and Xanthippus, the nephew of Cleisthenes by marriage with Agariste. The two remaining parties had advanced a little more towards the democracy. Cimon's party was, like that of Miltiades in the sixth century, the more aristocratic of the two; that of the Alcmaeonidae, now represented by Aristides and Xanthippus, had already made its evolution from the centre to the left, in the case of Cleisthenes.⁹ What was left for Themistocles if he wished to take a line of his own in domestic policy? Was he to continue the democratic tendencies, of which Peisistratus had originally been the exponent? But in the first place, the Alcmaeonidae had already inscribed them on their banner; secondly, the party of Peisistratus was disorganized; and thirdly, Themistocles was, as far as we know, not connected either by descent or friendship with any ruling family; he had therefore no party policy to adopt nor party influence on which he could rely. Although a Lycomid,¹⁰ he was a *novus homo*, and very self-willed into the bargain. A man who aspires to rule and has no party at his disposal by right of birth is in a bad way, especially if he is dogmatic and not always particular in his choice of means. But this was the case with Themistocles. His superiority made him enemies among the men who led the bulk of the party by means of their family connections, and his freedom from scruples discredited him with less clever people. Aristides, on the other hand, was just the man to adorn a party, an upright and honest man—as far as a politician could be—who supported the Alcmaeonidae,

obtruded his own personality as little as possible, and obtained the reputation of being an aristocrat merely by not currying favour with the people. Questions relating to the power of Athens had a special attraction for Themistocles, and no one was so well versed in the foreign relations of the city. But he had a fondness for crooked paths. The two missions of Sicinnus, the first of which is true beyond a shadow of doubt, and the method by which he frustrated the opposition of the Spartans to the building of the wall prove this clearly. It is even asserted that he once conceived a plan for the destruction of a Hellenic, *i.e.* a Spartan fleet, at a time when Athens was at peace with Sparta.¹¹ It is highly probable that he sometimes showed a want of straightforwardness also in home affairs and in his dealings with his fellow-citizens, which must, to a certain extent at least, have estranged the general sympathy from a man whose influence depended solely on his personal capacity. He was accused of being very fond of money, and he certainly lived like a man who spends a great deal. His peculiar relations with the Persians as early as 480, of a kind which should not be found in republics, were not such as to commend him to all his fellow-citizens; giving his daughters the names of Sybaris and Italia was a trifle in itself, but this too might be made a handle against him.¹² In short, the brilliant man, who was superior to many prejudices, easily became unpopular, and then it was not difficult to overthrow him, especially as he had no party at his back in Athens, and was detested by the Spartans. He was not employed as general after the year 480. And no doubt this was not merely because in less critical times others aspired to the honour and advantage connected with the chief command against the Persians; probably people did not feel certain that he would use his relations with Persia solely for the advantage of Athens. It is therefore not very surprising that he was banished when he incurred the displeasure of the two great parties; but it is neither proved nor probable that he was a

traitor like Pausanias. After his exile from Athens Themistocles resided principally in Argos, the centre of hostility against Sparta, but he also visited other places in the Peloponnese. The Spartans then sent envoys to Athens to accuse him of having participated in the treachery of Pausanias and to demand that he should be punished. The Athenians, acting on an *eisangelia* introduced by Leobotas, son of Alcmaeon,¹³ decided to send for Themistocles, and despatched some Athenians with the Spartan envoys to find him and bring him to Athens. Themistocles thought it prudent to keep out of the way, and fled to Corcyra, which was under obligations to him. But the Corcyreans did not venture to protect him against the Spartans, and he therefore went to the mainland of Epirus, where he begged protection of Admetus, king of the Molossians. Themistocles had once opposed his interests, but he counted on the generosity of the Prince, who did not give him up, but sent him by land to Pydna to King Alexander, who put him on board a ship bound for Asia. At Naxos he was in great danger. An Athenian fleet was there besieging Naxos. In consequence of a storm his ship was obliged to lay to there; if it went near the fleet, as it would naturally have done, he would be discovered. Themistocles made himself known to the captain, who kept his vessel at a distance from the fleet. He was thus saved and came to Ephesus and thence to Susa, just as Artaxerxes had ascended the throne.¹⁴ He asked the king to receive him after a year had elapsed, by which time he would have acquired the Persian language, and reminded him of the services he had once rendered to Xerxes. Artaxerxes allowed him the time asked for. He managed to get into great favour with the king, and held out hopes to him of making Greece a province of Persia. It was the custom in Persia to welcome foreign renegades of importance, and Themistocles was of great importance. He received the revenues of three cities for his maintenance: Lampsacus for wine, Myus for provisions (meat),

and Magnesia on the Maeander for bread and as a residence. The bread amounted to 40 talents a year. His name on the coins of the city proves that he really ruled as tyrant in Magnesia.¹⁵

There were different versions of his death even in the time of Thucydides. Some said that he died of an illness, others that he committed suicide because he could not or would not fulfil his promise to make Greece subject to the king; the story was that he drank the blood of a bull for this purpose. The year of his death is not given; it is supposed to be 458 B.C. His statue was erected in the market-place at Magnesia; his bones are said to have been brought by his relatives to Attica and there buried in his native soil.

Themistocles was one of Greece's greatest men. He did good service to his country, and, as far as we know, never injured it. He had not an attractive personality, but then great statesmen seldom have. He had grave defects of character, for which he had to pay dearly in the long run. The ease of a despot of Magnesia could not mean happiness to a man like Themistocles, and if it is true that he lived in constant expectation of a summons to make Greece a dependency of Persia, he could have had no peace of mind, and must have been worse off than Napoleon at St. Helena.¹⁶

The Athenian state meanwhile continued to develop vigorously under the leadership of the representatives of the two great parties, Cimon and Aristides, who managed public affairs in agreement with one another. At first the elder of the two, Aristides, took the lead both at home and abroad. He gave his name to the completion of the democratic constitution by carrying the law which made all Athenians, even those of the fourth property class, eligible to the archonship.¹⁷ It has been conjectured that selection by lot was introduced for the archonship on this occasion, according to Duncker, as a compensation to the aristocracy for the democratic extension of the franchise. But as early as the battle of Marathon

Herodotus refers to the polemarch as being chosen by lot, and it is difficult to believe that, if the system was introduced at a much later period by Aristides or Ephialtes, Herodotus was not aware of it. Selection by lot is in itself neither a democratic nor an aristocratic institution; it simply promotes impartiality at the expense of the possible qualifications of the candidates. It is therefore useful in the case of functions for which no special qualifications are requisite. It was safe to choose the archons by lot when their office had lost its intrinsic importance. This began with Cleisthenes, who made the Strategi and Prytanes the real magistrates of the state. Besides, for the Greeks selection by lot had a significance which must not be overlooked; it was considered an expression of divine confidence, for the gods decided in this fashion.¹⁸

Aristides also had the principal share in settling the relations of Athens to the allies, after Cimon had shown how they were to be treated in particular cases.¹⁹ The Athenian League was a continuation and offshoot of the great Hellenic League against Persia, which had itself grown out of the Peloponnesian alliance headed by Sparta. Athens had submitted to this headship as early as 490, and still more in 480 and 479. As soon, however, as the war was transferred from European Hellas to Asia and the Hellespont, the competency of Sparta to conduct it ceased, and besides the Spartans and other Peloponnesians soon got tired of fighting in those parts. Sparta therefore having ceased to defend the Asiatic Greeks against the Persians, they sought protection from Athens. She accepted the leadership and kept it in her own hands. The first steps on this path are, like the beginnings of so many important matters of a similar character, but little known.²⁰ This much only is certain. When the Athenians took over the command against Persia, the new allies, the Asiatic and insular Greeks, were badly equipped and organized, and the majority were so conscious of their military incapacity that

they preferred to pay a money contribution and, in case of need, furnish ships and soldiers, leaving all essentials to Athens. Hence arose the necessity of fixing the amount of their contribution, and this Aristides undertook to do. His procedure met with general approval, and the Phoros of Aristides remained the ideal estimate for the allies long after his death, which took place soon afterwards.²¹ The treasury was entrusted to the care of the Delian Apollo, the old Ionic tutelary god, and was managed by Hellenotamiae nominated by Athens. Thus the allies had themselves made Athens their mistress, and Athens henceforth took every concession once made to her as her right, and considered and treated all attempts to withdraw from the arrangement as rebellion. Unfortunately, having regard to the Greek character, this method of procedure was far from being unnecessary.

NOTES

Authorities. We are at the commencement of the history of the so-called *Pentecontaetia*, which is really only a *Tessaraktaetia*, and extends from about 479-439, at which point, coinciding with the close of the Samian war, the precursors of the Peloponnesian war appear, with which a new epoch begins, in respect of authorities as well as history. Our material for these forty years is scanty, apart from the history of civilization, grand monuments of which are still partly in existence. Besides the inscriptions, some of which are very important, but are only in a fragmentary condition (see below), we are limited to the ancient histories, which fall into two classes: (1) the more or less chronological narratives; (2) biographies. To the former class belong Thucydides and Diodorus, to the latter Plutarch's biographies, i.e. those of Themistocles, Aristides, Cimon, and Pericles, for Nicias and Alcibiades belong to the period of the Peloponnesian war. Of these writers Thucydides alone was nearly contemporary, and so could speak from personal inquiry. Thucydides as a rule conveys a decided impression that he really tried to find out and did find out the truth, although of late some writers have established certain points against him in this respect, for which see below in the notes to Chapter XXI. When therefore later authors differ from Thucydides, we have to ask the question: was it possible for them to have better informa-

tion than he had? What other and better sources could they have had? It is not sufficient to ask from what authors they quote; for it is possible that they quoted least from the very authors whom they used most. We must find out, independently of such quotations, what authorities they could and did use, and in what way they availed themselves of them.

With regard to this last point, which is of the highest importance, the view, which long prevailed among scholars, that Diodorus and Plutarch copied their authorities slavishly, and that we can trace them word for word in their writings, is now pretty generally abandoned, especially in the case of Plutarch. The ancient historians worked, as we do now, each on his own method, one adhering closely to his originals, another treating the subject more freely. Plutarch, who was a thinker and artist, handles his materials much more independently than Diodorus, and so it is far less easy in his case to say where the use of a new authority begins than it is with Diodorus. When we have further to ascertain whether Plutarch and Diodorus made proper use of their materials and reproduced the substance of them correctly, everything tends to show that their accuracy was not such as to command implicit confidence. Diodorus has often made mistakes, because he was unable to master the mass of material before him, and Plutarch has at times paid more attention to the ideal significance of a life than to the absolute accuracy of its individual facts, as we shall see later in several instances. Thus the use of Diodorus and Plutarch presents considerable difficulty to us, and the value of their narratives is further depreciated by the unmistakable fact that the authorities at their disposal are, with the exception of Thucydides, of no particular value.

For what writers could they have used and did they use as a matter of fact? Modern research (for which cf. as an exhaustive criticism the *Untersuchungen über die Darstellung der griechischen Geschichte von 489-413*, by L. Holzapfel, Lpz. 1879) has established the fact that their chief sources were Ephorus and Theopompus, and besides them other historians, who for the most part were neither more ancient nor more important than these two. Ephorus and Theopompus belonged to the fourth century B.C., and therefore lived rather more than a century after the events of the *Pentecontaetia*. What they wrote about the years 480-440 could only have been derived from literary sources. Were there any such available, apart from Thucydides? And had Ephorus and Theopompus the ability and the wish to investigate the history of the years 480-440 accurately? As regards the latter point, Theopompus has treated that period merely as an excursus *περὶ δημαγωγῶν*,

in the tenth book of his Philippian history, and with the object of decrying the Athenian democracy. In the case of Ephorus, the history of the *Pentecontaetia* is certainly the object of his work, but after having been long considered a careful writer (by Fricke, for instance, *Unters. über die Quellen des Plut. im Nikias und Alkib.* Leipz. 1869) he has now been proved by the latest researches to be an untrustworthy historian. In the second volume of his history of Greece Busolt gives conclusive proofs of the untrustworthiness of the man, who at times appears almost to be an impostor (Bus. 2, 105, 106, 152, 154, 174, 327, 440, and elsewhere). Ephorus and Theopompus were both rhetoricians, pupils of the rhetorician Isocrates, and they composed history not so much with the object of recording truth as in order to display their style and for purposes of instruction. Granting, however, that they aimed at truth in matters of fact, which must be assumed as a general rule, where could they find it except in Thucydides? In the first place there were official documents which they might have used, as we even have fragments of them—resolutions of the people, accounts, etc., but there is no trace of their having used them to any great degree. Craterus, brother of Antigonus Gonatas, was the first to turn his attention to these sources of history in the spirit of exact political investigation created by Aristotle. He published the Athenian *Psephismata*, and is quoted by Plutarch. On the other hand there were, it is true, some contemporaries of the *Pentecontaetia*, whom Ephorus and Theopompus could have used with Thucydides, and indeed probably did use, as even Plutarch has done so, but in all probability their writings were of inferior value. These are Ion of Chios in his *Epidemiai*, and Stesimbrotus of Thasos in his treatises on Themistocles, the elder Thucydides and Pericles. These works belong to the category of memoirs, as to the value of which Plutarch has pronounced a correct opinion (Per. 13). Ion appears to have recorded little of importance; and Stesimbrotus has not attained, in spite of the efforts of Ad. Schmidt, *Zeitalter des Pericles*, Bd. II., the importance which Schmidt endeavours to assign to him. No doubt if Stesimbrotus was, as Schmidt thinks, the principal authority for the *Pentecontaetia* in Plutarch, and if he was a reliable man, our information regarding the years 480-440 would be in a fairly satisfactory state; but Schmidt has not been able to prove that Plutarch made much use of him, nor has he been able to clear him from the charge of having only collected gossip. Most of what is still traced to Stesimbrotus is rightly regarded as dubious (Bus. 2, 489). Recently there has been an attempt to reach firm ground in another direction. A view has

been put forward (*e.g.* by Unger and Busolt), that Ephorus borrowed a good deal from an Atthis. This might be of some importance, as local research is a mine of information; but it is of greater value for antiquities than for history; and besides, according to the generally-received view, the Atthidae do not begin till about 400 B.C., with Cleidemus, so that they are not much older than Ephorus himself. Moreover, the trustworthiness of the Atthidae does not stand very high at present: "not free from self-glorification and untrustworthy details," Bus. 1, 363. The records of the Samian Duris may have had similar local importance (second half of fourth century). But in all these cases we may well ask the question—Did not all these writers aim at recording events, which, whether true or not, might redound to the glory of their native country?

The result of the foregoing observations on the value of the authorities for the history of the period 480-440 is therefore as follows.

Thucydides alone is of absolute value. He was probably right in thinking that he ought to supplement Hellanicus, who is too scanty for this period (Th. 1, 97), but he himself only gives a very brief survey of the events relating to the rise of the power of Athens. He may be supplemented, or even corrected by written documents (see below); but, on the other hand, statements made by Diodorus, Plutarch, or other later writers must be rejected if they contradict Thucydides, and if not, must be treated according to their intrinsic value and that of the author. The contributions of these later authors may be of great importance for that side of history which is less dependent on chronology, *i.e.* for the history of civilization. This is the case with the Pericles of Plutarch.

But the later writers are absolutely valueless for chronology, in respect of which importance has been wrongly assigned to Diodorus and Plutarch. We have to discuss here the question of the chronology of the *Pentecontaetia*, which in modern times has been treated principally in the following works:—K. W. Krüger, *Historisch-philologische Studien*, I. 1837; A. Schäfer, *De rerum post bellum pers. usque ad trienn. foedus in Graecia gestar. temporibus*, Lips. 1865; W. Pierson, *Die thukydid. Darstellung der Pentekontaetia*, Philol. 1869; Unger, *Diodors Quellen* im II. Buch, Philol. 1881-82; Volquardsen's works to be quoted presently; Duncker, *G. des Alt.* 8 and 9 in many passages; lastly, Busolt, *Gr. G. Bd.* 2, who thoroughly discusses each separate case. The results arrived at by the various scholars show a complete discrepancy; but the writers as a rule assume the possibility of attaining positive results in the individual cases. I

hope to show that, on the contrary, the nature of our authorities makes abstention from positive chronological conclusions the only safe rule.

Thucydides gives few dates, while Diodorus arranges everything according to years. Hence one could believe and for a long time did believe that the chronology of Diodorus might serve as a basis. It has, however, already been demonstrated by Volquardsen, *Untersuchungen über die Quellen des Diodor xi.-xvi.*, Kiel 1868, that Ephorus, upon whom Diodorus especially relies for his accounts of Oriental Greece, wrote without chronology, and I have adduced fresh proof of this in my *History of Sicily*. Moreover, the theories propounded by other writers respecting the beginnings of the years in Diodorus have not proved his usefulness as a chronological historian, not even Unger's ingenious hypothesis, to which I shall refer presently.

I trust to show in the following argument that Diodorus, although he may be accurate in his chronology of other periods, when he had annals at his disposal (for the way, however, in which he has distorted the chronology of the Peloponnesian War, with the best aids at his disposal, cf. Volquardsen 1, 1), deceives his readers with a make-believe chronology in the *Pentecontaetia*, especially in the first half (479-459). He wanted to maintain the annalistic form of his narratives in historical times, and yet it was precisely here that his authorities would not permit of it. The most striking proof of his incorrectness in spite of better knowledge is given in 11, 60-62, where he brings Cimon's actions into the space of one year, although he must have known that they could not have happened in that space of time; in ch. 60 he begins the year with the words—ἐπὶ δὲ τούτων (sc. ἀρχόντων), and concludes ch. 63 thus ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ἐπράχθη κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν ἐνιαυτόν. The same expressions are just as wrongly used in chh. 41 and 47. In reality Diodorus arranged the history of 479-459 according to the subject-matter, and his annalistic apparatus is a make-believe.

The following is the sequence of events according to him (I have marked the separate divisions (a) (b) (c) etc., and have omitted the events in Western Greece, in which he mostly follows Timaeus):—(a) 11, 37 Capture of Sestos, 479 B.C.—(b) 11, 39, 49 Building of the walls of Athens, 478.—(c) 11, 41-43 Fortification of the Piraeus, 477.—(d) 11, 44-46 Fate of Pausanias, 477.—(e) 11, 47 Measures of Aristides, 477 (11, 48 The death of Leotychides, 476, is from another purely chronological source).—(f) 11, 50 Resignation by Sparta of the hegemony against Persia, 475.—(g) 11, 54-59 Fate of Themistocles, 471.—(h) 11, 60-62 Measures of Cimon, 470.—(i) 11, 63, 64

Sparta's war against the revolt in Messenia, 469.—(*k*) 11, 65 Fall of Mycenae, 468.—(*l*) 11, 70 Difficulties of the Athenians with their allies, 464.—(*m*) 11, 71, 74, 75, 77 Egypt, ending with Ephialtes, 463-460.—(*n*) 11, 78 Quarrels of Athens with Corinth, Epidaurus and Aegina, 459.—(*o*) 11, 79 Megara sides with Athens; Myronides victorious.

This makes fourteen groups of events, each of which is complete in itself. Of these twelve are ascribed by Diodorus to one year. Even (*i*), which acc. to Diodorus (11, 64) is said to have lasted ten years, but is only brought to a close after fourteen years (11, 84), is related in a single year; only the narrative of (*m*) is spread over four years. In reality, however, things were as follows:—(*b*) and (*c*) might each have happened in one year, but this is improbable; (*d*) and (*e*) belong to several years; (*f*) should follow immediately on (*d*) and (*e*); but there is a year left unoccupied between; (*g*), (*h*), and (*l*) certainly extend over more than one year each. Of the twelve groups of events there are thus certainly five and probably two wrongly ascribed to one year. This would prove Diodorus utterly useless as a chronologist. But it is urged that the appearance only is against him: it is evident that he crowds the events of several years into one; in (*i*) he acknowledges it himself. If he did this in accordance with some principle, and this principle could be discovered, his chronology would at all events be serviceable to a certain extent. The explanation is said to be that he begins the narrative of the groups of events with the year in which the first of the separate events to be narrated by him in this section happened to fall. This is the view of Unger among others. But it is so difficult of application that other writers (Busolt following the example of Volquardsen) assume that "each division is placed in the year of the principal event which is related in it" (Bus. 2, 314). But how are we to know which was the principal event in his eyes? Which event was it, for instance, in the case of Pausanias and Aristides that was thus included in the year 477? It might just as well be said that the last event must have decided the date, for he concludes with the words (chh. 47 and 63): *ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ἐπράχθη κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν ἐνιαυτόν*. In my opinion the impossibility of applying these theories proves that they are incorrect and unserviceable, and my belief is that Diodorus did not trouble his head about the actual years 479-459, but related the course of events after Ephorus, and inserted names of Archons in the narrative at places which seemed to him convenient for the purpose. His narrative is a very systematic one and runs as follows.

After the conclusion of the great Persian war by the conquest of

Sestos (*a*) Athens built the walls of the city, in order to secure her independence (*b*), and the walls of the Piraeus (*c*). While the power of Athens rises in this way, that of Sparta declines owing to the conduct of Pausanias (*d*). Consequently Athens places herself at the head of a new league (*e*), and Sparta thus resigns the hegemony by sea (*f*). But Athens has also to encounter difficulties, for Themistocles meets with a similar fate to that of Pausanias (*g*). Aristides has, it is true, founded the Athenian naval league, but it is not he who leads the allies to victory, but Cimon (*h*). In the meanwhile Sparta has other misfortunes, for after a great earthquake the Helots revolt and make a stand in Messenia (*i*), the consequence of which is that Argos is able to increase her power and destroy Mycenae (*k*). The difficulties of Athens were of another kind; they are due to her superabundant energy, to her interference in the affairs of the allies (*l*) and the ill-fated Egyptian expedition (*m*). The Peloponnesians seize this opportunity and attack Athens (*n*, *o*). This is a very good systematic account of the development of events in Greece from 479-459. If, however, the details had to be filled in, this might be done in two ways. Firstly, in the form of annals, but in that case Spartan and Athenian affairs would have to be interwoven; the exploits of Cimon and Pausanias, etc., would have to be recorded in the same way. Secondly, the writer might give up bringing together the events that happened in one year, and treat a group of events which had an internal connection. This last was the method of Ephorus; but if he wished to state the years as well, the same year would reappear in the different divisions. There is nothing to show that Ephorus went as far as this. Then came Diodorus. He wanted to relate the events of historical times in the form of annals, but his only basis for this epoch was Ephorus, who did not adopt this system, and whom he copied. How then did he manage after all to arrive at annals? He simply put the different dates of years at the head of Ephorus' different divisions which were arranged according to subject-matter. The following examples will show that his chronology is not only impossible in itself, but of no use even with modifications. If (*d*) (Pausanias) can begin in 477, against which there is nothing to be said (Cyprus), then in that case 477 no longer fits in for (*e*) (Aristides), for the words *οὐκέτι προσείχον* (11, 46) could not refer to the first year of Pausanias' public life, in which they are however placed. Thus it is quite impossible to use the chronology of Diodorus for Aristides. Further it is now universally admitted that (*h*) (Cimon) cannot begin in 470, but must begin in 476, and it is of no use to say that Cimon's public life

may have culminated in 470, for no action of Cimon can be discovered which would fit into that year. Further in (l) after the conquest of Thasos, which may well have taken place in 464, other matters are related which happened partly in 459/8 (secession of Aegina) and partly in 466/5 (settlement of Amphipolis, Bus. 2, 414). If we did not know from other sources that some of the details related in (l) had happened earlier than the year given by Diodorus, how could we possibly suspect anything of the kind? There is no hint of it in Diodorus. The result is that Diodorus does not give a chronology, but only the make-believe of one. The sequence of events is really dependent on the subject-matter, and the dates of years are either misleading or useless.

Having thus seen that the Diodorus-Ephorus combination gives a good narrative of facts (apart from details), but is chronologically useless, we can also say from where Ephorus took the framework of his narrative, which he filled up with a respectable amount of connected material. His source was Thucydides, who also does not specify years. If we call the Thucydidean divisions *A*, *B* and so on, the following series correspond to one another: (*a*) = *A* (Th. 1, 89), (*b*) = *B* (1, 90-93), (*c*) = *C* (1, 93, 3), (*d*) = *D* (1, 94, 95, but with the addition of later events, 1, 128-134), (*e*) = *E* (1, 96), (*f*) is not distinct in Thucydides, it is comprised in *D*; on the other hand he has a personal remark in the corresponding passage (1, 97), for which Ephorus inserted (*f*) containing transactions in Sparta and the appearance of Hetoimarides. Thucydides puts (*g*) much later, 1, 135-138; (*h*) is concocted from 1, 98 and 1, 100, which are more strictly chronological in Thucydides; (*i*) = *I* (1, 101-103, but with an interruption at 102). Diodorus alone has *K*, but he introduces it here because Thucydides mentions Argos in this passage (1, 102); (*l*) = *L* (1, 98, 99, 101); here we see clearly that Diodorus does not place events in the year in which they begin; he arranges on an internal system. (*m*) = *M* (1, 104, 109, 110), (*n*) = *N* (1, 105), (*o*) = *O* (1, 105, 106). Thus one sees that Diodorus' authority follows the sequence of events in Thucydides as a rule, but leaves the chronology out of account and connects events only by their subject-matter. It is also clear why Cimon, for instance, first appears in such an unsuitable passage, unsuitable from a chronological point of view. Diodorus had first to dispose of the lives of Pausanias, Aristides, and Themistocles, and as Themistocles could not come on the stage till about 471—for Pausanias had to be got rid of before him—this explains why Cimon had to wait till 470. It might be said that the years between 475 and 471 were vacant, but Diodorus fills up these years with Sicilian history—probably on account of Timaeus, a more accurate writer from a

chronological point of view. Something must have happened every year. This seems to me to supply additional confirmation of the hypothesis that Diodorus simply borrowed his material from Ephorus, who arranged events in the order of subject-matter, and put more or less suitable dates at the heads of the various sections in accordance with his own good pleasure.

It is true that an attempt has been made just lately by Unger in his above-quoted treatise to save the chronological reputation of Diodorus at this period. Unger assumes that Diodorus leaves out the beginnings of the years which, in his opinion, Ephorus had, and thus admits that Diodorus concentrates the history of several years into one ; but Unger firmly maintains that this year is that of the first event of the division, and in that case the chronology of Diodorus would be of some service. Unger is certainly not followed in one of the most important cases, that of Cimon ; hardly any one is inclined to agree with him in assuming that Eion was not conquered till 470. And much remains inadmissible even for Unger. But he disposes of these last difficulties by the application of an ingenious theory. He observed that Diodorus occasionally begins his year's history with events which happened in the autumn of the previous year, and he concludes from this that Ephorus, whom Diodorus certainly followed, took as his basis the Macedonian commencement of the year, which falls in the autumn. He is followed by Busolt. It is true that Diodorus begins his narrative of events in the East in the years 480, 479, and 478, with matters which took place in 481, 480, and 479, but it is not proved that he did so for the reason assumed by Unger. This method of beginning the year is, as Unger himself admits, not carried out consistently, and if we consider the nature of the events thus assigned by Diodorus to a later period than the correct one, we arrive at another explanation of the fact. The events thus treated are such as belong by reason of their subject-matter to the group of the next year, and it is for this reason that Ephorus has inserted them in it. The campaign of Xerxes had to be related in the year 480 ; why should Diodorus separate the preparations, which he knew perfectly well belonged to 481, from the main subject and so cut up his narrative ? In this way the postponement of many events is easily explained by the endeavour to group together events which were connected in point of subject. And in the case of Ephorus we must not forget that this grouping according to contents is as good as proved, whereas the accuracy in chronology attributed to him by Unger is by no means so. What would Ephorus have done, if he wanted to take considerations of this kind into account ? He would have said in the history of the march of Xerxes : " Here

begins the Macedonian year. Xerxes assembled his army, etc. Now the spring begins, etc." And if there were parallel incidents, as in the cases of Pausanias and Aristides, he would have stated each time—consequently several times—the beginning of the Macedonian year, which always came just before the close of the events of the year. I see no grounds for such a hypothesis, which attributes to Ephorus a character quite foreign to him. In other parts also of this treatise Unger appears to me to find distinctions which do not exist. In Part II. p. 104, he concludes from ἀνακτησάμενος (Diod. 11, 71) that the passage is derived from a different authority to 11, 69. But ἀνακτησάμενος in ch. 71 is an allusion to κατακτήσασθαι in ch. 69, and shows that both chapters proceeded from the same mind.

We will now briefly consider the further narrative of Diodorus for the years 459-439 (11, 79 to 12, 28). Diodorus records (11, 79) the assistance rendered by the Spartans to the inhabitants of Doris (458): (*p*)=Th. 1, 107 (*P*); in 11, 80-83 follow Tanagra, Oenophyta (457) (*q*)=Th. 107, 108 (*Q*) [for Diodorus' account see infra, p. 147]; 11, 83 Athens against Pharsalus (457) (*r*)=Th. 1, 111 (*S*); 11, 84 exploits of Tolmidas, Gyttheum (456) (*s*)=Th. 1, 108 (*R*); 11, 85 Pericles, Oeniadae (455) (*t*)=Th. 1, 111 (*T*); [11, 88 repeats it with additions]; 11, 86 Spondae (454) (*u*)=Th. 1, 112 (*U*). Then follows Sicilian history. 12, 3, 4 Cyprus, Cimon (450, 449) (*v*)=Th. 1, 113 (*V*); 12, 4 Peace of Callias (449) (*w*) is wanting in Thucydides, while he, however, has something else in this passage which is wanting in Diodorus: that Sparta protected Delphi, and Athens the Phocians (Th. 1, 112). 12, 5 Revolt of Megara (448) (*x*)=Th. 1, 114 (*Y*); 12, 6 Coronea (447) (*y*)=Th. 1, 113 (*X*); 12, 7 Spondae (446) (*z*)=Th. 1, 115 (*Z*). After Italian affairs, which now follow, Diodorus (12, 27, 28) has the Samian War, which Thuc. treats in 1, 115-117. Thus we find once more in Diodorus the sequence observed by Thucydides, but with several transpositions, which are by no means improvements—(*r*) (*s*) instead of *SR*, and (*x*) (*y*) instead of *YX*, which seems to prove that Ephorus had another authority for these passages, who, we do not know, unless it is a confusion caused by Diodorus. But Ephorus is so entirely dependent on Thucydides even in this period, that he inserts, in place of a Thucydidean passage omitted by him, another which is not found in Thucydides, merely to fill up a gap, as above (*f*). If we consider how badly Diodorus has done his work in 11, 80-83 (see below), and how purposeless his transpositions are, we must pronounce his narrative as a whole of no value for details. This verdict is confirmed when we bear in mind

that occasionally a longer statement by Diodorus is nothing but an expansion of what Thucydides puts concisely. Thus 11, 39, 40 is evidently an utterly worthless rhetorical enlargement of Th. 1, 90-92, and 11, 41-43 a fanciful and, to my mind, sometimes nonsensical amplification of the passage in Th. 1, 93 relating to the building of the Piraeus and city-walls. In 11, 54, 55, in the history of Themistocles, we find two formal impeachments of Themistocles, a thing incredible in itself and, as it appears, not now believed by anybody. Lastly in 11, 77 some facts appear to have been invented to favour the Athenians. Unger, who would be sorry to be unfair to Diodorus, cannot (Part II. p. 124) prove the existence of any better authorities which he might have possessed, and the charges he brings against Thucydides (2, 120) do not seem to us well founded. It is only in the last section of all (12, 28) that Ephorus appears to be well informed and useful.

We now come to the value of Plutarch's narratives. In their case the general character has principally to be considered. Plutarch has moral objects in view even in his biographies, and besides aims at making each of them a miniature work of art. Each biography is intended to present a character, which the parallels contribute to bring into relief. Themistocles, who is compared with Camillus, is the wise liberator of his native country; Aristides, who is compared with Cato the Censor, is the upright statesman; Cimon, the great and wealthy general, is compared with Lucullus; Pericles, always circumspect as a man and a prudent soldier, with Fabius Maximus; Nicias, the rich but often weak politician, who is peculiarly unfortunate in the end, is compared with Crassus; finally Alcibiades, the spoilt, self-willed, and self-conscious man, whose statesmanship corresponds to his character, is compared with Coriolanus. This conception determines the selection of the facts which Plutarch wishes to communicate, and determines also the course of the narrative, except that at times the facts prove too strong for the theory, as in the case of Pericles. For Themistocles we have the work of A. Bauer (*Pl. Them. für quellenkrit. Uebungen comment. Lpz. 1884*); for Cimon and Pericles that of Rühl (*Die Quellen Plut. im Leben des Kimon, Marb. 1867*; *Die Qu. des Plut. Perikles, Jahrb. f. kl. Phil. Bd. 97*), and for Pericles the work of Sauppe in the *Abh. der Gött. Ges. des Wiss. 1867*. For our purpose it is expedient to examine the arrangement of the three biographies of Aristides, Cimon, and Pericles; for Themistocles we refer to the analysis by Bauer.

In the Aristides Plutarch starts with the alleged poverty of the man (ch. 1); he then refers to the contrast between him and Themistocles, where his virtues are conspicuous, as they are in his

whole bearing (chh. 3-5); at Marathon he is the first to give way on the question of the chief command, which Herod. 6, 110 does not mention. Similarly in chh. 6 and 7, 8 and 9, at the battle of Salamis. In ch. 10 we have the distress of the Athenians until the withdrawal of Mardonius, where Aristides is again introduced (not following Herodotus), and the pathetic answer of Athens to the Spartans is, no doubt, incorrectly transformed into a *psephisma* of Aristides. The answer is unsuitably split up into two parts, and Herodotus does not make Aristides an envoy. The battle of Plataea is related *ad maiorem Aristidis gloriam* as follows: ch. 11, prophecies received by Aristides; ch. 12, quarrel between Tegea and Athens, which Aristides nobly settles; ch. 13, conspiracy at Plataea frustrated by Aristides; ch. 14, cavalry engagement conducted to a successful issue by Aristides; ch. 15, appearance of Alexander, who summons Aristides; ch. 16, change of position of the contingents, nobility of Aristides; chh. 17-19, battle, once more noble conduct of Aristides; chh. 20, 21, Boeotian history, with further proof of the noble spirit of Aristides, whose uprightness is conspicuous even in his last years (ch. 22); lastly his death (ch. 21). As the whole biography is concentrated on the noble disposition of the hero, details of this kind, which are not found in Herodotus, are suspicious; they might so easily have come into history by means of tradition, and the Epicurean Idomeneus, who was probably Plutarch's authority for a good deal (Bus. 2, 107 and 111), was not a trustworthy writer. The oracle in ch. 11 was invented subsequently, according to Duncker, 7, 340, but not, as Duncker thinks, in honour of Delphi, but in honour of Plataea, which was said to have ceded its territory to Athens as an *ἐπίδοσις*, a conclusion, however, only drawn from the phrase of Alexander the Great—*ἐπέδωκαν* (ch. 11). The oracle of Tisamenus and the story of Masistius are put in the wrong place. The conspiracy in Plataea is altogether improbable (ch. 13). In ch. 15 the remark of Alexander, that Aristides should "*ἐτέρω μὴ κατεπεῖν*" what he said to him, is nonsensical, and only suited to a fairy tale or popular legend; Herodotus gives the true account. In ch. 16 the words "*ἐν τούτῳ δ', ὡς Ἡρόδοτος ἱστορεῖ, Πανσανίας Ἀριστείδη προσέφερε λόγον*" show how little we can depend on quotations in Plutarch, for Herod. (9, 46) does not mention Aristides. Even the words "*καὶ τῷ προνεικηκέναι θαρρόντας*" are a poor invention. Herodotus states simply that the Athenians answered that that was their intention also. But Plutarch creates difficulties in ch. 16 simply in order to magnify the importance of Aristides. In ch. 19, Herodotus is again referred to inaccurately; he mentions Megara and Phlius as well. The *psephisma* in ch. 21 is rejected

even by Duncker, 7, 356. It is worthy of note that in ch. 25 Aristides is ready to make his reputation for probity serve the interest of Athens even in a manner contrary to law. It is not likely that Aristides had anything to do with the transference of the treasury of the League to Athens (ch. 25). Finally, we must not overlook the fact that what Plutarch ascribes to Aristides without the authority of Herodotus is either self-evident and no proof of special ability, or improbable. All this shows that Plutarch's Aristides is of no value to us where it does not agree with Herodotus.

We now come to Cimon. After a long introduction (chh. 1-3), in which Plutarch enters into reminiscences of his native place, he gives a good analysis of Cimon's character. Then he discusses his military career, in which (ch. 6) he relates an anecdote about Pausanias, and dwells at length (ch. 7) on the taking of Eion, which occurred before the events of ch. 6. In ch. 8 the bringing of the bones of Theseus to Athens is related in detail; in ch. 9 we have an anecdote about the division of the booty at Sestos and Byzantium, in which Cimon gave proof of his great judgment. In ch. 10 Plutarch deals with the liberality and popularity of Cimon, and in ch. 11 with his method of governing the allies. In ch. 12 he comes by a skilful transition to the Persian War, and describes (chh. 12 and 13) the battle of the Eurymedon, and in ch. 14 the events on the Hellespont and in Thasos, and relates how the Athenians put him on one side (ch. 15) and select Ephialtes and Pericles as their leaders. Cimon was φιλολάκων, and helped the Spartans twice against Messenia (chh. 16, 17). He is now banished but recalled (ch. 18), and he reconciles Athens with Sparta and leads the Athenians against Persia. The warlike zeal of the Greeks against Persia disappears with his death (ch. 19); Agesilaus did not accomplish much.—There are two great chronological mistakes in this biography. In ch. 13 Plutarch puts the so-called peace of Cimon immediately after the battle of the Eurymedon, and then in spite of this is obliged to continue his history of the war. In ch. 18 he puts the death of Themistocles about 449, misled by a wrongly-applied reminiscence from his own biography of Themistocles (ch. 31). Hence we cannot accept other chronological statements of Plutarch in his biography of Cimon as a matter of course, for instance, the apparently contemporaneous conquest of Byzantium and Sestos (ch. 9), and the statement that the Persians had thirteen ships of war in the Hellespont after the battle on the Eurymedon. The biography of Cimon is merely a character-sketch illustrated by facts from his life, and has no chronological value at all. According to the generally-received idea, due

especially to Rühl, Plutarch's principal authority for his life of Cimon is Theopompus, who wrote a summary of the achievements of the Athenian popular leaders in a section of the 10th book of his history of Philip, for which reason it was styled *περὶ δημαγωγῶν*, Theopompus being an opponent of the democracy. If, therefore, we assume that Plutarch in his Cimon has followed the more argumentative method of Theopompus, we are justified in not taking his work as an authority for the sequence of events; and the fact that Plutarch reproduces the views of an opponent of the democracy warrants us in not accepting and repeating as a matter of course Plutarch's statements regarding the party politics of the great Athenian statesmen, Themistocles, Aristides, Cimon and Pericles. This will be found especially applicable to the cases of Themistocles, Aristides and Pericles, and I have endeavoured to treat the history of that period in this way. The incorrect views of Theopompus have hitherto found too ready acceptance with us. On the other hand, the portions of Plutarch's Cimon derived from Ion and Stesimbrotus and many other characteristic anecdotes in the biography deserve consideration.

Plutarch's most important biography in the fifth century is that of Pericles. The material is arranged in the following order. After the introduction (chh. 1, 2), Plutarch describes the external appearance of Pericles (ch. 3), then his training in the arts (ch. 4), and in philosophy, and the influence of this training on his conduct and style of oratory (ch. 5); his liberality of mind (ch. 6); then follows his entrance into politics (ch. 7); stress is laid on his seriousness (ch. 8); his opposition to Cimon leads him into extreme democratic principles; his procedure against the Areopagus (ch. 9); Pericles is reconciled with Cimon (ch. 10). After the death of the latter Pericles, in opposition to Thucydides, adopts more decidedly the position of candidate for popular favour. He sends out colonies (ch. 11), beautifies the city (chh. 12, 13). Thucydides is banished (ch. 14). At this point, now that Pericles rules alone, he changes his policy, and assumes the style of a monarch. He governs admirably, and is also a model in the management of his private affairs (chh. 15, 16). He makes an attempt to unite the Greeks more by means of religion (ch. 17). As a general he is cautious, the reverse of Tolmides, who is defeated at Coronea (447) (ch. 18). His expeditions to the Chersonese (date uncertain) and to Pegae (454) (ch. 19), his voyage to the Pontus (date unknown), and his foresight with regard to Egypt and Sicily (ch. 20) excite admiration. He opposes the Spartans, however, in connection with Delphi (448) (ch. 21). The revolt of Euboea (446) and its

results (chh. 22, 23) show how his caution was justified. After the Thirty Years' Peace comes the Samian War (chh. 24-28); then the causes of the Peloponnesian War (chh. 29, 30); apparently this war was connected with an accusation of Phidias (ch. 31); prosecution of Aspasia and Anaxagoras (ch. 32); beginning of the war (ch. 33); the plague (ch. 34); expedition of Pericles to Epidaurus; Pericles impeached (ch. 35); bereavement and discord in his family (ch. 36). Pericles again in favour with the people (ch. 37). His illness and death (ch. 38). Verdict on his career (ch. 39).

The arrangement is thus in the main as follows:—(1) Introduction, chh. 1, 2; (2) character of Pericles, chh. 3-6; (3) Pericles as a politician, chh. 7-17; (4) Pericles as a general, chh. 18-28; (5) the Peloponnesian War, chh. 29-38; (6) verdict, ch. 39. The whole work is not grouped chronologically, but from an internal point of view. In the separate main divisions too chronology is not the guiding principle. In chh. 12-14 there is much that happened after the banishment of Thucydides, which is related in ch. 14; chh. 18, 19, 21 are also not arranged chronologically, as we have pointed out above. Events are related in the places where they serve as illustrations for the delineation of character. But from another point of view the division of the whole corresponds to the succession of events, as Pericles was a statesman before he was a general.

This biography is of very great importance. For details we may refer here only to chh. 11-13 (colonies and public works), ch. 17 (attempt to unite the Greeks), chh. 19, 20 (voyage to the Chersonese and the Pontus). But we cannot quote everything in detail; the book is full of good matter, clothed in a graceful style. It is one of the most valuable historical works of antiquity. Where did Plutarch get so much valuable matter? We are referred to Stesimbrotus (Bus. 2, 446), Philochorus (Bus. 2, 558), and Theopompus. Cf. Bus. 2, 436, 37. It is not likely that Stesimbrotus furnished as much good material as A. Schmidt thought; the valuable references to the public works may come from Philochorus, or from Craterus, ch. 17 (Bus. 2, 558). Theopompus is more likely to have supplied Plutarch with inaccurate than accurate matter. We need not accept the political transformations of Pericles (chh. 9-11). In any case, in endeavouring to account for the origin of the work we are forced to the conclusion that Plutarch made use of many good authorities himself. While his Cimon is more in the nature of a character-sketch with illustrations, his Pericles is a genuine biography.

But it must have something to do with the nature of the

authorities available that Plutarch's Aristides has comparatively little that is of service, his Cimon much that is untrue and hardly anything new, while his Pericles is good almost throughout, and contains much that is new. The reason must be that there were so many more and so much better authorities for the age of Pericles. And these need not necessarily have been books. When Aristides was at the zenith of his fame very little was recorded in Athens, in Cimon's time somewhat more, and in the time of Pericles a great deal. For Ion and Stesimbrotus did not write till then. Thus a tradition was formed regarding Pericles, which must have contained much that was valuable, and as Pericles was principally of importance for the history of civilization, it would have been handed down especially by the *Atthidographeis*. The statements of Andocides regarding the *Pentecontaetia* are styled "as a rule not trustworthy" by Bus. 2, 565. We therefore divide the authorities for the *Pentecontaetia* into three categories: (1) they are very scanty for the period from 479-59; we are almost confined to Thucydides; later authors only relate characteristic anecdotes of the exploits of Cimon; (2) for 459-441 other records must have been in existence, which Ephorus (or Diodorus?) uses badly, and Plutarch more satisfactorily in his Pericles; (3) the administration of Pericles in general and the causes of the Peloponnesian War are well illustrated by the facts collected by Thucydides and Plutarch, and in part also by Diodorus.

Busolt (2, 406, 472, 557) gives a summary of the important inscriptions for this period. They may be classified as follows:—(1) Lists of Athenian losses in the war, C. I. A. 1, 432 (Thasian War), 433 (Phyle Erechtheis). (2) Documents relating to Athenian finance (very important); quotas received by Athene, C. I. A. 1, 226-272; deductions by the treasurers of Athene from sums borrowed for the Samian War, C. I. A. 1, 177; deductions by the treasurers of the other gods, C. I. A. 1, 32; building accounts. (3) Transactions between the Athenians and their allies and colonies; resolutions of the people concerning Erythrae, C. I. A. 9-11; Colophon, *ib.* 13; Miletus, 4, 22^a; Brea, C. I. A. 1, 31; the Chalcidians (after the re-conquest of Euboea Ol. 83, 3), C. I. A. 4, 217^a; Histiaea (same date), C. I. A. 1, 30; relations of Athens with the Phocians, C. I. A. 4, 22^b; resolution of the people concerning the firstfruits for Eleusis, Ditt. 13; Lacedaemonian offerings at Olympia, I. G. A. 75 and 26^a.

1. For the walls cf. Curtius, G. G. 2⁶, 821. Von Wilamowitz-Möllendorff (Phil. Unters. 1, 116) endeavours to justify the procedure of the Spartans against Athens, but wrongly. The "arbitrary erection of a fortress" was no violation of obligations

to the outpost, as he supposes. Athens had sovereign rights, and could fortify herself as she liked. The prevention of it would have been a sheer piece of illegality on the part of Sparta, of the kind which Athens committed subsequently against her allies. But the trickery of Themistocles was only justifiable if the Spartans really intended to use force. Thucydides, however, does not say this, and later writers do not speak with authority. The statement of Diod. 11, 39, that the Spartan ambassadors *προσιόντες τοῖς οἰκοδομοῦσι προσέτατον ἀφίστασθαι τῶν ἔργων τὴν ταχίστην* certainly looks like a menace of force, but it is not credible. For the assumption in this passage is that the Spartans saw them building, and this does not agree with ch. 40, in which Themistocles, while at Sparta, denies the fact of the building. If the Spartans had seen it, he could not have denied it. Consequently the passage in ch. 39 is meaningless. I do not believe that the Spartans intended to resort to force at all, for they could not have carried out such an intention. Or did they mean to maintain a permanent garrison in Athens for the purpose? We have only to picture to ourselves the circumstances of the case—allies with an equal share in the victory, and the Athenians full of self-confidence—to arrive at the conclusion that intention of using force was impossible. But no doubt it was the wish of Sparta that Athens should have no walls, for Sparta disliked fortifications; she did not use them herself, and did not know how to attack them successfully in the case of others. But Athens maintained the contrary principle, and for that reason she was to be intimidated. But the simple declaration of Athens, that she intended to build her walls, would probably have sufficed to bring Sparta to reason. If in spite of this Themistocles had recourse to stratagem, he probably did so because duplicity was part of his nature. No doubt there was another motive besides. He was under suspicion of having promoted the naval war of 479 in the interests of Sparta; he now wanted to regain the favour of Athens by a grand *coup*, and if he could carry out the speedy construction of the walls in the face of Spartan opposition, that was certainly an achievement of some importance. We may also add the following, if we wish to be quite just to Themistocles. His object was that Athens should have fortifications as quickly as possible. The protest of Sparta offered him an opportunity of effecting this. The Athenians would perhaps have worked very slowly at the walls, if there had not been some external impulse to spur them on. Themistocles created this incentive by representing the Spartan protest as worse and more dangerous than it really was; consequently the walls had to be completed very quickly.

Themistocles was one of those men whose brain is full of ideas and projects, and who often find it difficult to say themselves what their main purpose is and what their secondary object.

2. According to Bus. 2, 344 in the year 477/6.

3. Pausanias in Byzantium for seven years, Justin. 9, 1. A part like that of Pausanias was played some eighty years later in Byzantium by a Spartiate of similar character, Clearchus, whom, however, the Spartans deposed themselves. He then fled to Cyrus. Gongylus received from the Persians Gambreum, Palaegambreum, Gryneum and Myrina as hereditary possessions, so that he became the neighbour of the family of Demaratus, who had Pergamum, Halisarna and Teuthrania, and soon afterwards of Themistocles. The governments of the tyrants, which thirty years previously were in the cities on the coast, were now removed somewhat farther into the interior, and formed buffer states for Persia. Pausanias might have increased the number of these dynasties in Colonae, but his ambition soared above and his prudence fell below such a destiny.

4. Bus. 2, 383 and 400 for the date of the death of Pausanias. The accounts of the end of Pausanias' life are examined by the same writer, pp. 380-383.

5. Pausanias is an instance of the fate of an ambitious man who has neither the preliminary education necessary to enable him to feel at home in an important position which is not of his own seeking, nor sufficient sagacity and strength of character to supply the defect. The Spartan training was not calculated to fit people for a career among luxurious barbarians; a man of the stamp of Pausanias lost his head when brought into contact with them. It would not have been surprising if the contact of the essentially unpretending Greek civilization with the luxury of the East had affected many Greeks as it did Pausanias. It is a great credit to the Greeks that the number of men in a high position who succumbed to this fate was so extremely small.

6. Plut. Cim. 10: Cimon and Aristides opposed Themistocles *πέρα τοῦ δέοντος ἐπαίροντι δημοκρατίαν*. Duncker, 8, 97 seq., has endeavoured to prove this in detail, and his hypotheses would be useful if the later writers were correct in their assertion that Aristides was an aristocrat. He was so, however, at most in the ideal sense which is assumed in Plut. Per. 9. It is certainly true that Cimon and Aristides were opponents of Themistocles, but they were not so because he was a democrat.

7. Duncker, 8, 48; 7, 187, remarks that Themistocles introduced "allgemeine Wehrpflicht." This is a statement which is not in

keeping with the facts; general military service had existed long before this in Athens.

8. Duncker, 8, 96, summarizes the case. Busolt also (2, 368) admits that we do not know the nature of the democratic reforms proposed by Thucydides. The fact is that they only existed in the imagination of Theopompus.

9. We find a similar state of things in England. There has often been very little difference between the political ideals of the Tories and the Whigs. Certain families, however, were bound to rule in both parties. This was especially the case with the Whig party, in which the families of Temple, Pelham, Russell (Bedford), and Cavendish (Devonshire) took the lead, and the last still does so. In England also a too independent *novus homo* met with least favour from the Whigs; one need only recall the early close of Brougham's ministerial career. In England as in Athens the liberal party liked to be led by men of high rank. Themistocles was pushed aside because he would not submit to the time-honoured authority of aristocratic liberals.

10. Bus. 1, 508 assumes that Myron of Phlya, who accused the Alcmaeonidae on account of the Cylonian outrage, was a Lycomid in consequence, cf. Plut. Them. 3. In any case Themistocles had no large party of his own by birth.

11. Design of Themistocles against the Hellenic fleet, on which occasion the uprightness of Aristides is conspicuous: Plut. Arist. 22, Them. 20. Cf. the detailed discussion in Du. 8, 65-67: Themistocles is said to have proposed to burn the Spartan naval camp in the Bay of Pegasae, they being engaged in Thessaly under Leotychides in the year 476. See also Curtius, 2⁶, 827. Themistocles, who erects a shrine to Artemis Aristobule (Plut. Th. 22) and Timoleon, who ascribes his success to Automatia, are genuine contrasts.

12. Themistocles' connections with foreign countries are on a grand scale. They include Persia, Sparta, Argos, Corcyra, Italy, and perhaps Sicily. Themistocles is consequently the statesman who continues the great Athenian policy of the sixth century, and is the forerunner of Pericles and Alcibiades. His character is sketched by Thuc. 1, 138. Thucydides may very well have known of the intrigues of Pausanias against the Spartan constitution. According to Plut. Cim. 10, Cimon and Aristides were opponents of Themistocles, that is to say, he had Conservatives and Liberals against him; we have no occasion to doubt this assertion, either intrinsically or extrinsically.

13. Craterus, according to Lex. Rhet. ad Calc. Phot. fr. 5 quoted in Müller, Fr. H. 11.

14. Acc. to Thuc. 1, 137 he wrote to Artaxerxes ; later writers represent him as coming to Xerxes, for the sake of effect, as Bus. 2, 390 rightly says. Busolt thinks that if Themistocles came to Ephesus as early as 467, he might have had relations at Susa with Artaxerxes, who ascended the throne in 465 ; but the point is not clear. Krüger's conjecture, that Xerxes died in 473, is now rejected by all historians. Cf. also Curtius, 2⁶, 825, 26.

15. Apparently then the maritime cities of Lampsacus and Myus were not free at this period. Busolt assumes with Köhler that they were so, and that the assignment of them was only intended as a bait for Themistocles. But if he did not have Lampsacus, why was his memory alive there as late as the third century ? Bus. 2, 395, following Lolling, Athen. Mitth. 6, 103.

16. For the death of Themistocles, Thuc. 1, 138. The story of his having drunk bull's blood and died of it occurs first in Arist. Eq. 83, 84. The date acc. to Eus., Arm. and Hieron. was Ol. 78, 3 (466/5), but this is improbable ; cf. the brief summary of the essential facts in Bus. 2, 395, 396. Busolt assumes that he died about 458, when Artaxerxes began to arm against Greece, after the revolt of Egypt.—If we may compare the Persian Wars with the Trojan War, Themistocles is their Odysseus.—I see an indirect proof of the correctness of my idea of the political position of Themistocles and Aristides, in the attitude assumed by Herodotus and Thucydides towards Themistocles. Thucydides, the aristocrat, never speaks unfavourably of him ; Herodotus, of whom we may say that he was in high favour with the democratic government of Athens, only refers to his love of money. My view that Aristides was a democrat has meanwhile been completely confirmed by Aristotle's *Ἀθην. πολ.* ch. 23 : ἦσαν δὲ προστάται τοῦ δήμου κατὰ τοὺτους τοὺς καιροὺς Ἀριστείδης ὁ Λυσιστράτου καὶ Θεμιστοκλῆς ὁ Νεοκλέους, ὁ μὲν τὰ πολέμια ἀσκῶν, ὁ δὲ τὰ πολιτικὰ δεινὸς εἶναι δοκῶν (Kenyon).

17. Plut. Ar. 22, Bus. 2, 337, 338. As Pöhlmann, in his *Gesch. Griechenlands* in Müller's *Handbuch der klass. Alterthumswiss.* 3, 404, remarks, Finck, *De Themistoclis aetate* etc. 1849, has treated the law for the extension of the franchise as proceeding rather from Themistocles. Pöhlmann, however, rightly says that this will not hold good, but that Aristides' mode of action appears to presuppose a change of views. I believe that my theory, which is the result of an objective investigation of the authorities, supplies the simplest explanation of the matter.

18. The introduction of the system of electing officials by lot was, in the opinion of earlier writers (Boeckh, Schömann, Gr. Alt. 1³, 356 and others), the work of Cleisthenes ; according to Duncker

and Müller-Strübing, that of Aristides ; and lastly, according to E. Müller, Lugebil (*Jahrb. f. kl. Phil. Suppl.* 5, 564 seq.) and Busolt (*Gr. G.* 2, 471), of Ephialtes. Gilbert, *St. A.* 1, 146, only excludes Cleisthenes. It is ascribed to Cleisthenes on account of Herod. 6, 109. We can only bring forward one argument against this. How was it that leading men still became archons at the right moment, *e.g.* Themistocles? The explanation is as follows. We do not know how the lots were arranged. A man whose lot was not put into the urn could not be elected, and if only one lot were put in, only one could come out. It is of no use saying that this is ridiculous. Election by lot was managed in much the same way in mediaeval Florence.

19. *Plut. Cim.* 11 is not without importance. Cimon showed the way. After that time individual treatment of the allies was the rule.

20. The case is similar, for instance, with the beginnings of the Hanseatic League.

21. For the death of Aristides, cf. *Plut. Ar.* 26, acc. to which there were three distinct versions in existence of the place of his death and the attendant circumstances. Of these the most probable is that he died on an official voyage to the Pontus, probably not before 467, *Bus.* 2, 369 and 397. It is strange that there could be such different accounts of the death of a man of his importance.—Chronological estimates of Busolt: Athens leader against Persia, 477/6 (*B.* 2, 344). Death of Pausanias, probably 468 (2, 383). Banishment of Themistocles, probably 471 (2, 369). Flight of Themistocles, probably 468 (2, 389). Death of Themistocles, perhaps 458 (2, 396). Death of Aristides after 467 (2, 397).

CHAPTER VIII

ATHENS UNDER CIMON TO THE BATTLE ON THE EURYMEDON

THE commander-in-chief of the Athenian League was Cimon, son of Miltiades and Hegesipyle. The marriage of his sister Elpinice with the wealthy Callias had enabled Cimon to pay the fine which had been imposed on his father after the unsuccessful expedition against Paros.¹ By his decided support of the policy of Themistocles before the battle of Salamis he had shown himself a judicious and patriotic man, and his conduct was all the more praiseworthy, as his father had been the hero of the battle on land and in a certain sense the rival of Themistocles. He shared the command of the Athenian contingent with Aristides when the Spartans were still leaders in Asia, and became commander-in-chief of the Athenians and their allies when Sparta withdrew from the war.

The first exploit of the new general was the capture of the Thracian city of Eion on the Strymon (probably 476 B.C.) It was somewhat remarkable that this town, which lay so far west, remained loyal to the Persians at a time when they had lost places nearer Asia and almost the whole Asiatic coast. But Eion possessed a very able general in the Persian Boges, who burnt himself when he was unable to hold the city any longer. Cimon was allowed to set up three Hermae with inscriptions in the Hall of the Hermae in the market-place at Athens, as a permanent memorial of this conquest. The booty also was probably considerable.²

Cimon's power of making friends throughout the whole of Greece was shown at the Olympian Games of the year 472, where he was quite as much an object of general attention as Themistocles had been four years previously. And at that time Cimon had not accomplished nearly as much for Greece as Themistocles. It was consequently the personality of the man which pleased the Greeks, his aristocratic and yet affable disposition, and the brilliant use he made of his wealth. This fortune was derived from booty of war and from the dowry of his wife, the Alcmaeonid Isodice, a great-granddaughter of a brother of Cleisthenes—a connection which shows that Cimon wished to govern the state as far as possible in concert with the most powerful family in Athens. He attached, however, special importance to a good understanding with Sparta, in direct contrast to Themistocles. He named his two sons Eleus and Lacedaemonius; this flattered the Spartans more than the names of Themistocles' daughters. The Spartans appointed him their Proxenos in Athens. It was possible for one city to have several such friends in another Hellenic city; it was an honour which imposed on the recipient the duty of taking care of the citizens of the state which appointed him when they came to his city. The Proxenos was not a political agent as such.³

The exploits of Cimon and the Athenians during the next few years are little known. But the second sojourn of Pausanias in Byzantium must have occurred at this period, and Cimon must have taken an active part in expelling him. Whether other cities had to be re-conquered in consequence of this disturbance of the peace on the Hellespont, is not known. Cimon probably continued the struggle against the Persians in those regions and gained distinction and booty; but the details of his actions are not recorded. Another achievement of his, which cannot have given him much trouble, became very famous, because it considerably enhanced the national pride of the Athenians and flattered their vanity. During an epidemic they were advised by the oracle to bury the bones of

Theseus in their own city. The bones of Orestes had once in like manner brought luck to the Spartans. Theseus had died on the island of Scyros. Now it happened that at that very moment the Dolopian inhabitants of Scyros, who were carrying on their customary piracy, had been condemned by the Amphictyones to pay an indemnity in a certain case. They were apparently disposed to submit; but the community refused to pay, saying that the guilty persons were liable, and these latter appealed to the Athenians. Cimon intervened in the name of Athens, and naturally to her advantage. The upshot was that all the Scyrians had to suffer; they were reduced to slavery and the territory of the island was confiscated by Athens. On this occasion the following incident happened. An eagle was observed to scratch repeatedly on the same spot; the Athenians dug there and found a gigantic skeleton, which was of course declared to be that of Theseus. It was brought to Athens to the great delight of the people.

It was perhaps at this time, as is generally assumed, that Cimon exercised a special influence on the fortunes of the Greek drama. When Sophocles competed for the prize for the first time, together with Aeschylus, who had long won his reputation, Cimon and the other generals entered the theatre to offer the customary sacrifice to Dionysus just as the Archon Apsephion was about to appoint the judges from among the spectators. The Archon immediately cried out that these ten should be the judges; for they represented the ten phylae of the people. Sophocles obtained the prize, and Aeschylus is said to have been so sore about it that he left Athens and went to Sicily. We cannot, however, say with certainty that Cimon had returned from Scyros just at that moment.⁴

Soon afterwards Carystus incurred the enmity of Athens, why we do not exactly know: at all events it had refused to join Athens. It was compelled to do so. This was the beginning of the coercive policy exercised by Athens against

other Greek states ; Thucydides presents the matter in this light, and immediately afterwards relates the war against Naxos, which had belonged to the Athenian League, but had revolted from it.⁵ We have no record of Cimon's share in this campaign, but he soon gained great distinction against the Persians. Thucydides gives the following account⁶ of this : "After this (as usual he does not state the year) a land and sea battle between the Athenians and their allies and the Medes took place on the river Eurymedon in Pamphylia, and in both the Athenians, under the leadership of Cimon, son of Miltiades, were victorious, and took and destroyed in all 200 Phoenician triremes." We should like to know more of this great naval battle, which so closely resembles that of Mycale, that Nepos calls it the battle of Mycale, than Thucydides tells us ; and in fact later writers do give us details, which unfortunately do not agree with one another. According to Diodorus, who perhaps follows Ephorus (but how closely it is impossible to say), Cimon sailed with 200 triremes from the Piræus, increased his fleet to 300 ships, won over the Hellenic cities of Caria at once, conquered those which contained natives and Persians, while the Lycian cities joined him of their own accord. The Persians collected a land force and a fleet at Cyprus under Tithraustes and Pherendates. Cimon attacked and defeated the fleet. He took a hundred ships with their crews, and the rest without, the men escaping to land in Cyprus. He then made a rapid march against the army on the mainland, which was entrenched on the river Eurymedon. He made the Greeks put on Persian clothes, embark on the Persian ships which they had taken, and sail to the Eury-medon. The Persians were taken in and offered no obstacle to their landing. The Greeks penetrated into the Persian camp, and perpetrated a regular massacre ; the Persians now thought they were Pisidian brigands. After a time Cimon recalled his men by means of fire signals, and sailed for Athens with 340 captured triremes and 20,000 prisoners of

war. Polyænus has the same story, only he makes the naval battle take place on the Eurymedon and the surprise at Cyprus. If such a stratagem was really resorted to, is it likely that Thucydides would not have had a word about it? Plutarch's narrative is as follows:—Cimon, who had widened the Athenian ships of war and made them more suited to receive crews of hoplites (Thucydides having endeavoured especially to give them the quality of swiftness), subdued the coasts of Asia Minor from Ionia to Pamphylia. Then he sailed from Cnidus with 200 triremes and won over Phaselis with the aid of the Chians on the Athenian fleet. He heard that Ariomandes was lying on the Eurymedon with his fleet, and waiting for eighty more ships from Cyprus; without these he had only 600, or, according to Ephorus, 350. Cimon attacked them promptly, took 200 ships, and captured a large amount of treasure in the camp; he then took the other eighty, which had sailed to Hydros. This account leaves out the wonderful stratagem, so the account of Diodorus is all the less credible. Both battles were fought on the Eurymedon, and in that case there was no need for the stratagem.

The Athenians showed their gratitude to the gods by splendid gifts. The Delphian Apollo received a bronze palm with dates, and an Athene upon it. On the other hand, it is very doubtful whether another votive offering, mentioned by Diodorus, the inscription on which appears to have no reference whatever to this event, is really connected with the battle on the Eurymedon.

The victory on the Eurymedon secured the supremacy of Athens, and that of the Greek communities in the southern part of the coast of Asia Minor, where the power of Persia had up to this time by no means ceased. In these battles besides the Athenians only the Chians, Samians and Lesbians were actively engaged.

The Greeks never succeeded in taking Cyprus, neither Pausanias after 479 nor the Athenians after 469 and 449.⁷

NOTES

For Cimon, see Vischer, *Cimon*, Basel, 1847, and *Kl. Schriften*, I. Leipz. 1877; Oncken, *Athen und Hellas*, I. (*Kimón und Ephialtes*), Leipz. 1865; Cox, *History of Greece*, II. Lond. 1874; and, for the history of the greater part of the fifth century, his *Lives of Greek Statesmen*, II. Lond. 1886.

1. This Callias (*Plut. Cim.* 4; *Nep. Cim.* 1) is not now considered to be the same as the Daduchus of that name on account of the passage in *Nepos*, "*Quidam non tam generosus, quam pecuniosus.*" But *Nepos* is no authority, and it would be strange if, besides the rich Daduchus Callias, there were another very wealthy Callias in Athens, who derived his fortune from mines just like the Daduchus, for the word *λακκόπλουτος* applied to him has the same meaning.

2. *Plut. Cim.* 7, cf. *Busolt*, 2, 362; *Du.* 8, 142, assumes a second conquest of Eion, as also of Sestos: he is wrong, for no conclusions can be drawn from *Diodorus*, and *Plutarch* is no authority for chronology. Cf., however, *Busolt*, 2, 378.—*Doriscus* remained Persian for a long time, *Herod.* 7, 106. In 476/5, under the archon *Phaedon*, there was an attempt on the part of Athens to found a colony on the *Strymon*, *Schol. Aesch. De falsa leg.* 31.

3. This distinction between the Greek *Proxenoi* (protectors of strangers) and the modern consuls (originally governors of foreign colonies—consules) is not much noticed now, since analogies between ancient and modern institutions have come into favour. All the references to the Greek *Proxenoi* have been collected by *P. Monceaux*, *Les proxénies grecques*, Par. 1886.

4. Acc. to *Plut. Thes.* 36 and *Cim.* 8, the incidents in *Scyros* would have lasted from 476/5 to 469/8 (*Phaedon* to *Apsephion*) if the scene in the theatre took place just as *Cimon* had returned from *Scyros*; but this is not clearly stated in *Plutarch*. *Diod.* 11, 60 is of no value for the determination of a date. *Curtius*, *G. G.* 2⁶, 823, with others, is of opinion that the oracle and its fulfilment took place in 469.

5. *Th.* 1, 98.

6. *Th.* 1, 100. *Busolt*, 2, 400, makes the interesting conjecture, that the last intrigues of *Pausanias*, which ended with his death (in the year 468, acc. to *Busolt*), are connected with the warlike efforts of the Persians, which resulted in the battle of the *Eury-medon* (acc. to *Busolt*, 467). For further details of the battle,

Diod. 11, 62 ; Polyæn. 1, 34. We cannot tell which of the two, Diodorus or Polyænus, has misinterpreted Ephorus least. The 20,000 prisoners are merely the crews of the 100 ships captured with their complements of men calculated in the usual way (200 men to a ship), Plut. Cim. 12, 13, who probably follows Theopompus, but also quotes Callisthenes (according to Busolt, 2, 405, the original authority for the battle) and Phanodemus ; Busolt, 2, 402, assumes, not without reason, that Ion of Chios was also an authority. For the unknown Hydrus in Plutarch some read Cyprus ; Duncker, 8, 212, reads Idyrus, which is now accepted.—Votive gifts, Paus. 10, 15, 3-5 ; Diod. 11, 62, where in the epigram (certainly not of Simonides) there was first a battle, ἐν Κύπρῳ, against the Medes, and then the capture of the 100 ships takes place ; perhaps there is a partial confusion with the battles of 449. Cf. the clever paper of Benndorf, Ueber das Cultusbild der Athena Nike, in the special number published in celebration of the foundation of the Archaeological Institute at Rome, Vienna 1879, in which the building of the temple at Nike on the Acropolis is connected with the victory on the Eurymedon. For all the questions connected therewith, cf. Busolt, 2, 401 seq. ; at p. 404, N. 1, he remarks that ἐν γαίῃ should be read instead of ἐν Κύπρῳ in the epigram ; and at p. 406, that the votive offering obviously represents the defeat of the East (represented by the perhaps overturned (?) palm) by the Athenians.

7. Chronology, acc. to Busolt, 2, 401 : capture of Scyros, 469 or 468 ; subjugation of Carystus, 468 ; war against Naxos, 467 ; battle on the Eurymedon, 467.

CHAPTER IX

DIFFICULT POSITION OF SPARTA AND ATHENS UP TO THE BANISHMENT OF CIMON

WHILST Athens was displaying such striking activity, Sparta remained very quiet. She had undergone a painful experience in the case of Pausanias. The *grande politique*, which necessarily involved contact with Persian luxury, was ill suited to the Spartan character, which was not able to resist such trials. The Spartans determined to leave the management of Oriental affairs to others, and continue their old exclusive policy. Mention is made of deliberations said to have been held in Sparta as to whether the hegemony over maritime Greece should be maintained, and the decision to relinquish the leadership of all Greece and only continue the old league is ascribed to the representations of a certain Hetoimaridas.¹ And Sparta soon had enough to do at home, but perhaps for this very reason, that the descent from her old position suggested the idea that she was no longer the vigorous community of former days.

But though she resigned the leadership at sea, she might still be supreme in continental Hellas. And this would be more easily managed, thought the Spartans, if the Amphictyonic League were remodelled. Sparta proposed that the Greek states who had not joined in the struggle against the Medes should be excluded from it. Themistocles, however, persuaded the Pylagorae to reject the proposal. Most of the

thirty-one states which had fought against the Persians were, he pointed out, quite small; if these only belonged to the League, it would be at the mercy of two or three great states, and the remainder would be almost bereft of their rights.²

This incident, which is mentioned only by Plutarch, gives rise to many considerations. Even admitting that the general aspect of the matter was as Plutarch states, yet this attempt on the part of Sparta implies a perfectly justifiable wish to transform the imperfect federal union of Greece into a complete one, and convert a sham into a reality. It was an improvement on what Sparta had previously attempted, when she proposed to settle the Ionians in the cities of the medizing Greeks; the new proposal was that the latter should remain where they were, but should lose certain very undefined rights, which they enjoyed as members of the Amphictyonic League. The League would in that case have certainly received fresh powers. The counter arguments put forward by Themistocles were feeble. As it was, two or three states, which called themselves Dorians and Ionians, had the real power. And if the League were reorganized, the right of voting could still be regulated as desired, in such a way as to leave Athens the influence that was her due, an influence which, as the course of history shows, she did not possess in the League that was not reconstituted in consequence of her objections. The states which owed their continuance in the League to Athens showed their gratitude more to Sparta. Her opposition to the reorganization of the League did Athens no good.

The Spartans did not even succeed in carrying out a particular point in their programme. The Thessalians were to be punished for deserting the Greek cause; Sparta wished to be master of Thessaly. Leotychides was sent there but accomplished nothing; he is alleged to have taken bribes from the Aleuadae.³ The king was accused and found guilty. He fled to Tegea. These old allies of Sparta, however, refused to give him up; the Persian Wars had increased the sentiment

of independence throughout Greece, and Tegea went so far as to enter into an alliance with Argos in open defiance of Sparta. The allies were defeated, but Tegea maintained her position.⁴

Other parts of the Peloponnese, too, were in a state of ferment. Elis, which was generally devoted to the Spartans, adopted a new constitution on democratic principles, on which occasion a city with the name of Elis was formed out of the country towns.⁵ As Arcadia became estranged from Sparta at this time, the *sunoiikismos* of Mantinea has been assigned to the same period, but this is not quite certain.⁶ On the contrary, it is recorded that Mantinea took no part in a great war which all the other Arcadians waged against Sparta at that time. In this war a great battle was fought at Dipaea, in which the Spartans were victorious. But even if Mantinea did not display hostility just then, it is certain that Sparta was in great difficulties.⁷ It is strange that her position should have been so insecure immediately after the Persian Wars.

But the following incident was the most remarkable in this respect. According to Diodorus, the Argives destroyed Mycenae in the year 468/7 B.C., and Tiryns probably about the same time.⁸ Mycenae and Tiryns had done their best against the Persians, while the Argives were ready to betray Greece to Persia; and yet in little more than ten years after the tripod had been erected in Delphi, with the names of the Myceneans and Tirynthians on it, but without that of the Argives, Argos was allowed to destroy these two cities and reduce the male inhabitants of Mycenae to slavery. No doubt there were many people then in Greece who regretted that Sparta's plan of uniting the states which fought against Persia into a really strong League had miscarried; at all events very little sentiment is required to make the fate of Mycenae, after the position she had held both in ancient and in later times, appear quite unworthy of the traditions of Greece. It is true that Sparta invariably acted on a prosaic consideration of her

own interests. But these interests demanded the preservation of Mycenae. The conclusion is that Sparta, if she did not then interpose to protect Mycenae, must have been in a difficult position herself, and this is what Diodorus asserts. Was the reason, as Diodorus also supposes, that the earthquake and the revolt of the Helots had already taken place? We have no satisfactory information on this point.⁹

The last-mentioned occurrences inflicted a severe blow on the Spartan community about this time. It had to a certain extent recovered from the war with Arcadia, and was just on the point of trying how far it could injure Athens by supporting the Thasians, who had revolted from her, when a terrible earthquake reduced the city of Sparta almost to ruins. Only five houses are said to have been left standing, and 20,000 men are said to have perished. Tremendous confusion prevailed for the moment among the Spartiates in the city. King Archidamus saved the citizens from destruction; he collected them all together by means of the alarm signals, and led them at once into the open. The preservation of their lives was of more importance than the safety of property, as was soon seen, for a general rising of the Helots and part of the Perioeci took place forthwith. The Helots had shortly before been suspected of being ready to rise at a sign from Pausanias, and a number of them, who had fled to the altar of the Taenarian Poseidon, were put to death, a proceeding which involved Sparta in a charge of blood-guiltiness, as the Athenians made bold to remind them afterwards. Of the Perioeci Thucydides says that the Thuriatae and the Aethaeans took part in the insurrection. The rebels, among whom were many descendants of the old Messenians, seized the citadel of Ithome and held out there. In one of these engagements 300 Spartans perished under Aeimnestus, the Spartiate who had slain Mardonius. The war dragged on so long that Sparta's prestige suffered considerably. She thereupon asked her trustiest allies for assistance, and the Aeginetans and Plataeans

responded most readily to the appeal.¹⁰ But this made matters no better ; Ithome was not taken. The Peloponnesians as a rule were not experienced in sieges, while the Athenians were considered particularly skilful in them. The Spartans therefore applied to Athens for aid. Athens must have known that Sparta had just decided to assist Thasos, and it would have been only natural if the Athenians had in consequence declined to shed their blood for Sparta. But Cimon was well disposed towards Sparta, and his influence determined the Athenians to send the required assistance. He himself led a large Athenian force to the Peloponnese. But the result did not correspond to the magnitude of the sacrifice. Ithome was not taken. Thereupon the Spartans were seized with a suspicion that the Athenians had an understanding with the rebels ; who knows, they said to themselves, whether many an Athenian besieger of Ithome is not praying for the success of those against whom he is bound to fight ? Sparta sent the Athenian contingent only home, and kept the others. This was an insult to the Athenians, but it was due to the unnatural and ill-considered policy of Athens. Crafty opposition had been the rule under Themistocles, and now under Cimon Sparta was treated with good-natured indulgence. And the latter was worse than the former. For it was hardly essential to the welfare of Greece that Sparta should be mistress of Messenia. This policy of extremes went still further. Athens, which had just been ready to sacrifice the lives of her citizens in order to enslave Messene, now joined the Argives and Thessalians out of pique against Sparta.¹¹

It is remarkable that the Spartans after all brought this war in Messenia to a successful termination. It is said to have lasted for ten years (?), but Ithome had to capitulate in the end.¹² The Spartans allowed the besieged safe conduct out of the Peloponnese, subject to the proviso that any one of them found there again should become the slave of the man who caught him. The Spartans explained the terms of this capi-

tulation, which were evidently dictated by circumstances, by saying that an oracle had prescribed them. The Athenians received the Messenians and gave them Naupactus, which they had taken from the Ozolian Locrians, as a place of settlement. From this time the entrance to the Corinthian Gulf was guarded by friends of the Athenians, and people on whom she could rely protected a harbour which was of importance for Athens.¹³

If Sparta had many difficulties to overcome, which had arisen from her abandonment of a bolder policy, Athens likewise was not without troubles of a similar nature, which were due on the contrary to her too-grasping policy. There were revolts from Sparta on account of her inaction, from Athens on account of her arrogance. We read in Thucydides after the account of the capture of Eion by Cimon, and that of Seyros and Carystus,¹⁴ "Hereupon they made war upon the revolted Naxians, and reduced them by siege. This was the first allied community which was brought into a state of subjection in contravention of existing arrangements. The same fate befel a number of other communities. The chief causes of revolt from Athens were non-payment of tribute and refusal to supply ships or send help in time of war on the part of the allies. For the Athenians were very exact in enforcing the performance of their obligations from those who refused out of laziness or ill-will. Their rule too was by no means a pleasant one, while on the other hand, it was an easy task for them to bring those who revolted to terms. For from love of ease and dislike of hardships, most of the allies preferred to pay an equivalent in money to supplying ships and crews, the consequence of which was that the naval power of Athens increased, and the allies were not in a position to offer resistance when they wished to revolt." How great the "number" of the allies was who were subdued by force, we do not know. We are acquainted with only one more quarrel of this kind, that with Thasos. The revolt of this community had a special

reason. She had a grievance against Athens, because the latter encroached more and more on the Thracian coast, and threatened to deprive the Thasians of their profits from the mines which existed there.¹⁵ It was the possession of these mines which constituted the wealth of Thasos, and a great portion of them lay on the mainland. Thasos consequently revolted from Athens, which displayed special energy on this occasion (spring of 465).¹⁶ The city of Thasos was besieged, and 10,000 colonists, Athenians and allies, occupied an important position on the Strymon in order to crush the power of Thasos on the mainland. This place was called Ennea Hodoi (nine ways), because at that point, not far from the mouth of the river, nine roads met. As the place was to a great extent surrounded by the river, it was afterwards called Amphipolis.¹⁷ The settlement, however, did not thrive. The Thracians assumed a hostile attitude towards the colonists, and inflicted a severe defeat on them at Drabescus, the result of which seems to have been that Ennea Hodoi itself was abandoned. At all events the place had to be colonized over again.

On the other hand Athens was more successful against the Thasians themselves, under the leadership of Cimon. They were defeated at sea, and after they had stood a siege of some duration, they surrendered in the third year after the revolt. Sparta wanted to send help, but how could she have thrown troops into the city? Thasos lost her city-walls, her ships, and her possessions on the mainland, and was compelled to pay tribute. But this only amounted to three talents up to Ol. 83, 2, 447 B.C.¹⁸ For the rest, the Thasians retained their independence, like the other allies.

The subjugation of Thasos was an important success for Athens, which by this means secured her supremacy in the north. In spite of this Cimon did not receive from his fellow-citizens the recognition which he deserved. His enemies asserted that he had not done enough, and said that

he might have acquired a bit of Macedonia for Athens, and had not done so because he had been bribed by King Alexander. He was brought to trial, but acquitted.¹⁹ His opponents, however, among whom Pericles, son of the Xanthippus who had prosecuted Cimon's father, was most prominent, managed shortly afterwards to effect his banishment by ostracism. Aristides was dead, and the defence of Alcmaeonid interests had passed into the hands of younger and more active men. The people were displeased with Cimon on account of the friendly policy which he initiated towards Sparta, and which had met with such an unsatisfactory return.

Thus Athens also, although in a less degree than Sparta, had to contend with many difficulties in the first decades after the Persian War.²⁰

NOTES

1. Diod. 11, 50. Acc. to Bus. 2, 356 these incidents are inventions due to ideas of Isocrates.

2. Plut. Them. 20. This account is very dubious, and its accuracy is by no means above suspicion. The most important objection is that, so far as we know, neither the Argives nor Thebans as such had a vote in the League, while the Boeotians and Dorians had. Although it may be said that Boeotians and Thebans were pretty much the same, on the other hand Argives and Dorians were far from being identical. It therefore does not appear how it was possible to formally exclude Thebans and Argives. Had the Spartan proposal been adopted, the only states which would have been really excluded from the League, besides the Thessalians, were the old ornamental members such as the Malians, Phthiotians, Aenianae, Dolopes, Magnetes and Per-rhaebi, who certainly had been addicted to medizing, but were as much open to the influence of Athens as of Sparta. Hence the account of this proposal of Sparta can be correct only in a very general sense, viz. that she wished to substitute a new league for the old one, but with the privileges of the old one. On the other hand, it seems certain that Athens preserved the privileges of the renegade Greeks on this occasion. In doing so Athens cut

off her nose to spite her face. She prevented the Amphictyonic League from becoming a real confederation, because she feared that in a reformed league she would be in a still more inferior position to Sparta. But she had no better alternative to offer. And some of her *protégés* repaid her with scant thanks: Thebes came to an understanding with Sparta against Athens. The attempts to put Greece on a better footing begin directly after the victories, for Plut. Ar. 21 is very likely correct if interpreted as alluding to aspirations and plans. It was besides very natural to have such aims. On this occasion Sparta's endeavours were frustrated by Athens, as those of Athens were afterwards by Sparta. All this unfortunately is only too like human nature. Cf. Bus. 2, 357.

3. Herod. 6, 73; Paus. 3, 7, 9; Plut. Mal. Her. 20; Bus. 2, 355, 356.

4. Herod. 9, 35; Paus. 3, 11, 7; acc. to Bus. 2, 376 in the year 473 or 472.

5. Str. 8, 336 *μετὰ τὰ Περσικά*, Bus. 2, 372.

6. Cf. Vol. I. p. 216; even Bus. 2, 374 does not prove it.

7. Herod. 9, 35. We do not know the year of the battle, but cf. Bus. 2, 376, 384, who conjectures 469 or 468. Du. 8, 134, 135 has some very probable conjectures on this subject, but his various reasons will hardly hold water. Neither Pol. 1, 41 nor Isocr. Arch. 42 (he says incorrectly *De pace* 98) need refer to this.

8. Diod. 11, 65; Str. 8, 372, 373. Cf. Her. 6, 83. According to Bus. 2, 441 the conquest of Mycenae was probably in 464; this would explain the non-interference of Sparta.

9. Cf. Du. 8, 133 seq. and 240. Paus. 4, 24, 5 puts the revolt of the Messenians in Ol. 79, 2, 463/62 B.C., Bus. 2, 438 puts it at the end of the summer of 465.

10. Th. 2, 27; 4, 56; 3, 54. Cimon went to Messenia in the spring of 463, according to Bus. 2, 453. For the reasons of Plutarch's mistakes in Cim. 15 see Bus. 2, 455.

11. Th. 1, 102.

12. Krüger, Classen and Busolt (2, 475), however, assume that *τετάρτῳ* should be read in Thuc. 1, 103 instead of *δεκάτῳ ἔτει*, and it is certainly highly probable. Capitulation of Ithome according to Bus. 2, 475 in the year 462/1.

13. Curtius, 2⁶, 172, assumes that the words *Λοκρῶν ἐχόντων* in Thuc. 1, 103 are explained by the inscription I. G. A. No. 321 concerning the Epoeia of the Locrians in Naupactus, and that the Corinthians assisted in this, which is also supposed to be attested by coins with *ΛΟΚΡΩΝ* and Corinthian types. But these are later coins of the Italian Locri. If Athens had behaved to Sparta

as Sparta intended to behave to Athens with regard to Thasos, the Messenians would probably have become free, to the advantage of Greece.

14. Th. 1, 98, 99.

15. Th. 1, 100.

16. Bus. 2, 414. Cf. Curtius, G. G.⁶, 827: fragments of an inscription on one of the tombstones erected at the expense of the state with names of Athenians and allies who fell at Thasos, C. I. A. 1, 432.

17. Th. 1, 100. Du. 8, 231 rightly supposes that the project of this settlement became known to the Thasians and caused their hostility.

18. From Ol. 83, 3 onwards thirty talents, evidently because Thasos retained the mines then. Cf. Du. 9, 68.

19. Prosecution of Cimon, Plut. Cim. 14, 15. Curtius, 2⁶, 150 thinks there was another prosecution of Cimon for an attempt to change the *πάτριον πολιτείαν* (Demosth. c. Aristocr. 205) where some would read *Παρίων*.

20. Chronology according to Busolt: revolt of the Thasians, spring of 465 (2, 414); the earthquake in Sparta, end of summer of 465 (2, 438); subjection of Thasos, autumn of 464 (2, 441); Cimon at Messene, spring of 463 (2, 453); Cimon banished, spring of 462 (2, 471). Cf. also L. Holzapfel, Beitr. z. griech. Gesch. p. 32. According to Fabricius, Theben, p. 12, the subjection of Thasos took place in the spring of 463.

CHAPTER X

THE FOREIGN POLICY OF ATHENS UP TO THE BATTLE OF OENOPHYTA

IN spite of all the obstacles which blocked the path of the Athenians, their supremacy continued to make great progress. We shall explain the nature of this supremacy later on; suffice it to say here that it now embraced almost all the islands of the Aegean Sea, as well as all the known Greek communities on its northern coasts, the Greek towns from the entrance of the Hellespont to the farther end of the Bosphorus, and lastly, the west coast of Asia Minor and the south-west corner of that continent up to the borders of Pamphylia. On the mainland, with the exception of the Thracian Chersonese and a great part of Lycia, there was no actual possession of territory; the power of Athens was only conterminous with the influence of the city-communities. Many bits of territory lying between the cities may have still been, even in Ionia and right down to the coast, under the dominion of Persia. But other countries and empires felt the influence of Athens. In Thrace and Macedonia the power of the Athenians was considerable. In northern Greece proper the Thessalians were their friends, although this friendship was not very reliable.¹ Their relations with the Phocians were also of an uncertain character. The desire to injure a hated neighbour decided the alliances of the smaller Greek states more than any other consideration. Boeotia was almost entirely inaccessible to Athenian influence.

Neighbourly jealousy² also made Megara as a rule hostile to Athens. On one occasion only, when another neighbour, Corinth, became still more troublesome to the Megarians, did the latter ally themselves with Athens.³ To the Athenians the control of the territory of Megara was of supreme importance, as it extended from one sea to the other, from the Saronic to the Corinthian Gulf. Megara possessed two harbours, Nisaea close to Athens and opposite Salamis, and Pegae on the Gulf of Corinth. In order to have a greater hold on Megara, the Athenians connected it with Nisaea by means of long walls, the first experiment in fortifications of this kind, which was soon afterwards repeated in the case of Athens herself.⁴ It was impossible to do the same with the more distant Pegae, but Athens was able to use this port as a station for ships of war which were to cruise in the Corinthian Gulf. In this way the Athenians became dangerous rivals of Corinth even in these regions. Thucydides' account of the Thirty Years' Peace tells us further⁵ that before 446 the Athenians controlled the greater part of the southern coast of the Gulf, *i.e.* the district of Achaia; when and on what occasion it came under their influence we do not know. The Athenians evidently showed their most amiable side to the inhabitants of Achaia. They were probably satisfied if they could put in there to obtain provisions, and were allowed to enlist mercenaries from among the sturdy country people. On the other hand, the north coast of the Corinthian Gulf was less familiar to them; they only possessed the important town of Naupactus at the western end of it; Troizene was their ally in Argolis. To maintain all these varied relations and in about the Corinthian and Saronic Gulfs required great exertions on the part of the Athenian state. Nevertheless the Athenians ventured on a distant expedition, the failure of which would have been a serious disaster to them, as the Sicilian expedition was subsequently, had not Athens possessed abler statesmen and more vigorous citizens in the

middle of the fifth century than she did at the end of it. She made an attempt to detach Egypt from Persia—the first of the series of Egyptian expeditions which has brought misfortune to a European Power.

After the death of Xerxes Egypt wished to throw off the Persian yoke. The first attempt at revolt came from the Libyan prince Inarus, whom the Egyptians made their king. Inarus asked the Athenians for aid. Athens was then considered a power of the first rank in the East, and was so in point of fact. She sent, probably in 459, a fleet of 200 ships, which were lying at Cyprus, to Egypt. They sailed up the Nile and seized the city of Memphis, with the exception of a third part of it, the so-called White Wall, which was held by the Persian garrison. But the war dragged on, and the consequence was that the enemies of Athens in Greece considered the opportunity a favourable one for attacking the detested city.

The occupation of Megara had greatly irritated the Corinthians, and further encroachments on the part of Athens led to open hostilities between the two cities, which did not, however, involve Sparta in war as yet—a proof of the elastic nature of international relations among the Greeks. The Athenians landed (in the summer of 459) at Halieis on the Argolic peninsula and fought a battle there against the Epidaurians and Corinthians, in which the latter were victorious. On the other hand, the Athenians won a victory in the sea fight off Cecryphalea, near Epidaurus. Aegina now once more joined in the struggle. In a second naval engagement the Athenians took seventy of the enemy's ships and effected a landing in Aegina. The Corinthians sent 300 hoplites there, but at the same time occupied the ridge of Geranea close to the Isthmus and advanced into the territory of Megara, under the impression that Athens would at all events be obliged to give up Aegina, as they had sent so many citizens to Egypt. But the Athenians would have

preferred to sacrifice their last man rather than abandon Aegina. All the effective combatants, the oldest as well as the youngest, advanced into Megarian territory under Myronides, and fought the Corinthians with such success that the latter withdrew and in their retreat suffered a reverse, which Thucydides, who cuts short so much that is of importance, has narrated in detail.

The naval and military capacity of Athens perhaps reached its height at this time, if we leave Marathon out of account. There still exists a remarkable record of it, which supplements the accounts of Thucydides and others—the inscription on the monument erected to the Athenian citizens of the Phyle of Erechtheis who fell in battle in this year, in Cyprus, Egypt, Phoenicia, Halieis and Aegina. Cecryphalea is not mentioned, no doubt because no member of that Phyle fell there. The inscription bears 120 names. Athens might well be proud of the spirit of self-sacrifice shown by her citizens, and of the ability of her leaders, who knew how to do their duty even in Cimon's absence.⁶

But the more fighting there was abroad, the more necessary it became to provide for the safety of their city. It was all important that there should be undisturbed connection between Athens and the Piraeus. For a hostile army could easily throw itself between the two. Athens had built walls between Megara and Nisaea, but there were none leading to the Piraeus, although Cimon had already planned and even begun them. No doubt all due preparation had been made, but Thucydides does not mention the execution of the work until now, just after his account of the battles with the Aeginetans, the Epidaurians and the Corinthians. Of the two walls the southern one ran up to the south extremity of the harbour of Phalerum, the northern one to the point where the north side of the peninsula of the Piraeus begins. Thus the harbour of Phalerum was protected, but the protection of the Piraeus remained incomplete so long as its

northern coast was without a wall. For the rest, the work was still unfinished when the conflict with a few Peloponnesians developed into a war with Sparta herself.

The Phocians had a quarrel with the peasant republic of the Dorians in the upper valley of the Cephissus, the so-called metropolis of the Spartans, and had already occupied one of their three villages. At this point Sparta interfered. Nicomedes, the son of Cleombrotus, marched thither as representative of Pleistoanax, the son of Pausanias, with 1500 Lacedaemonians and 10,000 allied hoplites, and drove out the Phocians. The Athenians, who were guarding the Geranea range, were evidently taken by surprise; but they could cut off the enemy's retreat. The Spartans consequently determined to stay in Boeotia for the present, and await the progress of events. This was good policy for another reason, which had probably prompted the whole enterprise. There was a party in Athens which detested the democracy so much that it would gladly have availed itself of Sparta's help to effect a revolution. A Spartan army in Boeotia might lend a hand in promoting it. But the Athenian government was not to be intimidated by the threatening proximity of the dreaded Spartans. Again every nerve was strained for resistance. The allies were summoned to aid, among them 1000 Argives. An advance was made with 14,000 men, and a battle was fought at Tanagra. During the battle, however, the Thesalian cavalry went over to the Spartans; the latter were victorious and returned home across the Geranea, and then dedicated a golden shield from the proceeds of the booty as an ornament for the roof of the temple of Zeus in Olympia.⁷ But the defeat of the Athenians was not a decisive one, for a victory of that kind would have brought the Spartans up to the walls of Athens. It was simply the success of an army making good its retreat, which is threatened by the enemy. It was for this reason that friends of Athens in later times represented the battle of Tanagra as an Athenian victory.⁸

And in fact sixty-two days after the battle of Tanagra the Athenians were once more in Boeotia with an army commanded by Myronides, and ready to do battle with the Boeotians. They won a victory at Oenophyta and compelled the Boeotians to join them. The course of events was similar in Phocis, which had of late become friendly to Sparta. Of the Opuntian Locrians Athens took 100 wealthy citizens as hostages. We cannot but admire the energy of Athens in those days. It was certainly no slight matter to conquer the brave Boeotians; and the way in which the victory was used is a proof that the Athenian government possessed the ability to maintain and turn to good account the advantages won by the valour of her citizens. Athens brought central Greece under her influence at this time.

The Athenians now completed the Long Walls, and compelled Aegina to join their league. To the south they were even more adventurous. Some Athenian ships under Tolmides sailed round the Peloponnese and burned the Spartan arsenal at Gytheum. In the Gulf of Corinth they extended their power by the conquest of the Aetolian Chalcis, a Corinthian colony. They also landed on the territory of Sicyon and defeated the Sicyonians who marched to meet them. Thus the only consequence of the *coup* attempted by Sparta was that Athens was more powerful than ever in Greece.

But in another quarter she exhausted her strength without profit or glory. Everything had gone well at first in Egypt. The Persian king was so distrustful of his own strength that he thought it advisable to set another Power at the Athenians. He despatched Megabazus with money to Sparta to persuade the Spartans to invade Attica. But Megabazus spent the money uselessly, for the Spartans took it and yet did nothing. When he returned with the remainder to Asia, the king chose a better method; he sent a good army into Egypt under Megabyzus, the son of Zopyrus, who reconquered the country.

The Athenians were driven out of Memphis, and surrounded on Prosopitis, an island in the Nile. Here they were annihilated a year and a half later, the Persians having diverted an arm of the Nile, and thus obtained easy access to Prosopitis. Only a few escaped to Libya and Cyrene. In the swamps of lower Egypt a certain Amyrtaeus still held out, whose son Pausiris acknowledged the supremacy of Persia. Inarus was taken prisoner and crucified, but his son Psammetichus maintained his position in Libya, as did his brother Tannyras after him, although under Persian suzerainty.⁹ Finally an auxiliary force of Athenians, which entered the Nile after the capture of Prosopitis, fell into the hands of the Persians: it consisted of fifty ships, which were almost all captured. Such was the melancholy end of the great Egyptian expedition of the Athenians, which had lasted nearly six years. It is a pity that we have no detailed narrative of this war, like the account of the siege of Syracuse by Thucydides. It is true that in that case we should like to have Herodotus' eye for the peculiarities of foreign peoples and countries as well as the accuracy of Thucydides. It is just at this stage in the history of Athens that we feel how greatly our knowledge of her achievements suffers from the want of a detailed contemporary account of the *Pentecontaetia*. For in all probability these achievements were never greater or more interesting than in the years which we have just described and of which our knowledge is so extremely limited.¹⁰

NOTES

1. Cf. Thuc. 1, 102, and end of 107.

2. Neighbourly jealousy is one of the controlling factors of Greek history. Cf. my essay "Lange Fehde" in the articles dedicated to E. Curtius. Eteocles and Polynices are unfortunately only too apt illustrations of the Greek character.

3. Th. 1, 103.

4. Th. 1, 103, Long Walls of Megara; 1, 107, of Athens. The facts related by Thucydides in ch. 107 must have occurred

while Cimon was in exile. Therefore, if the Long Walls of Athens were begun after the battles of Halieis, etc., and before the battle of Tanagra, as we must conclude from Thucydides, Pericles must have begun them in the year 458. Acc. to Plut. Cim. 13, Cimon laid their foundations, in which case Thuc. 1, 107 must have expressed himself inaccurately in the words: *κατὰ τοὺς χρόνους τούτους*. In fact there is much to support the theory that it was Cimon who began them, especially the fact that Pericles afterwards built a third and inner wall. He would certainly have at once proposed this first and not the wall to Phalerum. Of modern historians Duncker (9, 134) is most decidedly of opinion that the two first Long Walls originated with Cimon. Wachsmuth, *Die Stadt Athen*, 1, 557, admits that there is much in favour of this view, but does not like to disregard the authority of Thucydides. Wachsmuth refuses to believe that Cimon spent his own fortune on objects of this kind. I see no reason why he should not; it was a liturgia on a grand scale.

5. Thuc. 1, 115.

6. C. I. A. 1, 433, Ditt. No. 3, with his chronological notes, and Duncker, 8, 278. Diodorus wrongly ascribes the expeditions mentioned in the inscription to different years:—the end of the Egyptian to Ol. 80, 1 (11, 77); Halieis and Aegina to 80, 2 (11, 78); Megara to 80, 3 (11, 79). It is not easy to ascertain the real year. Diodorus' statements of detail are valueless, only Thucydides can be used as a basis. Therefore, as Thucydides puts the conclusion of the Egyptian expedition later than the campaign of Myronides to Megara (the latter ch. 105; the former ch. 109, 110), we cannot follow Diodorus, according to whom the war in Egypt ended two years before the campaign of Myronides. Hence the year in question is probably not Ol. 80, 1, but Ol. 80, 2 or 3; Bus. 2, 481, assumes Ol. 80, 2 (459/8).

7. Bus. 2, 491. Fragment of the inscription in I. G. A. 26^a. Expedition of Nicomedes to Phocis, 458, Bus. 2, 488. Curtius, 2⁶, 189, assumes with Kirchhoff that democracy prevailed in Thebes before the battle of Oenophyta. But the point is far from certain, cf. Bus. 2, 494. There is no intrinsic reason against it, for the prevailing view, that the democracy throughout Greece was on the side of Athens and the aristocracy on that of Sparta, is certainly exaggerated in a one-sided manner.

8. Plat. Menex. 242, for instance. Thuc. (1, 108) allows that the Spartans were victorious. In spite of this Ephorus (in Diod. 11) afterwards imported obscurity into the situation. Diodorus 11, 80-83 is certainly an incredible muddle. In 11, 80 (Archon Bion, Ol. 80, 3, 458/7), the Lacedaemonians march to Boeotia and a

battle is fought at Tanagra, which, as it appears, lasts two days (or more ?) and is indecisive. Athens concludes a four months' truce with the Spartans. In 11, 81-83 (next year, Archon Mnesitheides Ol. 80, 4, 457/6), the Spartans have a large army at Tanagra and call out the forces. The Athenians march forth under Myronides, and after the historian has referred in extravagant terms to the magnitude of the victory and stated that Myronides conquers Tanagra after the battle (of which no description is given), and lays waste Boeotia, it is said (ch. 83) that the battle of Oenophyta was won by Myronides, whereupon all Boeotia, except Thebes, submits. The duration of the battle of Tanagra is not clearly stated in this account (11, 80); in 11, 81 the Spartan army does nothing; the brilliant victory of Myronides before the devastation of Boeotia (11, 82)—where?—is not described, and a battle is not fought at Oenophyta until 11, 83. Three battles have been manufactured out of two. An account of this kind is of no value.

9. Weidemann, *Geschichte Aegyptens*, 690. Bus. 2, 510. We are not even told the names of the Athenian generals who met with success or the reverse in Egypt. If Thucydides instead of relating battles as in 1, 106, had told us something more about the Egyptian campaigns, we should have been very grateful to him.

10. Acc. to Busolt the revolt of Egypt took place in 462; the appeal to the Athenians for aid, 459 (Bus. 2, 480); Halieis, 459; Cecryphalea, beginning of winter, 459/8; Aeginetan war, 458; the engagements in the Megarian war, 458; capitulation of Aegina, 457 (2, 482); battle of Tanagra, Sept. 458, of Oenophyta, Nov. 458 (2, 488). Fabricius, *Theben*, p. 12, shows that the battles of Tanagra and Oenophyta belong to the year 457.

CHAPTER XI

INTERNAL HISTORY OF ATHENS UP TO THE RECALL OF CIMON

WHILE the Athenians were extending their power abroad, at home they were advancing in the path of democratic development, as far as it was possible for them to do so. Unfortunately we are entirely without information as to the details of these changes also. Thucydides is silent on the internal development of Athens, and later writers for the most part indulge in mere phrases.

After Aristides had thrown the archonship open to all Athenians, further progress on democratic lines was made by the man who assumed the leadership of the popular party on the death of Aristides. This was Pericles, the son of Xanthippus, a colleague of Aristides: he was aided in the task by Ephialtes, who was probably an older man, but of less high rank.¹ They limited the power of the Areopagus. This fact alone is certain, further details being wanting, and it is sufficient to give us an idea of the nature of the measure. For the Areopagus consisted of members who were elected for life. If important powers were withdrawn from it, this was equivalent to a weakening of the aristocratic element in the state. But we have no accurate record of what was taken from it. Later writers say that Ephialtes deprived it of the greater part of its judicial power, and the oldest authority, Aristotle, expresses himself as follows:—"The

council in the Areopagus was limited by Ephialtes and Pericles." In modern times many have thought that the mere transference of judicial authority to other bodies is not sufficient to give this measure the democratic character which it is said to have had, and that therefore we must assume that the right of general supervision over the whole state, which is referred to sometimes in antiquity, was withdrawn from it. This would certainly be proceeding on democratic lines. But unfortunately the existence of this prerogative of the Areopagus cannot, as we have seen above, be demonstrated, *i.e.* as a political function, and hence this explanation is inadmissible.

But it is evident that the Areopagus, in its capacity as a court of justice, may have possessed an authority which enabled it to perform, by means of moral influence, the duty ascribed to it as a technical right. A tribunal which is composed of men who do not change from year to year, and has to decide questions of life and death, possesses a prestige higher than that involved in the legal validity of individual sentences. A court of justice of this kind not only can but often does supplement its decisions by remarks which have a more general character, and are intended to produce an effect beyond the limits of the court itself. In countries where the Bench is independent and much respected, as, for instance, in England, judges pronounce admonitions at their own discretion, and exercise a kind of censorial power, while on the other hand men who, like the Attic Heliastae, are thrown together by chance, possess only a technical authority which does not extend beyond the particular case before them. Consequently when a board consisting of ex-archons had to decide criminal cases of great importance, it was by no means unlikely that their judgments would be accompanied by instructive comments dealing with the moral condition of the nation at large, a function for which the Areopagus was all the better qualified as it was a court invested with a sacred

character.² We believe therefore that in Athens it exercised the influence which is ascribed to it only as a court of justice, and that it was quite possible for it to become in this way a bulwark of tradition and custom ; and it is obvious that if its jurisdiction were taken away in a number of cases, there would be fewer opportunities in Athens for men of weight to give the people a piece of good advice on occasions. The measures therefore of Ephialtes and Pericles with regard to the Areopagus, even if they withdrew only a part of its jurisdiction, still marked the disruption of a spiritual tie which had united the Athenians, and placed a curb upon their passions.

These innovations produced the greatest excitement in Athens. The educated classes, who valued the historic claim to respect of the old constitution and were warmly attached to it, felt the loss keenly. We find an echo of this feeling in some lines of the *Eumenides* of Aeschylus, which was performed for the first time in the year 459. In language of great power the goddess Athene gives utterance to her expectation that the Athenians will hold in high repute the court of justice which had been established on the occasion of the expiation of Orestes, for the welfare of Athens, the restraint of evil passions, and the observance of moderation. The warning was of no avail ; neither Aeschylus nor Cimon was able to stem the advance of democracy.

Ephialtes did not long enjoy the position to which party favour and his own merit had raised him. He was assassinated, according to Aristotle on account of his uncompromising prosecution of persons who tampered with the state finances for their own personal ends. It is assumed by many at the present day that the aristocrats as a political party were implicated in this murder, but the assumption is clearly unfounded ; to resort to assassination simply in order to get rid of a political opponent who was not disliked for personal

reasons, required more fanaticism than can be credited to the Athenians of that age.³

We shall now endeavour to give a brief summary of the political development of Athens after the close of the Persian wars, resuming our narrative at the battle of Tanagra, the most important result of which was the recall of Cimon. While danger threatened from Persia all parties in Athens were united. Even when Themistocles was banished on account of his unpopularity, the harmony between Conservatives and Liberals continued, the former supplying a general in the person of Cimon, and the latter making Aristides leader of the popular assembly and chief magistrate for civic affairs. After the death of Aristides, owing to the absence of a statesman of adequate experience among the democrats, the latter party was obliged to join in entrusting the collective policy of the state to Cimon alone for a time. Cimon proved of great value in the field, but of less skill as a politician, and in the meanwhile the Liberal party produced an able leader in Pericles, the son of Xanthippus, who availed himself of the assistance of Ephialtes, an energetic man of lower extraction, for the conduct of domestic affairs. This party thought that the time had come to place liberal principles once more at the head of their programme. Some important powers were withdrawn from the Areopagus. Certain persons who had been unscrupulous in their dealings with public money were brought to account by Ephialtes. Cimon endeavoured to resist this democratic movement, and was banished. This happened before the Spartan expedition into Doris, a campaign which was intended to encourage the Athenian aristocrats to overthrow the democratic constitution of the city with the assistance of the Spartan force which was close at hand. The Athenians, however, perceived the design, and Cimon himself fell under suspicion of being favourable to the Spartan enterprise. While the Spartans were at Tanagra Cimon came into the Athenian camp and

begged to be allowed to fight on their side. It might seem doubtful whether ostracism prevented an Athenian from fulfilling his duty as a citizen by sacrificing his life beyond the borders of Attica. The generals, however, did not venture to allow him to fight. They applied to Athens for instructions, and no one there would take upon himself to propose to the people that his request should be granted. Nothing was left for Cimon but to beg his adherents in the army to fight all the more bravely and prove that Cimon's friends were above all good Athenians. And many of them met death for their native country in the battle. It has been supposed that the Athenians would have been victorious if they had accepted his offer. But this is improbable, for he was not in command. And both the battle of Tanagra and that of Oenophyta showed that Cimon was not the only good general possessed by Athens at that time. Still he was the best of them all. He was soon afterwards recalled, for the people arrived at the conclusion that a man of his calibre ought not to remain abroad. And he himself accepted the new situation. Participation in home affairs and in purely Greek politics had evidently become distasteful to him. He agreed to a compromise, reserving the conduct of the war against Persia for himself, and leaving to others, especially to Pericles, the management of the relations of Athens with the Greek states. In this way the aristocratic party was no doubt crippled. For no aristocrat could hope to defeat measures which were unopposed by Cimon, as long as he was alive.⁴

NOTES

1. Acc. to Busolt 2, 456, the democratic reforms began in 463, when Cimon was in Messenia; he refers to Plut. Cim. 15, who, as Busolt assumes with Rühl, relies upon Theopompus. For the reforms of Ephialtes, see Forchhammer, *De Areopago non privato per Ephialtem homicidii iudiciis*, Kiel, 1828; Schömann, *Die*

solonische Heliæa und der Staatsstreich des Ephialtes, *Jahrb. f. kl. Phil.* 93, 585 seq.; Gilbert, *Staatsalt.* 1, 148; Busolt, *Staatsalt.* in I. Müller, 4, 124. The principal passages are *Ar. Pol.* 2, 9, 3; *Diod.* 11, 77 (agreeing in the main); *Plut. Cim.* 15 and *Per.* 9 (most of the *κρίσεις* taken away from the Areopagus). The *νομοφύλακες* are probably, in spite of the notice in the *Lex. Cantabr. νομοφ.*, a creation of Demetrius of Phalerum, *Gilb.* 1, 151, 153. Even the *νομοθέται* are wrongly ascribed to Ephialtes, cf. *Gilb.* 1, 286. On the other hand, the existence of the *γραφῆ παρανόμων* is possible as early as 411, and consequently it may have been adopted in Pericles' time (*Thuc.* 8, 67).

2. To prove the probability of the part ascribed by me to the Areopagus as a bench of judges, I need not refer to the authority of the Roman praetors; I may point to the position of judges in the East. The members of the Areopagus speak as persons invested with a religious dignity. The decision of a jury of Heliastæ had no moral value. There being no priesthood clothed with moral authority, such an authority might very well be represented by an august body of judges. I cannot discover any instance of the right of veto assumed by Curtius, 2⁶, 154, as belonging to the Areopagus with reference to proceedings of the Council and the Assembly.

3. Ephialtes is referred to in *Plut. Per.* 7 and 10. In the latter passage he says that, according to Idomeneus, Ephialtes was murdered at the instigation of Pericles; according to Aristotle, at the instigation of the people whom he prosecuted in a court of law, and by the hand of Aristodicus of Tanagra. We cannot hesitate in our choice between Aristotle and Idomeneus, apart from the monstrous nature of the accusation which the latter brings against Pericles. Busolt 2, 471 puts the assassination of Ephialtes soon after Cimon's banishment. M.-Strübing likewise represents Ephialtes as assisting in the banishment of Cimon. Ephialtes was plainly only of importance in home affairs; the fact that he is once (*Plut. Cim.* 13) mentioned as general proves nothing as to his ability in this respect. It is interesting to note the vivid and picturesque way in which Duncker (vol. 8 of his *History of Antiquity*) has succeeded in constructing a detailed picture of the achievements of Ephialtes out of the few statements concerning him which have come down to us from the ancients. Curtius 2⁶, 149 seq. and 827 seq., contents himself with giving the facts.

4. It is interesting to observe how the scope of Cimon's activity is gradually limited. We know nothing of the details of his resistance to the democratization of the Athenian state; but some time

certainly elapsed before Ephialtes achieved success. At the outset Cimon controls the foreign policy of Athens to such an extent that he carries the relief expedition to Sparta. But in the long run Pericles becomes all-powerful in Greece, while Cimon only asks to be allowed to fight against the hereditary foe.

CHAPTER XII

LITERATURE, SCIENCE AND ART IN THE TIME OF CIMON

AT this stage, now that a short truce prevails between parties in Athens, the time has arrived to discuss the state of civilization in the city and in Greece generally. From the time of the Persian wars, during which the minds of all were absorbed in the struggle, down to the close of the century, the educational development of the Greeks passed through three stages, which we have endeavoured to characterize briefly in a previous chapter. It is with the first of them that we have to deal here.

Athens takes the first place in all three periods, but to a greater degree in the second and third than in the first. The intellectual supremacy of Athens in Hellas becomes more and more pronounced in the fifth century. Of other Greek countries Sicily in consequence of many favourable conditions presents, so far as we can judge, the most brilliant aspect; but even she is far behind Athens. Ionia, which once was leader in the field of intellect, had in many respects played her part. The great struggle had accustomed the cities of Asia Minor to look to others, and above all to Athens, for their welfare. A native of these cities who felt that he had a vocation for higher things could not, even if his aspirations were confined to the sphere of idealism, remain permanently at home; it was only abroad, and especially at Athens, that his efforts met with due appreciation. It is true that these

cities still produced men of mark in the fifth century, but they spent only a part of their lives in their native place; most of them found their way to Athens. And even of the Sicilians, who in those early times had the same preference for their native island which characterizes their modern descendants, many migrated to Athens or to other cities of eastern Greece. Moreover the culture of Sicily, which is of a rich and peculiar kind, did not possess the untrammelled and profound character which marks that of eastern Greece. Under Gelon and Hieron the impulse proceeds partly from the court, and in republican times Sicily bore fruit which did the Greeks more harm than good.

Thus Athens takes the lead in the intellectual world, although not at first in every department. One type of poetry, the lyric, was little cultivated there. Pindar has not more in common with Athens than with the rest of Hellas.¹ He is more closely connected with the Dorian than with the Ionian element. He represents ancient Greece, the Greece of the period before the Persian wars, with all its religious and social interests, of which he is a peculiar embodiment. The intellectual centre of the Greece of that age, apart from the Delphic Oracle, was in the great games which disciplined both the body and the mind of the Greeks. Pindar gave the noblest expression to the feelings aroused by them, and sought by this means and with the aid of philosophic and religious theories, which did not reach the public through other written channels, to raise the tone of the people. He thus imparts to his odes, which were intended to celebrate the victories in these great contests, a thoroughly ideal significance. He often lays little stress on the performances of the victors—and what was Hieron's merit, for instance, but that of giving his costly horses a good training?—he likes, if possible, to dwell on the family history of the victor, or on the importance of the city which gave him birth; he recites the myths connected with the ancestors of the man he is celebrating and with their

native places, and endeavours to extract from them wise precepts for the present. He raises the art of poetry as high as it can be raised. He eulogizes virtue, but the fear of God is supreme in his eyes. For this reason the service of the deity according to Pindar cannot be a merely external one. Man must feel himself in close communion with the gods, and as a consequence he ought to think no evil of them, and not to credit them with evil passions, as the people had loved to do ever since the days of Homer. To the good he holds out the prospect of a future life. In politics he is indifferent to much that was of importance to others even at that time. All constitutions are alike to him; he has no objection even to the *tyrannis*, he only stipulates that the tyrant must be free-handed. Croesus is his ideal of a monarch, just as the 'gentle' lords were most beloved by the Minnesingers. And Pindar led a life like that of the troubadours; he travelled from palace to palace, from one wealthy house to another, everywhere adorning the festivals of victory with his lyre, and as a matter of course reaping rich rewards. He displayed no particular enthusiasm for the great national war, although he did not escape the influence of the great movement which had stirred all hearts. His attitude towards the Persian wars presents a glorified reflection of the conduct of his native city Thebes, the predominant element in which was certainly not treachery, but only lukewarmness, and we must bear in mind that the Delphic Oracle, which he revered so deeply, was far from being a bright example of patriotism. However noble the language of Pindar, however lofty his thoughts, the subject-matter of his poetry precludes him from being aught but a poet for the few. The impression made by his odes depended no doubt materially on the mode in which they were recited. In our day most people who read them, even among *savants*, can only appreciate their intellectual significance. But in reading Pindar aloud, if we fail to give full expression to the elaborate art of the rhythm which is repeated in

strophe and antistrophe and culminates in the epodos—and who can do this?—the audience misses half the enjoyment. And besides this, the musical element in Pindar's odes, which was closely connected with the rhythm, is entirely lost on us. Hence it may be safely asserted that even the best Greek scholar of the present day can only realize in his own case or reproduce for others a fraction of the impression made by Pindar upon his contemporaries. His odes of victory have alone come down to us; of his other poetical works fragments only remain. Pindar also composed dithyrambs, and this branch of poetry was further developed by others, chiefly by Boeotians and Sicyonians. Among Athenians Cinesias, who is satirized by Aristophanes, was the only poet who became famous as a dithyrambist. Pindar lived from 522-448.²

The external conditions of existence were the same in the case of Simonides as in that of Pindar. He went about among the courts and cities of the Hellenes; but although much older than Pindar (he lived 556-468), he was a man of far more modern style. This was due to his extraction. He was not an Aeolian like Pindar, but an Ionian from the island of Ceos near Athens. He wrote lyrical poems of the most varied character. Like Pindar he composed hymns, dithyrambs, and *epinikia*. Like Pindar also he knew how to appreciate the value of the courts of princes for fostering art and science, and he placed himself at the disposal of Hipparchus in Athens, the Aleuadae in Thessaly, and Hieron in Sicily. But although he was sixty years old when the battle of Marathon was fought, he could enter with enthusiasm into the sentiments of the Greeks, even from a moral point of view, in this period of their greatest expansion, and he expressed what all felt in the most beautiful, vigorous and perspicuous manner. Of his epigrams, some of which are inscribed on the Greek offerings for victories over the Persians, many are still extant, and are unsurpassed models of their kind. The mild wisdom which found utterance in his poems gave him a place by the

side of the Seven Wise Men. He excelled also in the composition of gnomic and plaintive elegy, which was so much in vogue at that time. Horace, in his well-known lines, praises the Cea Naenia. At the close of his life he went once more to the court of a prince, on this occasion to Hieron, who it is true had also defeated barbarian invaders, and there he introduced his nephew, the lyric poet Bacchylides. Although he had great enthusiasm for the heroic deeds of the wars of freedom, he took little interest in democratic aspirations. Simonides lived more in the world than Pindar, whose interests were more one-sided, and from all we hear of him he knew how to enjoy life more; it was even said of him that he was fond of money. Like Aeschylus he spent the last years of his life in Sicily.

We now come to Athens, who in the lofty mood that then inspired her, followed a branch of art which had taken rise on Attic soil, and brought it to a pitch of perfection such as it did not attain elsewhere for many a year to come. We mean tragedy.

Tragedy, as well as the Satyric drama, of which only one example, the Cyclops of Euripides, is extant, sprang from an appendage of the dithyramb, which was sung in honour of Dionysus, and consequently from an extension of lyric poetry. Next to the half-mythical Thespis, Choerilus, who lived to see the age of the wars of freedom, is said to have been the first important master of the tragic art. But Phrynichus was the first to create a genuine drama. He, it seems, made dialogue, its essential element, possible by introducing, besides the choregus, another actor as a speaker, who could also take a female part. Phrynichus made tragedy deal more with contemporary events than was usual in later times. His *Capture of Miletus*, for which he was fined 1000 drachmae, was famous; and no less a sensation was created by his *Phoenissae*, in which he anticipated Aeschylus by representing the effect of the announcement of the battle of Salamis at the

Persian court. This piece is all the more remarkable by reason of a conjecture connected with it which may be correct. It is believed to be the tragedy which Plutarch describes as having been performed in the lifetime of Themistocles and at the request of that statesman, and which gained the prize, the inscription being as follows:—"Themistocles of Phrearri was choregus, Phrynichus trained the chorus, Adeimantus was archon." This incident took place in 476 B.C.

Tragedy was made a genuine work of art by Aeschylus. He was of good Athenian family, the son of Euphorion, and was born in 525 B.C.³ His youth coincided with the time when his native city threw off the tyrant's yoke, and in the prime of his life he was himself able to join in the liberation of Greece from the Persians. He took part in the battles of Marathon, Artemisium, Salamis and Plataea. He then devoted himself with all the authority of a proved patriot and matured artist to the development of a branch of art which deeply interested all the Athenians and afterwards the whole of Greece. He gave tragedy its distinctive character in a twofold way, by external and internal reforms. He infused independent life into the dialogue by bringing a second actor on the stage. Sophocles added a third, and Aeschylus also adopted three in his later plays. With the exception of insignificant parts, the Attic drama never made use of more than three actors. It does not pretend to hold the mirror up to life, which to us seems the true aim of the drama, and it could not do so, as we shall see later on (Chapter xx.) Still the characters were intended to produce a certain illusion, and Aeschylus devoted his energies to this. He resorted to a variety of stage expedients. Masks had been customary from the beginning; Aeschylus provided handsome dresses for his actors, and introduced a background and side scenes; apparitions came from above or from the depths below. It was he who made dialogue on the stage the chief interest; the chorus, however, still played a considerable

part, and had more share in the action of the piece than was customary in later times. The object of the drama of Aeschylus was to present, by combining the recitations of the chorus with a series of inter-connected dialogues, a picture of some great event, in which the working of human passion and the controlling power of divine purpose are brought into clear relief. Aeschylus made the theatre an educational institution. He took as a framework certain family histories, the main features of which were familiar to the people, especially those of the Theban and Argive cycle of myths, and explained by means of them the divine government of the world and what mankind ought to do and leave undone. Aeschylus composed tetralogies, *i.e.* four pieces forming one cycle, of which three were tragedies and the fourth a Satyric drama. These pieces, which were performed on the same day, formed a sequel, although of course in the case of the Satyric drama the connection could only be a slight one; and even the three tragedies were not necessarily a development of the same story in three different stages. Analogous situations in entirely different legends might be used for a series of three tragedies. Sometimes, however, the history of a single family was treated in all three. Thus the *Seven against Thebes*, which has come down to us, is the final tragedy of the trilogy—*Laius*, *Oedipus*, *The Seven*, which were followed by the Satyric play of the Sphinx. We still possess the whole trilogy, *Agamemnon*, *Choephoræ* and *Eumenides*, in which a thrilling tale is told of the curse which brought ruin on the house of Atreus, the whole series being brought to a satisfactory conclusion by the intervention of Athene and the co-operation of the Areopagus. The fellow tragedies of the *Suppliants*—the Danaïdes, who fled from the sons of Aegyptus and were welcomed in Argos—are unknown to us; but there was a drama by Aeschylus called the *Danaïdes*, in which the murder must consequently have taken place. In the *Prometheus* the tragic element of suffer-

ing for the deed of daring is brought out with marvellous intensity. In the *Persae* Aeschylus has managed to glorify the great victory of the Greeks in the form of a description of the impression caused by the news of the battle of Salamis at the Persian Court. The nature of the connection of the other pieces of this trilogy, *Phineus* and *Glaucus the seagod*, with the *Persae* cannot now be ascertained, and we are quite at a loss to know what internal relation the Satyric drama *Prometheus, the Fire-bringer*, can have had to this supposed whole.

The language of Aeschylus is of extraordinary variety. His simplicity in the *Persae*, *The Seven* and the *Prometheus* is rivalled by the bold and almost unintelligible arrangement of words and imagery in the *Agamemnon*.

After having for many years taken a deep interest in all that concerned his native city, he left it in his old age and migrated to Sicily. He was dissatisfied with something that had happened in Athens. This much is certain. But what it was, cannot be stated with certainty. The ancients themselves gave conflicting accounts on the subject. It is highly probable that the democratic policy which Athens adopted at that time was not to his taste. It is possible that he was accused, as some said, of betraying religious secrets; if such an accusation were really brought against him, it would be merely additional proof of the fact that Athens did not always know how to value her true friends. Aeschylus died at Gela in the year 456 B.C.

While in Athens a new kind of poetry was arising which inspires the greatest interest by its vigorous participation in all that stirs the heart of man, Ionian culture came to an end with the decline of Ionian greatness. The Ionians had excelled in keen study of all real phenomena, both in the present and in the past; natural philosophy, natural history, geography and history had originated there. This tendency continued to be the same on the coast of Asia; but the tree

which had long shown such splendid growth now only put forth a blossom here and there. The Ionians of mark, to whom we shall refer presently, did not as a rule live in Asia Minor, and one branch of the tree, natural philosophy, soon withered.

Its last representative was Heraclitus, who was not a native of Miletus, like most of his predecessors, of the city which had always sought after real knowledge, but of Ephesus, which had never come into direct contact with the countries beyond the sea, but had always kept up a close connection with the interior of Asia and the religious spirit prevalent there. Heraclitus appears to have lived from 540-480.⁴ He held completely aloof from politics. The ancients called him the weeping philosopher, *i.e.* the father of pessimism. But in one respect he trod in the footsteps of his predecessors; he speaks of a primary element, which however was fire. Thus the conception of a primary element had a different significance in his eyes than it had for his predecessors. According to him everything was re-absorbed into fire. It seems that he only wished to signify by this the perpetual change which pervades the universe, and that the word fire was used by him as much in an unreal sense as the word number was by Pythagoras. Philosophy often expresses itself as symbolically as mythology. Heraclitus was a decided opponent of the Eleatics. For them Being, for him Becoming was the cardinal point of philosophy. The one is as correct as the other, for life cannot exist without both. "Strife is the father of all things" is a saying of Heraclitus, as it was of Empedocles in later times. He was called the Dark One. One of his sayings was "Much knowledge does not bring wisdom, or Hesiod, Pythagoras, Xenophanes and Hecataeus would have been wise." This was severe, but we can understand the possibility of his expressing himself in this way if we bear in mind that he lived a solitary life, and that the men whom he censured were regular Greeks, full of curiosity and

activity, who had studied the world of reality and endeavoured to influence their contemporaries. Heraclitus reminds us of the oriental sages who withdraw from the world, and the importance he assigns to fire recalls the religion of Iran; if he deposited his writings in the temple of Artemis, he probably considered that goddess to be the true representative of all the natural forces of the universe.

At the time when the last of the Ionic philosophers was living a hermit's life in the mountains near Ephesus, the age of philosophy and science had not begun for Athens. For Athenians of the old school all culture was comprised in art and politics. Athens was still completely permeated by religion, and religion tolerates poetry and the fine arts if they express the same feelings which it inculcates; but pure science cannot enjoy a peaceful existence in a state which is thoroughly saturated with religion. For the aim of poetry and art is to awaken enthusiasm, and for this reason they are readily pressed into the service of religion; but true science is critical, it easily wounds the feelings, which are the basis of religion, and it will serve no master. And Athens remained for so long a time penetrated with religious feeling that it refused to tolerate an entirely independent scientific system nearly a hundred years after the period with which we are now occupied, as is proved by the fate of Socrates.

But even in art we must not always keep our eyes fixed on Athens, as we shall have to do fifty years later. Both in sculpture and in painting other countries take the lead. We saw that sculpture made special progress in the Peloponnese, in connection with impulses which came from Crete, and the stimulus given by the development of the human body encouraged at Olympia. Sculpture had an essentially Doric character, and retained it for some time. In Sicily it flourished mainly owing to the master Canachus, who made the statue of the Didymæan Apollo for the Milesians. We still possess highly characteristic monuments of Peloponnesian

sculpture in the famous groups on the pediments of the temple of Athene in Aegina, which are preserved at Munich.⁵ Both pediments contain figures in relief and under life size, which represent the combats of Aeginetan heroes against the Trojans, the eastern pediment portraying Telamon fighting the Asiatics with the aid of Heracles, and the western showing the Telamonian Ajax and Teucer defending the dead body of Achilles (or Patroclus ?) against the enemy. In both groups Athene stood in the centre as protectress of the Greek heroes. The groups are quite symmetrically arranged, but there is no stiffness; the faces display the usual smile, and the figures are true to nature, while the movements are of a suitable character, but of a typical rather than an individual correctness. The eastern pediment is somewhat later than the western; Kekulé conjectures that the latter dates somewhat before and the former somewhat after 480 B.C. It is beyond a doubt that the patriotic enthusiasm of the people of Aegina, who in spite of their aversion to Athens, ranked among the bravest combatants of 480, was intended to find expression in these works of art. In the series of struggles between the East and the West, of which the conflict of the year 480 was the mightiest, the Trojan War occupied a prominent position in the view of the Greeks. There were good sculptors in Aegina, and Onatas was the most famous of them. He executed numerous works for Delphi and especially for Olympia, on behalf of tyrants like Deinomenes, the son of Hieron, and art-loving communities like Thasos, Tarentum, and Phigaleia; among these were complete groups of men and horses. He excelled especially in the casting of bronze. Hence it is not unreasonable to assume that the groups on the temple of Athene in Aegina are a specimen of the art of Onatas.

The pediment reliefs on the treasure-house of the Megarians at Olympia,⁶ and the more important metope reliefs of temple F at Selinus, probably belong to the same period. Of the

latter only the lower half is preserved, but there is at least one head, that of a conquered and dying giant, whose expression of face quite corresponds to that of the Aeginetan figures. The latest reliefs at Selinunto, those of temple E, are certainly some decades later, but they have not the perfection of form which is peculiar to the works of Phidias. Selinus was a colony of Megara, and it is well known that the Sicilian dependencies kept up their relations with the parent city in a most conscientious manner. Hence the influence of Peloponnesian art upon that of Sicily, and of Megarian art upon that of Selinus, is easily conceivable.

The sculptural ornamentation of the temple of Zeus at Olympia, the greater part of which was not discovered till the most recent excavations, belongs also to this period. The results of these excavations do not correspond to the expectations which the accounts of Pausanias were bound to arouse. This writer says that the eastern pediment was the work of the sculptor Paeonius of Mende, and that the author of the western pediment was the famous Alcamenes, one of the most distinguished pupils of Phidias. A very beautiful Nike by Paeonius was discovered in Olympia itself; and we should expect to find something equally beautiful in the eastern pediment. But this is not the case. The attitudes of the figures in this pediment, which represent the preparations for the chariot race between Oenomaus and Pelops, are much too stiff to be attributed to the artist of the Nike, and the grouping is by no means of the clear and harmonious kind that one would expect from so famous a sculptor. On the other hand, the figures of the western pediment, on which the combat of the Lapithae and the Centaurs at the marriage of Peirithous is represented, are characterized by such lack of repose and by such violent movements that we hardly like to take the artist for a pupil of the author of the pediment groups of the Parthenon. Thus a difficulty remains—the contrast between tradition and reality—for which various solutions

have been proposed, the most probable one being that Pausanias was misled, and that the pediment groups have no connection with Paeonius and Alcamenes. They may be the productions of a local art, not devoid of genius, but deficient in the general harmony and careful execution of detail which we are accustomed to consider as indispensable accompaniments of the artists belonging to the best period of Greece. A few metopes have been preserved, some of which possess a higher artistic value than the groups of the pediments.

A special position in the history of Greek plastic art was held by Pythagoras of Rhegium, or Samos,⁷ who from the character of his native city may be ranked as an Ionian. But his art is more of a Dorian stamp, and besides we know that the Messenian element was considerable in Rhegium. He is credited with many statues of Olympian victors; he also produced a group representing the brothers Eteocles and Polynices in the act of slaying one another, and a famous statue, called "the Limping Man," which is conjectured to be a representation of Philoctetes. If we wish to obtain an idea of the art of Pythagoras, we must think of the last Selinuntian metopes and of Apollo's combat with the dragon on the coins of Crotona, which seems to be traceable to an original of Pythagoras.

But the most important place in the further development of art was filled by the school of Argos. Its chief representative at that time was Ageladas, who, besides statues of the gods, executed dedicatory offerings, like so many artists of his time, among them a group of horses and captured women at Delphi ordered by the Tarentines. His name, however, was less known by his own works than from the fact that, according to the ancients, the three most famous sculptors of the century, Myron, Polycletus, and Phidias, were his pupils. Of these the Argive Polycletus continued the traditions of his art in the Peloponnese; with the two others Attica enters the lists of competitors for the crown of honour of the sculptor's art.⁸

Before we come to these, however, Calamis seems to deserve a place in the ranks of Attic artists. His birthplace, it is true, is unknown, but he worked for Attica as well as for Greek princes and other Greek countries. He executed an Olympic offering ordered by Hieron in partnership with Onatas, representing a victorious chariot and team of four. Calamis evidently kept within the limits of the older art, and endeavoured to observe the greatest faithfulness in the reproduction of the shape and the ordinary movements of the bodies of men and animals. The smile on a statue of his called Sosandra is praised by Lucian,⁹ a proof that naturalness of representation was his aim in art. Myron of Eleutheræ in Attica, who was somewhat older than Phidias, went a step further than Calamis. Myron aimed at perfection in depicting the movements of the body, and succeeded. "His special distinction and stimulus was a power of seizing and fixing the effect produced by the most fleeting movement of the naked human body. The crouching Discobolus is like an arrow sped from a bow. Marsyas reels backwards out of his joyous dance when Athene suddenly appears and strikes the flute out of his hand. The last breath seemed to float upon the lips of the runner Ladas as he collapsed at the goal. Perseus overtook the Medusa in his stride" (Kekulé). Myron is the sculptor of the moment. His statue of a cow was famous among the ancients, and a favourite subject for practice in epigrams. Old copies of the Discobolus and the Marsyas have come down to us. Myron brought art to the verge of perfection, Phidias conducted it into the sanctuary itself.

Painting in the time of Cimon is represented in tradition by a great artist, Polygnotus, whose fame unfortunately is all that remains to us. He was a Thasian by birth. In the first half of the fifth century the Greeks of Thrace rivalled the Ionians and Dorians in art, science, and general culture.¹⁰ That the Thracian Greeks devoted attention to questions concerned with the final end of existence, is proved by the lives

of Democritus and Protagoras of Abdera, to whom we shall refer later on. The labours of the historian Stesimbrotus of Thasos show that there were men among them who took a comprehensive interest in the events of the great world. The standard of general culture too must have been a fairly high one in these cities, or so many foreigners would not have come to them at that time and later, as for instance Hippocrates. And the connections of distinguished Athenian families, like those of Miltiades and Thucydides, with natives of Thrace indicates the possession of a considerable amount of culture by the latter, which can only have been derived from the coast towns. But art too was much cultivated in these cities. The commission given by the Thasians to Onatas proves a love of sculpture; that the natives practised the art is shown by our remarks on Paeonius of Mende, by some fine reliefs of northern Greece belonging to this period, and finally by the splendid coins of Mende, Olynthus, Aenus, Abdera, Thasos, and Macedonia. These countries were therefore in an advanced stage of culture, which exercised a considerable influence upon Greece proper through the agency of Polygnotus. Polygnotus devoted his talents principally to Delphi, the religious centre of Greece. Here he painted pictures of the destruction of Troy and of the nether world on the walls of a hall. The former was a collection of the most famous scenes from the poets of the downfall of the city, the latter represented the punishments of notorious sinners. These two great pictures were to a certain extent illustrations of Homer, not in a literal sense as being scenes out of his poems—although the painting of the nether world had a connection with the *Odyssey*, Odysseus conjuring up the shades being one of the figures—but in the deeper sense of presenting to the people the moral ideas aroused by the two poems—in the former the terrible end of the combats described in the *Iliad*, and in the latter the closing scenes of human life in general, which is depicted with all its aspirations, joys and sorrows in the *Odyssey*. In

Athens Polygnotus once more painted episodes of the conquest of Troy in the Peisianactian hall in the market-place, which was restored by Cimon and received the name of Poikile, the many-coloured. He also adorned the temple of the Dioscouri, and perhaps the temple of Theseus with his paintings. His friends Micon and Panaenus painted the battle of Marathon in the Poikile, and among the combatants in it Miltiades, Callimachus, and Cynegirus could be recognized. Aeschylus put his Persae on the stage about the same time. At that period, as we see, art boldly attacked contemporary events; great deeds had been accomplished and the people took pleasure in their representation. The wars that took place in the time of Pericles did not possess the same intrinsic importance. Civil war is not honourable, and consequently Phidias had little occasion for executing historical works of art. In lieu of this art became more ideal in a different sense.

Only a faint reflection of the painting of Polygnotus is presented to us in the vase-paintings of that period. To it belongs the older class of red-figured vases, the scenes on which have often suggested a connection with Polygnotus.¹¹

Polygnotus was personally acquainted with Cimon; in the Poikile he gave the Trojan woman Laodice the features of Elpinice, the sister of the great Athenian. He was Cimon's artistic adviser, the Phidias of his age.

The period between the years 500 and 450 has a decided stamp of vigour and grandeur, of sublimity and austerity. Miltiades and Cimon, Aeschylus and Polygnotus, and even Myron have the same aims in view; harmony prevails in the political, intellectual and artistic life of the age, and the character of this life is satisfactory in every respect.

NOTES

1. For the writers mentioned in this chapter, cf., besides the earlier histories of literature, the more modern publications of Bergk, Sittl und Christ (in I. Müller's *Handbuch d. kl. Alt. Bd. VII. Nördl.* 1888).

2. It is a fact that, while all other branches of ancient poetry have been successfully imitated by the moderns, all attempts to imitate Pindar have proved mere academic trifling. — For the dithyramb, etc., cf. K. Sittl, *G. d. Gr. L. 3*, 111 seq., connection between Thebes and Sicyon, *Gr. G. I.* 373-75.

3. The stage of Aeschylus has been treated by von Wilamowitz-Moellendorf in the *Hermes*, 1886. On the question as to the shape of the stage in the fifth century which has since come under discussion, cf. Kawerau in Baumeister's *Denkmäler*, p. 1730 seq. For the position of Icaria (near Vranà), cf. Merriam, *Report of the American School of Athens*, VII.

4. For Heraclitus, cf. of modern writers, Schuster, *Heraclit von Ephesus* in the *Acta soc. phil.*, Lips. III. (1873); Bywater, *Her. Eph. reliquiae*, Lond. 1877; E. Pfeiderer, *Die Philosophie des Heraclit im Lichte der Mysterienidee*, Berl. 1886.

5. For the Aeginetan monuments, which have been mentioned in Vol. I. p. 428, cf. Brunn, in his *Beschreibung der Glyptothek König Ludwigs I. in München*; K. Lange, *Die Composition der Aegineten*, 1878; and Friedrichs-Wolters, *Die Gypsabgüsse antiker Bildwerke*, Berl. 1885, p. 32.

6. For Olympia, see Vol. I. p. 249, to which must be added *Die Funde von Olympia*, 1 vol. Berl. 1882, and the article on Olympia in Baumeister's *Denkmäler* by A. Flasch, who still holds the opinion that the pediments are the work of Paeonius and Alcámenes. As a rule the opposite view prevails. Cf. also Löschke, *Die westliche Giebelgruppe am Zeustempel zu Olympia*, Dorpat, 1887, where the Olympian western pediment is ascribed to an earlier Alcámenes, who is to be distinguished from the pupil of Phidias. Flasch controverts this in the *Berl. Phil. Woch.* 1888, No. 42. For Selinus, see Benndorf's *Metopen von Selinunt*, Berl. 1873.

7. Pythagoras has been discussed in a monograph by Waldstein, in the *Journal of Hellenic Studies*, 1880 and 1881; cf. Ulrichs, *Archäologische Analekten*, Würzb. 1885.

8. For the development of art in Attica, see Curtius, *G. G.* 2⁶, 310 seq., where he describes how the potter's art and painting on clay flourished there, how the red-figure style prevailed about 500,

how Chachrylion, Euphronius, Duris, and others achieved considerable success, how the migration of the Thasian Polygnotus led to the foundation of a great historic style, how in sculpture marble relief-work was originally found in Attica, while the Peloponnese developed bronze-casting in Sicyon, Aegina and Argos, and how this practice in bronze explains the origin of Aeginetan sculpture; he then describes the heyday of art under Calamis, Myron, and Polyclethus, and finally comes once more to Athens, where the schools of Chios and the Cyclades had already taken root and Phidias attains perfection. Cf. also the notes dealing with this question from p. 845 onwards, which present an abundance of material in a concise form.

9. Here we have the culminating point of the smiling type of face in old Greek art, in which is probably discernible, not only Greek character in general, but a definite attempt to reproduce the proper expression of the countenance of a well-bred Greek.—Works of art dating from before 480, the year of the destruction of the Acropolis at Athens, have recently been discovered in the *débris* which was used by the architects of the Cimonian age for filling up the surface of the citadel. There are illustrations of some of them in Bötticher's Akropolis.

10. For the influence of the northern Greeks on Greek art, cf. Brunn, *Paionios und die nordgriechische Kunst*, Münchener Sitzungsberichte, 1876, p. 315 seq. Brunn shows how the art of northern Greece is due to a direct influence proceeding from Asia Minor. Cf. also von Rohden in Baumeister's *Denkmäler*, Art. *Malerei*, pp. 855, 857.

11. Cf. von Rohden in Baumeister's *Denkmäler*, Art. *Vasenkunde*.—Polygnotus, according to Paus. 9, 4, 1, painted the slaughter of the suitors by Odysseus in the temple of Athene Areia at Plataea. It is supposed that the representation of the same subject in the reliefs on the monument of Gjölbaski in Lycia, which have been brought to Vienna, may give an idea of the way in which Polygnotus treated it; the same influence is traced in the vase-painting, Fig. 2139, in Baumeister, *Denkm.* p. 1994. For Polygnotus, cf. Klein in the *Archäolog-epigraphische Mittheilungen aus Oesterreich-Ungarn*, XI.

CHAPTER XIII

ATHENS UP TO THE DEATH OF CIMON

CIMON had been recalled, and henceforth he and Pericles were joint leaders of the state. The former had no objection to the political development of Athens assuming a more and more democratic character, and the latter consented to the resources of the city being used chiefly against Persia. But the Spartans could not be allowed to enjoy uncontested superiority in Greece, and so small obstacles were still now and then put in their way, with which, however, Cimon had nothing to do.

From Thessaly, probably after Cimon's recall, there came a certain Orestes, the son of a man who assumed the title of king, and was at any rate ruler of Pharsalus, and begged the Athenians to re-instate him in his city, from which he had been exiled. The Athenians took with them some Boeotian and Phocian troops, and marched against Pharsalus (probably in 454).¹ But they failed to accomplish anything, and were obliged to withdraw with their *protégé*. Besides this, 1000 Athenians, under the leadership of Pericles himself, sailed from the Megarian harbour of Pegae, landed in Sicyonian territory, defeated the Sicyonians, then embarked some Achaeans and attacked the Acarnanian Oeniadae (probably in 453). But the attack miscarried and Pericles returned home. The Athenians consoled themselves with the idea that they had at all events demonstrated their power in the Gulf of Corinth.²

Three years later (consequently in 450/49), says Thucydides, a five years' peace was concluded between Athens and Sparta.³ The Athenians abandoned the war against the Greeks, but maintained the struggle against Persia. Thucydides does not say what happened between the last expedition of Pericles and the conclusion of peace; nothing of importance can well have taken place then. We know from inscriptions that on the occasion of a fresh assessment of the allies in the year 450 the Athenians reduced the amount of the tribute paid by several cities, so that the total revenue only amounted to about 470 talents, or 50 less than before.⁴ This proves that they did not entertain the idea of war in Greece. Peace with Sparta was naturally the principal object of Cimon's policy, and if Pericles could not accomplish more against the Peloponnesians than he had done in the last campaign, it was really not worth while continuing hostilities which might now and again do harm to Athens.

On the other hand, the war against Persia was to be pressed all the more energetically. At last the time had come for conquering Cyprus, whither Cimon sailed with 200 ships in 449.⁵ Unfortunately Thucydides relates the history of this expedition in only a few lines, and Plutarch throws no light on it, while Diodorus, as usual, confuses everything. Thucydides says: "Sixty ships of this fleet sailed to Egypt, at the request of Amyrtaeus, king of the marshes, while the rest besieged Citium (in Cyprus). But after the death of Cimon there being a dearth of provisions they retired from Citium, and while sailing off Salamis in Cyprus, they engaged simultaneously in a land and naval battle with the Phoenicians and Cilicians, were victorious in both, and returned home; and the ships which had gone to Egypt did the same." That is all. We are not told the circumstances of Cimon's death, nor the extent of the difficulties which the Athenians encountered at Citium, nor the reason of their sailing in an easterly instead of a westerly direction when they wanted to

return home, nor the extent of their victory off Salamis, nor, finally, why they did not attempt to conquer Cyprus after having won it. All these questions we can only answer by fragmentary conjectures. There seems to have been a bad harvest that year on the coasts of the Aegean, which would account for the famine in the camp of the besiegers, and the Athenians probably sailed eastwards to offer battle to the enemy. As regards the abandonment of Cyprus, the chief reason must have been that the Athenians were no longer inclined to carry on the war against Persia, which for some time past they had done only out of regard for Cimon. The times had changed; the generation which had fought at Marathon, at Salamis, and on the Eurymedon, had departed or grown old; the younger generation had different ideals. After all, the success of the latest contests with the East had not been so very brilliant.⁶

And now a new historical problem presents itself, one of the greatest of the very obscure history of this period. In the fourth century frequent allusion was made to a peace of Cimon, which was said to have been concluded between the Greeks, especially the Athenians, and the Persians about the middle of the fifth century, and people referred to it by way of contrast to the peace of Antalcidas.⁷ The Cimonian peace was as honourable for Greece as that of Antalcidas was discreditable. While the latter surrendered the Greek communities on the coast of Asia Minor to the Persians and left the Aegean Sea at the mercy of their fleets, the Cimonian peace was supposed to have prescribed that the Persian troops should remain at a distance of three days' march from the shores of the Aegean, and that Persian ships of war were not to appear in that sea, being only allowed in the south eastward of Phaselis and the Chelidonian islands, and to the north in the Black Sea. Thucydides does not mention a peace of this kind in his brief account. Diodorus mentions it just before he relates the death of Cimon, so that according

to him, the peace was really one made by Cimon. But war was going on when Cimon died, as we know from Thucydides; so the narrative of Diodorus once more fails us. Plutarch makes confusion worse confounded by stating that the peace was concluded after the battle on the Eurymedon, or at least in consequence of it, which is highly improbable. For Plutarch himself shortly goes on to speak of another great war waged by Cimon against the Persians, without being able to tell us which side broke this wonderful peace. Thus it cannot possibly have been concluded about 467. But was it concluded at all? Was it after the victory off Salamis, and was the name given to it then only as a compliment to Cimon? There certainly are traces of attempts on the part of Athens to come to an understanding with Persia. Plutarch, like Diodorus, mentions Callias as the Athenian who had brought about the peace, and Herodotus opportunely remarks that Callias was at Susa. But he does not state the object of his journey, nor if he effected anything. Plutarch certainly professes to know that the treaty was in Craterus' collection of *psephismata*. But that may be a mistake on the part of Plutarch's authorities. There may also have been an Athenian *psephisma*, by which the city gave its preliminary consent to the conclusion of peace with the king on certain conditions. Actual proof of the existence of a peace with Persia is therefore not supplied by a *psephisma* preserved by Craterus. And such a peace is intrinsically improbable. There is no instance whatever of a peace between Persia and another power like the peace of Cimon. The Peace of Antalcidas was not a peace between Persia and the Greeks at all, but only between the Greeks themselves, and Persia's intervention on that occasion was not the act of a state on equal terms with the Greeks, but that of a sovereign power issuing its commands. A Persian king is stated to have given an official promise about the year 449 B.C. to abstain from appearing at certain specified points. What would he have

gained by such a promise? He would only have tarnished his own honour. If the document in Craterus' collection was in the form of a regular treaty of peace, it must have been a forgery. Thus there was no peace of Callias or of Cimon in the strict sense of the words. Still in spite of all this it is certain that its supposed tenor corresponds to the actual state of the relations between Greece and Persia from 449-410 B.C. During these forty years the Persians left the Hellenic cities on the coast of Asia Minor undisturbed, and sent no ships of war into the Aegean, while the Greeks on their side engaged in no serious undertaking against the Persians. These forty years were characterized by quite a different set of circumstances to what prevailed in the previous half-century. Thus the Cimonian Peace may retain its ideal significance as a symbol of the successes obtained by Athens against Persia through the agency of Cimon, and we may assume that it was Callias who arranged with the Persian government that each power should abstain from molesting the other, and should keep within certain specified limits.

In Cimon Athens lost one of her greatest men, brave, free-handed, and affable, a genuine aristocrat, who worked hard when it was necessary, and did not grudge himself or others recreation when it was not, and who liked to provide amusement for the people, even at the sacrifice of his own fortune. His gardens, his table, and his purse were always at the disposal of his friends or the poor. His political opinions were perhaps not of such a kind that their realization would have conferred great advantage on Athens, but even the more profound mind of Pericles did not advance Athens much further from a political point of view; it perhaps rather tended to confuse the situation. Athens was never again so powerful as under Cimon, and her power was not due to him alone; Myronides was also a man of the Cimonian age. His example had beneficial effects. There was room for able men beside him, whereas Pericles eclipsed all his

contemporaries. Cimon's end has a certain resemblance to that of Pericles; he died when his countrymen were in danger. But still it was only an army that was in jeopardy, and not Athens herself, as was the case at the death of Pericles. On the whole, Cimon was a fortunate man, Pericles was not.

NOTES

1. Thuc. 1, 111; Diod. 11, 83.
2. Thuc. 1, 111; related twice in Diodorus, 11, 85 and 88; this campaign highly extolled in Plut. Per. 19.
3. Thuc. 1, 112 called *σπονδαί*, like the Thirty Years' Peace, 1, 115. Cf. Bus. 2, 504.
4. Cf. Bus. 2, 506.
5. Thuc. 1, 112; Plut. Cim. 18, 19; Diod. 12, 3, 4.
6. Cf. Bus. 2, 509. In Salamis soon afterwards Abdemon of Citium or Tyrus overthrew the Greek dynasty of the Teucridae, and brought the whole island once more under Persian dominion. Isocr. Euag. 19-21, 47, 49, 66; Diod. 14, 98.
7. The peace, but not with the name "Cimonian," is mentioned by Diod. 12, 4; Artabazus and Megabyzus, who also (11, 77) made the peace in Egypt, join Callias in concluding it; the same phrases are used in both cases; both treaties are equally improbable. Plut. (Cim. 13) also mentions Callias, whose journey is referred to by Herod. 7, 151.—For the peace cf. Duncker, 9, 41, followed by Busolt, 2, 512 seq. in a detailed account, which contains a list of modern literature on the question of the "Peace of Cimon," which has been so much discussed from the time of Dahlmann's *Forschungen auf dem Gebiete der Geschichte*, Alt. 1822, T. 1 seq. and K. W. Krüger, *Histor.-phil. Studien* I. To these may be added A. Motte, *La paix de Cimon*, Gand, 1880, who believes in an actual peace. The tradition of the fourth century is given in Isocr. Paneg. 128; a contrast was wanted to the disgraceful Peace of Antalcidas, an example of Athenian patriotism to set against the disloyal conduct of the Spartans. The inscription read by Craterus (Plut. Cim. 13) may have contained the conditions on which Athens was prepared to make peace (Duncker)—but were matters of this kind committed to writing? The fragments of Theopompus, 167, 168 (difficulty on account of the Ionic letters of the supposed *psephisma*) are very vague in their reference to this alleged peace. On the merits of

the question it may be observed that the king had no motive whatever to conclude a regular formal peace of the kind asserted. But that a state of affairs of that description recognized by both sides did exist is evident from Thuc. 8, 5 and 56. For in 8, 56 Tissaphernes asks for the right of cruising in the Aegean Sea—it had consequently really been given up by the king. In Thuc. 8, 5, on the other hand, we see that the Persians never expressly surrendered their claims to the tribute of Ionia. Moreover, the history of the Samian War, during which the arrival of a Phœnician fleet is expected, seems to me to show that Athens had no formal treaty with Persia upon which it could rely. The petty feuds on the coast are no argument against one, the satraps could begin these on their own responsibility, but the fleet was under the direct command of the king. If the fleet was expected to appear at Samos, it is clear that Athens did not possess any written treaty of peace with Persia. I can now refer to the thorough discussion of the subject by L. Holzapfel in the article *Athen und Persien* von 465-412 v. Chr. in his *Beitr. z. griech. Gesch.* Berlin, Calvary, 1888; at p. 44 he comments on the passage in Thuc. 8, 56 which is used by J. Six in Nöldeke's *Aufs. zur pers. Gesch.* Lpz. 1887, p. 52, in favour of the Peace of Cimon. Holzapfel assumes (p. 30 seq.) that the embassy of Callias took place in 464, and that a truce was then concluded on the accession of Artaxerxes, which was preserved by Craterus. He believes, moreover, following Andoc. De pace 28 seq. that at the close of the year 424 after the accession of Darius II. a real peace between Athens and Persia was concluded by Epilycus, which was not broken till Athens sent help to Amorges (Thuc. 8, 28). I have not been able to consider these ingenious conjectures in penning the text of my history.

CHAPTER XIV

PERICLES UP TO THE THIRTY YEARS' PEACE

ATHENS was now under the sole rule of Pericles. Yet he had to contend for a considerable time against a statesman of the school of Cimon, Thucydides, the son of Melesias, who could not enter into friendly relations with Pericles, because like the latter he aspired to lead the people in the Assembly, and was not bent on war like Cimon.¹

At first foreign affairs absorbed all the attention of Pericles. The mission of Callias to Susa was evidently prompted by him. He was compelled to make up his mind as to the attitude to be henceforth assumed towards Persia. And as a matter of fact he obtained all that the Athenians could ask for. Persia did not molest Athens again; and not only was the Athens of Pericles, but also the Athens of Nicias and Cleon, able to enjoy tranquillity in consequence of this mission to the East. A statesman who did not wish to continue the war against Persia could not achieve more. Hence there is no need to suppose that the so-called Peace of Cimon was a failure of Pericles.² And it must be borne in mind that Pericles had to deal with a situation created by Cimon. The Athenians had suffered a reverse at Citium, and even the victory off Salamis was used by them only to facilitate their retreat, as that of Tanagra by the Spartans. If Cimon had lived longer, the struggle would have been continued, but war was not Pericles' element. In his eyes it was only a bad means of attaining a

good object. He had conceived a plan for making Athens powerful, and constant quarrels with Persia did not fit in with it.

It was at this point, however, that real difficulties began in Greece itself, and this may seem strange at the first blush. The *status quo*, which receives the name of the Peace of Cimon, spared Athens the necessity of making immense sacrifices in men and money. The natural conclusion would be that she would have become all the more powerful in Greece. But precisely the reverse happened. She was made the object of attack by the Peloponnesians, and their attacks had a surprising measure of success. What was the reason of these two facts? The explanation simply is that Cimon was no longer alive. Cimon's personality had possessed a twofold value for Athens in her relations with the Peloponnesians. He was their friend and he was an able general. They liked him and could not have helped fearing him if they had had to face him as an enemy. After his death Athens was less friendly to them on the one hand, less formidable on the other. They expected no favour from Pericles, and did not fear him as a general. As there was constant occasion for friction between Athens and Sparta, war was bound to be the result sooner or later after the death of Cimon. Sparta wanted to check the rising power of Athens, and did so.

First there was a short prelude of no importance (probably in 448). The Spartans made a religious expedition, and took away the control of the Delphic temple from the Phocians, and gave it to the Delphians. When they had withdrawn, the Athenians came and restored everything to its old position.³

Then matters grew worse. The Athenians were not strong enough in Boeotia to protect their interests there. The number of people who had been driven out of various places was so great that they were able to occupy the two important cities of Orchomenus and Chaeronea.⁴ The Athenians (446) advanced

with 1000 of their own and many other hoplites under Tolmides, and captured Chaeronea. But on their return they were surprised near Chaeronea, and completely routed by the people who had taken possession of Orchomenus and by Locrians and Euboean exiles. The blow must have been a terrible one for Athens, chiefly on account of the number of leading men who were taken prisoners. For she gave up her hold on Boeotia forthwith in return for the surrender of the prisoners. Of course the principal adherents of Athens in Boeotia were now obliged to emigrate.

After the brilliant success of this *coup*, the second act of the carefully-rehearsed drama was placed on the stage. So much having been accomplished by means of a few Euboeans and Boeotians, a double attack on a grand scale was now put in motion. Euboea revolted. This stung Athens to the quick, and Pericles undertook to suppress the revolt in person. But hardly had he arrived in Euboea with the whole Athenian force, when he received the news that Megara had risen, that of the Athenian garrisons in the Megarian territory only that of Nisaea still held out, that Corinthians, Sicyonians, and Epidaurians had assisted in the execution of the plot in the Megarid, and that the Peloponnesians were preparing to invade Attica with all their forces. Pericles returned with all speed to Athens. But no hostile operation took place against the enemy, who had occupied the Thriasian plain near Eleusis under Pleistoanax, the son of Pausanias. The Peloponnesian army turned back and marched home. Pericles was now free to proceed against Euboea; he returned there and subdued it. The Euboeans were not treated with cruelty; only the Histiaeans were banished and their territory divided among Athenian *cleruchi*, the city Histiaea receiving the name of Oreos.⁵ Not long afterwards, Thucydides goes on to say, the Athenians concluded peace for thirty years with the Lacedaemonians and their allies, and in doing so surrendered Nisaea, Pegae, Troizen and Achaia (445 B.C.)

The brevity of Thucydides' narrative, which we have followed in the preceding account, supplies much matter for thought. The terms of peace are severe. The Athenians give up Boeotia, which they had already lost, Megaris, a small part of the Argolic Acte and Achaia. This they do in consequence of a signal defeat at the hands of the Boeotians, the insurrections in Euboea and Megara, and the invasion by the Peloponnesians. The change in the situation was considerable, and yet it satisfied but few. Only the Megarians and Boeotians really attained their object. The Euboeans were simply sacrificed by the Spartans. That the Spartans themselves were not entirely satisfied is shown by the fact that Pleistoanax was accused of taking bribes from Pericles, and that he left Sparta for this reason. We can only assume that the withdrawal of Pleistoanax from Attica was undertaken on his own responsibility, for if he was merely carrying out the orders of the Ephors, he could not have been accused. But there is no proof of the bribery. However, the Spartans must have been satisfied in the main with their success, or they would not have approved of the peace. But they wished to ignore their failure, for after all it was a poor result that a Spartan army under one of her kings should invade Attica and then withdraw without having rendered any help to Euboea, which had revolted at her instigation. It was convenient to have a scape-goat, and he was ready to hand. Greater energy on the part of Pleistoanax might have accomplished more; but still the success achieved was not inconsiderable. In any case the whole series of plots against Athens had been very well conceived and put into execution.

On the other hand, Pericles had proved himself a good diplomatist, for it is evident that it was only through his negotiations that Euboea was preserved to Athens. He had no opportunity of displaying generalship in this affair. Whether he had done his duty as ruler of Athens before the outbreak, we cannot say. The Athenians ought not to have

allowed themselves to be surprised at three different points. Or was the maintenance of the position occupied by Athens in Greece at that time really beyond her powers? This is a conceivable hypothesis. At any rate Pericles on this occasion saved his native city from a grave catastrophe only by his diplomatic skill, and that was sufficient for the moment, though it afforded no guarantee for a quiet and peaceable future. For a display of military superiority by her rival was the only means of enforcing Sparta's respect.

To conclude, if Sparta had had a Brasidas instead of a Pleistoanax in command of her army, who in case of need could have carried the Ephors along with him, Athens would not have come off so cheaply.⁶

NOTES

Pericles and his period have been treated in late years by—Oncken, *Athen und Hellas*, 2 Bde. Lpz. 1865, 66 (Band 2); Filleul, *Histoire du siècle de Périclès*, 2 vols., Par. 1873 (German adaptation by Döhler, Lpz. 1874); Cox, *Hist. of Greece*, II. Lond. 1874; W. Lloyd, *The Age of Pericles*, 2 vols., Lond. 1875; Ad. Schmidt, *Das Perikleische Zeitalter*, 2 Bde. Jena, 1877, 79; von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, *Von des attischen Reiches Herrlichkeit*, in his *Philol. Untersuchungen*, Bd. I.; Duncker, in the 9th vol. of his *Geschichte des Alterthums*; Egelhaaf, in his *Analekten z. Gesch.* Stuttg. 1886; E. Curtius, in the 2nd vol. of his *History of Greece*. Cf. the bibliography of the subject in A. Schmidt, *D. Per. Zeitalter*, I. pp. 8-10.

1. The political traits in Plut. Per. 9-15, are probably an invention of Theopompus, and do not deserve notice. The conventional Pericles presented there, a born aristocrat (C. 2⁶, 420) who wins the favour of the people by the arts of the demagogue, and when he has got rid of all his rivals, throws off the mask and plays the monarch, is not a historical personage. Pericles was a born democrat, he carried out the principles of his party without any concealment, and never shirked the responsibility which was incumbent on a leader of the people, and we have no ground for assuming that he did not consider the so-called demagogic measures, for instance the introduction of pay for service, as a reform de-

manded in the interests of justice. Judged by his acts, he is a perfectly consistent supporter of the rule of the Demos.

2. Failure on the part of Pericles wrongly assumed by Duncker, *G. d. Alt.* 9, ch. 2.

3. *Thuc.* 1, 112; *Plut. Per.* 21; *C. I. A.* 4, 22^b.

4. *Thuc.* 1, 113. These are the same cities which appeared to be desirous of seceding to the Athenians in 424 (*Thuc.* 4, 76). Evidently the parties in them were nearly equally balanced, on which account a revolution could be attempted by both sides.

5. A fragment of the treaty with Chalcis is still extant, *C. I. A.* IV. 27^a, *Ditt.* 10.—Worse treatment accorded to Histiaea, *Plut. Per.* 23.—The Peace, *Thuc.* 1, 115; according to *Bus.* 2, 555, it was concluded towards the end of the winter 446/5.—Chronology acc. to *Busolt* as follows:—Expedition of the Lacedaemonians to Phocis 448 (2, 545); battle of Coronea 446 (2, 546).

6. It is however worthy of note in connection with this peace that it really gave Athens a more secure position than she had before. She no longer had inland possessions to protect, a duty which involved great difficulties, as the events related in this chapter clearly show. She was now a purely maritime power. If she were attacked now, she had only to defend the city of Athens, and so long as she remained mistress of the sea her position was impregnable. The result would be that the enemy would grow weary of the struggle, and finally leave Athens alone. This consideration is not always sufficiently borne in mind, although Pericles stated it at the beginning of the Peloponnesian War. It was only a pity that she attained a better position as the result of a defeat. Athens was no longer feared, and so the time was bound to come when her supremacy at sea would be disputed as well. Venice also derived no advantage from her continental possessions in the long run; they involved her in disputes from which she otherwise might have kept aloof. Cf. *H. Delbrück, Die Strategie des Perikles erläutert durch die Strategie Friedrichs des Grossen, Preussische Jahrbücher, Bd. 64, Heft 3-4.*

CHAPTER XV

PERICLES UP TO THE END OF THE SAMIAN WAR

THE want of energy, with which Pericles was probably reproached, was not without consequences even in the immediate future. Pericles had few years of real tranquillity during his term of office, although he had got rid of the aristocratic opposition, which had made the splendid buildings on the Acropolis the chief object of its attack, by the ostracism of Thucydides, who left Athens probably in 445, consequently at the time of the conclusion of the peace.¹ In the first place, the Athenian tribute-lists prove that before this time, even in the course of the year 446, about twenty to thirty tribute-paying cities had seceded, so that the total sum paid amounted to barely 400 talents, instead of the estimated 434.² But the condition of Ionia caused much anxiety soon afterwards. In the sixth year after the conclusion of the Thirty Years' Peace, says Thucydides, a quarrel arose between Samos and Miletus about Priene, in which Athens was involved, and which gave her no little trouble.³ This war not only brought out the good and the weak points of Pericles, but also showed the continuous ferment prevailing in the allied states of Athens in Asia Minor. We meet with traces of this agitation still earlier, if certain inscriptions preserved in a fragmentary state have been correctly interpreted and brought into proper connection with other statements handed down from antiquity.

The essay on the Athenian state attributed to Xenophon quotes the case of the destruction of the democracy of Miletus by its nobles, in order to prove that the Athenian democracy were not acting wisely in tolerating or favouring aristocracies in the allied cities. It happens that we possess fragments of an inscription, containing provisions regarding the mutual relations of Miletus and Athens, and decreeing that Miletus was to have an Athenian garrison. The inscription is assigned to the year 450 or 449.⁴ If it was necessary at that time to make arrangements of this kind, although Miletus had long been an ally of Athens, then something must have happened to disturb the normal course of events, and this may have been the incident referred to in the above-mentioned passage. We should then have to assume that shortly before 450 the aristocracy ruling in Miletus under the favour of Athens had effected the overthrow of the Demos in the city, probably with the connivance of the Persian governors, and that the Athenians had suppressed the movement and placed a garrison in Miletus. The provisions of another treaty, concluded by Athens with Erythrae, have come down to us in a more perfect state; in it mention is made of the procedure to be observed towards the Erythraeans who had taken refuge with the Persians. There still remained therefore a party in the Ionic cities which maintained communications with Persia.

Thucydides goes on to relate that the Milesians were worsted in the quarrel between Samos and Miletus referred to above. They complained to Athens of Samos. And some of the Samians also preferred complaints against their own government; they were democrats who were discontented with the ruling aristocracy. The Athenians sided with the Milesians, manned forty ships of war, with which they sailed to Samos, and there changed the constitution and set up a democratic régime. They took as hostages fifty boys and fifty men, and brought them to Lemnos, leaving a garrison in

Samos. But all these operations were futile. Many Samian aristocrats had fled to the mainland. They applied to the Persian satrap of Sardis, Pissuthnes, son of Hystaspes, collected 700 armed men and returned to Samos at night time. They overthrew the democracy, took the Athenian garrison prisoners, and handed them over to Pissuthnes. They also managed to recover the hostages in Lemnos, and then made fresh preparations against Miletus. At this point Byzantium suddenly revolted from Athens.

The course of Samian affairs which we have just narrated contains much that is noteworthy. There is no constitution for the League, and two allied states wage war on one another about a third, for Priene was independent at that time. On the ground of *ex parte* statements the Athenians proceed at once to take violent measures against an ally, that is to say, they make an attack upon it without giving previous notice. It is true they could not have acted otherwise if they wished to attain their object. They had evidently no power to forbid war between two allies, nor the right to interfere in the internal affairs of Samos. The aristocratic government of the island being hostile to them, they were compelled to use force to remove it, and to do so quickly before the Samians had any inkling of their intentions. This is the explanation of the summary procedure of Athens. It was asserted in antiquity that the influence of the Milesian Aspasia over Pericles contributed to set him against Samos, and it is quite possible that he was confirmed by her advice in his views as to the policy to be observed towards the island. The question however presents itself—did Athens know how to maintain the advantage she had gained by her first prompt intervention? It was right to take hostages, but foolish to keep them in a place where they were not secure. It was right to leave a garrison in Samos, but this garrison should have been upon their guard. We are led to the conclusion that under the rule of Pericles, who had not learnt his business as a soldier, military matters were not

always managed with the care that was desirable. To be surprised in Euboea, Megara, Samos and Lemnos, cannot be attributed merely to a series of untoward incidents; the government was not equal to the occasion. On the other hand, it is a credit to Athens that, besides Samos, Byzantium alone revolted. This city was usually loyal to Athens; hence it is probable that skilfully-contrived intrigues had been at work there. The fact that other cities did not follow its example shows that the régime of Athens was on the whole not an oppressive one, and that as a rule she maintained a vigilant attitude in the independent cities.

After the revolt of Samos and Byzantium, Athens once more acted with energy, and, as far as we can judge, with more caution than she had recently done. Pericles set sail with sixty ships, from which however he detached sixteen, partly to procure aid from Chios and Lesbos, partly to meet the apprehended arrival of some Phoenician vessels.⁵ With the remaining forty-four he attacked the Samians, who had a fleet of seventy ships, twenty of which however were transports. The Samians were defeated at Tragia, an island at the entrance of the Gulf of Latmia.⁶ It was not till after this engagement that the Athenians received reinforcements, forty of their own ships, and twenty-five from Chios and Lesbos. They now landed on Samos, and surrounded the town. But Pericles suddenly raised the siege and sailed southwards with sixty ships, having been informed that a Phoenician fleet was approaching and that the Samian Stesagoras had gone to meet it with five ships. Consequently, if we include the sixteen previously detached ships among the forty which came as reinforcements, only forty-nine Athenian and allied vessels were left before Samos, and they protected their position on shore by a palisade. Suddenly the Samians, who, as we know from Aristotle, quoted by Plutarch, had a very able leader in the philosopher Melissus, made a well-planned attack. They destroyed the ships anchored as a guard in front of the others,

drove back those which sailed out to meet them from behind the palisade, and thus cleared the entrance of the harbour. This state of affairs lasted for fourteen days, which they spent in provisioning the city. They however made no attack upon the Athenian position.

At the expiration of this time Pericles returned, having sailed to Caunus and Caria in the interval. We are not told whether he fell in with the Phoenician fleet on the way or at his destination. Perhaps there was no fleet there at all, or perhaps it had not ventured out of harbour. Various possibilities are conceivable here. It may be that a Phoenician fleet was really on the approach, but that it was prevented from fear of Pericles from undertaking anything, and sailed home. It is also possible that Pericles followed up his naval demonstration by negotiations with the commanders of the hostile fleet, and displayed his abilities as a diplomatist in this crisis, as he had done when opposed by Pleistoanax. Perhaps the Phoenician admirals waited to see whether the Samians would inflict a decisive defeat on the Athenian fleet which had been left behind, in order to put in an appearance in that case and reap the fruit of other people's valour for the king of Persia. It is also possible that the whole thing was merely a stratagem on the part of the Samians, an attempt to draw away part of the Athenian squadron from the siege by false reports. If so, they attained their immediate object, but they ought in that case to have inflicted a crushing defeat on the Athenian fleet. And as they could not succeed in this, the diversion did them no good in the long run.⁷

The city was once more invested from the sea, and Pericles assembled a force, the imposing character of which was hardly equalled in the subsequent history of Athens. Forty Athenian ships came under Thucydides, Hagnon and Phormion; twenty more under Tlepolemus and Anticles; and thirty from Chios and Lesbos, making ninety in all. There

were 109 at Samos before ; some of these had been lost, but altogether there must have been 180 Athenian ships of war assembled before Samos on this occasion, a spectacle which might well have made the Samians tremble, and a display of power which was calculated to make a great stir throughout the whole of Greece. The Samians made one more attempt to maintain their position at sea, but the overwhelming superiority of the Athenians crushed them, and they were obliged to confine themselves to the defence of the walls. It happened that Samos had been admirably fortified since the time of Polycrates, so that an investment of the town was no light matter. The Athenians had already gained a reputation in this kind of warfare, but on this occasion they surpassed themselves. Diodorus refers to the great variety of mechanical apparatus used for the siege, rams, protecting-roofs, and other machines, designed by the engineer Artemon, of Clazomenae. The apprehension which they inspired probably contributed to the reduction of the city.⁸ But Pericles did not overthrow the walls. Samos surrendered while she was still able to continue the struggle in the ninth month after the beginning of the revolt. Two things certainly conduced to this surrender, firstly, the conviction that failing assistance Samos would be forced to capitulate by famine in the long run ; and, secondly, the lenient terms imposed by Pericles. The Samians were to pull down their fortifications, give hostages, pay the Athenian expenses of the war in instalments, and surrender their ships.⁹ Thus Samos became a dependent member of the Athenian League. But democratic government does not seem to have been reintroduced. This lenient proceeding, too, on the part of Athens may have been an inducement to many Samians not to push their resistance to extremes.

And a speedy settlement was of paramount importance for Athens. Other cities might have revolted as well as Byzantium, which now once more came under Athenian rule,

and if the Peloponnese had begun a war with Athens, she would have been in the greatest peril. In fact the question had already been mooted in the Peloponnesian senate whether they should assist the Samians.¹⁰ Afterwards the Corinthians took credit to themselves with the Athenians for having prevented the Peloponnesians from siding against them—every state, they are reported to have said, had a right to subdue a rebellious ally by force. This was probably a piece of boasting with only a partial foundation. In reality matters no doubt took their usual course. The Peloponnesians simply awaited the development of events. The Athenian preparations were on a colossal scale, and the capture of Samos might take place at any moment; if the Peloponnesians declared war at the wrong time they would encounter both danger and ridicule. Athens could only be attacked with advantage if Samos held out for a long time. The Peloponnesians acted in this way before, and did so again; they set on foot one intrigue after another. Still it is quite possible that the Corinthians, if they really advised peace, did so because they had no special dislike of Athens at that time; that did not come till afterwards, when she encroached still further westward.

No one can assert that Athens abused her victory. The terms could not have been more easy. Prudence demanded this, but something must be attributed to the character of Pericles, who never was guilty of such cruelty as his fellow-citizens perpetrated after his death against Mitylene, Scione and Melos.

When, as was the custom in Athens, a public funeral was arranged in honour of those who had fallen in the war, Pericles had to deliver the oration. It won the admiration of all, and the women crowned him with garlands, he having been the leader of the people in the war. Elpinice, the sister of Cimon, alone reproached him for having gained a victory over Greeks, and not, like her brother, over barbarians.

NOTES

1. See Plut. Per. 14 and 16 for the ostracism of Thucydides, after which, acc. to Plutarch, Pericles was Strategus for fifteen years, probably the period from 445-430; Bus. 2, 570 remarks "in the spring of 445," in contraverting Duncker and M.-Strübing. Duncker's account (9, ch. 8, pp. 163-191) shows how the endeavour of many modern writers to make the details of Greek history more attractive by guessing at unrecorded events, leads to narratives the charm of which makes us only too ready to forget the element of personal impression which they contain. When Curtius (2⁶, 186) asserts that the aristocratic party set the machinery of ostracism in motion against Pericles, and that it then turned against themselves, that is, against Thucydides, we must remember that this is merely a conjecture of Grote's (3, 327).

2. Bus. 2, 554.

3. For the Samian War cf. esp. von Pflugk-Harttung, Pericles als Feldherr, Stuttg. 1884. Authorities: Thuc. 1, 115-117, Diod. 12, 27, 28, who in this case gives us good information of a special kind, and Plutarch (Per. 25-28), who is also well informed. Diodorus probably follows Ephorus here, while Plutarch has also made use of the Samian Duris.

4. De rep. Athen. 3, 11; C. I. A. 4, 22^a resolution of the people concerning Miletus; C. I. A. 1, 9-11 concerning Erythrae; C. I. A. 1, 13 concerning Colophon.

5. We have the list of the board of generals for 441/40; cf. Bus. 2, 597; Sophocles was among the number; he went to Chios.

6. For the position of Tragia cf. von Pflugk-Harttung, I. 1, p. 124 seq. What according to Thucydides and Ephorus was a victory for the Athenians was held by others (Aristot. in Plut. Per. 26) to have been a victory for the Samian general Melissus.

7. It is also permissible to suppose that a Persian fleet was really approaching, that Pericles, however, reminded its commanders of the settlement obtained by Callias, which they seemed inclined to disregard as not having been concluded in proper form, and then induced them to return, firstly, by referring to diplomatic incidents of an earlier date (agreements between the king and Callias), and, secondly, by pointing to the strength of his own fleet, which was not to be despised.

8. The bitter feeling on both sides is proved by the fact that the Athenians branded the Samian prisoners with the mark of an

owl, while the Samians branded the Athenians with that of a Samian galley—*σάμαινας*; cf. Bus. 2, 599; Plut. Per. 26 certainly makes the Athenians use the mark of the *Samaina*, but this is hardly probable.

9. Detailed accounts of the terms of peace in Du. 9, 211 seq. and Bus. 2, 600; cf. the latter for the sums spent by the Athenians on the Samian War, which must have amounted to more than the 1276 talents taken by Athens from the treasury of the goddess (C. I. A. 1, 177). Busolt adds another 800 talents of current tribute.

10. Thuc. 1, 40, 41. That the war moreover exercised an unfavourable influence upon the relations of the League is clear from the fact that the number of tributary Carian cities decreased, and that this district was united to the Ionian on that account. In consequence Athens raised the scale of tribute in 439. Cf. Bus. 2, 602. The Thirty Years' Peace had for the time placed Corinth on the old terms with Athens, which were by no means of a hostile nature. The hatred of Corinth did not burst forth anew until Athens took Corcyra under her protection.

CHAPTER XVI

ATHENS UNDER PERICLES—THE GOVERNMENT OF THE CITY

BEFORE we proceed with our narrative of events we must describe the state of things prevailing in Athens at this time.

The Athens of Pericles is one of the most remarkable phenomena in history. And this is not only due to her world-renowned intellectual and artistic culture; her political institutions also are peculiar in a high degree. She forms a whole complete in itself, most of the elements of which had been contributed by preceding generations. From an external point of view it might be said that Pericles did not add so very much of his own to it. But we shall see that he not only organized the state in a peculiar way, but also endeavoured to infuse into it a spirit of a thoroughly special character.

The Athenian state was a completely developed democracy: the people ruled, so far as this is possible, and the term people comprised every man who could belong to it according to the views of antiquity. The last legal restrictions on political power had been swept away by Aristides, and the last checks connected with the duration of office by Ephialtes, for since the time when his reforms had deprived the Areopagus of its influence no bodies of importance were elected for more than one year. A man whose parents belonged to the community was received as a member of his father's deme by a vote of the demotae on the completion of his seventeenth year,¹

and could then take part in the deliberations of his deme as well as in those of the whole people.² But he had first to devote two years to military education, consisting of training both in the city and in the field, especially on the frontier, and perhaps even as a member of the garrisons (*φρουραί*) scattered throughout the territory of the allies, so that it was not till his twentieth year that the young Athenian actually took part in political work. This was divided into three branches, the affairs of the Deme, those of the Phyle, and those of the Polis. The affairs of the Deme were purely local, as the single Deme had only a local importance; since the time of Cleisthenes the Phyle had existed chiefly as a union for religious purposes, especially for honouring the gods by providing choruses at festivals. The affairs of the Polis—the state—were of paramount importance. For their discharge four ordinary meetings of the Assembly were held in every prytany, the duration of which was thirty-six days, and as many extraordinary meetings as was necessary. The Athenian citizen could thus, if occupation of this kind was to his taste, count on being engaged in affairs of state every seventh day. The most important ordinary meeting of the Assembly was taken up with the *epicheirotomia* of the officials, *i.e.* the enquiry as to whether any citizen had any objection to make to their conduct of office and the necessary voting thereon, and with reports by the magistrates on financial matters, on the security of the state, and on measures to be taken against any individual, such as the accusation known by the name of *eisangelia*. Another ordinary meeting dealt with motions relating to money demands made by the state on its citizens, a third with deliberations on foreign affairs, and the fourth with proceedings and statements relating to religious matters. Not only the Council but also every citizen had a right to initiate proposals in the Assembly, but all motions had to be introduced by a preliminary order (*προβούλευμα*) of the Council, and thus motions of individuals, if they were not merely in

the nature of amendments, went before the Council first for approval. The latter, however, was not required to express an opinion; it might simply declare that it left the matter to the decision of the people. Legislation was rendered very difficult.³ As a matter of fact we do not exactly know how laws were passed at Athens in the fifth century B.C.; no doubt a committee had to sanction any proposals that might be made. Resolutions of the Assembly could not contravene existing laws. The responsibility for a vote of the Assembly attached for the space of one year to the mover of the resolution, and he was liable to prosecution during this period for illegal procedure (*paranomôn*). If the year had expired, the prosecution could be instituted, but in that case only had the effect of annulling the resolution. Indictments of this kind came before the ordinary judges, the Heliastae.

The Heliastae had jurisdiction in all cases, with the exception of a few reserved for the Areopagus. The other ancient law-courts were presided over by Heliastae. Every Athenian citizen of good repute who had attained the age of thirty might be a judge of the Heliastae. To become a Heliast a citizen had to present himself before the Archons and take a special oath; his name was then entered in the list of the Heliastae, and he was then assigned to one of the sections, which consisted of 500 citizens. Individual cases, however, were decided by special juries, which might consist of any convenient number; we hear of juries numbering from 200 to 3000. The judges had to decide according to the laws, and, failing them, according to the dictates of conscience. There was no appeal from, nor review of, a decision of the Heliastae; their decision was final. They could thus really decide as they liked and were irresponsible—it was a despotism of the people. As many cases came before the Heliastae, because the Athenians were very litigious and because many matters relating to the allies were decided in Athens, the Heliast was often very busy, perhaps not on

every one of the 300 court days, but certainly on more than 100 of them.⁴

Lastly, membership of the Council occupied a considerable section of the community. Fifty Bouleutae were drawn by lot from every Phyle, and a special representative for each of them. In this case also candidates had to report themselves in order to get a summons. The Council met every day, with the exception of festivals. The idea was that it should form the government of the city. But the ordinary duties of a government, for instance the exercise of constant vigilance, could not possibly be performed by a Council of this kind; consequently a permanent committee was elected from among its members, the so-called Prytanes. These were the fifty councillors of one and the same Phyle, who lived in the Prytaneum for thirty-six days, or the tenth part of a year, and were boarded at the expense of the state. Their president, who was changed daily, was also chairman of the Assembly.

The heads of the executive in Athens were originally the Archons, the inheritors of the royal authority. But since the time of Cleisthenes they had been deprived of almost all their real power. The only privileges which were left to them were such as conferred more dignity than influence. They continued to be the representatives of the state in all matters of ceremony which they had to carry out in its name. It was their duty to offer the state sacrifices and to conduct the great festivals—a remnant of the priestly dignity of the ancient kings. Of judicial authority they only retained the preliminary examination of most of the legal proceedings, and the right of presiding in courts of law; the verdict was given by the jury. The third royal function, the supreme command in war, had, as we have already seen, passed to the board of strategi. The court of the Areopagus, which had sprung from the Archons, shared with them the fate of being used only for ornamental purposes.

It would not be incorrect to say that all this was the result

of a natural development. The Solonian constitution had not been in existence for more than a few decades when Peisistratus seized the reins of government. And in order not to appear a despot pure and simple, he still had need of the Archons. He always introduced a member of his family into the board of Archons, which in reality had lost all power. After the fall of the Peisistratidae, Isagoras in his capacity of first Archon once more asserted the authority which legally belonged to him and his colleagues. It was therefore not surprising that the reformer Cleisthenes took definite steps to diminish the powers of the Archons, and endeavoured to give greater importance to the military representatives of the ten Phylae created by him.⁵ Of course they were not intended actually to take the place of the Archons. Originally they were subordinate to the Polemarch. A trace of this is recognizable in the battle of Marathon. For apart from the question whether the Polemarch was elected or chosen by lot at that time, the fact that he gave a decision in a matter as to which the strategi were not agreed, proves that he still retained a certain measure of authority. A similar incident did not occur again in Athens. Henceforth there is no mention of the Polemarch either in the field or in preparations for war. We have here therefore a transitional state of things similar to that met with in Europe at the beginning of modern history, only in a different connection, because in modern Europe the officials who supplant the old dignitaries are not elected by the people, but are creations of the will of the sovereign. In feudal states there was a chief justice, a commander-in-chief, and so on by virtue of hereditary right. As soon as princes extended their control over their vassals they appointed men of their own absolute right, who undertook the functions of the barons, while the latter still enjoyed the titles of authority. Thus there was still an Admiral of France long after the French kings had entrusted the command of their fleets to men who understood naval matters better than the hereditary admiral, who meanwhile

still retained certain administrative and judicial functions. At Athens foreign campaigns naturally contributed to increase the importance of the post of strategus, and also to give one of the strategi an authority exceeding that of the others. The energy and fame of Miltiades, Themistocles, and Cimon confirmed and developed the new system. The details of the organization of this body cannot, however, be ascertained. We cannot say whether one of the strategi was legally invested every year with a higher power than that of his colleagues, such as was always actually possessed by Cimon and Pericles.⁶

The strategi, however, gradually got into their hands not only leadership in the field but the whole of the preparations for a campaign, and with them the actual if not the legal management of the foreign policy of Athens. They had to provide for nearly everything that was to be done in this respect, so far, that is to say, as the Athenians did not reserve it for themselves. For although the Athenian people allowed men whom they trusted to make the laws, they wanted to control the details of administration themselves as far as possible. But the foreign policy of the city demanded continuous attention. Athenian statesmen had not only to maintain the connection with friendly powers, they had also to obtain information as to the state of affairs in all the countries with which they were or might come in contact. It is therefore not surprising that they wanted money occasionally, of the expenditure of which they could not give a satisfactory account; and it is probable that the ten talents spent by Pericles when Pleistoanax withdrew from Attica was not the only money used in that way.⁷ Pericles or whoever else was in power at Athens was obliged to know the position of affairs in the cities of the Mediterranean from the Crimea to Naples, and could not afford to wait for information regarding possible designs against Athens from a friendly traveller or even an Athenian *Proxenos*, who might get into trouble through sending it. No doubt many journeys had to be taken on behalf

of the Athenian state. It would have been absurd, whenever an Athenian citizen went to Thebes or Corinth under the pretext of business to procure information that was useful for Athens, to obtain a special vote of his expenses from the people. In a case of that kind it was better to place a secret service fund at the disposal of a trustworthy statesman like Pericles. The stories of bribery supposed to have been effected with the ten talents merely prove the hostility of Pericles' enemies. We are in a position nowadays to form a better estimate of matters of this kind.

If the strategi actually directed the policy of Athens, their office was no sinecure, for officially it was their province alone to bring forward proposals on public business. When anything had to be decided which imposed obligations on the people, it was for the people themselves to pronounce the decision. Consequently they had to be consulted, and the proposal had to be presented to them in a favourable light. For this the gift of oratory was necessary. The strategi therefore were obliged to have at least one good speaker among their number. And this individual became their chief in consequence, for the others could not do anything without him. To be a good speaker was an essential condition of becoming head of the board of strategi and thereby head of the state, and thus the centre of gravity in state affairs was, in spite of the name strategus, once more transferred to home administration.⁸ This begins as early as Pericles, who was continually re-elected as strategus and governed Athens, although he dispensed with war as far as he could. But he remained at the same time general-in-chief and leader of the Assembly. Nicias and Alcibiades were in a similar position, and even Cleon had on occasion to play the general. But the separation of the two functions is in inception at this stage. Cleon was principally and by preference only a political leader, "the chief of the people." At this period the peculiar combination of the statesman and the military expert, which had been united for

half a century in the office of strategus, began to break up, and in the fourth century the two functions, that of leader of the people and general, are seldom found in one person. The leader of the people is as such a private individual. He is the citizen who proposes measures to the people, and legally it was open to every citizen to do so. It is precisely in this point that the democratic character of Athens revealed itself, that any one might give his advice to the people. Of course, besides eloquence, knowledge of affairs was required in order to do so with success, and only the possessor of these qualifications could undertake to give advice which was not ridiculous. It was much easier for a strategus to become leader of the people, merely owing to the fact that his official connections gave him a superior knowledge of affairs, and because he could convoke the people whenever he wished.

The strategi had so far charge of the finances of the state that they were responsible for the expenditure of the money supplied them for purposes of war or for military preparations, and were consulted as to the assessment of the citizens for direct war-taxes and also as to the imposition of the *trierarchia*. A despotic fiscal control emanating directly from Athens and unconnected with the League, which existed at Athens in the fourth century, cannot be demonstrated in the fifth century. The people paid attention to every detail, even in financial matters, and decided what revenues should be applied to the various branches of expenditure.⁹

The revenues of the Athenian state, apart from the tribute of the League, were for the most part of an indirect nature, proceeding from customs and royalties (the mines at Laurium). Direct taxes were regularly paid only by the Metoeci, and by the Athenians themselves only in extraordinary cases, and then the tax was called *eisphora*. The wealthy, however, were expected to aid the state in maintaining the navy in the capacity of trierarchs, that is, as men who equipped and commanded ships of war, and in upholding the dignity

of religious worship as Choregi. On the other hand, the Athenian citizen derived considerable pecuniary profit from the state, most of which naturally fell to the lot of the poor. In the first place, the system of money payments for public services was carried out in a most extensive fashion.¹⁰ The 500 members of the council were paid, and received a drachma each *per diem*, which, as there were probably about 300 days' sittings, amounted to an annual expenditure of 25 talents. The Heliastae were also paid, receiving at least two obols a day in the time of Pericles. Pericles also introduced the theatre-money, the *theorikon*, which the Athenian citizen received as compensation for loss of earnings incurred by attending the theatre; it had the special name of *Diobelia*. The Athenians clung to their *theorikon* longest of all, and this was not a sign of degeneracy, as is generally supposed, but a simple necessity, for as time went on many other sources of money-making were closed to the citizens. Besides, attendance at the drama was a religious service. Even those who sat in the Assembly were paid towards the beginning of the fourth century to the amount of one obol. Whether this was the case under Pericles, as some historians believe, is an open question. At all events in later times the introduction of the payment for attending the *ecclesia* was not connected with the name of Pericles, in whose system it might well have found a place. Furthermore the Athenians, who of course drew pay as soldiers and sailors, had the benefit of occasional largesses of corn, when friendly princes sent presents of it to the city, and it was distributed, or when the state itself sold grain cheaper than it had purchased it.¹¹ Finally the great state sacrifices were suitable occasions for giving banquets to the citizens. Disabled persons—whether from war or work—were assisted and even supported, as were also the orphans of citizens who had fallen in battle.

Athens managed to make very skilful use of her political power to absorb the commerce of a great part of Greece

and of the oriental coast; thus the products and manufactures of the shores of the Black Sea, of Thrace, Ionia, Phoenicia, Egypt, Cyrene, Sicily and Italy could be bought in the Piraeus and in Athens at a price very little higher than in those distant countries themselves.¹²

Foreigners were encouraged to settle in Athens, and there were many of them living in the city and in the Piraeus. They paid protection-money, but if they rendered great service to Athens, they were exempted from this payment as *isoteleis*.¹³ The friendly attitude of the Athenians towards strangers was rightly considered a proof of their higher culture and refinement.

The consideration of the relations of Athens to her allies and the way in which she looked after her citizens outside Attica, will complete the picture of the work and general life of an Athenian citizen, as it floated before the imagination of Pericles.

Here, however, we must lay stress on another point which is not always sufficiently noticed. The Athenian constitution was a perfect democracy, but, in the first place, the people did not claim the right to be able to make laws at their good will and pleasure, and, in the second place, they only adopted definite resolutions on the motion of a citizen who assumed responsibility for the measure proposed by him. This was a check upon reckless legislation. Even in Rome the system corresponded to the modern one; the vote was a discharge for everything, and the proposer was then free from further legal responsibility.¹⁴ The Athenians, on the other hand, rightly held that a citizen who moves the adoption of a resolution affecting the welfare of many individuals must be prepared to take a greater responsibility than the man who merely gives an affirmative vote. Democracy without responsibility on the part of the mover of a resolution did not meet with their approval. This is the key to many peculiarities of Athenian political life.¹⁵

The Periclean system, which contained a marked socialistic element, and was afterwards imitated in Rome, did not endure long after the death of Pericles. A people which wishes to be self-governing up to this point must also be capable of controlling and checking itself, and this the Athenians did not always succeed in doing.¹⁶ Of course their faults were in no small degree intensified by the pleasures in which the well-to-do citizens were able to indulge by reason of the gathering of men and merchandise in the commercial and political capital of the eastern Mediterranean. The possibilities of good and evil in an Athenian of the age of Pericles have been shewn by Pericles' kinsman Alcibiades. But it cannot be said that Athens was ruined by the effeminate life of her citizens. The mischief lay in another direction, and we shall see that Pericles did what he could to avert it, unfortunately without success.

NOTES

The constitution of the city of Athens under Pericles is explained in the well-known hand-books of archaeology, most recently by Gilbert, *Staatsalt.* I., and Busolt in *I. Müller's Handbuch*, Bd. IV. I must refer the reader to them for quotations. I have strongly emphasized the point, which is not sufficiently noticed, of the responsibility of the proposer of a resolution.

1. The reduction of the number of citizens by Pericles by means of the expulsion of 4760 *παρέγγραφοι*, acc. to Philochorus quoted in Schol. Ar. Vesp. 718, Plut. Per. 37 (almost 5000), has of late been the object of minute discussion; cf. Duncker, *Ein angebliches Gesetz des Pericles*, Berl. Akad. Sitzungsber. p. 936 seq., and his *Gesch. d. Alt.*, 9, 100, and Beloch, *Die Bevolk. der griech.-röm. Welt*, Leipz. 1886, p. 75 seq., also Bus. 2, 574 seq. Formerly the statement of Philochorus was accepted, that Pericles carried a law by which only *ἐκ δυνῶν Ἀθηναίων γεγονότες* (on the father's and mother's side) could be Athenian citizens, and this was considered the revival of an older law. It was probably, however, merely a solitary measure, to ascertain the civic rights of persons presenting themselves to receive an extraordinary largess of corn, in which case of course the criterion of descent from a male and female citizen was decisive.

2. For life in the demes see the treatise of Haussoullier, *La vie municipale en Attique*, Par. 1884, which it is true deals only with the fourth century, but enables us to draw conclusions as to the fifth century.

3. For legislation cf. Busolt in Müller, 4, 175; for the *γραφὴ παρανόμων* cf. Gilbert, *Staatsalt.* 1, 281-285; Busolt in Müller 4, 174.

4. Many political matters were also referred to the decision of the Heliastae, especially when the question was of a personal nature; cf. Curtius, *G. G.* 2⁶, 219, but he no doubt goes too far when he concludes from the circumstance that they had to confirm the treaty with Chalcis by oath, that they had to examine and approve state-treaties; the confirmation by oath of treaties constitutionally made was a duty and not a privilege. The citizens who confirmed the so-called Peace of Nicias had not been asked if they approved of it. The Heliastae intervened specially in disputed questions. Duncker, who calls the Heliastae an "Upper House," has also over-estimated their importance.

5. The diminution of the importance of the archonate and the increase of that of the general's office begins virtually under Peisistratus. For if on the one hand the latter ruled as an autocrat, and on the other allowed the board of Archons to exercise their legal authority as a matter of form, it is evident that he must have reserved for himself a sphere in which he could do as he liked, and this could only be that of a general. Hence even under Peisistratus the strategus must have been virtually independent of the Archon Polemarchus. After Isagoras had emphasized the importance of the archonate, Cleisthenes revived Peisistratus' despotic plan of placing the Polemarchus virtually on the retired list, but gave it a democratic turn by founding the board of strategi. This must have been all the easier to carry into effect in the years 508 or 507, as from 560 to 510 people had become accustomed to regard the Polemarchus as a mere puppet. Not only did the exterior of the strategus Pericles recall that of Peisistratus (*Plut. Per.* 17), but the office which he filled was to a certain extent a revival of the position held by Peisistratus.

6. The remodelling of the office of strategus has been discussed by von Wilamowitz-Moellendorf, *Phil. Unters.* I. pp. 63, 64; see Gilbert, *Beiträge*, etc., pp. 1-96, for the position of the strategi, and that of the *προστάται τοῦ δήμου* or *δημαγωγοί*. Cf. in general Hauvette-Besnault, *Les stratèges athéniens*, Par. 1884, and Bus. 2, 333 seq., who points out how the necessity of giving full powers to one individual for the successful co-operation of Athens in a general Hellenic war, gave the impulse to the development of the

office of strategus. Beloch, *Die attische Politik seit Perikles*, Leip. 1884, has expressed the opinion at pp. 274-289 that one of the ten strategi was chosen commander-in-chief every year. If there had been such a formal determination of the supreme command, it would certainly have appeared more clearly in the historians. We must draw a distinction here. In the board of strategi as such the presidency was a formal matter, and we do not know who had the right to preside; it might have been arranged in the most various ways, without making any material difference: who, for instance, was the president of the Ephors or of the tribunes of the people, etc.? When, however, generals were sent on a campaign, the people determined who were to go, and no doubt the order of their names gave a claim to the presidentship. An imitation of the position assigned to the Athenian strategi appears in that given by the Romans to their tribuni militum cons. pot. But the Romans did not find the change a practical one, and reverted to the old arrangement.

7. The ten talents spent *εἰς τὸ δέον* by Pericles are first mentioned by Plut. *Per.* 23, on the occasion of the invasion by Pleistoanax, but according to Theophrastus, quoted in the same passage, *καθ' ἑκαστον ἐνιαυτὸν εἰς τὴν Σπάρτην ἐφοῖτα δέκα τάλαντα παρὰ τοῦ Περικλέους*. If it were a fact that Pericles had for years together an annual sum of ten talents at his disposal for secret service expenses, the money of course did not go only to Sparta; it was a fund for diplomatic purposes.—That the Proxeni did much is certain; cf. Monceaux, *Les proxénies grecques*, Par. 1886. But they were far from being able to do everything, for they were exposed to the risk of being punished by their fellow-citizens. And even the Proxeni sometimes took money, Monceaux, pp. 96 and 113.—This underground kind of work in the Greek cities in the fifth century is shown by the revolts which, for instance, preceded the battle of Coronea, and several others. Nicias had relations with Syracuse. Is it likely that he never disbursed any money? —Pericles was permanently strategus, and besides this *ἐπιωτατής* of the public works, and often *ἀθλοθετής*, or steward of the great festivals; he had thus the most varied opportunities for exerting his influence on Athens. Cf. Curtius, *G. G.* 2⁶, 228.

8. Thus in Paus. 1, 29, 15, Ephialtes is called *ρήτωρ*, equivalent to statesman; an Athenian statesman was bound to be an orator. In the same way Gladstone was the indispensable leader of his party, because he was its most powerful orator.

9. That a supreme controlling authority in finance was in existence as early as the fifth century, as was the case in the fourth century, cannot be inferred from Idomeneus (a pupil of Epicurus

who wrote *περὶ δημαγωγῶν*) quoted in Plut. Ar. 4, as we have no other testimony to the same effect. A collector of anecdotes did not trouble his head about an inaccuracy in the designation of an office. What Aristides is said to have done in Plut. Ar. 4, corresponds exactly to what is ascribed in Plut. Per. 10 to Ephialtes, who in his capacity of private individual took care that the finances of the state should not suffer. It is true that Aristides is credited with the authority of office, but that may have been the *στρατηγία*. Müller-Strübing has based his conception of the Athenian policy of that time on the importance of the office of financial controller, which he thinks was refilled every four years. Busolt now (2, 425), following others, is of a different opinion; on the whole M.-Strübing's view no longer meets with support now.

10. Acc. to Thuc. 8, 67, this *μισθοφορεῖν* was really for the democracy, and on the appointment of the 400 it was abolished; even the constitution so much praised by Thucydides (8, 97) did not admit of it. For the system of payment for public services see Gilbert, Staatsalt. 1, 325 seq., Busolt in I. Müller, 4, 198; for the payment for attendance in the *ἐκκλησία* see especially Würz, *Demercede ecclesiastica*, Berol. 1878, and Curtius, G. G. 2⁶, 835.

11. A great part of the grain consumed in Attica came from abroad; cf. Boeckh, Staatshaush. der Athener, Buch. I. Abschn. 15. Only a third of the corn brought to the Piræus might be exported. The corn-trade was strictly regulated, and was under the superintendence of the *Sitophylakes*.

12. Curtius, G. G. 2⁶, 268.

13. Cf. Thumser, Ueber die attischen Metöken, Wiener Studien, and Curtius, G. G. 2⁶, 841. The strikingly large number of Milesians living at Athens has been noticed. The connection between Athens and Miletus must have always continued a very close one.

14. The Roman Lex had quite a different signification to the Greek νόμος; the Lex corresponded more to the *ψήφισμα*.

15. This personal responsibility permeates the whole polity of Athens; it explains the condemnation of Miltiades, the many prosecutions for deceiving the people (*προδοσία*), the frequent downfall of popular leaders, and the system of ostracism, which in a simple but rather too crude fashion established the principle of responsibility on general and consequently arbitrary lines. The point is not noticed by Socrates in his well-known criticism of the democracy; but like a good citizen he submitted to the arbitrary decision of his fellow-countrymen. Even the expression *Demagogus*, which gradually obtained an invidious meaning through Aristophanes among others, originally denoted an honourable duty.

The harsh sentence which Schömann (1³, 186), for instance, pronounces on the democracy, must be modified in view of the heavy responsibility of the leaders of the people. Curtius also, in 2⁶, 158, where he gives too loose a definition of the conception of "Gesetz," and in other passages describing the Athenian democracy, has not shown an adequate appreciation of the responsibility incurred by the proposer of a resolution.

16. We have no right, as is often done, to appeal to Plato's verdict on Pericles in the *Gorg.* 515 seq. It is a piece of pure sophistry. An able ἐπιμελητής, says Plato, improves the animals which he has to train ; under Pericles the Athenians became ἀγριώτεροι, and finally even impeached Pericles himself. Plato forgets, firstly, that men are not horses—although Callicles admits obligingly enough to Socrates, that they may be judged in the same way as ζῶα—and secondly, that if the ἐπιμελητής ἵππων is disturbed in his training, the horses also become ἀγριώτεροι. And unfortunately Pericles was not allowed to have his own way. I mention this criticism of Plato, though in itself it is historically unimportant, because at the conclusion of Chapter xxii. I endeavour to prove that Pericles aimed at conforming to the Socratic ideal of a good ruler who improves his people.

CHAPTER XVII

ATHENS UNDER PERICLES—THE MEMBERS OF THE LEAGUE

THE power of Athens was based upon her position in the League, which had quickly grown to be one of supremacy. The League attained its highest development in less than two decades. Begun soon after 479, it was completed as the result of the victory on the Eurymedon.¹ After the year 442 it was divided, with the exception of the few communities which contributed ships, into five districts: the Ionian, the Hellespontine, the Islands, the Thracian, and the Carian. Lists of the allied cities have come down to us in the documents which present an account of the tribute paid to Athens on the occasion of a new assessment (B.C. 425); one specifies the amount of the tribute itself, while the others state the quota received for the goddess Athene, amounting to a sixtieth part of the whole.

The island district embraced the communities of Euboea, the Cyclades, with the exception of the originally Dorian Melos, which was not conquered by the Athenians until the Peloponnesian War, Lemnos and Imbros on the north-east, and, near Athens, Aegina. The Thracian district extended from Aeson and Methone, south of the river Haliacmon, to the city of Aenus in Thrace, celebrated for its beautiful coins ornamented with the head of Hermes, and included the numerous cities of the densely populated Chalcidice, from Aenea to Potidaea, Mende, the Bacchus worship of which is

testified to by its coins, Scione, Olynthus, so famous in the time of Demosthenes, Torone, Singus, Acrothous and Olophyxus to the Andrian Acanthus; it included also Stagirus, Aristotle's native city, Argilus, the wealthy and art-loving island of Thasos with the opposite coast, and lastly the cultured and busy Abdera and the wine-producing Maronea. The Hellespontine district included the cities of the Chersonese, of which the most famous was Sestos, the cities on the north coast of the Propontis like Bisanthe, Perinthus, Selymbria, the important Byzantium, Chalcedon opposite Byzantium, and on the Asiatic coast from east to west, Astacus, Cios, Dascyleum, Cyzicus, the island of Proconnesus, Parium, Lampsacus, as famous as Cyzicus for its beautiful coins, Percote, Abydos, Sigeum, Cebrene on the Scamander, and the island of Tenedos. The Ionian district began in the north with Essos (usually called Assos, and famous for its ancient temple); then came Gargara and Astyra to the north of Lesbos; then to the south-east of that island, Pitane, Gryneum, Myrina (famous in modern times for its pottery brought to light by excavations), then a number of fine cities, the importance of which cannot be particularized here: Cyme, Phocaea, Clazomenae, Erythrae, Teos, Lebedos, Colophon, Notium (the port of Colophon), Ephesus, Priene, Myus, Miletus, and the islands of Icarus, Leros, and Nisyros. Of these Miletus and Ephesus, and in a less degree Teos and Erythrae, were very flourishing even at that time. Neither of the two cities named Magnesia nor Smyrna, which for a century had consisted of separate *κομαί*, belonged to the Athenian League. Lastly, the Carian district embraced in the first place towns of less note in history lying eastwards of Miletus such as Hyromus, Mylasa, and Pedasus, then Iasus, Caryanda, Myndus, Termera, the famous Halicarnassus, the city of Cnidus with its Chersonese, the islands of Calydna, Cos, Syme, Carpathus, and Casos, the large and wealthy Rhodes, the communities of which had not yet united themselves to the capital city, the numerous cities

of Lydia, and lastly the outpost city of the League in the south-east, Phaselis.

These communities were tribute-paying, and the districts tributary districts, hence the superscription of the lists ran—the Ionic Phoros (tribute), and so on.² The few communities which paid no tribute, but sent ships and men, are not included. These were the cities of the island of Lesbos, and the wealthy islands of Chios and Samos, to the latter of which belonged Amorgus. How it came about that there were so few cities in such an advantageous position, we can only indicate in general terms. It could not have been the original intention that the various cities should not send and equip vessels; for they were all independent communities which had united for defence against Persia. That in spite of this most of them determined to leave the task of providing ships to the Athenians was due to various reasons.³ Probably many of them, as we saw above, were not at the outset in a position to contribute ships; they therefore surrendered this task to the Athenians, paying them a money equivalent, and this arrangement was not disturbed. In the same way others from the very beginning were induced by considerations of convenience and love of ease to leave the worries of politics and the conduct of war entirely in the hands of the Athenians. Others again provided ships at first, but afterwards revolted from Athens, and as soon as they were reduced to submission, were condemned to pay their contribution in money for the future. But these three external reasons do not adequately explain how it came about that at last only Lesbos, Chios and Samos did not pay tribute. Athens herself must have directed her efforts systematically to placing the members of the League in this position, and many of them must in course of time have accepted it without first trying the chances of war.

Further, we must not overlook Thucydides' remark that at the founding of the League the Athenians themselves

decided which towns were to provide ships and which to pay money, indicating that Athens possessed from the outset a discretionary control over her allies, a supreme authority for purposes of organization, corresponding to the authority of a legislator, whose powers were so extensive in Greek politics. And here we must make another remark. Thucydides says that allied states were reduced to subjection by the Athenians because they had failed to pay their tribute. It follows from this that subjection was not, as many assume, the condition of all the allies who paid tribute, but only of those among them whose position was most unfavourable. As a general rule we may say that among the allies who had to pay tribute there existed a great difference in their respective relations to the capital, so that a statement concerning one city can never be indiscriminately applied to all.⁴ The determination of the obligations of the allies was taken in hand by Aristides, who decided how much tribute each city had to pay. Thucydides says⁵ that the first tribute amounted to an annual sum of 460 talents. Later writers subsequently called this the tribute or assessment of Aristides. This is now considered to be a mistake, the figure of 460 not having been attained, it is said, until after the battle on the Eurymedon. It is certain that the tribute after this battle did not amount to more, although the area of the League had been extended; but this does not prove that it was not so high before. The amount of the tribute must have depended on the number of ships which the allies would have had to provide for service against the Persians. In the fifth century, as we saw above, the cost of a ship was reckoned at about one talent, and the yearly expenses of the trierarch at nearly the same sum; if a ship were eight months at sea, the crew of about 200 men would receive pay for 240 days and perhaps their board money, four obols a day to each man; the manning of a ship would thus cost about 32,000 drachmae a year. If we add to this a quarter of a talent as the interest

on the value of the ship, the result is an annual expenditure of about 7 talents per ship. Thus 460 talents a year would suffice to maintain sixty-six triremes. This certainly would not have been too much to demand from the cities and islands extending from Ceos to Byzantium and back again to Miletus and Rhodes, even if some of them provided ships. In time of war it would have been far too little, for in that case soldiers had to be paid and fed as well. 6000 drachmae a day may often have been required for an army consisting of 5000 men. That alone would amount to 180 talents for a six months' campaign. If Athens expended this sum besides providing sixty-six triremes, she must have paid almost half as much again as all the others together, and yet at first the allies were six times as rich as Athens, both in population and wealth. There is therefore no reason why Athens should not have demanded 460 talents from the very beginning. If the tribute was not increased after the battle on the Eurymedon, that proves the justice with which Athens treated her allies, in keeping to the sum which she had once considered necessary, and preferring to make a smaller demand on the members of the League. And after all the contributions exacted were very trifling. In the year 436 Byzantium paid to Athene, as a sixtieth part of its Phoros, 1830 drachmae, which meant a tribute of a little over 18 talents; this was all that Byzantium had to contribute for the privilege of carrying on its extensive commerce in peace. With these 18 talents it could scarcely have maintained three ships of war, which would have been inadequate for any serious operations. It would have had to make far greater sacrifices to protect its independence alone. The Samians could raise a fleet of seventy triremes, and regularly maintained the half of that number; this cost them at least 180 talents a year. Hence it was not so very unreasonable for Athens to regard the money which thus flowed into the chest of the League, and the payment of which was a burden

to no one, as at her own disposal so far as it was not devoted to purposes of common protection. And she made use of this money in a very suitable way. About 454 the chest was removed from Delos to Athens,⁶ owing to a well-grounded apprehension that the money might not be quite safe in the small and exposed island. But in Athens it changed its tutelary deity, coming under the protection of the goddess Athene instead of the Delian Apollo. It was henceforth kept in her temple, and the goddess received in return a sixtieth part, *i.e.* a mina for every talent, which formed a special fund, used as a reserve for Athens and the League.⁷ If then Athens spent a part of the surplus, which had been intended for war purposes but was not called into requisition, on beautifying the abode of the goddess who protected the League, what Greek would blame the Athenians for so doing? Art was the handmaid of religion⁸ in the eyes of the Greeks.

In domestic affairs the cities, even those which paid tribute, were intended to be independent. But from the very beginning certain conditions limiting this independence might be made in the interests of Athens and the League. As a rule Athens of course desired that democracy should prevail in the various cities, but, as a matter of fact, this was not the case in all of them. We note that the treatise on the Athenian state mentions it as a fact that Athens sometimes favoured an aristocracy. The Athenian democracy might well believe that under certain circumstances they could place greater dependence on a small body of nobles than on a large mob liable to rapid changes of opinion. In Samos Pericles established democracy on the first occasion, but not on the second, for in 412 we find an aristocracy in power there.⁹ Sometimes Athens interfered in the details of the constitution of an allied city, and in that case the result was embodied in a special treaty. Fragments of such treaties with Miletus and Erythrae have come down to us. They are not precisely alike, which is another proof that in her relations with her

allies Athens always took into account the particular circumstances of the case, and was not bound by general rules. In the same way the Romans allowed communities possessing very different privileges to exist side by side in the same province.

That Athens did not wish the allies to be considered as subjects is also shown by the fact that she did not absolutely deprive them of the right of coinage. We have discussed the coinage of the allied cities in a note.¹⁰

The judicial arrangements strike us as the most remarkable. That in cases of treason against the League the members had to appear before the Athenian courts is well attested¹¹ and perfectly comprehensible. But it appears that all cases involving a capital charge were finally decided at Athens. This was certainly no misfortune for the allies, for they thus often had the advantage of more impartial justice than it was possible to obtain on the scene of the crime. To what extent the jurisdiction of the local courts was curtailed in other respects is not so clear as is usually assumed, the existence of general rules being wrongly taken for granted in this case also. It is probable that the limitation of jurisdiction increased as time went on and was not eventually the same in all cases. The evidence for this is of a twofold character: as regards particular limitations we have the provisions of the few treaties still extant; but as regards such limitations in general we have only statements of writers. These latter, however, do not possess the value often attached to them. The assertion, for instance, in the treatise on the Athenian state that Athens forced the allies to come to Athens for judgment, is a general statement which in a polemical work does not prove that it was done in most or even in many cases. As it could not always take place, we should first require proof as to when it did actually occur, and here we have hardly anything but conjecture to guide us. It is extremely probable that disputes regarding, for

example, a claim by one citizen on another were not decided at Athens unless the value of the subject-matter of the suit exceeded a certain amount, and further that, in cases arising out of contracts, the suit could be tried in the place where the contract was entered into. On the other hand, it cannot be asserted that the Athenians must necessarily have often abused their supremacy by unjust decisions. Nor was the inconvenience suffered by the allies in having to go to Athens for justice a very great one; they could get there in a couple of days or so. And, finally, one point must not be overlooked. The Athenian jurymen were not under any obligation to know the special laws of the various cities; in cases of this kind they could therefore only decide according to the best of their judgment. In consequence the parties concerned had to see that their judges were properly instructed, and no doubt this often gave them a great deal of trouble. If, however, the inhabitants of the cities of the League were induced to settle a case out of court by the inconvenience of having it tried in Athens, this was one of the good results of a state of things which we must not imagine to have constituted a very serious grievance.¹²

The members of the League had to bring their tribute to Athens and deliver it to the Hellenotamiae at the festival of the Great Dionysia in the month of Elaphebolion. The business was controlled by the Council. If payment was not punctually made, Athens despatched collectors, *ἐκλογεῖς*, who proceeded in ships of war to the cities which were in arrears. Any claims that might arise were dealt with by the Athenian courts. Many cities had Athenian garrisons under *φρούραρχοι*. The *ἐπίσκοποι* were inspecting officers of a political character. The ministerial staff of the Athenian courts consisted of *κλήτορες*, messengers, and *ἐπιμεληταί*, who looked after the supremacy of the courts in cities of the League, that is, prepared the cases, and in case of need presided at the hearing.¹³

For eight months in the year Athenian triremes cruised in the Aegean Sea, in order to show to all that the sovereign was on her guard against foreign and domestic enemies. The Athenians did not interfere in the religious affairs of the allies. They only gave precedence to the goddess Athene, as was natural. It was for this reason that the allies had to bring offerings to her at the Panathenaea. Athens, however, also regarded the Eleusinian deities as *ex officio* gods of the League, as we shall see later, and the Athenian people offered them gifts in the name of the allies.¹⁴

At first synodoi or meetings of the representatives of the cities which formed the League were held at Delos ; subsequently this was given up, but we do not know when.¹⁵ It is also not known whether the allies who provided ships were ever consulted again on important questions of common interest. At all events when Pericles was in power there seems to have been no question of summoning any council of the League.

Athens allowed her allies complete intellectual liberty. For this belonged to the province of religion, and each state regulated religious matters according to its own discretion. It is true that Athens laid down very strict principles for herself in this respect ; she would not permit her citizens to deviate from the old religious observances, nor to introduce new deities. But she did not interfere in the religious affairs of the other cities. This was a gain for the freedom of science ; for if Athens curtailed the intellectual liberty of her own citizens—a fact which cannot be denied—she did not carry on a propaganda of intolerance. Thus any one who could not remain in Athens because he was too much of a free-thinker might pursue his career in other cities of the League, if they considered his admission compatible with their principles.

The close connection of religion with the state, which was another name for the city, may have been one of the reasons why there could be no question in Greece and especially in

Athens of enlarging the state by the extension of civil rights. Individual foreigners might become Athenian citizens, whole communities could not. The Byzantines remained Byzantines, and the Parians Parians. But as fellow-inhabitants—*Metoeeci*—foreigners were welcomed in Athens, especially if they brought the city an increase of wealth, knowledge or skill. And although many Milesians, Byzantines, Halicarnassians and others preferred to live in Athens rather than in their own birth-place, yet Miletus, Byzantium, Halicarnassus, and all the other allied states did not decline in consequence. Some of them remained so vigorous that they revolted against Athens with success, while the communities of the island of Rhodes were able to found their new capital Rhodes during the Peloponnesian War. And the cities of the League which lay on the fringe of great continents continued their old civilizing work and maintained their influence on less cultured peoples even while under Athenian rule. The Thracian cities especially accomplished great things in this respect. But their achievements have not the brilliance of those done under the light which fell from the sky of Athens.

Meanwhile the Athenians strengthened their influence and supremacy in the allied districts by another material expedient, by planting colonies in the Roman sense of the word—Cleruchies, not *apoikiai*, as the ordinary Greek colonies were called.¹⁶ The latter are independent towns, while the Athenian and Roman colonies are settlements of Athenian and Roman citizens in foreign countries, settlements of people who always remain in the closest dependence on the mother-city, of which they do not cease to be citizens. They were to Athens what Messenia was to Sparta, except that geographically they were not so close to the parent-city, being planted in distant spots, with the intention not only of providing subsistence for their own citizens but also, like the Roman colonies, of controlling an empire. Like the latter some of them were settled in connected districts as

complete communities, and some only upon land which had to be made over by communities which continued to exist there, in which case the emigrant Athenians formed a state within the state of the already existing republic, somewhat after the fashion of the Germans in the Roman Empire at the time of the migration of peoples. In the former case the Cleruchy had its special constitution, like Athens herself, with Archons, Council, Ecclesia and Strategi. Some of their legal cases had to be decided at Athens. The same procedure had already been adopted by the Athenians at the beginning of the sixth century when they occupied Salamis. But then they were in the immediate neighbourhood of the metropolis, and Salamis may be considered as a continuation of Attica. The Cleruchies which concern us more closely in the history of the fifth century came into being after the unsuccessful attempt at Eion in Thrace (about 475), and were as follows: the colonization of Scyros under Cimon; the settlement of Athenian citizens under Pericles in the Thracian Chersonese, in Lemnos, Imbros and Euboea, in Naxos and Andros; the colonization of Brea in Thrace; the settlements in Sinope, Amisus and Astacus, which strengthened the power of Athens on the Pontus; and finally, the founding of Oreos in place of the community of Histiaea after the reconquest of Euboea. Up to the close of the supremacy of Athens, that is, the 'Thirty Years' Peace with Sparta, Duncker reckons the number of Athenians settled abroad in Cleruchies at 15,000. Scyros, Lemnos and Imbros became the private property of Athens, so that even in the fourth century, when the power of Athens was most humbled, they had to be left to her, and even the Romans did not take them from her. Thus in rather more than half a century 15,000 Athenian citizens, whose property was small, were provided with land, the possession of which made them at least Zeugitae. The average number of Athenian citizens in Attica is estimated at 20,000, or at 35,000 by Beloch.¹⁷

If, therefore, Athens could count in addition 15,000 landed proprietors in foreign countries, this was a considerable thing for the power and prestige of the city. The Cleruchi remained members of the Phyle and Deme to which they belonged at home. We may reasonably assume that the system of Athenian Cleruchies influenced the Romans, whose colonies certainly date from a later period than the occupation of Salamis by Athens.

We can easily see how service in the fleet and the opportunity of seeing the cities of the League and receiving the homage due to them as masters, became a source of manifold pleasure and profit to the Athenians.

NOTES

The principal authorities for this chapter are the Inscriptions, which are preserved in fragments and consist partly of the lists of the quota (*ἀπαρχή*) received by the goddess Athene from the *φόροι* of the allies of Athens, from which by multiplying by 60 we get the amount of each *φόρος*, and partly of a new valuation (for the year 425), the former in C. I. A. 1. 226 seq., the latter in C. I. A. 37. These inscriptions have been collected and published by A. Kirchhoff and U. Köhler, who have also been successful in making them serviceable for history. The principal works belonging to the subject are :—Köhler, *Urkunden und Untersuchungen zur Geschichte des delisch-attischen Bundes*, Abh. der Berl. Akad. 1869 ; Kirchhoff, *Der delisch-attische Bund im ersten Dezennium seines Bestehens*, Hermes, 11, 1 seq., also his *Tributlisten der Jahre Ol. 85, 2—87, 1*, Abh. des Berl. Akad. 1872 ; also Leo, *Die Entstehung des delisch-attischen Bundes in den Verh. des Philologenvers. in Wiesbaden 1877* ; Christensen, *De jure et cond. soc. Atheniens. in the Opusc. phil. ad Madvig. missa*, Havn. 1876 ; Fränkel, *De condic. etc. soc. Athen.*, Lips. 1878 ; Stahl, *De soc. Ath. judic.*, Münst. 1881 ; Boeckh, *Staatshaush. der Athener*, 3 Aufl. ; Gilbert, *Griech. Staatsalt.* Bd. I. ; Busolt, *Griech. Staatsalt.* in I. Müller, 4, 210 seq., and in the *Philol.* 41, 652 seq. ; also Giraud, *Condition des alliés, etc.*, Par. 1883 ; lastly Busolt, *Gr. G.* Bd. 2, and Curtius, *Gr. G.* 2⁶, in various passages, esp. p. 247 seq.

1. The name of the League was ἡ Ἀθηναίων συμμαχία, and

it soon became ἡ ἀρχὴ ἡ Ἀθηναίων in everyday language; the various places were called αἱ πόλεις. Cf. Bus. 2, 418. The assertion of Aristophanes (Vesp. 707) that there were 1000 cities of the League is a gross exaggeration. Only 280 are known, and these have been collected by Kirchhoff in the C. I. A. 1, p. 226 seq., as well as by Curtius, Gr. G. 2⁶, pp. 886-888, with map; cf. Boeckh, Staatsh. 2³, 362 seq.—Lygdamis must have continued to reign in Halicarnassus after the battle on the Eurymedon; but even a city governed by a tyrant may have been a member of the Athenian League. The actual composition of the League was subject to fluctuations, as all the communities did not always pay, and the defaulters were not always punished at once (Busolt, in Müller, 4, 212 seq.), while on the other hand attempts were made to extend the League to the cities of the Pontus. The number of cities might also fluctuate from the fact that sometimes smaller towns made their payment jointly with a larger one and sometimes paid for themselves; in the latter case the numbers increased. In 436 B.C. the Ionian section of the League was united with the Carian, and the number of contributing cities was thus diminished. Cf. many remarks by Curtius, Gr. G. 2⁶, 838 seq. It would be interesting to attempt to frame the statistics of the population of the Athenian empire, many contributions to which are to be found in Beloch's valuable work among others, Die Bevölkerung der griechisch-römischen Welt, Leipzig 1886. According to the proportion of the number of citizens as estimated by Beloch to the amount of tribute paid to Athens, the allied cities must have contained a population of from 90,000 to 100,000 citizens. If we consider that Miletus was able to carry on war against Samos, it may be assumed that the population of Miletus was not much smaller than that of Samos. For Samos, which could raise seventy triremes against Athens, Beloch reckons (p. 232) about 9000 citizens; Miletus paid 10 talents; an estimate of 8000 citizens for Miletus is not too high. We must not, however, take 10 talents for 8000 citizens as the basis for an estimate of the population of the cities in general; probably only the favoured Miletus paid so little. But if we assume that others had to pay four times as much, consequently that 10 talents represented about 2000 citizens, then a tribute of 460 talents would imply as many as 90,000 citizens, and that is certainly far too few. How many persons without the franchise lived in the Asiatic cities, it is impossible to say; I would merely point out that Beloch reckons the population of Chios, which is double the size of Samos, at 100,000 slaves and 30,000 enfranchised inhabitants, according to which an estimate of two millions for the total population of the Athenian

empire would not be too high. Acc. to Beloch (p. 506) there were 200,000 inhabitants in Euboea, the Sporades, and the Cyclades, 100,000 in Chalcidice, and 235,000 in Attica. But we ought to form an estimate not merely of the material but also of the intellectual resources of the empire, and the result would probably be that it was in every respect one of the most favoured empires in history. The union of such a large number of wealthy, cultured, and progressive communities is perhaps unique. It is true that individual members of the League may have been injured by the monopolizing tendencies of Athens, which appear to have especially affected the islands. This explains why there are records of revolt only in the islands: Naxos (perhaps 467), Thasos (perhaps 465), Samos (446), Lesbos (428), Chios (413). The larger islands near the coast had, it is true, possessions on the mainland. Thasos had mines; Samos fought with Miletus for continental territory; Rhodes, Lesbos, and even Tenedos, had a *peraia*; Chios in the year 413 was closely connected with Erythrae opposite. In this way they could always participate in the trade of the mainland; but they suffered also, being as islands confined to intermediate trade, which Athens endeavoured to monopolize. Hence the tendency to revolt, which is less marked in the continental towns than in these islands. The Thracian cities, for instance, which enjoyed great prosperity and were animated by strong republican sentiments (witness their coins), do not seem really to have been strongly opposed to Athens.

2. List of the cities, which paid tribute of two talents and upwards for Ol. 81. 3 (454 B.C.) and the following years, acc. to Kirchhoff, in the C. I. A. 1, p. 226. I. Ionian Tribute. The Haireioi 3 talents, Ephesus 7 t. 3000 dr., Colophon 3 t., Cyne 12 t., Lebedos 3 t., Miletus 10 t., Teos 6 t., Phocaea 3 t., Erythrae 7 t. The Haireioi are the inhabitants of Erai, Thuc. 8, 19, 20; Strab. 14, 644. Erai lay westward of Teos: cf. Kiepert, Map of Western Asia Minor, Pl. VII., and Ruge in the Berliner Philologische Wochenschrift 1892, p. 739.—II. Hellespontine Tribute. Chalcedon 9, Cebrene 3, Lampsacus 12, Perinthus 10, Tenedos 4 t. 300 dr., the Chersonesites 18 t., Abydos 4, Arisbe 2, Byzantium 15-21, Cyzicus 9, Proconnesus 3, Selymbria 5.—III. Thracian Tribute. Abdera 15, Aenus 12, Aphyta 3, the Bottiaeans 2, Dicaea 4(?), Thasos 3 (after Ol. 83, 3, 30), Thrambe and Scione 6, Mende 8, Peparethus 3, Samothrace 6, Singos 4, Acanthus 3, Potidaea 6-15, Sermyle 3, Torone 4-12.—IV. Carian Tribute. Cnidus 3, the Cyllandians 2, the Madnasae 2, Lindos 8 t. 2500 dr., Termera 2 t. 3000 dr., Phaselis 6, the Cherronesians 3, Astypalaea 2, Cos 3, the Lycians 10, Ialysus 10, Camirus 4 (thus Rhodes

altogether contributed about 24 t., while Halicarnassus only paid 1 t. 4000 dr.).—V. Island Tribute. Carystus 7 t. 3000 dr., Aegina 30, Andros 12, Lemnos 9, Coressus (in Ceos) 2 t. 1500 dr., Seriphos 2, Eretria 15 (not till Ol. 88, 4, 425 B.C.), Chalcis 10, Thera 3, Imbros 2, Ceos 4, Cythnus 3, Naxos 6 t. 4000 dr., Paros 16 t. 1200 dr., Siphnus 3, Tenos 3. The islands evidently had the heaviest burden.

3. The account in Plut. Cim. 11 is noteworthy, acc. to which other Athenian generals punished the allies of the League who *φόρους ἐτέλουν* but would not provide *ἄνδρας* and *ναῦς*, while Cimon allowed the allies, if they wished to have nothing to do with fighting, to provide *χρήματα καὶ ναῦς κενάς*. Here we see, if the statement is correct, firstly that the idea, that it was more profitable for Athens to take money, was not always the dominant one, and secondly, that at first wider scope was given to the individual discretion of Athenian generals. The statesmen of Athens created bit by bit a system which was by no means homogeneous. The variety which existed is also shown by the remark of Thucydides (5, 18), according to which a city might pay tribute and yet be autonomous.

4. The cities could not escape from the obligation of providing soldiers by the paying of tribute. But Athens seldom demanded soldiers, because the land campaign against Persia came to an end so soon. Cf. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, *Philol. Unters.* I, pp. 71-73, who endeavours to show that, where allies outside the "circle" provided soldiers, this proves that their original position had changed for the worse. Contra Bus. 2, 351 and 427.

5. The first tribute acc. to Thuc. 1, 96 was 460 talents; since Kirchhoff's criticism (*Hermes* 11, 30) most writers, among others Gilbert, 1, 393, and Busolt, 2, 352, consider this wrong. Many assume that this statement in Thucydides is a later interpolation. On the other hand, Beloch, *Rh. Mus. N. F. Bd.* 48, adheres to the 460 talents. He shows that most of the members of the League belonged to it as early as the time of Aristides, among others the island of Rhodes, and that the division into geographical districts, which is demonstrable from the year 442, proves nothing in regard to the date of the admission of the various communities into the League.—For the amount of the incoming tribute, cf. Busolt in Müller, 4, 216. At the commencement of the Peloponnesian War there was an annual income of 600 talents from the allies (Thuc. 2, 13), although not so much as 500 can be made out from the tribute-lists. It is supposed that Thucydides included the Samian contribution, Bus. 2, 603.—But we must also bear in mind that at the start, when there was more fighting to be done, larger con-

tributions were more necessary than at a later period. The allies might regard it as an act of injustice that the Athenians, when there was hardly any fighting going on, did not reduce the tribute more than they had already done. Aristides, they might urge, was guided by the necessities of the case, while his successors acted in a capricious and grasping manner. It has thus not been proved, in the first place, that nearly all the important cities did not belong to the League under Aristides, and in the second place, it is very possible that the allies expected a greater reduction of the tribute after the battle on the Eurymedon than was actually made. The cities were either πόλεις ἃς ἔταξαν οἱ τάκται or αὐταὶ φόρον ταξάμεναι, or ἃς οἱ ἰδιῶται ἔταξαν, as to which cf. Gilbert, St. A. 1, 396, and Curtius, G. G. 2⁶, 248.

6. Theophr. quoted in Plut. Ar. 25 ; the year acc. to C. I. A. 1, 260, fixed by Sauppe, Nachr. der Gött. Ges. d. Wiss. 1865, and Köhler, Urk. etc. p. 102 seq. Samos made the motion for the removal.

7. Modern writers are not agreed as to whether there was, besides the temple-treasury of Athene, a special state-treasury distinct from the annual balance in the League-chest ; cf. Bus. 2, 423 ; Kirchhoff following the majority, including Busolt, in Müller, 4, 189, holds that there was, while Boeckh as well as Beloch (Rh. Mus. N. F. 39, esp. p. 55) take a contrary view. Cf. Kirchhoff's articles in the Abh. der Berl. Akad. 1862, 1867, 1869, 1876. Curtius, G. G. 2⁶, 251-2 appears to me to be correct in saying that the revenues of the League, after deducting the sixtieth part, remained the property of the State, and were at the direct disposal of the people, while the sacred treasure, consisting of the sixtieth part and other receipts of the temple-chest, were used by the people in the form of a loan.

8. To justify Athens it is consequently quite unnecessary even to appeal to the view that every capital is beautified at the expense of the State, and therefore does it as much injustice as Athens did to the League.

9. Thuc. 8, 21. In opposition to Gilbert 1, 400 I should like to remark that I do not see why the liberty left to the Selymbrians καταστήσαι τὴν πολιτείαν as they liked, must necessarily constitute an exception. The abnormal nature of the relations of the individual states to Athens as a rule has been well pointed out by Busolt (2, 426 seq.) and others. And we have to note here that the distinctions between aristocracy and democracy are not so sharply defined as to allow us to say in each case whether the one or the other prevailed. A moderate democracy may, under certain circumstances, pass muster as an aristocracy, and *vice versa*. The

important point for Athens was that her friends should rule ; if they were few in numbers but wealthy, then an oligarchy served her purpose. And why should the lower classes be everywhere and always friendly to the Athenians ? Why not the rich in the commercial cities, it being their advantage that peace should prevail at sea ? And this was what Athens provided for. Even in Thessaly the case was not so simple as Busolt assumes (2, 474), when he says that the aristocracy, *i.e.* the nobles controlled by the Aleuadae and Scopadae, was hostile to Athens. That may be the case, but the Aleuadae were at all events no democrats, and were yet friends of Athens. Then as now politics were governed more by interests than by constitutional theories ; the solidarity of democracies does not hold good even in the present day.

10. A survey of the coinage of the Athenian Empire and of the eastern cities on friendly terms with it about the middle of the fifth century B.C., can be now given with the aid of Head's *Historia Numorum*, Oxford, 1887.

We premise, according to Head, that the normal weight of a stater, *i.e.* the coin which forms the basis of the coinage standard, in the various current standards, was as follows :— in the Aeginetan standard 194 English grains ; in the Persian 177 ; in the Babylonian 169 ; in the Euboic-Attic 135 ; in the Phoenician 112. The value of the stater consequently varied so much, that the Phoenician was but little more than half that of the Aeginetan, and so it might happen that though as a rule the stater was valued as a didrachmon, a Phoenician stater might on occasion be described as one drachma. Moreover, the Babylonian and Persian staters were practically identical, and both were only a little less than the Aeginetan. The consequence is that in particular cases it may be doubtful to which standard a series of coins should be assigned, and this is why Head himself (p. liv.) holds that certain coins, which others consider to be of the Persian standard, are of the reduced Aeginetan standard. As the standards circulated from one city to another for various reasons, it is evident that the large scope, which is left for our determination of the standards, also considerably increases the difficulty of making use of the weight of the coins for the history of the diffusion of the standards, and consequently for the history of the cities themselves.

In the Athenian Empire gold, electrum, and silver were in circulation. The gold coins were principally Persian darics (the word appears to have no connection with Darius) ; the electrum coins were minted in certain cities of Asia Minor ; many cities, especially Athens herself, had a silver coinage. We will now go

through the Athenian Empire, and mention the places which to our knowledge had a mint at that period.

ATHENS coined a large quantity of silver in the following pieces :—decadrachmae, tetradrachmae, didrachmae, drachmae, triobols, trihemiobols, obols, and hemiobols. The impress was a head of Athene and an owl, on which account the coins were called *κόραι* or *γλαῦκες*. Their artistic character does not keep pace with the development of art ; the head of Athene especially retains its archaic appearance. The object was that the coin, which was so widely circulated, should always retain the same form, which leads to the conclusion that it was very popular among barbarians, who, as the spread of the Maria Theresa thaler in East Africa proves, cling very much to old custom in this respect. From Aristophanes, *Ranae* 720, the inference was drawn even in antiquity that the Athenians minted gold coins as early as the Peloponnesian War, but Head (H. N. 313, 314) shows that this conclusion is uncertain. During the Peloponnesian War coins were turned out carelessly, and the head no longer retained its archaic appearance.

In EUBOEAE, the ancient home of a very important coinage (the Euboic standard, adopted by Corinth and Athens), during the period of the Athenian Empire only CARYSTUS, CHALCIS and ERETRIA had a mint, and that, too, only up to 445, when Euboea seceded. When it was reduced to submission soon afterwards, the minting ceased completely until 411, when Euboea revolted again and then struck a League coinage with the inscription EYBOI.

Of the islands of the Aegean, as far as our knowledge extends at present, only SIPHNIUS, an island rich in gold and silver mines, had a mint at that date (Head, 419 ; cf. Herod. 3, 57). These coins are only partly of the Attic standard, and partly of the Aeginetan, which had as a rule prevailed in the islands, and at that time obtained even on the Greek mainland, with the exception of course of Corinth, which held to the Euboic standard.

AEgina also, as tributary ally of Athens, continued her old coinage of the *χελῶναι* (Head, 333) ; in the year 431 it of course came to an end with the expulsion of the inhabitants.

In CHALCIDICE, where the Euboic standard prevailed, according to Head (183) AENEA, POTIDEA, MENDE, SCIONE, OLYNTHUS, TERONE (not *Tor* on the coins), and ACANTHUS used this standard during the period under discussion ; but in 424, evidently in consequence of the interference of Brasidas in their politics, they changed to the Phoenician standard, which was widely spread in Macedonia, and in the fifth century was used also by the Mace-

donian kings. In the district round the Strymon only TRAGILUS (?) is known at that time as having small coins of the Phoenician standard (Head, 190).

Of the cities of the Thracian coast we have coins of that period from ABDERA, from DICAËA, a city closely connected with Abdera, from MARONEA, and from AENUS. The latter belong to a simple form of the Euboic-Attic standard (Head, 214); those of Abdera, Dicaea and Maronea to the Phoenician. It is remarkable that in Abdera and Maronea names of magistrates frequently appear, probably the first example of the kind in Greek coinage. This shows a highly-developed republican sentiment, but not a specially aristocratic tendency. Hence one magistrate's name on a coin of Aenus need not necessarily belong to an oligarchical period, as von Sallet has assumed (Head, 214).

From the interior of THRACE there appears to be an Attic tetradrachm of Sparadocus I. (about 430) in existence (Head, 239), and Attic didrachmae of Seuthes I. are certainly extant with the inscription ΣΕΥΘΑ KOMMA or ΣΕΥΘΑ ΑΡΓΥΡΙΟΝ—palpable proof of Athenian influence in Thrace.

THASOS had originally the Babylonian standard of the Pangaeian and Emathian districts on the mainland, yet with a stater of somewhat lower value; its weight gradually decreased during the period of Athenian supremacy, and became at last equal to that of the Attic stater. When Thasos seceded from Athens in 411, she adopted the Phoenician standard, like the Chalcidian cities. Head (227) draws attention to the style of the Thasian coins of this period, as being worthy of the art of Phidias.

It is not certain whether some of the coins of the Thracian CHERSONESE, perhaps of a city Chersonesus, belong to this period; for coins which I ascribe to Miltiades, see p. 15.

Of SELYMBRIA (Head, 232) there are possibly coins of this period belonging to the Attic standard. Previously the Persian standard prevailed there, just as in APOLLONIA on the Pontus; on the other hand, coins of the Attic standard were perhaps minted after the year 450 in MESEMBRIA on the Pontus (Head, 237).

The powerful PANTICAPAEUM does not seem to have had a coinage as early as the fifth century. From its close connection with Athens we may assume that it liked to use the Athenian coinage, and the archaic type may have been popular with the Scythians. SINOPE, the powerful commercial city, used a standard which we may call either reduced Phoenician or Aeginetan (Head, 434, 441), two Phoenician drachmae being in that case equal to one Aeginetan.

Let us now return to the West, following the coast of Asia

Minor. In HERACLEA PONTICE we do not find coins until after the year 415, and they correspond in standard to those of Sinope. Of CHALCEDON coins of the Attic standard belonging to the second half of the fifth century are extant. The important city of BYZANTIUM appears not to have coined either gold or silver before 400; iron coins circulated in the city (Head, 229). The city of ASTACUS, which, according to Strabo, received an Athenian colony in 563, in spite of this always coined on the Persian standard in the fifth century. Thus on the Asiatic side of the Bosphorus Athenian influence on the coinage is perceptible, but not predominant.

CYZICUS, which began to coin early in the fifth century (Head, 449), was of great importance. Its staters and hectææ of electrum constituted, with the Persian darics, which were of pure gold, the principal gold coins of the fifth and fourth centuries B.C., till King Philip of Macedon brought his own gold pieces into general circulation. The Cyzicenes are often mentioned in the Athenian inscriptions. They are very beautiful, and of great variety of types. The exhaustive work on these coins by Canon Greenwell, *The Electrum Coinage of Cyzicus*, Lond. 1887 (*Num. Chron.*), has revealed the remarkable fact that the inhabitants of Cyzicus stamped upon their electrum coins types of quite distant cities, like Gela and Poseidonia, with whom Cyzicus may thus have had relations. A Cyzicene stater weighed about 250 grains, and the electrum coins of Lesbos and Phocæa were minted on the same standard, while the older electrum coins of a number of Ionian cities, and those of Lampsacus and Abydos, were of a different weight.

The electrum coins of LAMPSACUS followed at first the Milesian standard (about 220 grains), but in the fifth century their weight was increased to about 232 grains (Head, 456). The *στατῆρες Λαμψακηνοί* also appear in Attic inscriptions. They are likewise of great beauty. Lampsacus coined silver on the Phœnician standard before 500 B.C., and afterwards on the Persian standard.

ABYDOS also had coined electrum on the Milesian standard in the sixth century, but did not continue it in the fifth century. The city was thus, it seems, of less importance in the fifth century than Lampsacus. Silver, however, was coined by Abydos in the fifth century on the Persian standard. Of CEBRENE Head says (470) that it continued to coin hectææ of electrum in the fifth century as it had done in the sixth.—To DARDANUS Head (471) ascribes electrum hectææ of the Phocæan, *i.e.* of the Cyzicene standard, and staters of the Milesian standard. It coined silver

on the Persian standard. SCEPSIS, which had silver mines, coined silver (on the Persian standard ?), Head, 474.

LESBOS minted electrum hectae in concert with Phocaea, which we know from a treaty between Mitylene and Phocaea, relating to the χρυσίον Φωκαϊκόν, which is placed about the year 430 (Lenormant, *La monnaie dans l'antiquité*, 2, 62); cf. Head, 484. Besides these, Mitylene has small silver pieces; Methymna has (about 500 B.C. ?) Euboic-Attic didrachmae (Head, 488). Finally, so-called pewter coins have been found in Lesbos, pieces containing only 40 per cent of silver (Lenormant, *La monnaie*, 1, 197), which must have served as small change for home circulation (Head, 483).

IONIA had a rich electrum coinage in the sixth century, the centre of which was MILETUS. The stater of 220 grains corresponded to the standard in use in Lydia; it differed from that used in Phocaea, Lesbos, and Cyzicus, which was of about 250-260 grs. The Milesian standard prevailed in Miletus, Clazomenae, Erythrae, Chios, Ephesus, Samos, in the Aeolic cities of Dardanus and Cyme, and in Halicarnassus; we have even a specimen of an electrum stater of 207 grains with Aeginetan types (Head, 331, who puts it not much later than 700 B.C.) This Milesian electrum coinage was, however, not continued in the fifth century. On the other hand, we have Phocaeen hectae of the fifth century, and mention is made of στατήρες Φωκαῖται. These electrum coins were almost as widely circulated as the Cyzicene.—The Ionian cities chiefly coined silver in the fifth century; Miletus only appears to have coined nothing at all throughout the greater part of this century; we may assume that her particularly close connection with Athens was the reason of this. Of the cities which had a coinage most coined on the Phoenician standard, especially CHIOS and the neighbouring continental communities of CLAZOMENAE, ERYTHRAE, and EPHEBUS, and even SAMOS, which, however, presents many peculiar features. Clazomenae coined also on the Attic standard, Teos, on the other hand, on the Aeginetan, and later (about 400) the Phoenician. COLOPHON, which was not a seaport, followed the Persian standard. In Chios the didrachmae are very heavy, instead of 112 grains as much as 123-130 grains. Under the Athenian supremacy (acc. to Head, 523) the coinage is less abundant than before. The Samian coins were supposed to have been minted on a special Samian standard; but P. Gardner, *Samos and Samian Coins*, p. 52, rightly remarks that it must have been the Phoenician standard (about 202 grains instead of 204). After the subjugation of Samos in the year 439 the Attic standard was introduced. The coins, the style of which

justifies us in ascribing them to this period, have an adjunct in the shape of a small olive-branch on their reverse, which Gardner takes to be an allusion to the subjection of Samos by the Athenians. For the coin with the inscription ΣΑ and ΑΘΕΝ, referred to first by Borrell and afterwards by Curtius, *G. G.* 2⁶, 829, cf. the correction by Gardner, *Samos and Samian Coins*, Lond. 1882, p. 46, according to which it is simply one of the numerous cases of re-struck coins.

In CARIA there prevailed almost a greater variety than in Ionia. In ASTYRA, opposite Rhodes, the coinage was on the Babylonian standard, yet the stater only weighed 149·5 grains instead of 169 (*Head*, 521). In CNIDUS and the opposite CHERSONESE the Aeginetan standard was adopted; but in 412, when it revolted from Athens, Cnidus assumed the Phoenician. The coinage of CAMIRUS, a city on the west coast of the island of Rhodes, was also on the Aeginetan standard, but on the other hand IALYSUS and LINDUS, situated in the north-east, followed the Phoenician standard. This was also the case after 400 with HALICARNASSUS, which previously, during the Athenian supremacy, had, as it seems, coined no silver at all. Cos used the Attic standard (*Head*, 535). We see from this, as also from the history of the city and the names of its inhabitants, that Halicarnassus had a strong Asiatic (Carian) colouring, that Cnidus and the western coast of Rhodes gravitated towards the Peloponnese, where the Aeginetan standard prevailed, and lastly that Cos stood on particularly friendly terms with Athens. It is remarkable that in Caria, as in Thrace, the Phoenician standard was introduced on the occasion of the secession from Athens, and it is not less remarkable that this Phoenician standard was adopted for Macedonia by Philip and Alexander (*Head*, 196, 197). A dynastic coinage of TERMERA (*Head*, 532) probably belongs to the first half of the fifth century.

The Lycian city of PHASELIS, the most easterly city of the Athenian League, coined on the Persian standard.—The real LYCIAN COINS on the other hand follow the Babylonian standard, which depreciates into the Euboic (*Head*, 571).

Themistocles coined Attic didrachmae in Magnesia (*Head*, 501).

In summing up the foregoing, we may say that the coinage of the Athenian Empire was as follows: (1) gold, scarcely any, at most perhaps a little in Athens; (2) electrum, on the Phoenician standard in Cyzicus, Lesbos, and Phocaea, and with a somewhat different standard in Lampsacus; (3) silver, in the following categories:—on the Aeginetan standard in Aegina, Teos, Cnidus,

Chersonesus, Camirus; Persian in Apollonia on the Pontus, Dardanus, Scepsis, Lampsacus, Abydos, Colophon, and Phaselis; Babylonian in Thasos, Astyra and Lycia; Euboic-Attic in Athens, Chalcidice, Aenus, Thrace, Thasos, Selymbria, Chalcedon, Lesbos, Clazomenae, Samos (after 439), Cos and Lycia; Phoenician in Maronea, Dicaea, Abdera, Clazomenae, Erythrae, Chios, Ephesus, Samos, Ialysus, Lindus, to which after the revolt from Athens may be added the cities of Chalcidice, as well as Thasos and Cnidus. The Persian darics were used for gold coins. Bronze coins appear to have been first coined in Athens towards the end of the Peloponnesian War (Head, 315). Bronze coins in general did not make their appearance in Eastern Greece till about this time.

The variety of coins is thus not extraordinarily great. The money-changers (*τραπεζίται*) who were found everywhere provided the necessary adjustment. On the whole, the Athenians naturally desired to substitute their own silver coinage for that of other cities, but they evidently did not deprive the allies of the right of coinage; all of them were independent. On the other hand, it was by no means necessary for an independent state to mint coins, and originally probably only those did so which had silver at their own disposal, a thing of by no means common occurrence. We may therefore ask where the Euboeans and Aeginetans found the silver which they used for the minting of their coins, and may conjecture that the district of Laurium, which as it were forms a peninsula apart lying midway between Euboea and Aegina, originally supplied these two islands with more of its treasure than Athens herself. Of the Cyclades probably only Siphnus had a coinage at the time of the Athenian supremacy—a proof that these islands were more dependent on Athens than the cities of Thrace and Asia Minor; evidently Miletus alone felt itself to be thoroughly Athenian.

11. Charges of treason decided at Athens, Ar. Pax, 639 seq.; cf. Gilb. 1, 402; Resp. Ath. 1, 16 generally.

12. For the details of the Athenian jurisdiction over the allies, cf. now esp. Bus. 2, 430 seq. Some writers assume that the autonomous cities were subject to no limitation of jurisdiction (Bus. 2, 430); but the conception "autonomous" is a very vague one and does not carry us very far.

13. For the *φρούραρχοι* cf. von Wil.-Moell. Ph. Unters. 1, pp. 73, 74. Forts placed at suitable points had also *φρουραί* and *φρούραρχοι*; young Athenians formed the garrison.—*ἐπίσκοποι*, cf. von W.-M. pp. 75, 76. It is an *ἀρχή*, i.e. a civic post.

14. Plut. Per. 11: *ἐξήκοντα δὲ τριῆρεις καθ' ἑκάστον ἐνιαυτὸν*

ἐκπέμπων ἐν αἷς πολλοὶ τῶν πολιτῶν ἔπλεον, ὁκτὼ μῆνας ἔμμισθοι, μελετῶντες ἅμα καὶ μανθάνοντες τὴν ναυτικὴν ἐμπειρίαν. — One might call the Athenian naval league the amphictyony of Pallas Athene.

15. Th. 1, 96, 97. The discontinuance of the synodoi is easily explicable. The relations of the individual members of the League to Athens were entirely different. If war with Persia was not the subject of the conference, what was there to confer about? The regulation of the taxing of the League had been left to Athens, with the consent of each separate member. The League had no constitution; what then was the good of a council? It would have been really quite surprising if subjects for common discussion and a procedure for the voting of the members had been devised by the League. Cf. Bus. 2, 417 with regard to the views of modern writers.

16. Cleruchies, Plut. Per. 11. Cf. Kirchhoff, *Tributpflichtigkeit der attischen Kleruchen*, Abh. der Berl. Akad. 1873; Foucart, *Mém. sur les colonies Athéniennes au 5^e siècle* in the *Mém. prés. par divers savants à l'Académie des Inscriptions*, 1878, I, 9. The colony in Brea, known through the fragment of the act of foundation, C. I. A. 1, 31, is evidently identical with that referred to by Plutarch in the words *χιλίους Βισάλταις συνοικήσοντας*. For the various Cleruchies, which we have given in the text, cf. the accounts of Bus. 2, 364 (Eion), 398 (Scyros), 536 (Chersonesus), 538 (Lemnos and Imbros), 540 (Sinope, Amisus, Astacus, cf. also Bus. 1, 328), 542 (Euboea), 543 (Naxos, Andros, Brea). For Lemnos and Imbros cf. also Bus. 2, 20 and Krafft, *Die polit. Verhältn. d. thrak. Cherson.* 560-413, in the *Festschrift z. 4. Säcularfeier der Univ. Tübingen*, 1877.—When a community had to part with territory for an Attic Cleruchy, the tribute was reduced as a rule (Kirchhoff), but it was always taken amiss, and the planting of Cleruchies in Euboea may have contributed to the revolt of the island against Athens.—Estimate of the number of Athenians provided for as Cleruchi in Du. 9, 237.—The founding of Amphipolis (437-36) and that of Thurii were failures because too many foreign elements had to be incorporated. An Amphipolitan and a Thurian were on quite a different footing with Athens as compared with the Cleruchi in the places enumerated above. Cf. also Curtius, *G. G.* 2⁶, 840.

17. Beloch, *Beitr. zur Bevölkerungslehre*, I⁶, 73; in addition to which there were 9000 metoeci, making a total of 45,000 citizens (p. 83). In his approximate estimates Beloch enumerates the Cleruchi who formed incomplete communities abroad as belonging not to their foreign settlements but to Attica.

In conclusion I may remark that in order to understand how slight the demands were which Athens made on the allies, we may consider how much Xerxes was able to exact from the Greeks of Asia and the islands (see p. 43); it was at least six times the amount demanded by Athens.

CHAPTER XVIII

ATHENS UNDER PERICLES—ATTEMPTS OF THE ATHENIANS TO OBTAIN FOR THEIR CITY A LEADING POSITION IN GREECE

ATHENS had founded her empire, a goodly kingdom, consisting almost entirely of splendid cities not separated from one another by portions of continents, but united by the sea, an element familiar to the Athenians. She might have rested content with this measure of success. But it is characteristic of states which are conscious of their strength and for which nature has prescribed no external boundaries, to be ever seeking to extend their dominion, and they are actually driven into this course if their path is crossed by troublesome rivals, for in that case every expansion of their power appears to be an increase of their security, which, however, is not always really the case. Athens, therefore, was always bent on extending her sway within Greece itself, either by direct or indirect means. Directly indeed, that is to say, under the form of actual dominion, she could not attain her object; on the contrary, every step in advance intensified the energy of her opponents' resistance. Athens could bring but few Dorians into her league. It is true that a pure Doric race did not exist anywhere. Every Dorian state possessed a non-Dorian element, which could perhaps be influenced. But the mere attempt was an act of hostility to Sparta, and Sparta was on her guard. Moreover, the non-Dorian states of Greece, when they were not decidedly hostile, like Boeotia,

had no particular affection for Athens. Thus Athens could never become the political capital of Greece.¹

But could she not aspire to the leadership of Greece in another sphere? As a matter of fact a remarkable attempt was made in this direction under Pericles, of which Plutarch gives the following account in his biography of that statesman :—"When the Lacedaemonians began to take offence at the growing power of Athens, Pericles endeavoured to make the people still more sensible of their importance, and inclined to consider themselves capable of achieving great things, and he carried a popular resolution to the effect that all the Hellenes, both of Europe and Asia, whether belonging to small or large communities, should be summoned to send deputies to a congress in Athens, to consult regarding the Hellenic shrines, which the barbarians had burnt, and the sacrifices which the Greeks had vowed to offer when they were at war with the barbarians, and also regarding the security of the sea, so that all might sail upon it in peace. For this purpose the Athenians despatched twenty persons, all above the age of fifty, five to the coasts and islands of Asia, five to the Hellespont and Thrace as far as Byzantium, five to Boeotia, Phocis, and the Peloponnese, and thence by Locri through Acarnania to Ambracia, and five through Euboea to the Oetaeans, to the Gulf of Malia, to the Phthiotic Achaeans, and to the Thessalians. But the project fell through, for the Spartans were opposed to it, and the attempt was first made in the Peloponnese." The proposal was prompted by religious considerations; it was a clever move, and moreover exactly suited Athens, who was justly proud of her piety. If it had been accepted, the Greeks would unquestionably have been right in regarding Athens as the religious head of Greece. But Sparta would not admit such a pretension. Unfortunately the date of the attempt is not given. Some place it in the autumn of 444. No doubt the scheme could only have been possible at a time when Athens had obtained a high

degree of power, but many considerations tell against the assumption of so late a date. The opening words of Plutarch : "When the Lacedaemonians began to take offence at the growing power of Athens," certainly cannot be referred to the period after the Thirty Years' Peace, and even if they are a rhetorical flourish of little meaning, the tenor of the resolution itself does not fit in with that date. The sanctuaries were to be rebuilt and the promised sacrifices performed. What Greek state would have delayed even to commence the fulfilment of such religious obligations for a period of thirty-six years? And the security of the sea had been long ago assured by the Athenians themselves in concert with their allies. If the Athenians really approached the Greeks in the year 444 with proposals of this kind, the only straightforward answer could have been : "Your request has been carried into effect already ; all the Greeks, you yourselves especially, have amply complied with it." It is therefore more probable that the attempt belongs to a very early period, as early as is consistent with the accession to power of Pericles, consequently soon after 460. The motion may be described as the act of a young leader, who has not yet learnt from experience that it is better not to make proposals of such importance and in so formal a manner unless their acceptance is in a certain measure assured. The division of the embassies according to localities is also highly significant. The first ten envoys are sent to the members of the maritime league of the Athenians, five others to states on close terms of friendship with the Spartans, and the remaining five to those forming the northern half of the Amphictyonic League, Euboea certainly being thrown in, but probably only to be taken *en route*. The congress might have resulted in the formation of an alliance which would have thrown the Amphictyonic League into the shade. For this reason, I regard this attempt of Athens as a counter-move to the endeavour of Sparta (discussed in Chapter ix.) to remodel that league. Sparta said—Let us exclude all who

have been guilty of unpatriotic conduct. No, retorts Athens, let us be generous and magnanimous; let us welcome all, the old allies and the new. But the mere distribution of the embassy showed what the result was to be according to the views of Athens. Half of the new league would have been formed by the allies of Athens, a quarter by Sparta and her friends, and another quarter by the Amphictyonic cities of northern Greece. It was impossible that this should please Sparta; she would have been at too great a disadvantage in the matter of voting power. However this may be, it is certain that after the Persian Wars attempts of a more or less definite kind were made on both sides, by Sparta and Athens, to give Greece an improved although still very loose form of constitution, that the Spartan attempt, which was conceived from a continental point of view, failed in consequence of the protest of Athens, while that of Athens, which was dictated by maritime interests, was defeated through the opposition of Sparta. The truth is that Greece was not intended by nature for unity.

Just as Plutarch is our only authority for this attempt of Pericles to bring the Greeks under the moral influence of Athens, in the same way another remarkable but much more modest attempt in a similar direction is known to us only through an inscription which has been recently discovered at Eleusis. It is a resolution of the Athenian people, the date not being given, but after 446 and before the beginning of the Peloponnesian War, and placed by some in 439 and by others in 444-3. It prescribes that gifts are to be made to the goddesses of Eleusis, consisting of a hundredth part of the barley and a two-hundredth part of the wheat, by the Athenians and their allies, the execution of the resolution being entrusted to the Demarchs in the case of Athens, and to the Eklogeis in that of the allies (see Chapter xvii.) After the special provisions for carrying out the order at Eleusis the inscription proceeds as follows: the Council was

to communicate it to the other Hellenic cities, pointing out that the Athenians and their allies were making this offering to the goddesses, that they did not impose this burden upon them (the other Greeks)—that would have been a difficult matter—but called upon them to do likewise in accordance with custom and the pronouncement of the Delphic Oracle. The inscription then prescribes that dedicatory offerings shall be made out of the proceeds of part of the contributions at the discretion of the Athenian people, accompanied with a notice from which of the Hellenes they came. The object of this resolution is evident. Greece was to be accustomed to regard the Eleusinian sanctuary as one of the chief national shrines. This would have given fresh prestige to the city of Athens. We do not know to what extent the invitation to the other Greeks was successful. Isocrates certainly says that most of the Greek cities sent the tenth part of their corn to Athens, but this may be, as is so often the case with Isocrates, a phrase used for effect. It was to the advantage of the Athenians to represent the honours paid to the Eleusinian shrine as greater than they were in reality.

On the whole the attempts of Athens to pose as the leader of the nation met with very little success in Greece proper. Her treatment of the members of her maritime league was not of a kind to attract the Greeks who could dispense with her assistance. As she ruled and made her rule felt in her own sphere, she failed to win the sympathy of those who stood outside it. So far from this being the case, they congratulated themselves on not being on closer terms with a city which exercised such despotic control. Sparta, they might well think, was preferable, for she generally demanded nothing whatever from her allies.

NOTES

Authorities. Plut. Per. 17, and the Eleusinian taxation edict quoted by Foucart in the Bull. de corr. hellén. 4, 225, C. I. A. 1, Suppl. 27b, and Dittenberger, No. 13.—For the plan described by Plutarch (Per. 17) cf. A. Schmidt, Perikl. Zeitalter, 1, 47, who places it soon after 460. Duncker, 9, 120, puts it in the year 444; Busolt, Zum Perikl. Plan einer hellen. National-Versammlung, in the Rh. Mus. n. F. 38, 150, about 439/8.—For the taxation edict cf. A. Schmidt, N. Jahrb. f. klass. Phil. 131, pp. 681 seq. and Duncker, 9, 126. Isocrates (Panegy. 31) states that the majority of the cities sent a tenth part of their corn to Athens. The taxation edict has an appendix of Lampon's in the shape of a resolution about the Pelargicon, and the question arises, what was the close connection between the Pelargicon and Eleusis? To elucidate this it would be useful to be able to fix the locality of the Athenian Eleusinium, which may have been either near or in the Pelargicon. It is mentioned as lying ἐπὶ τῇ πόλει; cf. Milchhöfer, Athen, in Baumeister, Denkm. p. 198. The Pelargicon is generally supposed to have been to the west of the Acropolis, and the Eleusinium consequently in the same place. E. Curtius, on the other hand, who considers the Pelargicon to be the walls surrounding the whole Acropolis, places the Eleusinium to the eastward; cf. A. Bötticher, Acropolis, pp. 51 and 58. The close connection which, according to the above-mentioned resolution of the people, must have existed between the worship of Demeter and the Pelargicon, might also suggest the conjecture that at Athens in the fifth century Demeter was supposed to have been originally worshipped as a Pelasgic deity in that part of the city which was called Pelargicon or Pelasgicon.

1. Readers of this volume will not discover in it many remarks on general Hellenic policy, or national aspirations, nor much eulogy of the men who are supposed to have wished to unite the whole of Greece. Considerations of this nature easily lead to the engrafting of modern possibilities and ideas on antiquity. The Greeks of the fifth century did not advance beyond the idea of the πόλις. In their view a city did not expand into a state embracing several cities, at the most it controlled other cities. Athens exercised a control of this kind, but it collapsed under the attacks of the Peloponnesians. The latter possessed a league, which could conquer others but could not safeguard its own existence. Thus there was no relation possible between Sparta and Athens but an alliance, such as, for instance, Cimon and Callicratidas wished to

establish, which, however, could not last longer than any other international treaty. A firmly-knit indissoluble bond implied the presence of a garrison in the conquered community, and if Sparta could not even hold Thebes by this method, and did not so much as make a serious attempt to do so in the case of Athens, how was it possible for Athens to carry out a similar policy and control and direct the Peloponnese, so long as Greeks remained what they were? A real federal constitution is only possible when full powers are given to the representatives of the various states; but the Greeks of the fifth century considered it surprising that individual city-communities could part with their sovereignty even to this extent; the decisions of the representatives always remained subject to the approval of the community which had deputed them. The Greeks never longed for that unity, to which almost all modern nations have aspired for some time past. As a general rule it is some pressure coming from without that makes a closer national union desirable. But after the Persian crisis the Greeks had no difficulty of this kind for a long space of time, consequently attempts to form a union came late, and are of an incomplete character. The cohesion of the Athenian empire rested only on the proposition which was advanced by Athens, but not recognized by the members of the League, that the League was indissoluble and that secession from it was unlawful, and therefore high treason. If we consider that the same question formed the point of dispute between the Northern States of the American Union and the Confederates, consequently that even in our own day members of a union who possessed perfectly equal rights and whose votes were counted on every occasion, have maintained the principle that any member can withdraw from a union when it pleases, we shall be able to understand all the more readily that the Greeks of the fifth century had no conception of a national federal constitution, and no desire for anything of the kind. The result was that they had afterwards to submit to Macedon. But I do not believe that their want of political unity involved the loss of any intellectual acquisition which they might have made under a closer connection. It is impossible, however, to enter into this question further here.

CHAPTER XIX

ATHENS UNDER PERICLES—FOREIGN RELATIONS AND DIPLOMACY

THE preceding chapters do not present a complete picture of the influence of Athens under Pericles. We must follow it still farther in its relation to Greek as well as Barbarian states. The Greek states must not be neglected, for the Greeks who were not hostile to Athens on principle might be brought under her influence in individual cases. In a word, we now have to deal with the diplomacy of Pericles.

We turn first to the East, which enjoyed a closer because a more natural connection with Athens than the West; for the empire of Athens lay in the East. But this empire was almost entirely composed of maritime cities; outside them lay the aristocracies of the mainland, kingdoms half or wholly barbaric, and sea-coast towns, which were too remote for Athens to extend her rule over them.

The relations of Athens with Thessaly were subject to peculiar fluctuations. We have seen that a kind of alliance existed between them, for the Thessalians furnished the Athenians with a contingent of fighting-men. But we also noted that these soldiers were not always loyal, as, for instance, at the battle of Tanagra. Hippias had already found them untrustworthy allies (vol. I. p. 418). And no doubt a certain difference of interests existed between democratic Athens and aristocratic Thessaly. But there

was another reason for the instability of the Thessalians. They had long been enemies of the Boeotians and Phocians, who hated one another. The Phocians were for the most part friends of Athens, from whom they expected support against the Delphians, the *protégés* of Sparta. But if the Athenians were too friendly to the Phocians, they offended the Thessalians. For this reason the Thessalians were lukewarm allies of Athens, and they were in fact of but little use to her, except in so far as they made the passage through Thessaly difficult for her foes, and this they did chiefly in their own interests.

The case was different with Macedonia. The relations between Athens and Macedonia were of old standing. King Alexander was the hereditary friend of the Athenians, as his ancestors had been. During the Persian Wars he always endeavoured to keep on good terms with them. In the course of his long reign (498-454) he had strengthened the royal power, which had been weakened through the separation of the collateral branches of the reigning family, by the subjection of these branches, and had forced the Paeonians, the Lyncestae and the Orestae to recognize his supremacy. But separatist tendencies were as strong with the people and princes of Macedonia as the desire for concentration was with the most powerful of her kings. After Alexander's death there was a redivision of the kingdom; the larger or western half fell to Perdiccas, the smaller eastern part as far as the Strymon to Philip. Dardas, their cousin, ruled over the Elimiotae in the far west. Perdiccas was the Macedonian prince with whom Athens had to deal while Pericles was in power, and even after him. Athens was obliged to have definite relations, either of a friendly or hostile character, with the Macedonian princes, because Macedonia lay in the rear of the more westerly of the Thracian allied cities, and the Macedonian kings had a marked tendency to bring the sea-coast under their sway.

The relations of Athens with the eastern neighbours of the Macedonians, the Thracians, were not less important. This people, originally kinsmen of the Greeks, was divided into several races, of which the Odrysians were especially powerful at that time. Their king Teres founded a great empire extending from the mouth of the Danube in a southerly direction to the town of Salmydessus on the Black Sea, and westwards to the mountains of Rhodope opposite the island of Thasos. He died about 440 B.C., and his two sons Sitalces and Sparadocus divided the territory between them. The power of Thrace was a matter of serious consideration to the cities lying eastwards of Abdera, such as Maronea, Aenus, the towns of the Chersonese and of the Propontis as far as Byzantium. But the Thracians were not so dangerous as the Macedonians, because they were less civilized and did not aim at the possession of the coast line.

The Athenians considered it expedient to make friends of the more remote Macedonian princes, in order to play them off against the nearer and more dangerous ones. They therefore entered into friendly relations with Perdiccas. Their chief apprehension with regard to Philip was that he might appropriate the Athenian gold-mines in his neighbourhood. Hence they endeavoured to protect this district by means of new colonies. Here they founded the city of Brea, the position of which cannot be accurately determined, and the existence of which is only known to us through the charter of its foundation, which has been preserved in a fragmentary state. Here too, after previous unsuccessful attempts of a similar nature (see above, Chapter ix.), in the year 437 Hagnon built the city of Amphipolis on the Strymon for the Athenians, on the spot known as Ennea Hodoi.¹

In course of time the internal affairs of Thrace and Macedonia grew more and more complicated, which caused the Athenians much anxiety. War broke out between Sitalces and Sparadocus. The latter fled to Scythia, where his nephew

Octamasadas was king, but obtained no protection there. Octamasadas had overthrown his step-brother Scyles, who had fled to Thrace. The reigning monarchs now made a mutual exchange of each other's *protégés*, and so secured their own thrones. In this way Sitalces became very powerful, and the Athenians had to court his alliance. According to Thucydides he extended his dominion from the mouth of the Danube up to Abdera, and from the sources of the Strymon to Byzantium.² He had married a Greek woman of Abdera, and her brother Nymphodorus was the most influential man at the court of the Thracian king, who attached great importance to the relations with the Greek world, in which Nymphodorus acted as go-between.

A concentration of the supreme power, similar to that which had occurred in Thrace, took place also in Macedonia, where Perdiccas defeated Philip and forced him to flee to Elimiotis, the kingdom of Derdas. Perdiccas, it is true, had been a friend of the Athenians, but as soon as he was master of Philip's territory and had become their near neighbour, he was in their way, and so they soon cast about for some means of creating difficulties for him in his own country. The position at the Thracian court was more favourable for their project. At first Nymphodorus does not seem to have been well disposed towards Athens, but subsequently a change took place and Thrace actually became her ally.³ The potentates of the interior could do little direct damage to the Greek maritime towns, for the latter were fortified on the land side and neither the Thracians nor the Macedonians possessed a fleet. The Thracian Chersonese is separated from Asia Minor by the Hellespont. The interests of the Athenians were closely bound up with these straits. As ancient kinsmen of the Milesians they had a considerable share of the corn-trade of the Pontus, and were naturally loath to see the approach to this sea in the hands of others. For this reason Athens had secured the Asiatic side of this sea-route as early as Solon's

time by garrisoning Sigeum. Subsequently the conqueror of Marathon became tyrant of the Chersonese in the prime of his life, with the consent of the Athenians and the Peisistratidae, and in the fifth century the peninsula had again become Athenian territory by occupation and colonization. The Propontis, which came next, was also surrounded by cities subject to Athens. Thus the Athenians could sail in peace into the Pontus, the shores of which were also inhabited by many Greeks who were friendly to them, most of them being considered Milesian colonists. These Greeks, however, did not join the Athenian maritime league, and the reason is obvious. In any event they would have had to protect themselves single-handed against the peoples of the interior, and no Persian fleet, against which Athenian aid would have been desirable, cruised in the Black Sea. There was no reason therefore why they should pay tribute to Athens. The Athenians, on the other hand, did not much care about cruising regularly in the Black Sea, which they would have been obliged to do if the Greek cities there had joined the League. But they were bound to make themselves feared in the Pontus, and for that reason they felt the necessity soon after 479 of making a naval demonstration in those waters. Aristides sailed thither, and tradition states that he died on the voyage.⁴ Then we hear little of the Pontus for a considerable time. Cimon had enough to do where real fighting was going on. But when Pericles came into power, the north-east resumed its importance. His first act was to take measures for the security of the Chersonese; he settled 1000 Cleruchi there, and fortified the Isthmus with a wall against the raids of the Thracians.⁵ He then, in what year is not known, availed himself of an opportunity of giving the dwellers on the Pontus an ocular demonstration of the power of Athens. Some inhabitants of Sinope appealed for help against their tyrant, Timesilaus, and Pericles sailed for the Black Sea. It was an easier matter for the Athenians to pose as masters

here than in the Mediterranean east of Phaselis, where Persian vessels of war might be met with. The expedition had the desired result. Pericles' colleague Lamachus stayed in Sinope for some time, and 600 Athenians received grants of land there. The town of Amisus, which lies farther eastward on the other side of the mouth of the Halys, was afterwards styled an Athenian colony, from which we may conclude that Athenians settled there too about this time. But the relations of Athens with the cities on the south coast of the Pontus were not so important as those with the opposite ones on its northern side. In the plains adjoining the sea corn was the principal staple of cultivation, the importation of which into the Piraeus was such an important branch of Athenian commerce. All the Greek cities in those parts were no doubt markets for corn; but Panticapaeum (now Kertsch) on the western side of the Cimmerian Bosphorus in the Crimean peninsula, was for a long time of special importance in antiquity.⁶ In the fifth century (up to 437) the family of the Archaeanactidae, who came from Mytilene, ruled here. They were succeeded by Spartocus and his family, the Spartocidae. The heads of these families were merely chief magistrates in Panticapaeum itself, but outside its boundaries they called themselves kings and ruled as such over a kingdom which embraced an extensive tract of country inhabited by Scythians. In this way Athens came into relations with the Scythians. From the time of the Five Years' Peace she kept 300 Scythians, and subsequently a greater number, as state-slaves for police duty and for the office of executioner. The relations of Athens with Panticapaeum continued to be of a close description, and the Athenians were even allowed to have their own harbour in the territory of the city, Nymphaeum, which brought them in a yearly revenue of one talent for a considerable time. As late as the first half of the fourth century the Spartocidae Satyrus and Leucon displayed a more friendly feeling for the Athenians than for all the other Greeks. Moreover the commercial

intercourse between Athens and Panticapaeum was not confined to the import of corn. Athens also imported fish, leather and slaves, and in return the Panticapaeans took wine, oil, pottery, and other artistic products from the Piraeus. Many Athenians lived there for commercial reasons; even family ties were soon formed with the Scythians, as had been done a hundred years earlier with the Thracians. Just as Thucydides was half Thracian by descent, so the grandmother of Demosthenes was the daughter of a Scythian woman.⁷

The importance of the trade of the Pontus to Athens may also be inferred from the fact that in the year 411 B.C. Alcibiades, in his capacity of Athenian general, established a toll of ten per cent at Chrysopolis in the territory of Chalcedon on all trading vessels leaving the Pontus. It is conjectured that this was not an innovation but a renewal of an old custom, and that the Athenians had always levied dues there. But such a high toll as ten per cent on the value of the cargo is not probable in the ordinary course of things. At all events the corn of the Pontus was imported into Byzantium duty-free, which gave this city a great advantage.

Let us now pass over the mainland of Asia Minor and turn our attention to the south-east of the Mediterranean. Here we find the much-coveted island of Cyprus, with its numerous dialects. The relations between Athens and this island during the time when Pericles was in power are unknown, from which we may conclude that Pericles abstained from all interference in that quarter. Greek civilization held its own there, and the feeling for Greek nationality survived, as is shown by the history of the king Evagoras at the end of the century.⁸ In Egypt too Pericles made no attempt to re-establish the political influence of Athens. He could not do so if he wished to be on good terms with Persia. Pericles prevented the Athenians from entangling themselves afresh in Egyptian complications. But the importance attached to the favour of

Athens in those regions is shown by the circumstance that in the year 445-4 Psammetichus, king of the Libyans, made the Athenians the splendid present of 30,000 bushels of wheat. The trade of Athens with Egypt evidently remained considerable throughout. It was more advantageous for citizens to sail thither as peaceful merchants than to endeavour to wrest the country from the king. But the story of Zopyrus proves that the political reserve of the Athenians was not always interpreted by the Persians as a confession of weakness on their part. Zopyrus was the son of the Megabyzus who defeated the Athenians in Egypt, and grandson of the famous Zopyrus who by his self-sacrifice had obtained possession of Babylon for Darius. Megabyzus himself had fallen into disgrace with Artaxerxes; Zopyrus actually rebelled against the king. He was obliged to flee, and he came to Athens (about 440 B.C.)⁹ This was certainly a strange reversal of circumstances. Formerly Greek kings and generals had taken refuge with the Persians. That might happen again, and, in fact, did so happen. On this occasion one of the leading Persians, a descendant of one of the Seven, fled to the republic of Athens, because he believed that she could restore him to power. Athens and her empire were evidently regarded by the inhabitants of the countries around the Mediterranean as a power equal in rank to Persia. Fortune, however, did not favour Zopyrus. He accompanied an Athenian force to the city of Caunus in Caria, which had formerly been Athenian but had revolted, and there he met his death. This episode also shows that more than one conflict on isolated questions may have taken place between Athens and Persia on the coast of Asia Minor without disturbing the general peace.

We now turn to the West.¹⁰ In this region Italy was chiefly the scene of Athenian influence. But we have not much definite information on the subject. The ancient historians, true to their general method, have only mentioned actual historical facts or followed rhetorical and moral aims.

They have hardly touched on the history of the mutual relations of states, on diplomacy, plans, negotiations, and treaties, which are of such importance, and they are equally silent as to the commercial intercourse of the various states, which we can only gather from stray notices and archaeological discoveries. Our knowledge of state-treaties is derived almost entirely from inscriptions. The famous threat of Themistocles that the Athenians would, if forced to do so, settle in the Siritis, is a proof among others that a long-standing connection existed between Athens and Italy. The influence which Athens had in Neapolis is additional testimony to the fact. The Athenian general Diotimus established a religious festival there with a torch-race in the course of his campaign against the Sicels.¹¹ Although this is not supposed to have happened till the time of the Peloponnesian War, yet Athens must have possessed influence over Neapolis for a considerable period, or it would have been impossible for an Athenian general to institute a festival there which long continued to enjoy high repute. Besides, the Neapolitan coins of the middle of the fifth century have a head of Athene with an Athenian, not a Corinthian, helmet, just like those of Thurii. The relations of Athens with the west were pre-eminently of a commercial character. She supplied Italy and Sicily with earthenware and imported grain and Etruscan metal work. But in the middle of the fifth century the Athenians endeavoured to obtain a firm political footing in Italy by founding Thurii.

The city of Sybaris had been destroyed for more than half a century. But it continued to exist as a community of Sybarites, just as the Messenians did not cease to be Messenians when the Spartans deprived them of their country, or the Poles have not lost their nationality by the partition of Poland. Most of them had fled to the cities on the Tyrrhenian Sea, to Laos, Scidros, and Poseidonia, and thence they made repeated attempts to recover their ancient city, or to found a new one in the same neighbourhood. In the year

453 the descendants of the exiles built a new city close to the site of the old one. But the people of Croton attacked them and drove them away. They saw that they were too weak to stand alone, and sought assistance in Greece proper. Sparta refused to entertain their proposals. Thereupon Athens undertook to provide them with a home.

Athens was in many respects peculiarly adapted for an undertaking of this kind. She was in good repute in Lower Italy, and the Siritis, to which the Athenians laid claim (perhaps on account of Pallas, whose image was brought to Siris), was not far from the territory of Sybaris. In addition to this Athens was the natural representative of Miletus, which had been on the best of terms with Sybaris. Finally Athens, as a commercial city of the first rank, could thoroughly appreciate the advantages of a position like that of Sybaris. The trade-route through the interior, which had been formerly controlled by Sybaris, might still prove of importance, although the Italian tribes had become more conscious of their strength and more formidable in the interval. It was just about the time when the Lucanians began to develop their power. But even under somewhat altered conditions a city on the site of Sybaris was destined to have an important future. Athens therefore undertook to found it.¹² It is difficult to see how this was possible in the face of the conquest of the district by the Crotoniates. But for that very reason the method adopted by the Athenians must have been the best suited to the purpose. They sought the co-operation of all the Greeks and of the Delphic Oracle. The Greeks and Apollo responded to their appeal; if an expedition to Sybaris was unavoidable, at all events the undertaking should not redound to the exclusive advantage of Athens.

Diodorus relates—and we are obliged to follow him here, as he is our only authority—that the Athenians despatched ten ships under Xenocritus and Lampon, a man well versed in matters of ecclesiastical law, and at the same time

announced publicly in the cities of the Peloponnesus that any one who wished to do so might join in the settlement. The oracle of Apollo was to the effect that the city was to be founded on a spot "where water was measured and bread was not." When the settlers arrived in the territory of Sybaris they came upon a spring named Thuria, not far from the site of the old town, with a brass pipe, which was called 'medimnos' by the inhabitants. As 'medimnos' means 'a measure,' Lampon, who was skilled in such matters, decided that this was the place with a measurable supply of water—the abundance of corn in the neighbourhood did not require special proof—and so the city was founded on this spot, and received the name of Thurii. The settlers were Greeks and old Sybarites, and they built the city in four broad streets running lengthwise, called Heraclea, Aphrodisias, Olympias, and Dionysias, and three running crosswise, with the names of Heroa, Thuria, and Thurina. It was a perfectly regular plan, of a kind which was more common at that time in the case of new settlements than it had hitherto been. It owed its origin to the Milesian Hippodamus, who planned the sea-port of the Piræus, and afterwards the city of Rhodes, in the same manner. The consolidation of the colony, however, did not proceed quite smoothly, as Diodorus also tells us. After a short period of harmony quarrels arose among the citizens. The old Sybarites claimed the highest offices, leaving the minor ones for those who had come from Greece. The wives of the former were to have precedence of the wives of the new citizens at the sacrifices. The old Sybarites wanted to take the lands in the neighbourhood of the city and let the others have those farther away. At last an open conflict broke out. The new-comers put to death a great number of the other citizens and drove the rest away; the latter founded a third Sybaris on the river Traïs, coins of which have come down to us. The victors now sent for a fresh contingent from Greece and established a democratic constitution; they

also came to an understanding with the Crotoniates, who of course had not been best pleased with the founding of Thurii. The community was divided into ten phylae :— Arcas, Achais, Elea, Boeotis, Amphictyonis, Doris, Ias, Athenais, Euboia, and Nesiotis. The seven streets divided the city into twenty squares; perhaps the division of the community into ten phylae had some connection with this. Then, says Diodorus, the Thurians adopted a code of laws drawn up by Charondas, their most learned citizen. This statement is untrue, for Charondas had long been dead. The names of the phylae indicate that Athens had a slight preponderance, and that Sparta was in the background. In the naming of the streets it is noticeable that the tutelary goddess of the city, Athene, is not included; this may be because she was decidedly superior to the others. Thurii quarrelled with Tarentum, and shortly afterwards even with Athens. When we consider that the new city soon became more of a burden than an advantage to Athens, we are forced to the conclusion that the Athenians were wrong in overcoming their old dislike to colonial settlements, and in promoting a grand scheme of colonization instead of providing their citizens with cleruchies, especially as they could not carry out their scheme without assistance, and had to obtain the co-operation of people who repaid them with scant thanks. It was a division of forces, which we should hardly have expected from Pericles. Thurii, however, rapidly attained both material and intellectual prosperity. The novelty of a general Greek colony attracted a number of distinguished men thither. Protagoras, who is said to have legislated for the city, Herodotus and Empedocles took up their abode there.

Tarentum,¹³ which was hostile to Thurii, was constantly on bad terms with its neighbours the Messapii, who again cultivated friendly relations with Athens. On the occasion of the Sicilian war the Athenians renewed the old alliance with the Messapian King Artas.¹⁴

The friendly connection which Athens maintained with Rhegium and Leontini, a fact fully explained by their identity of origin, was shown at the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War. On that occasion also it was seen how great her prestige was in the west of Sicily, with the inhabitants of Segesta.

The attitude of Athens towards the Etruscans was not a hostile one. In early days their mutual intercourse was evidently due to the agency of Sybaris and to the overland trade, for the sea-route through the Straits of Messina was in the hands of the Chalcidian Greeks of Sicily and Lower Italy, and of the Syracusans, who disliked commercial rivals. Attic vases are found in Etruria in the fifth century, and also in Campania and in Adria. In former times Cyme, as representative of the Chalcidians and Corinthians, and especially of their potteries, had controlled the market of Western Italy.

We know hardly anything of the relations of Athens with Carthage.¹⁵ And yet Carthage was the greatest naval power of the West, as Athens was of the East, and it must have been of great importance for Pericles to obtain information regarding the power and the policy of the Carthaginians. At this point the gaps in the historical annals of the ancients and the scantiness of the inscriptions are clearly discernible.

We must now return in an easterly direction, in order to complete the circle. The most powerful state in Western Greece was Coreyra, which was notoriously almost always on hostile terms with Corinth, and well-disposed towards Athens on account of her connection with Eretria. Coreyra had already experienced favours at the hands of Themistocles, and we may assume that if Athens wished to appear in the Ionian Sea as a rival of Corinth, she could count on the friendship of Coreyra even more than she had hitherto done. But no regular alliance was concluded between the two states until the crisis which led to the Peloponnesian War set in. The Athenians also obtained a firm footing on the mainland

of western Greece. Tolmidas had wrested Molycreum and Naupactus from the Locrians, who as a rule were opponents of the Athenians, and subsequently the Athenians had settled the Messenians in Naupactus, the position of which made it of such great importance. The Thirty Years' Peace led to no change in the situation here. Before the Peloponnesian War, however, but at a date which cannot be precisely determined, Athens interfered still further in the somewhat complicated affairs of these districts.¹⁶ The inhabitants of Argos Amphilocheum had admitted certain Ambraciots into their city, and the latter had driven out their protectors. The exiled Amphilocheians placed themselves under the protection of the Acarnanians, and both parties, Acarnanians and Amphilocheians, appealed to Athens for help. Athens granted their request. Phormion was sent with thirty triremes to the Gulf of Ambracia. Athenians, Amphilocheians and Acarnanians besieged and took Argos, and made slaves of the Ambraciots who had been guilty of so heinous a crime. The city of Ambracia had always been a loyal adherent of Corinth. Athens could henceforth count upon the Acarnanians.

We thus see the Athens of the time of Pericles in manifold relations with peoples and states of the most varied description. In every case an interest of a twofold character is either demonstrable or probable, that of commerce and that of politics. Athens had to be on her guard on all sides if she wished to escape injury of two kinds. She was protected from harm not only by the friendship of her allies but also by the weakness of her rivals and enemies. In the East, Thrace and Macedonia could not be allowed to develop their power; the quarrels of Thracians with Macedonians, of Thracians with Thracians, and of Macedonian potentates with Macedonian potentates, were all useful for Athens. In the West the hatred of Coreyra for Corinth was a fortunate circumstance for Athens, otherwise she could hardly have

found scope for her energies in that quarter. Pericles was obliged to keep an eye on all this. He had to conclude treaties at the right moment, and counteract the intrigues of jealous rivals in the nick of time. With this end in view he had to gather information concerning all that was going on both in Greece and barbarian states, from Panticapaeum to Segesta. He had no permanent embassies at his disposal for this work, as modern statesmen have. Even the Proxenoï, who have been compared with our consuls, could only render scant service in this respect, for they remained citizens of the place in which they lived, and were only under an obligation to protect the individual citizens of the state which conferred on them the honour of their appointment, and not to represent its general interests.¹⁷ Pericles, or whoever controlled the destinies of Athens, was compelled to devote unremitting thought to the problem of using every means which could ensure the maintenance of satisfactory relations with every state. He was responsible to the Athenians for the measures which he proposed in this respect, and yet the State gave him little assistance in the collection of the requisite knowledge and information. Pericles accomplished his task in truly brilliant fashion; few statesmen in antiquity have conducted foreign affairs with such splendid energy in the face of so many difficulties.¹⁸ Our own belief is that he had to devote part of his private fortune to the furtherance of these objects.

NOTES

1. For the position and founding of Amphipolis cf. *Bus.* 2, 410 seq.; *Curtius*, G. G. 2⁶, 260 and 841.

2. *Thuc.* 2, 29, 96-98.

3. *Du.* 9, 299 represents the Athenians as having won over Nymphodorus at this early stage, contrary to Thucydides, according to whom it did not take place till later, when the tension between Athens and Corinth had become more marked.—The Athenian policy of keeping the barbarians at variance with one another is referred to by Demosthenes, *Aristocr.* 103.

4. Plut. Ar. 26.

5. Plut. Per. 19; cf. Du. 9, 105 and 8, 360.

6. For the relations between Athens and the Cimmerian Bosphorus, cf. Bus. 2, 538-542.

7. Aesch. Ctes. 171. In general cf. Thirion, *De civit. quae a Graecis in Chers. Taur. etc.*, Nancy, 1884, p. 52.

8. Cf. Bus. 2, 510.

9. For the affairs of Egypt and the present of grain, see Plut. Per. 37, and Philochorus (Fr. 90) quoted in Schol. Ar. Vesp. 718, also Herod. 3, 160 and Ctes. Pers. 40-43. It is conjectured that the name should have been Amyrtaeus and not Psammetichus. Duncker has combined the isolated facts and other events of the time into a picture which will always retain a peculiar value as an ingenious creation. Among the coins found at Naucratis there are comparatively speaking many Athenian specimens of the fifth century, which prove the close relations existing between Athens and Egypt, for instance, the exportation of corn to Athens.

10. H. Droysen, *Athen und der Westen*, Berl. 1882.

11. Timaeus (Fr. 99 M.) quoted in Tzetzes' commentary on Lycophron, 732. The Lampadodromy is a purely Athenian institution, Paus. 1, 30, 2; cf. Baumeister, *Denkm. v. Fackeln*. But whether Timaeus has not exceeded the truth in his mention of Diotimus is a moot point.

12. For the attempts of the Sybarites to refound their city, see Diod. 11, 90 and 12, 10. For the coins of the new Sybaris, some of the city alone, and some in conjunction with Poseidonia, see Head, *Hist. Num.* 70. Diod. 12, 10 puts the founding of Thurii in 446/5; the spring of 445 is generally assumed to be the date, Bus. 2, 587. For Thurii cf. L. Schiller, *De rebus Thuriorum*, Gott. 1838, and Th. Müller, *De Thuriorum republica*, Gott. 1838. Its situation has been roughly determined by the researches of Cavallari, for which see the *Notizie degli Scavi*, 1879; cf. also Lenormant, *La grande Grèce*, 1, 263 seq.—Of the ten Phylae, four represented Athens and her dependencies—Athenais, Eubois, Nesiotis, Ias; three central and northern Greece—Boeotis, Doris, Amphictyonis; and three represented the Peloponnese—Arcas, Achais, Elea. Sparta and the Peloponnesian Dorians do not appear. They took no part in the settlement. If we reckon Achais as friendly to Athens, and Arcas as doubtful, the upshot is that the Athenian party in Thurii were in an enviable position. Charondas legislator of Thurii, according to Diod. 12, 11, probably following Ephorus, who would have been more likely to commit such a gross chronological blunder with regard to a famous Sicilian than the Sicilian Timaeus. According to Her. Pont. in D. L. 9, 8, 50, Pro-

tagoras drew up a code of laws for the Thurians; he may have based them on those of Charondas.

13. Inscription of a votive offering of Tarentum concerning Thurii found at Olympia, Ditt. 35.

14. Thuc. 7, 33.

15. If Holzapfel's conjecture quoted below in Chapter xxii. is correct, Athens must, like Rome, have had fairly direct relations with Carthage in the fifth century.

16. Thuc. 2, 68. In the West Corinth and Carthage counter-balanced each other; hence Athens could trade there all the more easily. Syracuse was especially powerful in the Tyrrhenian Sea.

17. See Chapter viii. If the Proxenoi represented the interests of the state which appointed them, like the modern consuls, they would have been often obliged to betray their own city.

18. The influence of Athens is represented in Plut. Per. 15 as co-extensive with that of Pericles. We may point out here that modern research has refuted a theory, now no longer so openly advocated but still silently held by many scholars, which prevailed in its crudest form at the close of the last century. In those days Athens was looked upon as the city of enlightenment, but as insignificant from a political point of view. Immense empires, as, for instance, that of the Mongols, were regarded with admiration. It now turns out that the Athens of the fifth century was a great state in a higher sense than most of the kingdoms of the Middle Ages. The historians of antiquity have not laid direct stress on the great political power of Athens for various reasons, among others because it lasted for so short a time. But for the space of half a century it was quite on a par with that of Persia. The policy of Athens during the period from 480-430 is one of the most brilliant phenomena of history, and the Athenian empire is the true precursor of those of Macedonia and Rome.

CHAPTER XX

ATHENS UNDER PERICLES—ART AND LITERATURE IN GREECE DURING THAT PERIOD

WE have still to consider one of the most important aspects of the government of Pericles, the provision made for the intellectual life of Athens as understood by the Greeks, that is, for the adornment of the city, and for enabling the citizens to cultivate a noble enjoyment of life. That Pericles devoted his energies to these objects has been stated by the ancients and referred to by himself. But besides this he cherished a silent aspiration, silent because he could not venture to give open expression to it, and unnoticed by the ancient historians, because they regarded things too much through the medium of their own feelings and prejudices. We shall deal with this at the end of the chapter. The first-mentioned points are emphasized by the ancients themselves, and have done more than anything else to stamp the rule of Pericles as an important and brilliant one. In discussing them we shall also refer to similar efforts made during the same period in the rest of Hellas.

One of the chief aims of Pericles was the adornment of the city, which was based on a foundation of religion, for the idea was that art, when it was promoted by the State, should be devoted to the service of the gods.

The tutelar divinity of Athens was Pallas Athene, and her home was the Acropolis. But Athene also extended her pro-

tection to the Athenian empire, especially after the treasury of the League had been removed from Delos to Athens for greater security. The adornment of the Acropolis, which was intended to be an offering worthy of the goddess, was associated with the marked rise of the plastic art and its attainment of perfection.

In his cultivation of art Pericles at the outset continued the labours of Cimon, who had actively promoted the embellishment of the whole of Athens.¹ We must therefore specify here the most important of Cimon's achievements in this direction. Cimon evidently defrayed much of the expense out of his own pocket, while Pericles applied the public funds to the adornment of the city. Both methods were right. Cimon could devote his own fortune to this object, because he had acquired it almost entirely from booty of war, and in doing so he merely anticipated the conduct of great Roman generals in a less striking way. Marcellus and Fabius, and many others after them, adorned Rome with temples and statues from the proceeds of booty of war. Pericles, however, was never a fortunate general in this sense. Moreover, in beautifying the city religion was more an immediate object to him than to Cimon, and so it was right that payment should be made by the State and not by him.

The ancients were particularly fond of shady spots which invited them to spend their time in the open air. It was for this reason that Cimon improved the Grove of Academos, in front of the Dipylon gate, which was used as a gymnasium, so that it became a more favourite place of resort for the athletic exercises of the young men and the walks of their elders. With the same object he planted the Agora in the city with plane-trees, and increased the number of porticoes which surrounded it. A hall in the market-place, built by one of his relations, Peisianax, and decorated with the paintings of Polygnotus and Micon, received the name of *Poikile*, the many-coloured. When Cimon brought the bones of

Theseus from Scyros to Athens, the Athenians erected a sanctuary to their hero. The question arises whether this is the beautiful temple on the rocky terrace which runs into the city in a north-easterly direction between the Dipylon and the Areopagus and overlooks the market-place.² The style of its architecture is not inconsistent with the hypothesis that it belongs to a somewhat earlier date than the Parthenon. Of its sculptures the metopes of the east end and of the sides are still preserved, the former representing the exploits of Heracles, the latter those of Theseus, and considered by some authorities to resemble the art of Myron. There are also some much damaged portions of the frieze surrounding the cella, with combats between Lapithae and Centaurs. In these Kekulé thinks he recognizes an early work of Phidias. From an artistic point of view, therefore, nothing militates against the assumption that the temple was built about 460 B.C. ; but this does not prove that it was a Theseum.

But Cimon devoted his attention to the Acropolis as well. The fortification of it was his first care. What its condition was in this respect in early times is quite uncertain. A part of it, Enneapylos, also called Pelargicon or Pelasgicon, was ascribed to mythical Pelasgians. The fortifications destroyed by the Persians were rebuilt when Athens regained her freedom. The idea was that there should be a citadel within the fortified city. It does not appear, however, that the northern wall dates from Themistocles, as has hitherto been assumed ; the whole wall was in the main not begun till Cimon's time, and was finished under Pericles. The southern wall, behind which the surface was levelled to provide a site for the Parthenon, included the bastion forming the south-western corner to the right of the ascent, on which stood the little temple of Nike Apteros, or more properly Athene Nike, to which we shall refer presently.

But Cimon did not neglect the adornment of the citadel. Besides smaller votive offerings and the substructures of the

new temple of Athene, built by Pericles and called the Parthenon, he ordered the dedication of a colossal bronze statue of Athene Promachos, erected at the public expense, a piece of sculpture with which Phidias, the son of Charmidas, made a brilliant inauguration of his glorious career at Athens.³ The point of the spear is said to have been the first of the many wonders of the fair city that caught the eye of navigators as they rounded the promontory of Sunium on their voyage to Athens.

Phidias executed another important work at an early stage of his career—thirteen bronze figures dedicated by the Athenians at Delphi out of the spoil of Marathon, and representing Miltiades surrounded by Athene and Apollo and ten national heroes of Attica. He was next summoned to Olympia, where the Eleans had built the great temple of the Olympian Zeus, the sculpture on the pediments and metopes of which was discussed in a former chapter. He was commissioned to make the great image in the temple of gold and ivory. Zeus was presented sitting on his throne; in his right hand he carried the goddess of victory, and in his left he held the sceptre. The statue was about forty feet high. Its countenance appeared to the Greeks to embody the description given by Homer of the father of the gods. We now know that it is not the famous Zeus head of Otricoli, as was formerly supposed, but the head of the god portrayed on the Elean coins which reproduces the ideal of Phidias. The throne, the stool, the base, and the railing which surrounded the statue were richly ornamented with sculpture and painting; on them was depicted a variety of myths in which the power of the supreme god had been revealed to mankind.

When Phidias returned to Athens Cimon was dead and Pericles in the first freshness of his power. Pericles had removed the treasury of the League to Athens and deposited it in the treasure-chamber of the goddess on the citadel. He now conceived the bold project of devoting part of the money

collected for the war against the Persians to the adornment of the citadel. Athens had enforced yearly payment of this money and she continued to receive it ; but she did not spend it all on the equipment of ships and the wages of crews. She could put by a considerable sum every year without neglecting her duty as protectress of the Greeks. The surplus was and remained the property of the League and not that of Athens alone. If, however, a portion of it was spent in embellishing the temple of the tutelar deity of the League and the citadel of Athens, which was her abode, was this diverting the funds from their rightful object ? In pronouncing our verdict on this conduct we must consider it from the point of view of the ancients. Art was a matter of religion to the Greeks. It has been frequently pointed out that in early times their dwelling-houses were simple, and that splendour was confined to their public buildings. We can go further than this and say that almost all their public buildings were temples. They did not even build fine town-halls. Cimon, it is true, laid out walks and built porticoes, and he could do this because the expense was defrayed mostly from his own private income. Pericles used the funds of the League, and with them erected buildings destined for the services of religion and statues of the gods. The members of the League could not well complain of the money being spent in this way.

Pericles required some one to direct his artistic schemes, to give the ideas of the statesman the outward form which can only be supplied by the artist. He found such a man in Phidias. "Phidias," says Plutarch, "initiated everything and superintended everything." A number of other artists worked under him, who were little inferior to him in ability. But by his genius and his whole personality he towered above them all as did Raphael above the artists at the court of Leo X. Many a time, no doubt, when he walked from his house to the Acropolis Phidias was respectfully escorted by a troop of painters, sculptors, and architects, much as the

Roman artists pressed round Raphael when he repaired to the Vatican to create his immortal works or to submit his designs to the Pope.⁴

The principal building erected at the instigation of Pericles and under the direction of Phidias was the Parthenon, the great temple of the virgin goddess Athene.⁵ Up till recently it was assumed that the present Parthenon was erected by Pericles on the site of a building begun by the Peisistratidae, to which the substructures, which are still discernible, were said to belong. But now some other foundations south of the Erechtheum have been recognized as belonging to a temple of the sixth century, consequently the substructures of the Parthenon are attributed to Cimon, who planned the erection of a temple to Athene on this spot. The architects of the Parthenon of Pericles were Ictinus and Callicrates; it is supposed to have taken not less than fifteen years to build, and is said to have been completed soon after 438. The Parthenon is a Doric Peripteros with eight columns at each end and seventeen on each side, making forty-six in all. They have a slight convexity towards the centre, and each column has twenty grooves. Variety was given to the cornice by a decoration resembling a string of pearls, which is generally a peculiarity of the Ionic style. The interior was divided into three parts: to the east the Pronaos, separated from the surrounding colonnade by pillars only; in the middle the cella or Naos, and to the west the Opisthodomos, which was open to the outside. The Naos itself was divided into two parts; the western portion was enclosed by walls and served as the treasury of the goddess and of the State. The external effect was enhanced by the painting of the architectural details. But the choicest ornament of the temple was the sculptures in the pediment, in the metopes, and on the frieze surrounding the cella. On the eastern pediment was represented the birth of Athene from the head of Zeus, on the western the struggle between Athene and Poseidon. Most of

the figures, which are entire statues and not mere reliefs, are in the British Museum; they form the culminating point of Greek sculpture. The natural appearance of the bodies and the drapery in no way detracts from the ideal effect produced by the whole and the details. Their tranquillity does not degenerate into stiffness, their movements betray no undue lack of repose. When the groups had become better known through their removal to London, they excited general admiration even among the best artists, and they have effected a complete revolution in our conception of ancient art. It is they which have taught us what Greek art really was. In the metopes, as was natural and usual in the case of sculpture confined to a limited space, were represented combats between gods and giants, Lapithae and Centaurs, Athenians and Amazons, and Greeks and Trojans. A few of them are in London, and the rest *in situ*. The frieze, which is in low relief, gives an ideal presentation (the preliminaries and the actual procession are intermingled) of the Panathenaic procession, with the gods as spectators. The portrayal of noble and graceful movement is here seen in perfection. We have a series of figures in sitting, walking, and carrying attitudes, men in chariots and men on horseback, some stationary and others at a gallop. All the space is so well utilized that there is no crowding and no gaps, a point in which modern artists, even of the first rank, are not always successful. Even the repetition of similar movements does not produce a monotonous effect. Thus in the pediment groups of the Parthenon we have examples of great scenes of concentrated dramatic interest, in the metopes small animated pictures, and in the frieze a model of a continuous and, so to speak, epically flowing narrative. In the pediment groups we think we can see not only the spirit but also the hand of Phidias, whereas it is supposed that the master left the metopes and frieze to be executed by his pupils. But the great gold and ivory statue of the Parthenos in the cella, of which we can obtain an idea

from imperfect copies that have come down to us, was certainly from his hand alone.⁶ The goddess was represented standing, with her left foot slightly drawn back. In her outstretched right hand, which probably rested on a column, she carried a winged Nike; her left hand grasped her spear and at the same time rested upon the upper rim of her shield, which stood on the ground, with a Gorgon's head in the centre. The pedestal, the sandals of the goddess, and the shield were decorated with sculptures; on the shield, among the figures of a combat with Amazons, were the portraits of Pericles and of Phidias himself. The statue was unveiled before the admiring eyes of the Athenians, allies and foreigners, in the year 438, at the festival of the Panathenaea. The temple was used for the worship of its goddess for more than seven centuries, and was converted into a Christian church, dedicated to the Theotokos, the Mother of God, probably in the fifth century A.D. In the year 1687 the centre was destroyed by a Venetian bomb. Most of the sculptures were removed by Lord Elgin to England at the beginning of the century. They were purchased by the State and placed in the British Museum.

The Acropolis having thus received its chief temple, had also to be provided with a worthy entrance portal.⁷ Cimon had treated it as a fortress; Pericles deprived it of this character. The construction of the Long Walls had made a fortified position inside Athens superfluous. A fortified Acropolis was apt to give rise to the suspicion that the statesman in power contemplated a *tyrannis*. As the abode of the goddess it was sufficiently protected by religion, and so there was no reason why it should not have a grand entrance instead of a fortified approach. The Propylaea were erected near the summit at the edge of the plateau. How the lower end at the beginning of the ascent was arranged we do not know. The Propylaea were probably built in the years 437-32 by the architect Mnesicles. The exterior resembled a

temple fronted by six columns, and flanked to the right and left by projecting buildings, between the corner pillars of which three columns faced the central approach. The building on the north side served as a Pinacotheca. The southern wing was not so deep as the northern; its expansion was hindered by the close proximity of the little temple of Nike Apteros, which projected to the west, and had to be provided with an entrance. This temple was quite small, 5 to 5½ metres; in 1835 it was re-erected from the remains of it found in a Turkish bastion. Most of the frieze, which represents assemblies of the gods and combats, has been preserved. But in point of beauty it does not equal the reliefs on the parapet which runs round the corner of the rock. The latter present goddesses of victory erecting trophies and leading animals to the sacrifice. The traveller who lingers on the plateau west of the temple of Nike, gazes over a wide expanse of land and sea—Eleusis, Salamis, the mountains of Megara, the Acrocorinthus, the Saronic Gulf, Aegina, and even the island of Hydrea, which lies south of the long promontory of the Argolic Acte. From this spot it was easy to watch all hostile movements directed against Athens; it was, therefore, a fitting place for an Athene Nike, who could survey the territory placed under her protection, and descry from afar her perpetual rival, Aphrodite, on the rocky citadel of Corinth.

As regards the fourth important building upon the Acropolis, the Erechtheum, there is no record of its having been begun in the time of Pericles; but the remains show that it was built in the spirit of that age, although perhaps somewhat later. The site, on which Athene was worshipped jointly with Erechtheus as protectress of the city (Polias), was formerly occupied by buildings of a similar kind, the external appearance of which is unknown to us; the earlier Parthenon had been erected close by. The Erechtheum was the oldest shrine on the citadel. Here stood the olive-tree which Athene had called into existence in the course of her strife

with Poseidon. The Erechtheum as it appears to-day seems not to have been completed till the end of the Peloponnesian War. Its shape is irregular ; the main building runs east and west, and at the western end two colonnades form wings to the north and south. The architecture is of the Ionic order. The porch of the Caryatides, which abuts on the south-western corner, is specially famous ; the roof is supported by six female figures instead of pillars, resting on a breastwork of masonry ; since the revival of the study of Greek architecture they have often served as a model for loggias. In the neighbourhood of the Erechtheum were also worshipped Poseidon, Hephaestus, the hero Butes, and the daughters of Cecrops, Pandrosos, and Aglauros ; a grotto was dedicated to the last-named, which is still to be seen. The Erechtheum was the abode of the chief priestess of Athene ; in an adjacent precinct dwelt other priestesses of the goddess, the Arrephorae.

Just as the Acropolis with its monuments—and there were many smaller ones besides those described, especially statues—formed a splendid offering from the Athenians and their allies to their chief divinity, so the Festival of the Panathenaea constituted the most brilliant display of the reverence of the citizens for the goddess. It was celebrated every year, with special splendour every fourth year, when it was called the Great Panathenaea. An important part of the proceedings was the contests, the oldest of which was equestrian in character (to a certain extent a sign of the connection of the cult of Poseidon with that of Athene) ; then came the gymnastic, and lastly the musical contest. This last was instituted by Pericles, recitations of the Homeric poems having formerly taken place at the same festival. It consisted of singing and playing on the flute and the cithara. For these performances Pericles built the Odeum, near the theatre of Bacchus, supposed to be an imitation of the tent of Xerxes which fell into the hands of the Greeks, with a number of pillars inside, and a roof made of the masts and yards of

Persian ships. No remains of this building can now be seen. There are, however, ruins of a much later Odeum in Athens, that of Herodes Atticus, which was more like a theatre, and in the style of the buildings generally called Odeia, which differed from theatres only in being roofed in.

The victors in the musical and especially the theatrical competitions, in which the object was to form and train a chorus, generally received a tripod for a prize; they did not, however, keep them in their own houses, but dedicated them to a deity and set them up in a public place. Many such tripods stood on the road leading from the theatre of Dionysus eastward round the citadel to the north; they were erected on special bases or pedestals planned and decorated on a more or less grand scale, one of which has come down to us, the monument of Lysicrates, dating from the fourth century.

But the most remarkable feature of the festival of the Great Panathenaea was the procession which has been immortalized in the frieze on the Parthenon. On that occasion the citizens of both sexes and the other male and female inhabitants of Athens presented to their tutelary goddess a new robe woven and embroidered by Athenian maidens; at a later period it was carried on a machine in the form of a ship, over which it floated like a sail. It was hung round the statue of Athene Polias. A great sacrifice made at this festival provided the citizens of Athens with a welcome meal off the meat of the many oxen that were slaughtered.

To the north-west of the Acropolis and north of the Areopagus or hill of Ares, lay the market-place of Athens, commanded on the west by the temple which is generally called the Theseum.⁸ In this market-place and its environs the public life of the Athenian citizens was spent. It was divided into two parts, each used for a different purpose: a southern half, which was the scene of the political life of the city, and a northern half, reserved for trade and commerce. At the western end of the former stood two fine porticoes,

the King's court and the Stoa Eleutherios, which was decorated with pictures of the twelve gods, and the temple of Apollo Patrous; farther south were the Metroum, containing the state-archives, the Council Hall (*βουλευτήριον*), the round building called Tholos, in which the Prytanes dined, the Strategeum or office of the Strategi, the statues of the heroes of the ten Phylae, the statues of the tyrannicides, and on the eastern side, opposite the two first-mentioned halls, the Poikile, to which we referred in a former chapter. From the King's court and the Poikile there extended a famous row of Hermae, we cannot tell exactly in what direction. The northern half of the market-place was occupied by shops; on its eastern side King Attalus II. built a Stoa, the remains of which still exist. This piazza was filled with a motley throng, especially in the forenoon. In and around the porticoes on the south side could be seen all who were engaged in the law-courts sitting there, people who wanted an interview with members of the Council or had business with the Strategi; the northern side, on the other hand, was the resort of those who had purchases to make or who had dealings with merchants. All kinds of merchandise were offered for sale in booths made of wicker-work; the money-changers sat there, with all the current coins exposed to view on their tables. Idlers strolled about in every direction. The meeting-place of the Assembly, the Pnyx, was farther to the south, that is to say, if, as we believe, it is the spot which has long been so considered, a bit of high ground to the south of the Areopagus, where we can still see the rocky projection which may have served as a platform for the orators. To the north-west of the market-place a road called Dromos, flanked by colonnades, led to the main gate of Athens, the Dipylon, outside which stretched the great cemetery of the Athenians, with the graves of many famous warriors and statesmen, among them those of Solon and Pericles. In this quarter, which formed the Demos Ceramicos, many tombs have been

recently discovered, the sculptures of which have contributed valuable material for the history of art. The Attic sepulchral reliefs of the fifth century are extremely attractive by reason of their simple beauty. In this direction the road led to the Academy and to Colonus.

If the principal object of Athenian art, to which we now return, was the glorification of the goddess of the city, the other deities were not neglected, some of the tripods, for instance, being gifts to Bacchus. We shall see shortly that Dionysus was worshipped at Athens in another way, but as we are discussing sculpture, we must mention here what was done in honour of Demeter. The great Athenian artists were required by Pericles to exert their skill on behalf of Eleusis as well as Athens.⁹ The remains of the sacred buildings of Eleusis are not nearly so imposing as those on the Acropolis of Athens. Still the excavations which have been recently carried out prove that the sacred precinct of the city of Demeter contained buildings of a very peculiar character. There were outer Propylaea, the ground-plan of which reminds us of those at Athens, and smaller ones inside, which stood at an oblique angle to the former. It would appear that the secrets of the worship required a variety of irregular barriers between them and the outer world. The temple of the Mysteries itself was begun by Ictinus, but the building progressed very slowly; the outside portico facing the south-east was added in the fourth century by the architect Philo. The temple was almost a square, divided by forty-two columns into a number of separate naves (there were six rows of seven pillars), and surrounded by seven tiers of seats; evidently it was intended that a considerable number of people should assist at the rites which were performed inside. A beautiful relief found at Eleusis, representing Demeter, Core, and a youth, gives us a satisfactory idea of the art of the fifth century as influenced by the worship at Eleusis.

But there are other fine examples of the Attic art of the

Periclean age. The promontory of Sunium was crowned by the temple of Athene, nine columns of which are still preserved. The sculptures of the temple are much damaged. Cape Kolónnais, as Sunium is now called on account of the columns, is, however, visited chiefly for its noble view, which extends as far as the island of Melos. Another temple, of which the ruins still exist, is that of the Nemesis in Rhamnus, a place to the north of Marathon. The statue of the goddess is said to have been chiselled by Phidias or Agoracritus out of a block of Parian marble which the Persians had brought to Marathon as material for their trophy of victory. Still more famous than Agoracritus was the Lemnian Alcamenes, who is mentioned above in connection with Olympia, and to whom is attributed a standing Discobolus of which many replicas are extant. Outside Attica the temple of Bassae near Phigalia in the Peloponnese belongs to the Attic art of this period. It was built by Ictinus, amid grand mountain scenery not far from the Ionian Sea, in honour of Apollo Epicurius, and, as is alleged, on the occasion of the Great Plague of 430 and 429. The arrangement of the interior, with the niches marked off by three-quarter columns, is remarkable. In 1811 a frieze, now in the British Museum, was found there, giving an animated picture of combats with Amazons.

Phidias is supposed to have been a pupil of the Argive school. This school, however, was not without successors in Argos. The greatest fellow-pupil of Phidias, Polyclitus, was an Argive, belonging to a family of artists, his father being probably the sculptor Patrocles, and his brothers the artists Naucydes and Daedalus. Polyclitus created a type of the youthful male figure, which was afterwards regarded as a canon of art until Lysippus introduced other rules. His standard work, of which copies have come down to us, was called the *Doryphoros*. Another youthful type created by Polyclitus was the *Diadymenos*, the boy putting a bandage

over his eyes ; a famous type of Amazon was also attributed to him. Lastly, Polyclitus was the author of the classic figure of Hera, the tutelary goddess of Argos ; her gold and ivory statue was a companion to the Zeus of Phidias. Like the latter, Hera was represented sitting upon a throne, her outstretched right hand holding a pomegranate, and the left resting on her sceptre. We have copies of the statue and the head on Argive coins. For the rest, the Sicynic-Argive school was largely occupied with making statues of victors.¹⁰ We have referred to the painting of this period in Chapter xii.

In addition to Athens and eastern Greece, we find art in a high state of perfection in Sicily, as is proved by the remains still extant, although they are almost exclusively of an architectural character. First and foremost come the two great temples at Selinus and Acragas, the huge dimensions and rich sculptured decoration of which excited the universal admiration of the ancients. Two other Acragantine temples in a better state of preservation are remarkable for their beauty of form. The ruins of Selinus and Acragas are among the grandest of the ancient world ; Selinus especially, which was destroyed in 409 B.C. and never completely rebuilt, shows, as no other city does, what Greek architecture could achieve in the fifth century. The date of the imposing temples of Poseidonia (Paestum) is not easy to determine ; those of Metapontum, which are in an inferior state of preservation, probably belong to the fifth century.

Many other public works, intended for useful and not for artistic purposes, were constructed at Athens in the fifth century. Among them were the aqueducts and drainage-conduits planned by the famous astronomer Meton, the walls extending from the city to the Piræus, and the rebuilding of the town of Piræus itself.¹¹ We know that two long walls had already been built between Athens and the Piræus. But this was not sufficient for Pericles. The southern wall extended to the promontory of Phalerum, and thus embraced

the whole roadstead of that name. An enemy might land here, and in that case they would be inside the long walls. The simplest mode of remedying this would have been to build a wall round the Bay of Phalerum. Pericles, however, preferred to construct a wall parallel to and not far from the northern wall up to the northern point of the Bay of Phalerum. The two walls were only about 600 yards apart, and could be defended by a small force. The old (Phalerum) south wall was then allowed to fall into ruins. In this way the Piraeus became the only harbour of Athens. Warehouses for trade purposes were erected there, among them a building called *Deigma*, situated in the free port, in which samples of goods were exhibited. The town of Piraeus was planned by Hippodamus of Miletus, to whom we refer below; it was built in a perfectly regular manner like Thurii. The traffic between Athens and its port now became very brisk, the arsenal and the whole trade of Athens being in the Piraeus. The short distance, some four or five miles, was not unfrequently traversed by pedestrians.

We now leave the requirements of practical life, and return to the ideal sphere of religion and poetry. If the goddess Athene ennobled every aspect of Athenian culture, the worship of Dionysus bore fruit, in one respect at least, in its influence on literature. The drama was an offshoot of the Dionysia, and its first great representative was Aeschylus, whom we have discussed above. We propose, as before, to deal only with tragedy at this stage, reserving the discussion of comedy for the period of the Peloponnesian War.

Sophocles was the tragedian of the Periclean age.¹² He was born in 496 in the deme of Colonus near Athens. He was leader of the boys' chorus which recited the festal ode at the celebration of the victory off Salamis. At the age of twenty-eight, in the year 468, he defeated his rival Aeschylus, and from that time he enjoyed the constant favour of his fellow-citizens. The intimate terms on which he stood with Pericles

led to his becoming strategus; we find him acting in this capacity in the Samian War, and continuing in camp the life of an Athenian man of pleasure, which drew down upon him a reprimand from Pericles. His quarrel with his son Iophon is legendary. The story is that Iophon endeavoured to have his father placed under restraint in his old age, and that thereupon Sophocles convinced the judges of his unimpaired sanity by reading aloud his unpublished *Oedipus Coloneus*. He died in 406 B.C., and thus lived to see the star of his native land gradually set.

Sophocles abandoned the Aeschylean use of the trilogy, *i.e.* the connection of the subject-matter of three consecutive tragedies. He was therefore obliged to give each separate drama a more marked internal unity. In scenic externals he did not advance much beyond his predecessor's innovations, except that he constantly made use of a third performer, and so gave the action a greater semblance of life. The chorus does not take so active a part in the dramas of Sophocles as in those of Aeschylus, but it endeavours to grasp the spiritual significance of the subject which forms the basis of the piece, and indulges in moral reflections remarkable alike for beauty of form and for refined wisdom. It was not the aim of Sophocles to represent man as simply succumbing to his destiny; the conflict was to be solved in a more spiritual fashion, by the *dramatis personae* arriving at the conviction that self-will and one-sided obstinacy on the part of individuals do not meet with the approval of the gods. Sophocles is one of the greatest masters of the technique of the drama, *i.e.* of the art with which the picture of life is presented to the spectator. Competent judges have asserted that he applies the principal rules of dramatic construction with admirable accuracy and judgment, and that as regards enhancement of interest, climax and *dénoûment* he is even now rarely equalled.

Sophocles is said to have composed more than a hundred

dramas, among which were several Satyric plays. Only seven tragedies have come down to us. Of these the *Antigone*, which was performed with great success for the first time in 442, takes the first place. The plot, the gradual progress of the interest, and the consistent development of character are all of a high order. The contrast between the unjust stubbornness of the king and the self-sacrificing constancy of Antigone is extremely well drawn, while the punishment of Creon by the death of his son forms a just conclusion. In the *Electra* stress is laid on the hatred of the daughter for the mother, while suspense is heightened by the device which makes Electra believe for some time that her brother is dead. In the *Oedipus Tyrannus* we see ruin gathering around the head of the king, who hastens his destruction by his own impatience. The *Oedipus Coloneus* presents the closing scenes of the Oedipus legend in a manner flattering to the glory of Athens. The blind king, led by his daughter Antigone, enters as a suppliant the sacred grove of the Eumenides at Colonus, to which ordinary mortals are denied access. In Thebes it has been discovered that his absence is a misfortune for the city, and the Thebans want to bring him back thither by force. Creon and Polynices represent the Thebans, who are united on this point alone. Oedipus refuses to follow them, and Theseus himself, the ruler of Athens, protects him against threats of violence. He dies on Attic soil, which is blessed by the reception accorded to him. In the *Ajax* we have a hero who, puffed up by an overweening sense of his own importance, commits in his blind frenzy an act of folly which makes him an object of ridicule, and punishes himself by taking his own life. In the *Philoctetes* the delineation of character is of rare merit. The hero is summoned to Troy, because without his bow the city cannot be taken, but he refuses to go. Odysseus and Neoptolemus manage to entice him on board ship on the pretext of taking him to his native land. On the strength of this Philoctetes entrusts his bow

to Neoptolemus, and Odysseus gets possession of it. Without the bow he cannot support life on the desert island, and so he is obliged to follow them. But the young Neoptolemus is touched by the misery of the sufferer, and gives him back his weapon. Troy, therefore, would not have fallen had not Heracles appeared as *deus ex machina*, and altered the hero's determination. The weakest play is the *Trachiniae*, in which the death of Heracles is represented.

It will not be amiss here, now that we are engaged in estimating the value of the greatest of the Greek tragedians, to add a few general remarks on the nature of Greek tragedy and the points in which it differs from modern tragedy. In this way the historical importance of the former will appear all the more clearly.¹³ The origin, the aim, the external conditions, and the ideal significance of Greek tragedy are all of a thoroughly peculiar character. The first three belong entirely to the domain of history, it is only on the fourth that the ideals which floated before the minds of individual poets have exercised a decisive influence. Greek tragedy had its origin in a development of lyrical recitation, and its aim was the glorification of the gods. The principal external condition is the division of the persons on the stage into two sharply-defined bodies—a sympathizing group which expresses its sentiments in lyric form, and the actors who carry on the dialogue, these last being fewer in number, three or at most four. The case is quite different with the modern drama, which had its rise in the Middle Ages. Like the Greek, it was associated with religion, but the Christian drama was never an essential part of divine worship and soon lost all connection with it. It was not an expansion of lyric recital, but a direct and intentional representation of animated action. Consequently the modern drama was able to do full justice to the varied aspects of real life, especially as it was from the outset unrestricted in regard to the number of actors. It was better equipped than the Greek drama for the performance of

the task which presents itself to every dramatist, the art of constructing and unravelling a plot. For how frequently it happens that the development of an incident requires the active co-operation of more than four persons. In his *Iphigenia* and *Tasso*, which have little resemblance to the variety of actual life, Goethe sometimes puts five persons on the stage in one scene. The omission of all situations of this kind, or the evasion of them by some means or other, was a necessary consequence of the Greek system, the application of which required perhaps more ingenuity than our own, but certainly imposed greater limitations on the art of holding the mirror up to nature. The Attic stage was of moderate depth, and was occupied by three or at the most four persons, holding a measured dialogue, and always together in full sight of the audience. The modern stage is a deep one, sometimes full of a crowd of people, from which individual actors detach themselves as occasion requires and engage in separate action, or even in conflict, with one another, rejoining the original group if need be for a shorter or longer space of time, just as in real life. The Greek stage corresponds to the plastic art, the modern one to painting. For the drama in the modern sense of the word, conceived as a picture of life, the chorus is not only an entirely unnecessary but in most cases a disturbing and even inadmissible element. The moral aim of tragedy is no doubt as prominent in the Greek drama as in the modern. But we must bear in mind that the moral ideal of antiquity was not quite the same as our own, and especially that many refinements of feeling, which are natural to us, were unknown to the ancients. This is why even Sophocles' tragedies contain much that sounds discordant in our ears. Individual passages which strike us as particularly strange may have been interpolated by later writers, but even in that case it was done in antiquity, and at any rate was not repugnant to the sentiments of the majority. There is another point to which we may call attention here, the

tendency of the poets to introduce verbal quibbles on the stage. In the first place, it was part of the Greek and especially the Athenian character to enjoy displays of this kind, and secondly, the tendency was encouraged and fostered by the constantly increasing popularity of rhetoric at Athens in the fifth century. The Greeks in fact did not want to witness action on the stage, but to listen to speeches, to hear the expression of the mind. There can be no doubt also that the dialogue of the Greek stage was not intended simply to represent the dialogue of real life, but, like the choral odes and lengthy narratives, rather to serve as a test of ingenuity.

Greek tragedy to us is represented wholly by its three great masters, the third of whom, Euripides, we shall discuss in the next period. Among the others whose works have not come down to us, we may mention Ion of Chios, celebrated for his poems of a different kind and for other writings, the Eretrian Achæus, and Agathon, who is of a somewhat later date, and is known to fame through Plato's Symposium.

Regular theatres, as far as we know them from their remains, were not built until the second half of the fourth century B.C. Before that date the stage does not appear to have been really separated from the *orchestra*, or dancing-place.¹⁴

Our reason for postponing the discussion of the third great tragic poet until the next period is not that he was a generation younger than Sophocles, for he died shortly before him. But the character of his poetic creations is different. He is the representative of a new order of culture to be described later on, which had great influence in the last three decades of the fifth century, especially at Athens. This new culture, however, had been to a great extent prepared in the Periclean age by certain intellectual tendencies which originated mostly in Asia Minor. The Ionian cities were still the wealthiest and the most flourishing of the Athenian naval

league, and they continued to produce distinguished scholars and artists. But these men did not remain in their native country. They felt attracted by the brilliancy of Athens as by some magic power, and they brought with them Ionic currents of civilization. These Ionic ideas, however, contained more of a personal element than was pleasing to Athenians of the old-fashioned stamp, and hence everything which their authors imported into Athens did not receive a warm welcome there.

Ionic philosophy had hitherto endeavoured to find the primary element of the universe, but there was no field for further discovery in this direction. It was possible, however, to strike out a new line, in which not so much importance was attached to matter itself as to the force which imparts to it motion and change. This was done by Anaxagoras of Clazomenae.¹⁵ Anaxagoras' conception was that of a primary matter, containing a chaotic medley of diversified elements. Into this chaos form and order are brought by another principle, endowed with life and reason, to which he gives the name of *νοῦς* (the word usually signified *intellect*). The *νοῦς* effects this by means of a circular movement, which is present in matter from the beginning, but manifests itself with gradually increasing energy, and gives shape to the separate entities by a process of separation and conjunction. This formation of the universe is continued to infinity. Anaxagoras went to Athens, where he became intimate with Pericles, and exercised some influence on the great statesman. He also influenced other Athenians of note, such as Euripides and Thucydides. He was obliged, however, to leave Athens before the death of Pericles, on account of a charge of atheism. The Athenians were very zealous for the maintenance of their peculiarities, of which pietism was one; when these were in question, they would not submit even to a Pericles. Anaxagoras had to learn this by experience. But the fact that Pericles was unable to protect him was due to political party intrigues. As

a statesman Pericles was obnoxious to many Athenians, and to be a *protégé* of his was to incur their hatred. Others accepted him as a statesman, but disliked his philosophic and foreign surroundings. Thus Pericles had two categories of opponents, who possessed considerable power, yet were not always united; but if they did join forces, they became doubly dangerous both to Pericles and his friends. In any case Pericles suffered from the aversion which many people had to the Ionic culture, while in the same way philosophy was a loser by the dislike which others felt for the statesman who governed Athens.

The culture of Ionia was materially promoted in Athens by Aspasia of Miletus,¹⁶ the consort of Pericles. She was famous for her beauty and not less so for her wit: she is said to have been specially skilled in the art of oratory, and in the dialogue *Menexenus* ascribed to Plato, Socrates is made to state that he once heard her deliver a masterly oration. It was consequently asserted in Athens that Pericles derived his oratorical powers from Aspasia. There was of course exaggeration and a shade of irony in this. A third quality for which she was distinguished was her sound judgment in household matters; this is why Xenophon quotes her in discussing the question of how to train a young woman to be a good housewife. The combination of all these qualities made her admirably fitted for the position which she occupied. She was the centre of life in the home of Pericles, and in the social circle which gathered there, the chief ornaments of which were artists and scholars. In it we find the philosophers Anaxagoras, Zeno the Eleatic, Protagoras, Socrates, the historian Herodotus and probably Thucydides, the poet Sophocles, the artists Phidias, Ictinus, Callicrates and Mnesicles, the highly-cultured Hippodamus, to whom we shall refer shortly, the musician Damon, who also took a great interest in politics and was even said to have been the political mentor of Pericles,¹⁷ the seer Lampon, and many others.

Thus Aspasia did much to smooth the path for the devotees of free intellectual development in Athens. Whether she was also her companion's adviser in affairs of state cannot now be determined. Pericles, it is true, did not need the instigation of Aspasia to make him espouse the cause of Miletus, but the native of that city certainly did not attempt to dissuade him from the expedition against Samos. That she exercised an improper influence on the course of Athenian politics was no doubt stated in antiquity, but is not susceptible of proof. But this is only a fraction of the calumnies which attached to her name. She was beautiful, clever, the confidant of the first statesman in Athens—and a foreigner—that was enough to justify every imaginable slander. The comic poets started with calumnies, the learned men of antiquity, who had a greater respect for writing than many moderns have for print, and recorded as a fact everything that had ever been said by any one, gave further currency to the gossip, while modern scholarship, which for a long period of time consisted of the compilation of every available statement, affixed the seal of its assent to the evil reputation of the fair Milesian. It is only in modern days that great pains have been taken to construct one of those rehabilitations, which she deserves far more than many a tyrant of antiquity who has been the object of similar attempts. Of course we must not push the legitimate reaction against the gossip of antiquity too far, and try to make Aspasia into a Roman matron of the good old times. The manners and customs of ancient Greece were not the same as ours or as those of Rome in her early days. If Pericles formed a connection with a beautiful foreigner who associated with the most gifted inhabitants of the most intellectual city of Greece, it is probable that much reached her ears which would offend us in the present day. But this does not warrant the conclusion that Aspasia was a woman of easy virtue. If it is difficult enough to obtain a clear idea of the details recorded in modern memoirs, how can

we expect to succeed in the case of Greeks of the fifth century B.C.?

Ionia also produced a man of original mind, Hippodamus of Miletus, an architect and philosopher, whom we have already mentioned and who distinguished himself in various branches of intellectual life.¹⁸ He is chiefly famous for having laid out several new cities on a regular plan. He is credited with having planned the Piræus, Thurii and Rhodes. Rhodes was laid out in the year 408, and Thurii in 446, according to Diodorus. The active career of Hippodamus was thus of considerable length. His cities were divided into rectangular blocks by streets intersecting each other at right angles. Here again we see the influence of the oriental studies which were carried on at Miletus; a model for a plan of this kind was to be found in the great cities of the East, such as Babylon. It is usually assumed that this mode of laying out cities was a novelty for the Greeks of that age. But this is a mistake. Selinus, as its ruins show, had already been planned in the same way, to this extent at least that it had two main streets intersecting each other at right angles, and the Campanian Naples exhibits clear traces of this regular design on a large scale. We thus see that new Greek cities had been actually laid out in the same fashion before the fifth century, and Hippodamus' sole claim to distinction in this respect was that he enjoyed the opportunity of applying the old method to places of great importance in an era of advanced civilization. The fact that he was also a philosopher and writer contributed to his fame. And here, too, he was a devotee of mathematical regularity of construction. He maintained that the proper number of men for a city (he must have meant citizens) was 10,000, and that they should be divided into three classes, artists (artizans), agriculturists, and warriors. In like manner the soil was to be divided into three parts—sacred ground, state property for the maintenance of the warriors, and private property for the agriculturists. The

artizans would consequently have been under the control of the priests. Hippodamus was never able to put his socialistic ideas to a practical test.

If Ionia proper sent the Athenians Anaxagoras, Ion, Hippodamus and Aspasia, Athens and the whole of Greece were indebted for the greatest historian of the age, Herodotus, to Halicarnassus, which, although originally Dorian, was permeated by Ionic civilization.¹⁹

Herodotus was born between 490 and 480, at a time when Halicarnassus, as well as Cos, Nisyros and Calydna were governed, under the suzerainty of Persia, by the Artemisia who proved her good sense and energy at the battle of Salamis. He had a near relative in Panyasis, who revived epic poetry with much taste, and was even placed on a footing of comparison with Homer. Panyasis evidently exercised some influence on the education of Herodotus and his conception of the world. For not only does Herodotus always show his attachment to the old beliefs of the Hellenes and his respect for the oracles,—which reminds us that Panyasis was called an interpreter of omens,—but Panyasis celebrated the exploits of Heracles, the great knight-errant of antiquity, and Herodotus' chief study was the origin of the spread of peoples, customs, and religions over the face of the earth. The childhood of Herodotus corresponded to the period of the greatest victories of the Greeks, and they permanently moulded his views of life. Halicarnassus did not throw off the Persian yoke so quickly as many of its inhabitants may have wished. The descendants of Artemisia continued to rule there for a considerable time. Panyasis and Herodotus fled to Samos, whence they made attempts to liberate their native city, in one of which Panyasis lost his life. Subsequently Herodotus in conjunction with others drove out the tyrant Lygdamis, but he did not stay long in his native city. He undertook extensive journeys. He possessed the genuine Ionic curiosity which had already been of such advantage to the

Greeks. Although he showed a preference for Athens, he did not reside permanently even there, but went to Thurii, where he died, before the outbreak of the war between Athens and Syracuse. He may have started on some of his travels from Halicarnassus; some he undertook from Athens, and others from Thurii. He explored the interior of Asia as far as Assyria, and visited Egypt and Cyrene and the shores of the Pontus. These travels are known to us from occasional remarks of his own; but grounds of internal probability are our only warrant for concluding that his acquaintance with Italy was confined to Magna Graecia, and that he went to Sicily. The result of his convictions, his reading, his journeys, and his personal inquiries was his great history, the work of his life. We find in it allusions to incidents in the first part of the Peloponnesian War; but as a whole it was finished much earlier, although he was constantly occupied in giving finishing touches to it. There is nothing to prove that it was published long before the close of his life, but it was known throughout the whole of Greece at an early date that Herodotus was engaged on such a work, and in what spirit he was composing it, while portions of the history were communicated by him to the Greeks. Thus at Olympia he read aloud passages from it to the Greeks who had gathered for the festival, and he made it known specially to the Athenians, who are said to have given him a reward of honour of ten talents, on the motion of Anytus. He was closely connected with Pericles, whom he once mentions in terms of the highest respect. If in spite of all this he was disinclined to take up his permanent residence in Athens, the main reason must have been that distant countries had a special attraction for him.

The history of Herodotus is one of the most perfect works of art of its kind, in plan and execution, in thought and style. It has all the qualities of a work of art—harmony of subject-matter and form, no useless prolixity, and no undue

brevity. According to all that we know it is as far removed from the work of the Logographers as from the later historical writings of the ancients. There is a very great difference in nearly every respect between Herodotus and his immediate successor, Thucydides. At the commencement of his work Herodotus styles it "*ἱστορίας ἀπόδειξις*," and the word inquiry, *ἱστορία*, has since become the designation of the whole species. As a matter of fact he investigated everything in the sphere of life and action that can interest mankind, that is to say, everything real, and not the subjects which had attracted the philosophers of Ionia, such as the origin of being; he had no taste for speculations of this kind. In other respects the past and the present are equally interesting to him. He combines history and geography, and he does so for a reason inherent in the subject, because his work represents a great contrast of a historical and geographical nature, the contrast between Europe and Asia, between Hellenes and Barbarians. This antithesis found its most marked expression in the wars of Darius and Xerxes against Hellas, and it was these wars especially that Herodotus set himself to relate. But he planned his history on as comprehensive a scale as possible, and consequently began with the earlier phases of the struggle. One peculiarity of the work of Herodotus, the exhaustive way in which he describes the manners and customs of the Barbarians, is due to the object which he had in view. He did not write for mankind in general or for posterity, but for the Greeks of his own time. He described the East with such accuracy in order that his contemporaries might know what it was like; it never entered into his head to describe the Greeks in the same fashion, for they of course were acquainted with their own ways. In Herodotus Greek life is indirectly revealed to the reader by means of the contrast it presents to that of the East.

The plan of the work is remarkable for the artistic way in which description and narrative are interwoven; such a com-

plicated task has perhaps never been so successfully accomplished. We are never wearied by too much of the one or of the other. In the development of his plan Herodotus starts with the Lydians, who subdued the Greek towns on the coast, and consequently he proceeds to relate their history. The Lydians are conquered by the Persians, which leads to the history of the Persians. Directly the Persians have subdued an important country with peculiar characteristics, Herodotus seizes the opportunity to describe it. In this way he deals with Babylon in the first Book, while the second is devoted to Egypt, and the third again is of a historical character. It records the history of Cambyses and of the false Smerdis, and the accession of Darius to the throne, and makes us acquainted with the division of the Persian kingdom into satrapies. The Persians do not rest content with the mainland, they obtain possession of Samos, and thus encroach in the direction of the islands. Darius then turns his attention to the west and the north. He plans a campaign against the Scythians, whose customs and country Herodotus describes in detail in the fourth Book. Darius has to return from Scythia without accomplishing his purpose, but his generals conquer Thrace and subdue Macedonia and Cyrene in the south. The last-named country is discussed in detail here, whereas he says nothing of Macedonia—an indication of the public which Herodotus had in his mind, and of what he assumed to be well known. The Macedonians of course are a section of the Greek people in his eyes. This brings us into the fifth Book, and to the narrative of the Ionian revolt, which is continued into the sixth. Upon the occasion of the appeal of Aristagoras, Herodotus discusses the relations between Sparta and Athens, but only so far as they throw light on and explain the political situation at that time. The Persians now attempt to subjugate Greece. The first expedition of Mardonius fails: Herodotus relates the quarrels which took place in Sparta in consequence of the rivalry between

Demaratus and Cleomenes ; then follows the expedition of Datis and Artaphernes and the glorious battle of Marathon. The government of Persia passes into the hands of Xerxes, who plans and carries out his gigantic campaign. The narrative of this is prolonged through the last books. The history of Herodotus is not unfinished, as many have supposed. Herodotus has given a full account of the Persian Wars, so far as they are connected with the expedition of Xerxes. For apart from this point of view they had no real end, as an actual peace was never concluded. The absence of any statement by Herodotus at the close that the work was finished, does not prove that it is incomplete. If he had dealt with the following years, he would have had to describe the offensive campaigns of the Greeks, which had an entirely different character. The epic had come to an end.

As a composition Herodotus' history has been compared to the Homeric poems, and the comparison holds good especially in the case of the *Odyssey*. Both in the *Odyssey* and in Herodotus, the first main division of the work takes us over land and sea, while in the second a great conflict is decided and the wicked intruders are vanquished after a sanguinary struggle. Themistocles has a good deal of the crafty Odysseus, who is not a bad representative of a prominent side of the Greek character. Herodotus' work also closes very appropriately with the conquest of Sestos, where an arrogant Persian meets with condign punishment.

There is still something to be said regarding Herodotus' connection with Athens. He had a high opinion of Pericles, as is shown by a passage in the sixth Book. But this is no reason for crediting him, as is often done, with a prepossession in favour of the Alcmaeonidae, whose eponymous ancestor is made to cut a poor figure in the history. Herodotus was more impartial than has often been supposed. But he rendered Athens greater service than generally seems to be

admitted. At any rate sufficient attention has not been directed to the importance of the following facts.

The history of Herodotus must have possessed a special practical importance for the Athenians. Athens had become the rallying-point of every Greek who was conscious of antagonism to Persia, but she had not yet done with Persia by any means. We must transport ourselves here into the period following the conclusion of the Thirty Years' Peace with Sparta (445), for it is really for this period that the history of Herodotus was written. With the commencement of the Peloponnesian War the Athenians are seriously confronted with the problem of self-preservation, but before the conflict with Sparta assumed an intense form, they entertained plans for extension in an easterly direction. This being so, it was of the highest importance to have accurate knowledge of the countries and peoples with which they had to deal there. Herodotus endeavoured to meet this want, and no one else was capable of doing it in so efficient a manner. It was very important for the Athenians to be acquainted with the resources, the mode of government, and the history of the Persian empire, and Herodotus gave satisfactory information on all these points. Besides this there were special parts of the empire and countries bordering on it which had a particular interest for the Athenians; Herodotus gave a description of them. How keen the interest which the Athenians took in Egypt was for a considerable time, and how many thousand Athenians and allies must have found their way there! It is true that after the death of Cimon attempts at direct interference in Egyptian affairs were given up by the Athenians. But they might be resumed, and so it was still very useful for the Athenians to obtain detailed information from Herodotus respecting the history and the manners and customs of Egypt. There was another still more important district far away to the north. What was the character and appearance of the regions which supplied Athens with grain

and fish, the articles of commerce the sale of which was a source of wealth? Herodotus answered this question for the Athenians. We should have been glad if he had taken the opportunity to give a detailed account of the Greek colonies of the Pontus as well, to relate their history and describe their peculiarities; but he did not do so because it was not his object to tell the Greeks of things which they knew already. The ten talents given him by Athens were certainly not intended as a reward for the praise which he bestowed on them. A wreath would have been the appropriate recompense for this. They made him the present because he had spent more than this amount in their interests. The long journeys which he undertook must have cost him a great deal of money, and it may be assumed that the contents of his book, which were intended for the Greeks in general, was not the only information which he had obtained concerning matters which had a particular interest for the Athenians. He must have learnt much that was of great value for them, and which he was best qualified to tell them; it is even possible that he visited many places specially on behalf of Athens. If it is surprising enough that Athens, in spite of the difficulties of communication in those days, could keep a firm hold of the numerous threads which served as a connection with the most distant countries, it is a great gain for us and affords us a glimpse into almost unknown regions to come across an individual who may have helped to keep those threads distinct. The ten talents bestowed on Herodotus are a pendant to the talents which Pericles spent without rendering an account. Herodotus probably owed them to the influence of Pericles himself.

His disinclination, in spite of all this, to settle in Athens must have been due in the main to his love of travel. But it may have been partly caused by his perception that Athens as a whole had no sympathy for the culture of Ionia. We know the fate of Anaxagoras, and it is probably not devoid of sig-

nificance in this connection that Hippocrates, to whom we shall refer later, resided so little at Athens, and that one of the greatest philosophers of that age, a great traveller into the bargain, only paid flying visits to Athens. We mean Democritus.²⁰

Democritus was a native of Abdera ; he was very rich and spent his fortune in long journeys, in the course of which he saw the countries which Herodotus had visited. He penetrated into Babylon and Egypt, and is said to have lived in the last-named country for five years. Subsequently, it appears, he resided in his native city. The appellation given to him of 'laughing philosopher' shows that he felt himself superior to the things of the world and the persons with whom he came in contact. In conjunction with his friend Leucippus, who was perhaps his teacher, he became the founder of the atomic theory, the crowning point of the Ionic natural philosophy. For Abdera, as a colony of Teos, was an Ionic city. The period to which we have to assign Democritus is only vaguely known ; it would seem that he was living at the beginning of the fourth century B.C. The Ionic philosophy had dealt with the primary elements from which the universe was supposed to have arisen, and Anaxagoras had dwelt on the force which was necessary for their transformation. There remained the question how this process of change was materially possible. Leucippus and Democritus stepped in with the theory that tiny molecules existed, incapable of further subdivision, atoms moving in a vacuum and differing in their nature, attracting or repelling one another by similarity or dissimilarity, and in this way and to a certain extent by chance producing the individual entities. The finest atoms formed the soul. The idea of a primary element did not enter into this conception ; and no special force or mind appeared to be necessary. It was the mechanical theory of the universe, which has since been so widely disseminated. Side by side with this attempt to explain the origin of all things by a mechanical process we find in the pre-

served fragments of Democritus' writings remarks which prove that his philosophy by no means satisfied himself. We read laments over the insufficiency of knowledge which rests merely on the perception of the senses, coupled with the contention that the contemplation of the beautiful is the highest form of enjoyment. The consistency of all this is not so easy to see.

Athens failed to attract Democritus and she banished Anaxagoras. Later on Socrates was put to death by the Athenians for atheism, and Aristotle left Athens in consequence of a similar accusation.²¹ The particular charges which their accusers brought forward against Anaxagoras, Socrates and Aristotle were no doubt mere pretexts; they only wished to get rid of the individuals themselves. But the Athenian people took a very serious view of these proceedings, and it was the Athenian people who sat in judgment. Athens in her prime was not a place for the unfettered development of free enquiry. And this peculiarity of Athens was displayed not only in the case of the philosophers, some of whom were foreigners, and to whom she was under no obligations, but also in the case of the poets, most of whom were members of the Athenian community. If a popular poet stepped outside the *via media*, which was confined to approval of moderation and an artistic conception of the universe, he ran the risk of giving offence, and if he were self-willed or even conscious of his merit, it was better for him to leave Athens. Men of entirely different character like Aeschylus and Euripides, the one strictly religious and the other a sceptic, but with this resemblance that they both gave prominence to their own ideas, left their native city of their own accord towards the close of their life. Art and rhetoric were the only pursuits which enjoyed permanent popularity in Athens. And the last-named was the only one which was quite unassailable, as it could flourish without the accompaniment of intellect. Art, if it was genuine, had an intellectual basis, and if an artist was unpopular it was possible to find a handle against him.

When the Athenians were told that it was irreligious for Phidias to put a likeness of himself on the shield of Athene, they agreed that it was wrong, just as they believed people who accused Aristotle of irreligion because he had composed a hymn to a man, when hymns should be reserved for the gods. All these manifestations were due to the Athenian mind, which was of a marked patriotic-religious and conservative type, strongly averse to innovations derogatory to the State religion, and ready to listen to every accusation which bore on this point.

Pericles was fully aware of this defect in his fellow-citizens, and he did his best to give a different bias to their character. It was with this object that he encouraged the culture of Ionia. But he was not successful. The old-fashioned Athenian conservatism was too strong for him. It is true that in the famous speech in praise of Athens which Thucydides puts into his mouth, there is not a word of this. The panegyric of Athens in it is even overdone. He describes his fellow-citizens as he wished them to be, not as they actually were. He boasts that they allowed every man to do as he pleased; and yet they were very far from being really tolerant. If Athens had been Greece, such a thing as a free science would hardly have existed among the Greeks. It was fortunate that there was a group of republics to ensure a wholesome variety in the treatment of important questions, and that the religious and political principles of Athens were not a model for her allies. This made it possible for Anaxagoras to live unmolested at Lampsacus after his banishment from Athens. The other centres of Greek culture supplemented Athens in a marked degree. From a material point of view and as regards enjoyment of art the Athenian citizen under Pericles was no doubt in an exceptionally favourable position. The city of Athens had become the mistress of a great empire, which embraced the fairest, the wealthiest, and the most civilized cities of eastern Greece—Thrace with its ancient and still

surviving culture ; the Hellespont with its splendid sea-route, which intercepted all the trade of the wealthy Pontus ; Ionia with its numerous ancient Greek cities, of which Ephesus and Miletus were the most famous ; Caria with its Greeks and semi-barbarians and their highly peculiar civilization ; and finally the Islands, with Delos for their sacred centre. And these communities were by no means in a state of servitude ; they were dependent on Athens in certain matters, but were self-governing in others, and enjoyed their own constitution and religion. The amount which they paid for the protection afforded to their commerce was small ; their legal dependence was confined to appearing before the Athenian courts in certain classes of law-suits. But the citizens of Athens were the privileged individuals in this empire. They could cruise, if they chose to do so, for part of the year in triremes on the Aegean, in the Hellespont and in the Propontis, with the object of seeing that the allies did their duty and that no piracy was carried on, and they had a pleasant time of it on these voyages, for the inhabitants of the cities which they visited honoured in them the men who might one day be their judges in Athens. Those who cruised about in this way were people of moderate means, who were consequently not sorry to spend part of the year in seeing the world at the expense of the State ; they were of course practised oarsmen. And at home again they were occupied in a remunerative fashion with State affairs ; they could earn pay by serving as jurymen several times in the month, and many of them were also in receipt of good salaries as members of the Council. Sufficient provision was made for amusement of a refined, and also of a less refined, description by the numerous festivals, which the citizens could attend at their ease, as they received compensation for their loss of income while the festivals lasted. Then those who preferred agriculture to State business occasionally had opportunities of putting in a successful claim when the distribution of terri-

tory confiscated from a conquered enemy took place. For we have only casual information of many grants of land, and consequently cannot estimate their real extent. To sum up, it was only the fault of the individual Athenian if he suffered material privation. The State provided for him if he chose to remind it of his existence. It was an organized form of socialism. The Athenians constituted the ruling class of a great, but mildly-governed empire.

This would have satisfied the ambition of many a sovereign, but it was not sufficient for the aspiring mind of Pericles. The material well-being of his people, their supremacy in the eastern Mediterranean, their delight in exquisite works of art, was not enough in his eyes. His aim was not merely that they should rule, he wished to make them high-minded and worthy rulers, fitted in every respect for their task. The pursuit of the beautiful, which Athens held in such high esteem, rested on deep foundations in Greek antiquity, for art was the handmaid of religion. Pericles valued religion and art, but felt that an exclusive devotion to them might involve the risk of injury to the State. His object was to provide food for the mind as well, to enlighten the people by means of scientific knowledge. He himself, as we know, had attained a point of view which unfortunately was still rare among his fellow-citizens—he considered unusual natural phenomena to be, not omens, but simple facts. Hence he promoted the diffusion of every kind of knowledge in Athens.

But he did not accomplish his purpose. The Athenians would have none of philosophy. The ready-made wisdom of the soothsayers suited the conservative party better than the occasionally strange speculations of the natural philosophers, and many a democrat too cared little for the enlightenment of the people. And in point of fact it was no easy matter to achieve the aim which Pericles had in view. An ancient people, like the Athenians, could not assimilate a new culture so rapidly. Pericles had the means of knowing this, he must

have been prepared for resistance. But he can hardly have anticipated the vehement opposition which he encountered. We shall return to this topic in Chapter xxii. and see how the persecution to which Anaxagoras, Phidias and Aspasia were subjected embittered the closing years of the great man's life. And we may be sure that the grief which this persecution caused him was not due merely to the circumstance that it was his own friends who had to suffer—what gave him still greater pain was that his fellow-citizens blindly turned their backs upon the far-reaching and beneficent designs which he cherished for their welfare.²²

NOTES

1. Our knowledge of the condition of the city of Athens in the fifth century has been much advanced by the excavations of recent years, while publications and discussions by specialists have circulated the results of these excavations far and wide. Hence not only Bursian's *Geographie Griechenlands* (1862), but also C. Wachsmuth's *Stadt Athen im Alterthum*, Bd. 1 (1874), has been superseded, although the latter still deserves careful consideration for its detailed treatment of the original authorities. The best general view is obtained from Milchhöfer's article *Athen* in Baumeister's *Denkmäler des Alterthums*, Bd. 1 (1884), and the more recently-published topographical map of Athens by Lolling in Iw. Müller's *Handbuch der klass. Alterthumswiss.* Bd. 3 (1888). A short survey of the most important points is also to be found in Baedeker's *Griechenland*, 2nd ed., 1888. The monuments of the Acropolis have been described by A. Bötticher, *Die Akropolis von Athen*, Berl. 1888, without any parade of learning, but with numerous illustrations, borrowed more often than is acknowledged from Durm, and reproducing the latest discoveries.

2. For the temple called the Theseum, cf. the article *Theseion* in Baumeister's *Denkm.* p. 177, 4 seq., where P. Graef deals with the architecture and Baumeister with the sculpture. The former quotes the extensive literature of the subject. As regards the name, tradition was in favour of Theseus, and Ross suggested Ares. Subsequently the following have been mentioned: Heracles, Hephaestus, and Apollo Patroos.

3. The modern writers of special treatises on Phidias, apart from authors of comprehensive works on Greek plastic art, such as

Brunn, Overbeck, Murray, and L. M. Mitchell, are the following—L. de Ronchaud, *Phidias*, Par. 1861; E. Petersen, *Die Kunst des Pheidias*, Berl. 1873; Ch. Waldstein, *Essays on the Art of Phidias*, Lond. 1885, and his short article in *Baumeister's Denkmäler*; also Collignon, *Phidias*, Paris, Rouam, 1885. For the close of Phidias' life see Müller-Strübing, *Die Legende von Tode des Pheidias*, N. Jahrb. 1882; for the opposite view, Loeschcke, *Phidias' Tod in the Histor. Untersuchungen* dedicated to A. Schaefer, Bonn, 1883. To Müller-Strübing's correction of the fragment of Philochorus (97), quoted in the *Schol. Ar. Pac.* 605, where he substitutes for the ancient and very likely incorrect tradition something that corresponds more to our idea of the value of Phidias, we raise the objection as a matter of principle that Müller-Strübing is too fond of trying to eliminate strange but still recorded facts, at one time by ingenious alterations of the texts (*Phidias, Mitylene*), at another by throwing suspicion on the author (*Plataea, Corcyra*). But the Greeks as well as other people sometimes wrote stupid things, and they did not invariably act in a reasonable manner. According to *Sen. Controv.* 8. 2, it appears that even in antiquity Phidias was represented as involved in a prosecution for embezzlement in Elis; there is therefore no reason for altering the text of Philochorus. The order of Phidias' works is quite uncertain; our own presentment of it is entirely a matter of personal impression. On the strength of this fragment of Philochorus, many writers assume that he did not execute the statue of Zeus at Olympia until towards the end of his career. Cf. also Curtius, *G. G.* 2⁶, 845 and 851. That Ageladas (*Ἀγέλαδας*) was teacher of Phidias is doubted by Robert (*Arch. Märchen*, p. 92) and others.

4. The notes in Curtius, *G. G.* 2⁶, 846 seq., contain remarks of value for topography and for the history of art.

5. For the Parthenon see in the first place Michaelis, *Der Parthenon*, Leipz. 1871, who summarizes and discusses everything discovered up to that date. K. Bötticher includes the Parthenon in a special category of temples assumed by him, which were not intended to be regular temples for worship, but rather sacred buildings for votive offerings, and which he calls *Agonal temples*. Many arguments have been rightly advanced (by Julius, for instance) against this theory, which, however, still finds a supporter in Curtius, *G. G.* 2⁶, 846 seq. It does appear to be a fact that the Parthenon possessed no priesthood of its own, and was really only one great votive gift consecrated to Athene. The treasures at Olympia also were called *ναοί*. Cf. also Lolling in I. Müller, 3, 347, and von Sybel, *Parthenon*, in *Baumeister's Denkmäler*. Recently the researches of Dörpfeld on the Acropolis have brought the relations of

its temples, especially in the period which preceded the building of the Parthenon of Pericles, into prominent notice. The subject has been treated from different points of view by Dörpfeld and Petersen in the *Athen. Mittheilungen des archäol. Instituts*, 1885 seq. It is certain that Peisistratus' temple of Athene, the duration of which is now a matter of controversy, was south of the Erechtheum. Cimon laid the foundations for a new temple of Athene, on which the present Parthenon was erected by Pericles with a somewhat different plan. Quite recently the progress of the excavations on the Acropolis has led to the discovery of the foundations of the old royal citadel at Athens, close to the eastern side of the temple of Athene Polias, the Homeric house of Erechtheus; cf. *Berl. Philol. Wochenschr.* 1888, No. 9. It has been ascertained that the arrangement of this building has considerable resemblance to that of the palace at Tiryns. According to the *Berl. Ph. Woch.* 1888, No. 15, walls of houses and bronze utensils have been found in front of the museum on the Acropolis at a depth of 14 metres.

6. Some recent discoveries enable us to form a better idea of the Athene Parthenos of Phidias than we could formerly do: they are the Lenormant statuette (found near the Pnyx in 1859, and reproduced in Collignon's *Phidias*, p. 25), and the more important one found at Varvakeion in 1879, both of which are now in the Central Museum at Athens. For the head we may add the gem of Aspasius in Vienna (vignette on the title-page of the German edition of this work), and the gold medallions of Koul Oba in St. Petersburg. For the shield see the Strangford shield in the British Museum; the Lenormant statuette also has the sculptures on the shield.

7. Von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff has published an interesting paper on the older fortifications of the city and citadel in the first volume of his *Philol. Untersuchungen*. He thinks that Peisistratus broke down the city-walls, which had ceased to exist in 490. They certainly may not have been in existence in 490 and 480, and although there is no proof that the tyrant pulled them down because he wished to rule over a defenceless city, as von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff supposes, yet such a proceeding would have been by no means unreasonable. Just at present views differ widely as to the Pelasgicon or Pelargicon with its nine gates. According to Curtius (1884) it was a line of fortification running round the whole citadel, with nine gates and nine roads leading out of them (ground-plan in Bötticher, *Akropolis*, Fig. 7, p. 58). Since the discovery of the king's palace the theory of a single approach protected by nine consecutive gates has been revived. A process of levelling gave the surface of the Acropolis the form

which allowed the erection of the Parthenon on its present site. This must have taken place when the southern wall was built by Cimon. Cf. Lolling in Iw. Müller, 3, 337-38 for the Pelargikon, 336 for the surface of the citadel; section-drawings in Bötticher's Akropolis, Pl. 5.—The Propylaea have been exhaustively treated by R. Bohn, *Die Propyläen*, Berl. 1882, with supplemental corrections by Durm in the *Zeitschr. für bild. Kunst*, and by Dörpfeld in the *Ath. Mitth.* Ross, Schaubert, and Hansen, Berl. 1839, have written on the temple of Nike; the balustrade reliefs have been described by Kekulé, Stuttgart. 1881. Other literature—Lolling in I. Müller, 3, 341. For the Erechtheum, Lolling, *ibid.* 3, 349 seq., where the extensive literature of the subject is quoted, p. 352.—For the Odeum of Pericles see Plut. Per. 13, and Lolling in I. Müller, 326. I cannot refrain from quoting here the concise and appropriate passage in which A. Milchhöfer (*Deutsche Rundschau*, May 1888) describes the Acropolis:—"Thus from the fifth century onwards the citadel became the ideal counterpart of the city, just as the simple name *πόλις* clung to it, an epitome of its most precious possessions and of its choicest creations—fortress, sanctuary, treasury, and museum. It possessed the character of a fortress in external form only, in honour of the tutelary goddess Pallas Athene, the guardian of the city. The fortress gate was transformed into the splendid portal of the Propylaea; upon the old tower outside the porticoes rose the small, elegant temple of Wingless Victory, of the conquering Athene; the battlements were replaced by a marble parapet with goddesses of victory in relief. The columns and the entablature of the demolished temple of Athene were built into the northern wall, as a memorial of Persian devastation and successful defence. The whole citadel was a sanctuary; its very form was that of a colossal altar, a noble offering dedicated to Athene, to Zeus, to Poseidon, and to the other gods. From henceforth its summit was crowned by the Parthenon, while the Erechtheum contained the ancient palladium, the most sacred worship, traditions, and relics. On the citadel or within the sacred precinct at its foot most of the deities of Greece received the pious tribute of sacrifice—Artemis of Brauron, Demeter the earth-mother, Hephaestus, Dionysus, whose theatre nestles on the south-eastern slope, Asclepius, Aphrodite, the Charites, Pan and the Nymphs; in short, the citadel became an assembly of the gods, an Attic Pantheon. It became a treasury as well, after the contributions of the members of the League and the money devoted to Athene and the other gods were kept in the Opisthodomos of the temple of Athene. It was a museum owing to the rich sculptural adornment of its buildings and the crowd of dedicatory offerings, on which the

greatest masters of the heyday of art and of successive generations had lavished all their powers. Besides this the northern wing of the Propylaea contained a gallery of paintings."

8. In historic times the market of Athens was confined to the north of the Areopagus. An attempt to give a graphic representation of the arrangement of the Agora and the position of the different public buildings in its neighbourhood has recently been made by Kaupert, in the supplement to No. 18 of the volume of the *Berliner Philologische Wochenschrift* for 1887. Cf. the article on Athens by Milchhöfer in Baumeister's *Denkmäler*, and Lolling in Iw. Müller's *Handbuch*, 3, 311 seq. The Prytaneum was not in the market but near the Aglaurium to the north of the citadel. To the east of the market-place many remains are still extant—the building called the Gymnasium of Hadrian, the Tower of the Winds, with arcades near it, also the so-called market-gate, which, however, was not in the market-place, while hardly anything remains of the buildings in the market.—For the street of the Tripods, see Lolling, in I. Müller, 3, 326; for the Pnyx *ibid.* 331 seq.; for the Athenian cemetery, and the public and private burial-places (the latter since the fourth century B.C.) *ibid.* 335.

9. For the buildings at Eleusis, see Baedeker, 2nd ed., with a plan materially supplementing the older one based on the *Antiquities of Attica* in Baumeister's *Denkmäler*, I., especially as regards the interior of the temple. The excavations are being carried on by the Greek Archaeological Society at Athens. The Eleusinian Relief (Athens, Central Museum) reproduced in Baumeister's *Denkm.* p. 413. For Sunium, see Dörpfeld, *Ath. Mitth.* 9; for Rhamnus, Lolling, *Ath. Mitth.* 4. For Phigalia, the publications of Stackelberg, Rome, 1826, and Cockerell (*The Temple of Jupiter Panhellenius at Aegina and of Apollo Epicurius at Bassae*), Lond. 1860, and also the article by Baumeister in his *Denkm.* p. 1319.

10. For Polyclitus cf. Baumeister in his *Denkm.* p. 1345, where the literature of the subject is quoted. The work of Polyclitus in Epidaurus (Tholos) has recently attracted much attention. For the Argive coins relating to the statue of Hera, see Imhoof-Blumer and P. Gardner, *Num. Comm. on Paus.*, in the *Journal of Hellenic Studies*, 1885, Pl. I. 12-15.

11. For the Piraeus cf. the exhaustive paper by Milchhöfer in the 1st number of the *Karten von Attica*, Berl. 1881. For the aqueducts see the researches of E. Ziller, *Mitth. des arch. Inst.* 2, 107 seq. Athens drew her water supply "principally from the springs at the foot of Mt. Pentelicon, probably as early as the fifth century," Milchhöfer, *Athen*, in Baumeister, p. 181.

Curtius (2⁶, 280, 281) deals with Meton and astronomy in Athens.

12. For Sophocles cf. the latest comprehensive accounts by K. Sittl, *Gesch. der Griech. Lit.* 3, 272-3091, and Christ in *Iw. Müller*, 7, 168-188. Some of the anecdotes of the life of Sophocles are certainly inventions, but as he was not a butt for the comic writers they probably do not misrepresent his character in essentials; cf. *Plut. Per.* 8; *Ath.* 13, 603. The attitude of the deservedly praised statue in the Lateran Museum is extremely self-conscious and not free from artificiality.—High appreciation of his dramatic art by G. Freitag in *Bernhardy*, 2, 2, 331. The verses of the *Antigone*, 905-912, discussed by L. Schmidt, *Ethik der alten Griechen*, 2, 160.—The peculiarity of the *Electra* is shown by the fact that Bernhardy considers this tragedy to be 'gemüthlich' (2, 2, 346), and that old critics were able to place it among the Satyric dramas by reason of its "happy and cheerful *dénouement*" (*Bernh.* 2, 2, 349).

13. These remarks on the fundamental difference of Greek and modern tragedy follow the tendency expressed elsewhere in this work; they are intended to draw attention to the elements in Greek life which differ from our own or from that of the Romans. With regard to the fondness of the Greeks for long discussions on the stage there is a remarkable passage in Goethe's *Ital. Reise*, Venice, Oct. 7, where, after hearing an Italian tragedy with its accompaniment of lengthy speeches, he says: "I am now better able to understand the long-winded speeches and endless discussions of Greek tragedy. The Athenians were fonder of listening to oratory and were better judges of it than the Italians; at the law-courts, where they spent the whole day, they picked up a good deal." Masks and *cothurni* were most certainly not favourable to the reproduction of delicate shades of mood and feeling: this is a point which must not be overlooked.

14. On the theatres cf. the article by Kawerau in *Baumeister's Denkmäler*, p. 1730 seq., and A. Müller's *Lehrbuch der Griechischen Bühnenalterthümer*, Freib. 1886. The latest researches have brought the question as to the form of the Greek theatre before the fourth century B.C. into an entirely new phase.

15. For the chronology of Anaxagoras cf. the summary of the results of the latest investigations in *Bus.* 2, 306. It is not very likely that Anaxagoras, who was persecuted as the friend of Pericles just before the Peloponnesian War, came to Athens as early as 480 B.C., as Curtius (2⁶, 833) supposes. *Busolt* (p. 307) assumes with more probability that Anaxagoras lived in Athens from about 462-432.

16. The subject of Aspasia has been almost exhaustively treated by A. Schmidt in the first volume of his work on the Perikleische Zeitalter, Jena, 1877, where he proves (pp. 288-297), that all the charges brought against her, which originated in the malice of contemporaries, assume a systematic form only in course of time.

17. For Damon, see Bus. 2, 443; loci classici, Plut. Per. 4 and 9, in which latter passage 'Damon' is conjectured instead of 'Damonides'; Damon ostracized, Plut. Ar. 1, and Nic. 6. He is one of the leading figures of the supplements to history due to the highly ingenious imagination of Duncker (9, chap. 8).—Pericles and the Philosophers, Bus. 2, 444 seq.

18. For Hippodamus cf. Bus. 2, 566. Aristotle refers to his political theories, Pol. 2, 5, 2 (the city was to be *μυρίανδρος*). Cf. also K. Fr. Hermann, De Hippodamo Milesio, Marb. 1841; Hirschfeld, Ber. der sächs. Ges. der Wiss. 1878; Erdmann, Hippodamos von Milet, Philol. 42, 193 seq. With regard to the possible connection between his plans of cities and his philosophy, it may be said that the twenty rectangular blocks of Thurii might very well have been divided among 10,000 citizens; in that case each of the 10 Phylae of the cities would have numbered 1000 members.

19. For Herodotus, besides Stein's introduction to the edition of his works published by Weidmann, cf. in general K. Sittl, Gesch. der griech. Litteratur, 2, 368-393, Christ, pp. 251-259, and especially Busolt, G. G. 2, 89-103. It seems to me that even many writers who have shown a preference for the study of Herodotus have not been quite just to him. Thus Stein (p. xxix.) finds him unsatisfactory as regards the "uniformity and appropriateness of the principles which guided his selection of topics and events, and the careful determination of dates, and the sequence of dates," and as regards "his grasp of things and persons." I think I have proved that his choice of matter was good; what things and persons could he have shown a better grasp of? As to the determination of dates and their sequence, in what part of the only period where it was difficult to give dates, viz. in the *Pentecontaetia*, do we find Thucydides, whom Stein calls 'unsurpassed' in all these points, 'unsurpassed'? Stein remarks that Herodotus was as unsatisfactory in all these respects "as any of his predecessors," even in the "sifting of his historical material." But as these predecessors are no longer extant, how is it possible for us to say to what extent they are satisfactory or not?—Herodotus on Pericles, 6, 131.—The famous saying of Thucydides (1, 22) that he wished to produce a *κτῆμα ἐς αἰὲν*, not an *ἀγώνισμα ἐς τὸ παραχρῆμα*, is of course aimed at Herodotus. We shall see further on that Thucydides'

pride in the superiority of his performance was not entirely justified, and I would add here that the ephemeral character which Thucydides ascribes to the work of Herodotus is best capable of explanation if we take it to mean, not a performance serving only for purposes of amusement, but a composition intended to meet a temporary object, such as knowledge of the countries with which Athens had dealings. Herodotus, the foreigner honoured by Athens, and Thucydides, the Athenian banished from his native city, formed a painful contrast for Thucydides. The descriptions of Herodotus possessed the same value for the Greeks as the reports of their ambassadors did for the Venetians; and the value of the two authorities is much the same for us. The Venetians could only repeat what was told them by their most trustworthy informants; the best of these might be mistaken, and the inferior ones might be misleading. The accounts of Herodotus have the same origin and value.

20. For the chronology of Democritus cf. the summary of the results of the latest research in Busolt, 2, 308.—The travels of distinguished Greeks in the East have long been wrongly considered doubtful on *a priori* grounds. People who wished to travel to Babylon or Egypt in the sixth or fifth century were free to do so; foreigners were not molested in the Persian empire. The Greeks were admittedly curious and enterprising; their whole history shows it. The reluctance to accept the travels of philosophers, historians, and others in the East, is a remnant of the dislike, which has now been generally overcome, to consider the Greeks as in any way indebted to eastern philosophy.—The name of Democritus occurs on coins of Abdera as that of a magistrate (Eponymos) in the fifth century; also the name Herodotus, which was borne by a brother of Democritus; and Nymphodorus (Thuc. 2, 29); cf. Head, *Hist. Num.* p. 221. Cf. also Windelband, *Gesch. d. alten Phil.* in I. Müller, V. 1, p. 207 seq., who quotes with point the remark of Democritus in DL. 9, 36: ἦλθον εἰς Ἀθήνας καὶ οὐ τις με ἔγνωκεν.

21. The weak points of the intellectual tendencies prevailing in Athens are well brought out by Schwarcz in his work, *Die Demokratie*, Bd. 1, Leipz. 1883. He might, however, have laid more stress on the good intentions of Pericles. For the enlightened views of Pericles cf. Plut. *Per.* 35 and 38.

22. I pointed out at the end of Chapter xii. that the civilization of the age of Cimon had a decidedly vigorous stamp. This is shown especially by the fact that the immediately preceding period, the heroic age of the wars of liberation, was then the subject of art. Aeschylus and Polygnotus worked on these lines. The culture of

the Periclean age pursued aims of a more ideal kind, and discarded the national and historical tendencies. Sophocles and Phidias treated the legends only. It was probably no gain for the dramatic literature of Athens that tragedy, which might by emphasizing the national aspirations have better fulfilled its noble mission of elevating and inspiring the people, confined itself entirely to the mythical heroic age, and left the treatment of the real heroic age of Greece to the comic dramatists, who destroyed the good they had done by their eulogy of the combatants at Marathon by a one-sided advocacy of a feeble peace policy.

CHAPTER XXI

CORCYRA, POTIDAEA AND PLATAEA

THE material development of Athenian greatness was interrupted once and for all by the outbreak of hostilities between Athens and Sparta, which originated in their relations with Corinth, a city closely connected with Sparta and in its maritime and commercial capacity more likely to come into conflict with Athens than Sparta in her snail-shell.

In Epidamnus, a colony of Corcyra but founded under the leadership of a Corinthian, quarrels arose between the nobles and the lower classes, in which the former were expelled the city. But with the assistance of the barbarians of the mainland the nobles inflicted some injury on the remaining inhabitants of Epidamnus, and the latter applied to the Corcyreans for help. The Corcyreans refused. The Epidamnians thereupon appealed to Delphi and asked whether they might seek aid of the Corinthians. The oracle answered in the affirmative. The Corinthians gave the Epidamnian envoys a friendly reception, for Corinth was the constant antagonist of Corcyra, which never treated the parent-city with due respect, and had made itself a maritime power of the first rank. The Corinthians sent a garrison and some new colonists to Epidamnus, all of whom took the land route *via* Apollonia, for fear of the naval power of the Corcyreans, who could put to sea with a fleet of 120 triremes. The Corcyreans now espoused the cause of the exiled Epidamnian nobles in good earnest, and ordered the Epidamnians to re-admit them. On this command

being disregarded, they proceeded to lay siege to the city.¹ Corinth also now took the matter seriously. The number of colonists destined for Epidamnus was increased. Megara, Epidaurus, Hermione and Troizene promised their help, as did Leucas, Ambracia, and Pale in Cephallenia. Thebes and Phlius were asked for money, the Eleans for money and empty ships. The Corcyreans would have been glad to avoid war, and they made proposals intended to pave the way for a settlement. They agreed to refer the matter to arbitration if Corinth would withdraw her troops from Epidamnus, and promised to abide by this offer even if hostilities were only interrupted. But the Corinthians wanted to carry their point, and declined to submit to arbitration. Fortune, however, did not favour them; their fleet of seventy-five ships was defeated by eighty Corcyrean vessels, and on the same day Epidamnus surrendered to the Corcyreans, who took advantage of their supremacy in the western seas to lay waste the territory of Leucas and burn the Elean naval arsenal at Cyllene. In order to protect her position in that quarter to the best of her power, Corinth formed an intrenched camp on the mainland opposite Corcyra at Actium and Chimerium, which compelled the Corcyreans to fortify the peninsula of Leucimne, where they had erected their trophy. On the whole, the Corinthians had a decided advantage; they could make a direct attack on the Corcyreans when they liked, whereas the ports of Corinth had nothing to fear from Corcyra.

The Corcyreans, therefore, thought it necessary to obtain a more powerful ally and made overtures to Athens.² When the Corinthians heard of this step, they sent ambassadors to Athens as well, to counteract those of Corcyra. Thucydides says that the Corcyrean and Corinthian envoys stated their cases immediately after one another in the Athenian assembly, and he gives the speeches delivered on that occasion. As he appeals mainly to his own good faith for the correctness of the speeches recorded in his history, he has evidently given a

personal colouring to the arguments which the speakers used or might have used, and this is the case here. The whole of the Corinthian and Corcyrean speeches can scarcely be treated as authentic. Probably the negotiations really covered a longer period and have been concentrated in a dramatic form. We therefore only give a summary of the arguments used on both sides.

The Corcyreans prefaced their appeal by saying that they regretted their previous isolation, and that they now perceived that they stood in need of support. But the alliance which they now desired in their own interest was also advantageous to Athens. Corcyra did not come with empty hands. She possessed one of the two fleets which existed independently of that of Athens, in Hellas. And an alliance with Corcyra, they went on to say, was all the more valuable to Athens because the Peloponnesians would attack Athens on the first opportunity. Athens, moreover, would infringe no legal right by accepting Corcyra as an ally, for Corinth was clearly in the wrong, as she had refused to submit to arbitration, and besides this the Corinthians had recruited troops among the allies of the Athenians, and consequently had already assumed a hostile attitude towards Athens. The Corinthians, according to Thucydides, met these arguments by stating that the Corcyreans were a thoroughly worthless set, as their conduct towards Corinth had always proved, and that their offer to submit to arbitration was valueless, as they had not made it until they had committed an injustice. The Athenians, they urged, could not conclude an alliance with Corcyra, for they were under no obligation to that power, whereas they were indebted to Corinth, treaties with whom were in existence, and Corinth on her part had repeatedly behaved in a friendly way to Athens, notably in the quarrels of the Athenians with Aegina and Samos. It was also by no means certain that war was bound to break out between Athens and the Peloponnesians. Friendliness to Corinth was the surest road to peace, and honesty the best policy.

After two days' negotiations the Athenians decided to accede so far to the request of the Corcyreans as to conclude a defensive alliance with them, without admitting them as full members of their League.

It is no part of our task to examine into the validity of the arguments of the two embassies as stated by Thucydides. We cannot ascertain whether Corinth or Corcyra was in the right. Technically, the former had put herself in the wrong by refusing to submit to arbitration, and so Athens could not be reproached for espousing the cause of Corcyra. The appeal of the Corinthians to their former kindnesses to Athens was of doubtful value, for a friendly attitude towards Athens probably appeared advantageous to Corinth at the time. If Athens had never acted more unjustly than when she stood by the Corcyreans, she would always have been a pattern of justice. In the present instance she could, without violating any right, decide in accordance with her own interests, which certainly consisted in preventing the naval power of Corcyra from falling into the hands of Corinth. And the form of the new alliance was also unimpeachable in point of law; it was merely a question of self-defence.

At first Athens sent only ten ships to Corcyra, merely as a warning to Corinth, who, however, was not to be thus intimidated. The Corinthians displayed the same energy against Corcyra which Pericles had shown against Samos. They despatched a fleet of 150 ships, of which 10 were from Elis, 12 from Megara, 10 from Leucas, 27 from Ambracia and one from Anactorium, and anchored them in the harbour at Chimerium. The Corcyreans took up a position facing them with 110 vessels off the islands of Sybota, in the neighbourhood of Cape Leucimne, where the Corcyrean army was encamped with 1000 Zacynthians. The Athenians, who were only to interfere in case of extreme necessity, posted themselves on the right wing of the Corcyrean fleet; opposite them were the Corinthians themselves, who had likewise placed their allies on their right

wing. The battle was fought out with little tactical skill. The right wings of both sides were defeated, and the Athenians were compelled to join in the engagement to prevent the defeat of the Coreyreans becoming too severe. The Corinthians collected their dead and their wrecked ships, brought them to the mainland, and then advanced once more against the enemy. But suddenly, to the surprise of the Coreyreans, they stopped. They had caught sight of twenty Athenian ships approaching from the south, and as it was now late, did not like to begin another and a severer struggle. On the following morning the Athenians and Coreyreans bore down on the Corinthians, but the latter again refused battle. They had made some 1000 prisoners, whom they were anxious to take to Corinth, and besides it seemed to them a dubious proceeding to incur a political responsibility which belonged more to the citizens of Corinth by repeated encounters with the Athenians. They confined themselves to reproaching the Athenians and asking them whether they intended to hinder their voyage. "Against Corcyra, yes," answered the Athenians, "elsewhere, no." The Corinthians now knew that they could get home in safety and set sail for Corinth after erecting a trophy at Sybota. The Coreyreans of course also erected a monument of victory, for although the Corinthians had destroyed more of the enemy's ships than they (seventy to thirty), yet they had declined battle on the following day, which was considered by the Greeks equivalent to an admission of the superiority of an opponent. On their return voyage, the Corinthians obtained possession of the town of Anactorium by a piece of treachery. But on the whole the attempt made by Corinth had failed owing to the intervention of Athens, and the Corinthians resented it greatly.

The conflict between the two states was intensified by events in the East. Potidaea on the isthmus of Pallene was a city which paid tribute to Athens. It was a Corinthian colony and still maintained a close connection with the parent-city,

from which it received a governor or *Epidemiurgus* every year. The Athenians were afraid that, as a result of this continued influence on the part of Corinth, Potidaea would in the long run revolt from them, and they ordered the city to desist from receiving the *Epidemiurgus* and also to pull down the walls which shut off Potidaea on the side of Pallene, that is, towards the sea. The Athenians wanted to be able to enter the city at any moment without hindrance. Potidaea, however, would never have allowed herself to be persuaded to revolt by Corinth alone, which was at such a distance; her nearest neighbours instigated her to do so. It was the interest of Athens that there should not be too close a union between the Macedonian princes. Perdiccas was her friend; but to prevent him from becoming too powerful, the Athenians now and then showed favour to Philip and Derdas. Perdiccas now repaid them by inciting the Chalcidians, the Bottiaeans and Potidaeans to revolt, and he even sent to Sparta to stir up war against Athens. Athens became aware of this and despatched thirty ships and 1000 hoplites to Macedonia with orders to proceed to Potidaea, take hostages there and pull down the walls. The Potidaeans had meanwhile sent envoys to Athens and Sparta, to Athens with the request to leave things as they were, to Sparta with an appeal for help in case Athens declined to comply. Before the Athenian troops arrived, the Potidaeans, Chalcidians and Bottiaeans had revolted, and the Chalcidians who lived on the coast had resolved, in response to pressure from Perdiccas, to settle in Olynthus; but Olynthus being not yet prepared for them, they had moved for the present to Lake Bolbe, under Macedonian protection.

The Athenian generals at first took no measures against the rebels, but marched against Perdiccas. Meanwhile the Corinthians sent assistance to the Potidaeans, volunteers and mercenaries, 1600 hoplites and 400 light-armed men, under Aristeus, son of Adeimantus. The Athenians likewise, on receiving news of the revolt of Potidaea, sent 2000 hoplites

and forty ships of war to Chalcidice, under Callias and four other generals, who found their countrymen already in possession of Therme (afterwards Thessalonica) and engaged in laying siege to Pydna, the Macedonian capital. They decided in favour of a change in the political situation, and came to terms with Perdiccas. After this they marched against Potidaea with a large force, which included 3000 Athenian hoplites and 600 Macedonian cavalry from the territory of Philip. But in a very brief space of time the situation underwent another change. Whether it was that Perdiccas considered the continued friendship of the Athenians with Philip as dangerous, or whether his sole object in coming to terms with them was to get them away from Pydna, he suddenly joined the Potidaeans once more, and even assumed the leadership of their cavalry. The idea was to attack the Athenians from two sides, from Potidaea and from Olynthus, and so annihilate them. But the enthusiasm soon cooled. The attacking party from Olynthus watched the engagement from a convenient elevation at a distance, with the object of coming to the rescue and winning cheap laurels if the others were successful. But the Potidaean party, who did their duty at the right moment, were left in the lurch and defeated, and Aristeus with difficulty made good his escape to Potidaea. Callias had fallen on the Athenian side. This was the battle in which Socrates saved the life of Alcibiades.³ The Athenians now with the aid of reinforcements invested Potidaea on all sides. Aristeus left the city on the pretext of fetching help from the Peloponnese, but did not do so; he remained in Chalcidice, while the Athenians under Phormion continued their operations in the same district.

The Corinthians now perceived that they were no match for Athens and looked around for help. The idea was that Athens should be confronted with the whole Peloponnesian league. The Aeginetans, who had been obliged to take the Athenian side, secretly added fuel to the flame, and the Megarians, whom

Athens had excluded from her markets and harbours by the Megarian psephisma, probably in the summer of 432, intrigued openly against her.⁴ There had long been a neighbourly rivalry between Athens and Megara, and the participation of the Megarians in the battle off Sybota had widened the breach. The Athenians had no wish to see their enemies in the market-places of their country, and no one could blame them for that. But the participation in the battle of Sybota was not sufficient according to Greek ideas to stamp the Megarians as foes—it was merely assistance rendered to friends. The Athenians therefore had to find other grievances against them. They discovered that the Megarians had cultivated some land belonging to the Eleusinian deities, that they had occupied some disputable border territory and had harboured fugitive Athenian slaves. These offences would, they thought, justify the exclusion of the Megarians from the Athenian markets. The facts may have been to a certain extent correct; but the indignation of the Megarians at a measure which materially injured their interests was none the less very natural.

The negotiations relating to the grounds of complaint against Athens were conducted with greater detail in Sparta than might have been expected, because some Athenian envoys were actually there, and were allowed to hear what the Corinthians had to say and to make such reply as they thought fit. According to Thucydides the Athenian ambassadors were there by accident, and consequently without any instructions on this important question. But here too it is probable that matters did not proceed with quite such dramatic simplicity as Thucydides states; it is more likely that the public negotiations were preceded by secret ones, that the Athenians had already given their envoys instructions with regard to the accusations that were to be expected, and that the speeches, the purport of which we now relate, were not delivered in the form given by Thucydides but are a summary made by him

of all the arguments advanced in the negotiations, both of a public and private nature.⁵

The Corinthians do not consider it necessary to prove that the Athenians had violated international law ; they only point out that their encroachments in the direction of Coreyra and Potidaea involve a great danger for the future. They endeavour to rouse the Spartans by reproaching them with their dilatoriness in all their undertakings and contrasting this ponderousness with the activity of the Athenians, and they do this in a very pointed analysis of the character of the two peoples. The conclusion they draw is that the Peloponnesians must attack Athens, or Corinth will be obliged to withdraw from the league. The Athenian envoys also abstain from dealing with the legal aspect of the question ; they indulge in a panegyric of Athens, emphasizing her services on behalf of Greece in the Persian wars, and asserting that Sparta had not behaved nearly so well as Athens in that crisis. Athens, they say, is disliked on account of her supremacy over the members of her league ; but Sparta had abandoned this supremacy to Athens of her own accord, and under similar conditions would be exposed to the same accusations. For the stronger commands without considering the question of right and wrong,⁶ and men submit more readily to the superior power of an enemy than to the claims of those who are considered as equals. Sparta should beware of plunging into a war of uncertain issue on behalf of others. For the rest, Athens is ready to treat and to submit the matter to arbitration.

The majority of the Spartans were on the whole in favour of a war with Athens. King Archidamus, however, did not consider the occasion a favourable one. The Athenian power, he said, lies in their navy and their money. It will take us some time to procure either. How then are we to compel them to give way ? It will be better therefore to prepare quietly for war. It is only a case of waiting two or three years, and then our better state of preparation will make a very

different impression. Precisely because it is to be a war of material resources, we need not be ashamed of postponing it. The caution with which the Corinthians reproach us is the source of our strength. Let us begin by merely calling on the Athenians to do justice to our allies.

The Ephor Sthenelaidas controverted the arguments of Archidamus in the brief speech of an honest straightforward man. The Athenians, he said, have not even attempted to prove that they have been unjustly accused. War therefore is the only course worthy of Sparta. He then put it to the vote by acclamation whether war should be declared or not. What followed can only be conjectured, in spite of the apparently accurate but really inadequate account of Thucydides. The vote by acclamation does not appear to have settled the point whether the majority was in favour of war. The Ephor therefore ignored it and arranged for a fresh vote by division of the assembly, but artfully put the question in another form. He asked if the Spartans were of opinion that Athens had broken the treaties and was in the wrong. In this way he was certain of a majority, for it required a very considerable amount of naïveté to answer these questions in the negative. But once Sparta had committed herself to this view, it would be easy enough to begin the war as soon as preparations had been made. Most of the Spartans did not reflect at that time that they had not yet pronounced in favour of it. As a matter of fact the majority decided that Athens had broken the treaties. The Ephors now ordered that the allies also should declare their views at Sparta, which of course increased the prospects of war. And to make the certainty of it still greater the Delphian god was consulted and the desired answer was received to the effect that he would side with the Spartans, whether called on to do so or not. If it had been the Homeric god, and the answer had not been given so late as 430, the plague would have been an evident sign of his wrath. But what had Athens done to deserve this displeasure?

In the assembly of the allies held at Sparta the Corinthians appeared once more as agitators for war, from which of course they only would reap advantage. They were afraid of this being discovered and therefore said that the people in the interior (meaning the Spartans) were not to suppose that Athenian policy did not concern them; for if the cities on the sea-coast (Corinth for instance) were in the hands of the enemy, their imports and exports would be stopped (in other words famine and poverty would be the result). And a war with Athens, they went on to say, is by no means such a hopeless prospect. We can build ships and the sacred treasure of Delphi and Olympia will supply us with money (what treatment was meted out to the Phocians when they put the same idea into practice!); the Athenian power resides only in their money and their ships; we have bravery on our side (the Corinthians braver than the Athenians!). If we do not all combine to fight them, we are lost, for Athens is superior to each of us individually (Sparta into the bargain?). Our fathers made Greece free; are we to allow a city to play the tyrant over us? A vote was then taken, this time on the question of peace or war, and the majority of the allies voted for war. But they were not sufficiently prepared to begin it at once, and more than six months elapsed before the Peloponnesians could invade Attica.

What was to happen meanwhile? The Peloponnesian maritime cities would have been exposed to very considerable risk if the Athenians had commenced hostilities in consequence of this vote for war, a course which they would have been practically if not formally justified in pursuing. To prevent this, negotiations had to be opened with Athens. The resolution in favour of war was a private affair of the Peloponnesians; as long as it was not communicated to Athens, they could say that it had not been taken; the Greeks were great sticklers for the letter of the law. It was the interest of Athens to begin war at once, so as to prevent the enemy from making

their preparations at leisure, and she ought to have delivered an ultimatum to Sparta with this object. But Pericles had not the energy of a Frederick ; he waited to see what demands the enemy would put forward, allowed them to take advantage of him by negotiations, and thus gave them time to prepare.

The demands which the Spartans made on Athens were so unjustifiable that Athens could not comply with them ; but as they were made, they had to be answered, and thus Sparta gained valuable time. The first demand was that the Athenians should remove the *agos* (guilt) caused by the murder of Cylon's adherents, that is to say, that they should banish Pericles, the Alcmaeonid. The Athenians responded, after the usual Greek fashion in such cases, which required that an opponent should if possible be outdone in cunning, with a counter-proposal in reference to the Taenarian *agos* contracted by the slaughter of the Helots, and the *agos* of Athene Chalcioecus incurred by the death of Pausanias. Thus defeated with their own weapons, but having really achieved their object of gaining time by trifling, the Spartans came nearer to the point and demanded that Potidaea and Aegina should be allowed their freedom and that the Megarian psephisma should be withdrawn. Athens rejected this, and as Sparta wanted to gain more time, a fresh embassy under Ramphius, Melesippus, and Agesander was sent to demand that Athens should dissolve her League, which was more than she had already refused. An assembly of the people was now held at Athens, in which the speakers expressed different views on the demands of Sparta. Some were of opinion that the Megarian psephisma should be withdrawn, as the Spartans were supposed to have signified that they would be satisfied with that concession. But Pericles opposed all idea of surrender. The ever-increasing demands of Sparta prove, he said, that their one object is the humiliation of Athens. If Athens yields in the case of Megara, fresh demands will be made. War with Sparta is therefore inevitable. And Athens has no reason to shrink

from it. The Peloponnesian position is not a favourable one. Sparta's allies enjoy independence and equality of rights, and consequently are not amenable to discipline;⁷ besides they have neither money nor ships. They may, it is true, invade Attica, but we can reach the enemy's territory with our ships quite as easily, if not more so, while the Peloponnesians are at a disadvantage compared with us because they cannot create a fleet so readily. Even if they take the treasure at Olympia and Delphi (here we see Thucydides' reply to what he represents as having been said in Sparta), they will not be able to do much with the money; they need oarsmen, but they will not be able to entice away many from us, as the men will not be inclined to fight against their own cities which are in alliance with us, and they cannot get our own helmsmen, for they are all Athenians (as if Corinth could not obtain oarsmen and train helmsmen just as easily). If Attica is laid waste, Athens still has plenty of islands and territory on the coast. If Attica itself were an island, it would be as good as invincible. Athens therefore must be made an island by abandoning the rest of Attica. We must not let ourselves be drawn into any battle on land in which everything would be at stake. Men do not exist for the sake of the land, the land exists for the men. If I could have my way, continued Pericles, we should lay waste our land ourselves. Therefore let us accept this war, but for the maintenance of our honour let us offer to submit to a court of arbitration. One point, however, is important. We must not engage in fresh conquests during the war. We must show ourselves worthy of our fathers, who resisted the Medes under far more unfavourable conditions. A reply to this effect, but with the formal accompaniment of counter-proposals, was given to the Spartans. No more negotiations took place, and both sides were now absorbed in the prospect of war.

And war was inevitable, as the Spartans were bent on it. Their demands had no reference to any wrong supposed to be

done by Athens; she was simply called on to dissolve her League. There was nothing for it but to abide by an appeal to force. And what reason was there for supposing that the Spartans would succeed in this? After all, Athens had been at war with the Peloponnesians before. And she was in a better position now than before the Thirty Years' Peace, for she had no subjects on the mainland to hold in check, and the Corcyrean fleet was at her disposal. Why should she then be so afraid of war if it could not be avoided with honour?

The position of the two combatants at the beginning of the war can be described with clearness. On the one side was a strong military force, on the other an imposing naval power; on the one a large continental kingdom, on the other an empire of maritime districts and islands; on this side nearly all agriculturists, on that almost exclusively merchants and traders; here country-folk, there denizens of towns. The situation would be somewhat similar if war broke out between Russia and England, but with this difference that in the present case the naval power was the more efficiently led of the two combatants. Unfortunately Attica was not an island like England. Hence the position of Athens may be better compared with that of the Netherlands when they had to contend against Spain, and at a later period against France.

The state of affairs would appear to have justified the expectations entertained by Pericles to this extent, that the Peloponnesian attack would come to nothing, for they could not help seeing sooner or later that they could do Athens herself no harm. But in addition to these material conditions of success for Athens, a success which was assured if Athens did not actually succumb—with which every friend of Greece might be content^s—two factors were necessary to make the success a reality, ability on the part of the Athenians and good luck. For the Athenians were by no means so secure from attack as Pericles asserted. There were excellent sailors

among the Peloponnesians; why should they not be able to create a navy for their League. Pericles, according to Thucydides, stated that this would be a difficult matter, because Athens herself had barely accomplished it in fifty years' time. This sounded well enough in a popular assembly, but unfortunately had no foundation in fact. Syracuse when in a state of siege took less than two years to raise a fleet which defeated and destroyed the Athenian fleet, and in point of fact Athens owed her ruin to the annihilation of her fleet by that of the Peloponnesians. The contrast, therefore, between a continental and a naval power—the last-named, so to speak, of an intangible nature, and always eluding the grasp of its opponent—certainly existed, but was not necessarily of a permanent nature. To ensure its permanence it was necessary in the first place that no unforeseen events should occur to injure the Athenian power. Such an event, however, was the Plague, which decimated and disheartened the Athenians, and in indirectly causing the death of Pericles deprived them of the man who was best qualified to lead them through the crisis. In the second place, it was necessary that the spirit of the Athenians should be maintained at the proper pitch both in the conduct of the war and as regards the capacity for enduring it. The right kind of spirit, which readily follows the right leader and cheerfully submits to every sacrifice, saved the Netherlands in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. But this spirit was unfortunately not present in sufficient measure in Athens at that period. Even Pericles does not appear to have conducted the war quite as he should have done,⁹ and after his death the Athenian people degenerated far too much into a mob, following the impulse of the moment, and making dangerous experiments in the course of the war. The Netherlands would hardly have been saved without the continued leadership of the great members of the House of Orange; in times of urgent danger dictators are necessary for a brief period. We shall see later on to what

extent certain factors belonging to the history of civilization in Greece contributed to the fall of Athens.

Mistakes were made on both sides, first of all by the Peloponnesians, who should not have allowed themselves to be carried away by the commercial jealousy of Corinth into attacking the Athenians, who could never injure Sparta in the long run; and secondly by the Athenians, who ought to have conducted the war which had been forced upon them with greater caution. Athens and Sparta might perfectly well have continued to stand side by side on a footing of equality, as they did afterwards in the fourth century. This is what reason tells us; but it only too often happens that states allow themselves to be ruled by passion instead of reason.

And passion accelerated the outbreak of the war. In the beginning of March 431 some 300 Thebans under the command of Boeotarchs made a night attack on the town of Plataea, the faithful ally of the Athenians, in the hope of undermining its loyalty. The hatred of Athens was as strong in Thebes as in Megara and Corinth. The Thebans had been admitted into the city by a few Plataeans. They took up a position in the market-place, and instead of seizing the leaders of the Athenian party who had been pointed out to them, which would probably have placed the city in their hands, they determined to try and invest their attack with a legal sanction, and issued a proclamation calling upon the inhabitants of Plataea to come and join them. The Plataeans in their surprise remained quiet for a time and then ascertained the number of the intruders. When they discovered that it was inconsiderable, they planned a resistance by breaking down the partition-walls of the houses, and joining forces in this way fell upon the enemy from all sides, from the streets, the houses, and the roof-tops. The night was dark and rainy, the streets slippery, and the Thebans little acquainted with the locality. They fled at random, being evidently left in the lurch by

their friends. Some escaped by jumping from the city-walls, others by finding and bursting open the gate through which they had entered. Many mistook the door of a house for a city-gate and could get no further ; these and the others who could not escape surrendered at discretion. When it was all over a second band of Thebans arrived, who had been delayed by the bad weather and the rise of the Asopus. The Plataeans entered into a parley with them, and apparently it was agreed that no harm should be done the Theban prisoners for the present, for the force which had just arrived withdrew ; if it had not been for this they might have captured many Plataeans who were outside the city and taken them off as hostages, but in consequence of their withdrawal all these men were able to gain a place of safety. But the Plataeans had not understood the arrangement in this way, for hardly were the others gone than they killed the prisoners, 180 in number. Passion drowned all feelings of humanity and all cool reflection, for in the first place it is clear that the second Theban force was deceived, and secondly by killing the 180 prisoners the Plataeans deprived themselves of a valuable means of bringing pressure to bear upon Thebes. The Athenians, to whom the Theban attack and the capture of the prisoners were at once reported, sent word with all speed that the prisoners' lives should be spared, but by the time the message arrived they had been put to death. Athenian troops were now despatched to Plataea, while the wives, children and other non-combatants were brought for safety to Athens.

Both sides now pushed on their preparations with greater energy and looked about for allies. The Spartans were very anxious to win over the Persian king and to obtain money and a fleet amounting to 500 triremes from the Greeks of Italy and Sicily. This was their plan for securing what they were deficient in—money and ships. That it was highly unpatriotic to apply to Persia, did not affect Sparta. But the king declined to accede to her request ; he still had a great

respect for the power of the Athenians. And no ships were forthcoming from the West; the Greeks of Italy and Sicily, even the Syracusans, had more important things to do than to pander to Corinth's commercial jealousy. The Athenians, on the other hand, had hopes, as Thucydides states, of being able, with the aid of Corcyra, Cephallenia, the Acarnanians and Zacynthians, to attack the Peloponnese from all sides and seriously embarrass it. But these hopes too were exaggerated. Athens no doubt could obtain the assistance of the above-mentioned states, but it is difficult to conceive how she could use it to make a general attack upon the Peloponnese. Athens soon came to the conclusion that she was hardly in a position to inflict serious injury on isolated points of the country. The wonders and omens which took place testified to the great expectations which were entertained of the impending war. In general the feeling of the Greeks, who were more eager for war than ready to engage in it, was in favour of Sparta. Sparta was a quiet state, which allowed every one, especially her own allies, to go their own way, while Athens used constraint with the members of her League. Consequently people would have been heartily glad to see Athens humiliated, without, however, being ready to make great sacrifices for the fulfilment of their wishes. Thucydides enumerates the cities and districts which joined the two parties. On the Spartan side were all the Peloponnesians with the exception of the Argives and Achaeans. The former continued permanently hostile to the Lacedaemonians, while of the latter the city of Pellene, which was Sicyon's nearest neighbour, had already been drawn into the Dorian League, and the remainder went over to Sparta in the course of the war. Outside the Peloponnese the following were on the Spartan side: the Megarians, Boeotians, Phocians, Locrians, Ambraciots, Leucadians and Anactorians. The Corinthians, Megarians, Sicyonians, Pellenians, Eleans, Ambraciotes and Leucadians provided ships, the Boeotians, Phocians and Locrians cavalry, and the

rest infantry. The Athenians had control of the Chians, the Lesbians, the Plataeans, the Naupactians, most of the Acarnanians, the Corcyreans, the Zacynthians and their tributary subjects. Of these Chios, Lesbos and Corcyra contributed ships, the rest only soldiers and money.¹⁰

NOTES

For this and the following chapters Thucydides is the principal authority, as far as his work extends—to 410 B.C. Only the few inscriptions which exist of this period can be placed on a level with him; we quote some of the important ones. Thucydides has been exhaustively studied for a considerable time; cf. the introduction to the edition of his history by Classen, and Sittl, *Gesch. der griech. Litteratur*, 2, 401 seq. The point has been argued whether the existing work dates from the time when the Peloponnesian War recommenced after the pause which ensued, or whether, as Ullrich has maintained, Thucydides related the Archidamian war immediately after its close in the form which the first books now present, so that in writing it he had no knowledge of the Deceleian war. But these questions are of small importance for our estimate of Thucydides as a historical authority. An estimate of this kind from a critical point of view has only been recently formed. Hitherto the authority of Thucydides had been accepted unconditionally, but now many writers have attempted to disparage it. This is only the case to a small extent when it is assumed that not only the 8th Book but the greater portion of the work is incomplete, somewhat more where the belief prevails that much of the text of the author is corrupt, but to a very considerable extent when Thucydides himself is credited with defects which are incompatible with a good historical authority, such as intentional suppression of the truth, and even deliberate untruths. It is now generally admitted that many misstatements have crept into the author's text, but they do not affect material facts. Müller-Strübing has chiefly endeavoured to prove that Thucydides is unworthy of credit, but without success, as is shown by A. Bauer (*Thukydides und H. Müller-Strübing*, Nördh. 1887). In a short account of Müller-Strübing's methods of procedure, Bauer has clearly proved how this scholar gradually arrives at more and more unfavourable and finally self-contradictory views of Thucydides. In his first paper (*Aristophanes und die historische Kritik*, 1873) Müller-Strübing only states that the historian was not always impartial.

In his *Thucydideische Forschungen* (1881) he goes farther and assumes that Thucydides groups the whole series of facts from an artistic point of view, but he disposes of what seems to him unsatisfactory (the execution of the 1000 Mytileneans) as an interpolation, and consequently leaves Thucydides pretty much where he was. In his criticism of the siege of Plataea and the sanguinary scenes in Corcyra (*N. Jahrb.* 1885, 1886), Thucydides has grown in his eyes into a poet who invents facts, partly in order to teach people how things ought to be done (the siege of a city), partly because he liked to depict certain scenes of horror (Corcyra). The first and second contentions are admissible in point of principle, and to a certain extent correct; the third is unproved. The conclusion is that this criticism of Müller-Strübing's has no value in principle or method; it merely contributes some acute observations which have to be tested. Christ, *Griech. Litteraturgesch.* in I. Müller, 7, 264, follows Müller-Strübing in believing that Thucydides indulges in "a fanciful and half-romantic picture of events." This however is something different to what Müller-Strübing assumes in connection with Plataea, and seems to me not proved in the case of Corcyra. On the whole, therefore, the old view that Thucydides is a truthful writer is not in the least shaken. No doubt he groups many things more with regard to art than truth, especially in the speeches (in Herodotus the events, in Thucydides the speeches are concentrated in an artistic way); he has probably overlooked many incidents of importance, and his criticism of persons can only be accepted if it is confirmed by facts (his verdict on Cleon and Nicias, for instance, is probably not correct); it is also possible that he has suppressed facts concerning his opponents, which would induce us to form a more satisfactory estimate of them; lastly, he may occasionally have accepted what was told him too credulously, especially if it suited his own point of view to believe it. Thus he may have received an overdrawn account of the cruelties of the democrats in Corcyra from aristocrats, and for that reason have given a wrong impression of them; but there is no reason for supposing that he drew on his own imagination for a picture of them. In spite of all these objections Thucydides still remains a trustworthy historical authority. If we are to refuse to admit him as such without cogent reason, who can we prefer to him? For events specially relating to Athens, the Attidographers may have supplied later historians with better information; but there is very little of such matters in Thucydides' history. He treats of the incidents of a war; consequently Ephorus would be the only authority presumably superior to him. But Ephorus is not a good authority for the *Pentecontaetia*, as we have seen in the

Notes to Chapter vii. ; he is not so for the siege of Syracuse, as I think I have proved in my History of Sicily, and in the *Topografia archeologica di Siracusa*. Volquardsen in his *Untersuchungen über die Quellen Diodors*, p. 39 and Appendices II. and III., has shown how Diodorus, on whom our knowledge of Ephorus chiefly rests, has used him incorrectly, and confused the sequence of events. What then have we left of Ephorus which can be preferred to the account of Thucydides? Lastly, Plutarch does not give us a history of the war, but only historical character-sketches. Therefore, what we meet with in Plutarch that deals with the internal affairs of the various states may be used with advantage, but is of little authority for the incidents of the war. For Plutarch cf. Fricke, *Untersuchungen über die Quellen des Plutarch in Nikias und Alkibiades*, Leipz. 1869. Our use of authorities, therefore, for the period of which Thucydides treats is clearly prescribed ; the narrative must follow Thucydides, subject to reservations as to particular points, some of the reasons for which may be of an objective and others of a subjective character.—The most important inscriptions belonging to the period of the Peloponnesian War have been collected by Hicks, *A Manual of Greek Historical Inscriptions*, 1882 ; since then many others have been discovered. Of course other sources of information are to be found in all kinds of references in contemporary and subsequent writers, which we cannot enumerate here. The collections of anecdotes belonging to later periods are generally regarded with some suspicion, while the mass of gossip in Aristophanes has hitherto been regarded with favour, no doubt for the special reason that the solution of the difficulties requires ingenuity and learning. Of course a detailed and exhaustive description of the period in question would have to make use of this material.

1. Thus Corinth, the friend of Sparta, is on the side of the democrats, while Corcyra, the ally of Athens, sides with the aristocrats, a proof that it was not so much democracy and aristocracy as interests of a practical nature that decided the formation of alliances.

2. For the causes of the Peloponnesian War, cf. Plass, *Urs. des archidam. Krieges*, Stade, 1858, 59. — From the record of the preparation of the expedition to Corcyra (*C. I. A.* 1, 179) it appears that Glaucon's colleague was not Andocides, as Thuc. 1, 51 says, but Dracontides.

3. Metrical epitaph on the Athenians who fell at Potidaea in a partial state of preservation : *C. I. A.* 1, 442.

4. Ullrich, *Das megarische Psephisma*, Hamb. 1838 ; cf. Duncker, 9, 329. G. Hertzberg (*Gesch. von Hellas und Rom*,

Berl. 1879, I, 295) points out that such stoppages of trade were "one of the most dangerous weapons of the republic of Venice during the most prosperous period of its rule in Greece." The charge (Arist. Ach. 527) relating to the *πόρναι δύο* of Aspasia, whom the Megarians were supposed to have carried off, is simply a new version of similar old stories, composed for the amusement of the Athenian mob, the truth or untruth of which is quite unknown. The earlier stories are as follows. The Megarians were said to have attempted to carry off some Athenian women on the occasion of the war under Solon or Peisistratus. At a much earlier date the Pelasgians were supposed to have kidnapped women in Brauron, and according to Schol. Ar. Pax, 873 there was a festival of Dionysia in Brauron, at which *μεθύοντες πολλὰς πόρναις ἤρπαζον*. Consequently charges of attempting to carry off women and the representation of such scenes were part of old tradition in Attica, and if these tales were used on the stage and the name of Aspasia connected with them, a laugh was raised. The learned men of antiquity then stepped in and made history of it.

5. The declaration of the Athenian envoys that Athens was ready to submit to a court of arbitration, proves that they had instructions for the matter in question.

6. Thuc. 1, 76. This appears to be an indirect censure of Athens by Thucydides, like his account of the negotiations with the Melians subsequently.

7. Th. 1, 141 *ισόψηφοι*. Allies enjoying equal rights were not of much use in antiquity; they separated from each other at will. The despotic conduct of the Athenians had a practical justification.

8. History in the main ought only to be a record of facts; but now and then the historian may be allowed to display a certain interest in his subject. Sparta, and this was in keeping with her whole character, gained nothing by a victory over Athens, as the result showed, and the world probably lost much by Sparta's victory. Athens could never have destroyed Sparta's power, much less have annihilated her. Why then was Sparta obliged to wage war? Simply because Corinth's interests demanded it. The racial distinction between Dorians and Ionians no doubt had something to do with it, but would not of itself have turned the scale. Neighbours, even of a kindred race, have always hated each other more in Greece than strangers. Thus we find the Thebans and Corinthians most bitter against Athens, the former not being Dorians at all, and the latter certainly not so in point of character, if Sparta is to be taken as the typical Dorian state. Commercial jealousy was the ruin of Athens. She had to fall in

order that Corinth might carry on her commerce undisturbed in the West. We must remember, as Curtius has pointed out, that Corinth had a colonial empire as early as the beginning of the sixth century, in the possession of which she was only occasionally disturbed by Corcyra. When Corcyra joined hands with Athens, Corinth could bear it no longer. The so-called Peloponnesian War has an internal consistency if we regard it as a Corintho-Athenian war. Athens could at a pinch have come to terms with all her other opponents, but not with Corinth. Up to the Persian wars, Aegina and Corinth were commercial rivals, and this was why Corinth supported Athens with a fleet against Aegina. As soon as the power of Athens increased, the friendship of Corinth ceased, and there arose a jealousy culminating in hostility, which knew no peace until Athens was humbled by Lysander.

9. It is undeniable that some of the Periclean expeditions, such as the invasion of Megara, were more like military promenades than serious campaigns. It is true that the invasion of Attica by the Peloponnesians was not much more, and neither Athenians nor Peloponnesians seem to have been inclined to offer battle in earnest unless they could take the field with a decidedly superior force. In spite of this Pericles ought to have been able to effect more on the occasions when he landed in the Peloponnese. He was evidently more careful of the lives of his soldiers than was compatible with the requirements of an energetic conduct of the war.

10. For the chronology of events from the battle of Leucimne to the first invasion of Attica by the Peloponnesians, cf. the exhaustive treatise of L. Holzapfel in the *Beiträge zur griech. Geschichte*, Berl. 1888. According to him, the battle of Leucimne took place in 434, the battle of Sybota in May 432, the revolt of Potidaea in July 432, the Megarian psephisma in the summer of 432, the assembly of the people at Sparta in the beginning of October 432, the assembly of the League at Sparta in Nov. 432, the surprise of Plataea 5th-6th March 431, the beginning of the invasion of Attica 25th May 431. He reads in Thuc. 2, 2 *πέντε μῆνας* instead of *δύο μῆνας*.—The question as to the military strength of Athens at the beginning of the Peloponnesian War, which depends upon the passage in Thucydides, 2, 13, as to whether it should be explained or emended, is still unsettled. The estimates of Beloch too, *Die Bevölkerung der griechisch-römischen Welt*, Leipz. 1886, who assumes 40,000 slaves instead of 400,000 in Athen. 6, 272 (or rather 100,000, see p. 95 of Beloch's work), are not incontrovertible. Cf. Beloch, pp. 60-66, and the article by H. Landwehr, *Die Forschung über die griech. Geschichte*, Part II. in the *Philologus*, vol. 47, 1.

CHAPTER XXII

THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR TO THE DEATH OF PERICLES

431-429

THE Spartans sent two-thirds of their whole levy to the Isthmus, where their commander-in-chief, king Archidamus, delivered an address to the leaders of the various contingents, in which he represented prudence and obedience as the chief virtues of a soldier. But before beginning the war in earnest he sent once more to Athens to ask if she would give way. The envoys were, however, refused an audience and conducted at once to the frontier. Here their chief Melesippus said: "This day is the beginning of great evils for Greece."

Shortly before this Pericles had once more explained the situation to his fellow-citizens and stated his plans in the form of a piece of advice. They were to withdraw into the city, not to offer battle, and to rely chiefly on their financial resources. Their annual revenue from the allies alone, without counting the others, amounted to 600 talents; there still remained 6000 talents in the treasury, 2700 having been spent on the buildings on the Acropolis and on the war against Potidaea. Besides this they had as a reserve the valuable offerings in the citadel, the golden mantle of Athene Parthenos, which was removable, containing alone 40 talents of gold.¹ The number of their hoplites was 13,000, besides the 16,000 older and younger men, who were required and available for the defence of the walls round the city and the Piraeus. They had 1200 cavalry and mounted bowmen, 1600 other bowmen,

and 300 triremes ready for sea. The instructions of the general were followed out: everything that could be taken away was removed from the country; the people were brought into the city and the cattle taken to Euboea or the other islands. It was hard for the Athenians to give up their homes in the country, to which they had been accustomed from early times and in which they had settled comfortably after the retreat of the Medes. Only a few could get a lodging in the houses of the city; the majority encamped in the squares and open spaces round the sanctuaries; the Pelargicon was filled with temporary dwellings, as was also the space between the Long Walls; some country-folk took up their abode in the towers of the city-walls.

The Peloponnesians first advanced against Oenoe and were detained a considerable time by the siege of this frontier fort. It was not till long after their start that they arrived in the Thriasian Plain, just as the corn was ripe (end of May). They laid waste the fields of the goddess, and then advanced, leaving Mount Aegaleus on the right, into the Athenian plain and halted in the deme of Acharnae, where they continued their work of destruction. Archidamus had thought that possibly the Acharnians, who formed such a large part of the Athenians that they alone contributed 3000 (?) hoplites, would not be able to remain in patience behind the city-walls when they saw their fields being laid waste, and that in this way a defeat might be inflicted on the Athenians. But no sortie was made, and Pericles did not even summon an assembly of the people, being anxious to give no opportunity for unnecessary discussion. All that he did was to send out Athenian and Thessalian cavalry, the latter from Larissa, Pharsalus, Crannon, Pyrasus, Gyrton, and Pherae. But very little blood was spilt in the skirmishes which ensued. Finally the Peloponnesians retired between Mount Parnes and Brilessus and then across Oropian territory into Boeotia. But before they withdrew, the Athenians undertook a raiding expedition of their own. They

had reserved 1000 talents and 100 of their best ships for cases of extreme peril, and wished to do what they could with the rest. They sailed with 100 ships to Methone on the coast of Laconia, and, as it seems, would have taken it, had not Brasidas, who was commanding in that district, forced his way through the Athenian army and thrown himself into the threatened town. This was the first exploit of the man who was destined to inflict such injury on Athens. Then they sailed in a northerly direction along the west coast of the Peloponnese, took Pheia in Elis, which, however, they abandoned, conquered various places in Acarnania and persuaded Cephallenia to join their league. They then returned home after a fairly successful campaign.

In order to obtain a firm hold of a really important station, the Athenians at this juncture removed the Aeginetans from their island and established Athenian cleruchies in it. The Spartans allowed the Aeginetans to settle in Thyreatis, which had so long been disputed border territory between Sparta and Argos. Pericles then led 13,000 hoplites in person into the territory of Megara. He had evidently arranged this campaign to tranquillize his fellow-citizens, who thus had the satisfaction of making their hated neighbour do penance for the sins of the whole of the Peloponnese against Athens. A more useful achievement was the occupation of the island of Atalanta on the Opuntian coast. In this way the Athenians showed the enemy that they were not to be intimidated and that they intended to attack him in his weak points. The Corinthians adopted the same system on a smaller scale, of course only in the west, attaining some success in Acarnania, but none whatever in Cephallenia. On the whole, the results of the first year of the war (431) were favourable to Athens.

When the military operations were over, the Athenians in accordance with ancient custom celebrated the funeral ceremonies of those who had fallen in the war, on which occasion ten coffins made of cypress wood, one for each Phyle, with

the remains of those who had belonged to it, and an empty bier in memory of the citizens whose bodies had not been recovered, were conveyed to the Ceramicus. Here Pericles, by order of the state, delivered the funeral oration.

If Thucydides has not reproduced the train of thought in this speech with accuracy—although we may assume that he did, as the occasion was a very special one—at all events it fits into his history extremely well as a complement of other speeches made for and against Athens, and is most instructive for posterity. And it may be that Pericles himself had a similar object in view in making the speech. It is mainly a sketch of Athens from Pericles' point of view, a glorification of the ideal Athens which floated before his mind. Pericles says that rather than eulogize individuals, he would prefer to praise the city and the spirit which made the individual members of it great. He boldly enunciates the proposition that Athens had not borrowed her institutions from others, but had served as a pattern to them; and certainly the development of the Athenian democracy was quite peculiar to itself. In this democracy, says Pericles, poverty is a bar to no man; every one is respected according to his worth. No one grudges his fellow-men their pleasure, and the laws are not broken, because obedience is paid to authority. Throughout the whole year entertainment is provided for the Athenian citizen by means of sacrifices and festivals, and our widespread commerce brings all the gifts of the earth to Athens. Strangers are not expelled (as at Sparta); we like them to see the Athenians developing without effort into men who combine an apparently careless mode of life with ability to face danger. And the assertion of our enemies that they are a match for Athens is a mistaken one, for they have never yet encountered the united force of the Athenians. The Spartans are not braver, although they take more pains with their training. We, says Pericles, love beauty but not luxury; poverty is no disgrace with us; rather is it a disgrace not to wish to be rich.

We all take part in state affairs, and consider it wise to try and understand them by listening to speeches beforehand. We are brave after reflection ; we serve our friends, and therefore have friends who are serviceable to us. We are the only people who help our friends not out of calculation, but with the confidence of a generous nature. The speech concludes with impressive remarks on the glory which the dead had won, and with exhortations to the survivors.

This speech is one of the most important contributions to the history of civilization, because it is a contemporary character-sketch of one of the most interesting peoples of antiquity drawn by two of its leading representatives (Pericles and Thucydides). We, who survey that age with unbiassed eyes, are able to say that there is a great deal of truth in the picture, but also much exaggeration. It is a piece of exaggeration to say, as Pericles does, that their enemies had never proved themselves a match for Athens, because they had never encountered all the Athenians at once. The conquered side might always say this. The whole strength of a combatant is never concentrated at one point, and the test of a general's ability is his power of bringing the greater part of his forces to bear at the decisive spot. The assertion that Athens alone helps her friends from generous motives is extremely naïve. It is not analysis of character but flattery. Another exaggeration is the statement that the Athenians are just as brave as the Spartans without their laborious discipline. Even the most gifted nation cannot dispense with strict discipline in war time with impunity. This funeral oration throws a surprisingly clear light on the weak points of the Athenian character.²

In the second year of the war (430) the scenes of the first were repeated. The Peloponnesians advanced with two-thirds of their troops into Attica. This would not have done much harm, but a more terrible visitation followed. The plague broke out among the Athenians, at first in the Piræus, and

then in Athens itself. It is described by Thucydides, who was attacked by it himself. Beginning in the head, the disease spread through the body, not carrying off its victims rapidly but generally torturing them for a week with intolerable heat, so that many threw themselves into the water with the hope of finding relief. Many persons who survived the plague itself died of other diseases which resulted from it. As it was contagious and everybody was isolated people died like sheep without help. Physicians and religious ceremonies were of no avail. It was believed that the springs had been poisoned by the enemy, but we are not told that the people killed any one who was suspected of having put poison in them. The only thing which Thucydides mentions as exceptionally dreadful was that people threw their corpses on funeral pyres which belonged to others and then ran away. Many tried to enjoy life as much as they could, being convinced that it would soon come to an end.³ Meanwhile the Peloponnesians extended their work of devastation as far as Laurium, but did not remain long in Attica for fear that the disease might attack them also. Before they withdrew, Pericles once more sailed forth with 100 ships, 4000 hoplites, and 300 cavalry. The Chians and Lesbians had been obliged to contribute fifty ships. He landed at Epidaurus, nearly succeeded in capturing it, laid waste the territory of Hermione and Troizene, and took Prasias. Hagnon and Cleopompus sailed meanwhile to Potidaea, but could not capture it. The plague broke out both among Hagnon's troops and those of Pericles at Epidaurus. Of his 4000 hoplites Hagnon lost no less than 1500 in 40 days.

The discontent of the Athenians now burst forth. Their land had been devastated a second time, the plague had broken out, and no success had been achieved at Epidaurus. The blame, as usual, was laid on the leader. They vented imprecations upon Pericles, who thought it necessary to tranquillize and encourage the people in a speech which is

recorded by Thucydides.⁴ They even went so far as to send to Sparta and sue for peace, but the Spartans wanted to humble Athens yet further. The war was therefore continued, but Pericles was made a scapegoat, and condemned to pay a money fine. Plutarch relates that various people were specified by different writers as his accusers, Cleon, Simmias and Lacratidas, and that the fine amounted to 15 or 50 talents. The verdict, no doubt, involved his departure from office. But the Athenians could not do without him for long, and he was elected general once more, whether in 430 or not till 429 is uncertain. It is on this occasion that Thucydides narrates his death, which did not take place till 429.⁵

In the summer of 430 the Spartans made a futile endeavour to win over Zacynthus, the Achaean inhabitants of which were allies of the Athenians. But in Thrace six Peloponnesian envoys, who were on their way to Persia, were delivered into the hands of the Athenians by their ally Sadocus, the son of Sitalces. Among them were three Spartiates, Aneristus, Nicolaus, and Stratodemus, and the Corinthian Aristeus. The Athenians put them all to death, by way of retaliation on the Spartans, who had killed every one captured at sea who was not on the side of Sparta.⁶ About the same time an Ambraciote attack upon Argos Amphiloichicum miscarried.

In the following winter, the Athenians sent Phormion with twenty ships to Naupactus to watch the entrance to the Gulf of Corinth, while Melesander proceeded with six ships to Caria and Lycia. Melesander was defeated and slain, and the Athenians were exposed to great dangers at the entrance to the gulf. This was where the Peloponnesians could meet the Athenians at sea. Athens must have keenly regretted that she no longer possessed a harbour on the Megarian coast of the Gulf of Corinth.

In February 429 Potidaea surrendered under stress of famine. The Athenians, who had already spent 2000 talents on this siege, readily granted the inhabitants free exit with

clothes and money for their journey. Everything else fell to Athens as booty, a small return for the expenditure incurred.

On the other hand the doom of Plataea was approaching. The Athenians had both the power and the will to conquer the distant Potidaea, but could not protect Plataea that lay close to them, and had no wish to do so. Here it was a question of fighting a battle in the open, in which the Athenians, in spite of all the fine speeches of Pericles, felt themselves no match for the Peloponnesians. In the summer of 429 Archidamus marched against Plataea. Negotiations took place between the Plataeans and Spartans, which are characteristic of the ideas and manners of the time. The Plataeans pointed out that Pausanias had once declared their city to be neutral and inviolable, and they demanded that they should be left in peace accordingly. Archidamus replied that they might remain neutral, but that they should prove their neutrality by aiding in the liberation of the subjects of the Athenians, and if they were unwilling to do that, they should at all events receive the Peloponnesians into their city. The Plataeans replied that they could not do this, because their wives and children were in Athens, and besides the Thebans would ill-treat them if they were admitted into the city. Archidamus thereupon finally proposed that they should count all their possessions, their trees, etc., and withdraw wherever they pleased while the war lasted, and afterwards everything would be restored to them. The Plataeans asked for a truce to communicate this proposal to the Athenians. The latter declared that they would protect Plataea, whereupon the Plataeans declined to accept the proposal. Archidamus called upon the gods of the country to be witnesses to the unjust conduct of the Plataeans, who would have to suffer for the wrong they had committed, and then began the siege of the city. The Athenians never made any attempt to help Plataea afterwards, although it was in reliance on such assistance that the Plataeans had decided to stand a siege.

Archidamus first threw up a mound, to enable his troops to scale the city-wall. The Plataeans protected themselves by raising the wall at the threatened point, and removing the earth from the bottom of the mound by means of holes which they made in the wall. They then built a new wall in the form of a semicircle inside, so that if the threatened portion of the wall were actually captured, there would still be another to replace it. When the battering-rams were directed against the wall they dropped beams on them, which broke their force. The Peloponnesians next piled up wood and set fire to it, which caused such a conflagration as had never been seen. The fire, however, was extinguished by a sudden fall of rain. The enemy then gave up attempting to take the city by force, and set to work to invest it. They built a wall with a trench round it, and left some Peloponnesians and Boeotians there to man it. In Plataea, according to Thucydides, there were only 400 Plataeans, 80 Athenians, and 110 women to bake bread. Of course 480 men could not defend an extensive city-wall. No doubt Plataea was much smaller then than it afterwards became, still we must assume that the Peloponnesians were firmly resolved not to sacrifice a single life in storming the place.⁷

In the same summer (429) the Athenians sent 2000 hoplites and 200 cavalry against the Chalcidians and Bottiaeans. A battle was fought at Spartolus, and the Athenians were defeated and had to flee to Potidaea. Matters took a more favourable turn for them in the west. The Lacedaemonians under Cnemus, in conjunction with the Ambraciots and some Epirote tribes, wished to wrest Acarnania from the Athenians, and with this object they marched first against Stratos. But owing to the fault of the Epirote allies the adventure turned out a failure. The Epirotes, who formed a third of the attacking party, made a premature advance; the Stratians laid an ambuscade for them, and displayed great skill in the use of the sling, with the result that Cnemus returned to

Oeniadae and disbanded his army. In the same part of the world the Athenians themselves achieved a brilliant success at sea. The Corinthians and the other Peloponnesians sailed out of the Corinthian Gulf with a fleet of forty-seven ships, thinking that Phormion, who had only twenty Athenian vessels under him, would not oppose their advance. When, however, he did so, they adopted defensive tactics and drew up the fleet in a circle with the prows turned outwards. Phormion then sailed round them with his twenty ships, making constant demonstrations of attack, while they, in their efforts to avoid it, were gradually driven closer together. Finally, taking advantage of a strong easterly breeze, he dashed into the confused mass of ships, destroyed several, among them those of the admirals, and pursued the rest to Patrae and Dyme. The Athenians set up a trophy on the promontory of Rhium, and placed a captured vessel as an offering to Poseidon by the side of it; they then returned to Naupactus. The Peloponnesians proceeded to Cyllene, the naval arsenal of Elis, where Cnemus joined them with his fleet.

This was not the end of the naval encounters in these waters. The Peloponnesians were of opinion, and no doubt rightly so, that their fleet might have accomplished more. They sent Timocrates, Brasidas, and Lycophron as advisers to Cnemus, somewhat in the fashion that the first French Republic gave its generals deputies of the Convention as coadjutors. Phormion sent to Athens for reinforcements, and twenty ships were voted him, but with the unfortunate additional order that they were in the first instance to aid Nicias of Gortyna in the conquest of Cydonia. This enterprise was unsuccessful, and loss of valuable time was the only result. Meanwhile Phormion had been obliged to hold his own with twenty ships against seventy-seven of the enemy, and had performed his difficult task in brilliant fashion. The Peloponnesians lay to the west of Cape Drepanum, opposite Naupactus, in the harbour of Panormus, where their army was also encamped. Phormion was

stationed opposite them, off the promontory of Rhium Molycrium, also called Antirrhium. It seemed as if a battle would now be fought. The Spartan generals, however, resorted to stratagem, which might have resulted in the annihilation of the Athenians. They suddenly turned eastwards with their fleet, as if intending to attack Naupactus, which was without a garrison. Phormion of course was obliged to follow in the same direction. The two fleets then advanced in parallel lines, the Peloponnesians on the south, the Athenians on the north coast. The latter were in single file, the former, who were nearly four times as strong, four abreast. All of a sudden the Peloponnesians wheeled to the left and attacked the Athenians, so that there were four of their ships to every Athenian one. Twenty of their best vessels were at the head of the column. But in spite of this eleven of the Athenian ships escaped; of the remaining nine some were captured. The leading ships of the Peloponnesian column pursued the eleven to Naupactus, and a Leucadian vessel came up with an Athenian just outside the harbour. But the pursued ship skilfully steered round a merchant vessel which was lying at anchor, struck the Leucadian amidships, and sank her. Timocrates, who was on board this vessel, killed himself in despair. The Peloponnesian fleet now fell into confusion. The Athenians sailed out again and attacked them. They not only recovered all of the ships they had lost excepting one, but captured six of the enemy besides. They then set up a trophy at Antirrhium. The Peloponnesians also erected one at Rhium, but withdrew in the night to the Gulf of Corinth, the Leucadians alone remaining. The Athenian fleet which had been wasting its time in Crete now put in an appearance.

Cnemus and Brasidas, however, were not discouraged, and planned a great *coup* in an entirely different quarter. They made their sailors take their oars and cushions and march from Corinth to Nisaea, where they embarked in forty ships,

intending to surprise the Piræus. But at the last moment they had not the courage to carry out the plan, which might have done serious damage to Athens. They contented themselves with making a nocturnal descent on Salamis, whence they took away three empty ships of war. An alarm was given to the Athenians by means of fire-signals, but when they arrived on the scene the enemy had already departed with their booty.

It was about this time that Pericles died. It is not known whether he was alive when Phormion's battles at Naupactus and the surprise of Salamis took place. He succumbed to a lingering illness. Pericles had many severe trials in the concluding years of his life.⁸ He had been all along subjected to the attacks of the comic stage, which was under the influence of the aristocrats, and had systematically ridiculed all the men who were connected with him, such as Metichus, who filled many offices, the wealthy Pyrilampes, and others. But at last ridicule developed into legal proceedings against his most intimate friends. The first attack was directed against Phidias. An artist of the name of Menon, who had co-operated in the works on the Acropolis, was enlisted in the service of this intrigue. After demanding and obtaining the *adeia* (exemption from punishment, *i.e.* permission) which was required by the constitution for bringing his accusation, he asserted that Phidias had embezzled money which had been destined for the works of art. We have no trustworthy record of the case, but it is not impossible that the great artist was condemned upon this or some other charge. Pericles himself was involved in the accusation, and strangely enough it was stated in Athens that the war with Sparta was connected with the danger that threatened Pericles from this quarter, the idea being that he wished to divert the mind of the Athenians from his guilt by means of the war. Phidias, it seems, then returned to Elis, where he had commissions to execute, and died there.

A second indirect attack was now made. Pericles held Anaxagoras in the highest esteem. Diopceithes, a man of great experience in religious matters and a friend of the Nicias who was about to become so famous, brought forward a motion in the Assembly that a public prosecution (*eisangelia*) should be instituted against those who denied the existence of the gods, or propagated doctrines concerning celestial phenomena, and the adoption of the motion led to an accusation against Anaxagoras, which according to some authorities was made by Cleon. Athens was in a bad way when orthodox conservatives and advanced democrats made common cause against her best citizens. Pericles defended Anaxagoras, but failed to obtain his acquittal. The popular tribunal did not want to receive lessons in philosophy from any one. Anaxagoras had to pay a fine of five talents, and went to Lampsacus.

Pericles' two best friends, the confidants of his ideas on art and science, had been removed; the next step was to deal a last and cruel blow at his affections. A comedian named Hermippus, acting on the popular resolution obtained by Diopceithes, brought charges against Aspasia of impiety, and of acting as procuress to Pericles. Pericles defended her in person. During his speech he shed tears, tears which were not part of the stock-in-trade of the rhetorician. Aspasia was acquitted.

Pericles lost his two sons Xanthippus and Paralus by the plague in the space of a week; his sister also died. He bore his misfortunes with dignified composure. In order to continue his family he obtained a decree legitimizing his son Pericles by Aspasia; this was some small consolation for the man who throughout his life had served his city to the utmost of his power. But his strength was broken. When death was approaching his inmost thoughts found vent in a characteristic remark. The friends who stood around his couch, believing that he was dead, began to praise his success in war. He overheard them and had strength enough to say:

“My only claim to praise is that no Athenian has ever had to put on mourning for any act of mine.” Humanity in fact is a prominent trait in the character of Pericles ; in this respect also he towers above an age which witnessed and prompted the acts of cruelty perpetrated in Plataea and Corcyra, and against Mytilene and Melos.

In recording the death of a man of Pericles' importance, one would naturally like to sum up the total of his life and work.⁹ It is, however, a peculiarly difficult task in his case, not only because the state which he organized succumbed to its opponents, nor because the estimate of him as a statesman will differ according to the political views of the critic, but for this special reason that there are good grounds for maintaining that the aims which we believe Pericles to have set before himself, and which he unfortunately did not attain, were never proclaimed by him in so many words. The verdict on Pericles depends on whether his critics share our view that he had more extensive and more exalted aims than he ever thought fit to make public. We add here a few remarks to what we said on this subject at the close of Chapter xx.

The Athenian state was not merely the outward expression of the democratic principle, it was also an attempt to realize the principle of socialism. The idea was that the Athenian citizen should not only be entitled to vote on public affairs in accordance with certain rules, but should also be in a position to perform this political duty without incurring loss by neglect of his private affairs. This was the origin of the pecuniary compensation allowed for every kind of public service. If the poorest man announced his intention to take part in the government of the city, he could add that he was able to do so, because the state provided for his subsistence. In this way Pericles managed to place the Athenians on an equal footing with the Spartiates in one very important point ; if they wished it they could be gentlemen like them. Just as the Spartiates could devote their attention to public affairs

without losing anything, so the Athenians could do the same, thanks to Pericles. In point of dignity the Athenian citizen was on a level with the Spartan, which, so far as we know, could not be said of any other people in Greece.

In material resources, too, Athens was on a par with Sparta. The number of combatants and the quality of their equipment were much the same in both states. But material power alone is not sufficient. There must be a spiritual element permeating the whole, the peculiar character of which constitutes the strength of a state. This the Spartans possessed in their discipline, in their absolute submission to authority. Discipline of this kind could not be enforced in Athens. The Athenian character was of an entirely different nature. We shall describe it more in detail later on; we need only point out here that a love of individual freedom was its fundamental trait, and that the democratic constitution fostered this propensity. The Athenian with his alert and active mind was inclined to rule the state himself, and to decide all questions of detail. Consequently he was not qualified for his task if he was not educated up to the highest pitch. He declined to render unquestioning obedience to any authority; it was therefore necessary that he should be sufficiently enlightened to come to a right judgment of his own accord. Our view is that the aim of Pericles was to make the Athenians into men of this stamp. Above all they were to be free from prejudice, for prejudice is a bar to right judgment. Pericles is generally thought of merely as the man who adorned the city of Athens with works of art, and provided for the refined entertainment of its citizens, but in other respects allowed every one to follow their own devices; and this conception of him is confirmed by his speeches in Thucydides. But if we take certain facts into consideration, we arrive at a different conclusion. The first of them is the personality of Pericles himself, which was marked by gravity and absorbed in lofty and serious aspirations to an extent met

with among few statesmen. We may think it of slight importance that he never took part in a drinking-bout; we may, if we are bent on censure, style it a piece of irony that he had a citizen, who followed him to his door one evening with abuse, escorted home by a slave with a torch; but his invariably careful preparation for every speech which he had to deliver, his endeavour to instruct and not to persuade the people in his speeches, his solicitude as a general for the lives of the Athenian citizens, which almost outweighed other military considerations—all this reveals exceptional earnestness and extraordinary self-control. Is it not natural that he should have wished his fellow-citizens to possess the seriousness which he demanded from himself? Did he not blame Sophocles because he was deficient in it? The whole personality of Pericles conveys the impression that he wished to be a pattern of human worth to his people; is it likely that his ideal was only morally and not also intellectually an exalted one? The Athenians were superstitious. Diopetithes' friend Nicias in the Sicilian expedition is evidence of the harm wrought by this. Pericles was not so, and it was precisely in campaigns that he endeavoured to disseminate more enlightened interpretations of natural phenomena. In this Anaxagoras aided him with his rich stores of knowledge. Shall we be wrong then in assuming that Pericles wished to see the Athenian people become better qualified for their position as rulers by means of solid instruction in natural science? Besides, we are aware in these days what an important factor the proper position of woman is of national greatness. In Athens women were excluded from educated society, which consisted of men only. The greatest admirers of Athens cannot deny that this was a serious defect. Aspasia, however, was a real help-meet to Pericles, and, as the charge brought by Hermippus shows, a group of cultivated men and women used to meet in Pericles' house; is it likely that a serious-minded and highly-educated man like Pericles would

not have come to the conclusion that his own example ought to be generally followed in Athens if the social life of so gifted a people were to be placed on a satisfactory basis?

It was an idea worthy of Pericles to introduce the best elements of the civilization of Asia Minor, the study of natural science and the social recognition of the female sex—we need only call to mind Sappho and Artemisia—into Athens, amidst this energetic, artistic, commercial, novelty-loving population. Might not the result be that Athens, who had founded her empire so gloriously, would preserve it for the welfare of all? Unfortunately circumstances were too strong for the great statesman. The soothsayers deprived him of his friend Anaxagoras, and then completed the ruin of the army in Sicily; while a comic writer pretended that Aspasia was a woman of bad character, and yet the old comedy was anything but a pillar of morality.¹⁰

It is of no consequence that our conception of Pericles' importance is not expressly recorded by the ancients. Thucydides himself says that Pericles did not follow, but took the lead. Is it likely that his ambition was confined to taking the lead in politics? His aims, if they were such as we believe them to have been, could only be guessed at; to proclaim them would have been to ensure their failure.

And they owed their failure to unfavourable circumstances. The end in view, the completion of the Athenian citizen's education, was not attained; there remained only the instrument which ought to have led to better things, an uncontrolled democracy. But even this taken by itself was not so mischievous as many suppose nowadays. Every form of government which allows the free expression of opinion may work for good, and at all events the uncontrolled democracy of Athens possessed the excellent counter-check, which is unknown in modern states, of strict responsibility on the part of the political leader. Hence we consider the Athenian

democracy with Pericles at its head as one of the most brilliant and perfect of political institutions, and as a very high type of one without him.

NOTES

1. For the ten golden Nikes existing at the beginning of the war, which contained altogether 524 kilogrammes of gold, cf. Foucart, *Les Victoires en or de l'Acropole*, in the *Bull. de corresp. hellénique*, vol. 12, p. 283 seq.

2. There is much in this speech of Pericles (Thuc. 2, 35-46) that reminds us of the French character, *e.g.* the value set upon the conveniences of life, the assertion that his people is the only one always actuated by disinterested motives in politics as well as other matters, and the opinion that the highly-gifted Athenians could accomplish just as great results in war without strict discipline as other disciplined armies. In precisely the same way, the article *L'armée française avant la bataille* (1886) eulogizes French military discipline, strict obedience being exacted only in the period of actual service, and the individual retaining his freedom in other respects. This theory did not hold good in the case of the Athenians, as the battle of Amphipolis proves.

3. The Plague (Thuc. 2, 48) is said to have originated in Ethiopia, and thence to have spread to Egypt, Libya and *ἐς τὴν βασιλέως γῆν τὴν πολλήν*. It has already been noticed by several writers that the plague which, according to Livy 4, 21 and 25, prevailed in Rome in the years A.U.C. 318, 319 and 321, and died out in 322 (*i.e.* according to the usual chronology, the years 436, 435, 433 and 432) must have had the same origin; in Athens it raged during 430, 429, 427, 426. Holzapfel (*Römische Chronologie*), who makes use of this coincidence to confirm his own chronological system, according to which A.U.C. 318 would correspond exactly to 430, advances (p. 145) the well-founded conjecture that the plague may have been brought to Rome as well as Athens from Carthage—an interesting glimpse into the commercial relations of the most important cities of the ancient world. In their behaviour during the plague, the Athenian people proved more civilized than many nations in modern times. We need only recall the plague of Milan as described by Manzoni, and the many incidents which have happened in our own day in districts ravaged by the cholera. Thucydides does not state that any one was attacked on the suspicion of disseminating the poison. This is greatly to the honour of the Athenians.

4. Thuc. 2, 60-64.

5. Thuc. 2, 65. Pericles strategus again in 430 according to Grote (3², 444), A. Schmidt (Perikles, 1, 174); in 429 according to Gilbert (Beitr. 121), Beloch (Att. Pol. 300), Duncker (9, 188).—No Athenian statesman was treated as considerably by the people as Pericles. He died probably in October 429.

6. At sea no international law applied, because it belonged to no one. The Athenians no doubt claimed the Aegean as their property, but that was only an additional reason why the enemies of Athens should treat it as enemy's territory.

7. For modern criticism on Thucydides' account of the siege of Plataea see the notes to the next chapter. For the extent of Plataea at that date cf. Fabricius, Theben, Freib. 1890, p. 17.

8. For the charges brought against the friends of Pericles, cf. the notes of Curtius, G. G. 2⁶, 851, 852. Curtius (p. 396) points out very justly that the constant personal attacks on Pericles through his friends may certainly have inspired him with a wish that war might soon break out. For he knew how it ought to be conducted to ensure the welfare of Athens.

9. We cannot here go into the details of the question of Pericles' military abilities, which has been much discussed in recent times. We consider him to have been, as we have already endeavoured to explain, a great and far-sighted statesman, and a very fine character; we also think that he always acted judiciously and consistently in time of war; but we are unable to discover that he displayed any special talent for the conduct of a campaign. Even in those days generalship had no doubt become an art, skill in which could not be improvised and which demanded rather a thorough and well-nigh exclusive devotion to the subject. We do not believe that Pericles during his thirty years' career as an Athenian statesman ever had time to make a practical study of military science. A man who had to conduct the home and foreign policy of a state like Athens, of the importance of which we have endeavoured to convey at least some notion, could not possibly be a great general as well, even if he had a talent for military detail. We believe, too, that a man who was as careful of the lives of his fellow-citizens as Pericles, lacked the recklessness which is sometimes necessary in war. His constant re-election to the post of strategus by the Athenians does not prove that they considered him a good military leader, for the functions of a strategus were of quite a different character to those of a general in modern times. We may admit that he was a good war minister, but not much more. The comparison of Pericles with Nestor and Antenor in Plat. Symp. 221 (where Brasidas is also compared with Achilles)

is no proof that he was thought highly of as a general ; after all, a Nestor is not enough as leader in a great war.

10. I look on Pericles as a man who continued, in the spirit of the age, the work which Solon undertook for Athens. Solon, in accordance with the ideas of his time, aimed at a government by the well-to-do classes, subject to the proviso that they were hard-working, honest men. Solon planned his state in the spirit of the practical wise men of his age. In Pericles' time a constitution based on a property qualification had become obsolete ; the leaders of the democracy, Cleisthenes and Aristides, had made universal equality of political rights an accomplished fact. Pericles, who considered this form of constitution to be the only suitable one for Athens at that time, as it undoubtedly was, wished to make the citizens really qualified to govern the state themselves. To attain this object it was necessary that they should be educated and enlightened. Among the Greeks of the fifth century enlightenment was of the highest practical importance in a democracy, as the history of the Sicilian campaign shows. Both Solon and Pericles represented all that was highest and best in the culture of their age, a culture which in the case of both men was due to the civilization of Ionia. The measure of success which they attained cannot be stated in a few words ; I will only point out that the work of both was spoiled by their most gifted pupil and kinsman, that of Solon by Peisistratus, that of Pericles by Alcibiades.—For the political friends and colleagues of Pericles, Phormion, Hagnon and others, cf. Gilbert, *Beitr.* p. 105 seq. ; for Phormion cf. also Cox, *Greek Statesmen*, 2, 111 seq.—For the helmeted bust of Pericles, cf. Friederichs-Wolters, 481 : the character of the head, which points to idealising propensities, is remarkable.—It is true that Athens has the merit of having duly appreciated the great astronomer Meton, and this is quoted as a proof that she valued pure science. But he was either an astrologer into the bargain or characterized by a worldly cunning which was not very becoming for a savant ; *Plut. Alc.* 17 ; *Nic.* 13 ; *Ael. V. H.* 13, 12. It is said that these are calumnies, but his reputation was of such a kind that he was credited with skill in interpreting omens, and it was precisely this accomplishment which the Athenians held in especial esteem. Meton certainly made a great impression on the Athenians ; but very probably not because he was a great natural philosopher, but because he knew how to interpret omens.

CHAPTER XXIII

THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR TO THE PEACE OF NICIAS

429-421

AFTER the death of Pericles there was no one of paramount authority in Athens to take the helm of the state. The most prominent man was Nicias, son of Niceratus,¹ chief of the peace party, of good birth and large fortune, but of a narrow and dull mind, as a general noted only for his caution, but at times misled by superstition. At first he had thrown in his lot with Pericles, but had eventually seceded from him, and placed himself at the disposal of the party whose religious and political views were opposed to those of Pericles. The first leader of the war party was Lysicles, who married Aspasia, and soon afterwards perished in the war. Demosthenes,² an energetic and enterprising soldier, then came to the front. But the soul of this party and at the same time leader of the democracy, was Cleon, a turbulent man,³ who had combined with Nicias for the overthrow of Pericles in 430, but who now opposed Nicias. The war proceeded in the old fashion, except that more districts were continually drawn into it. We now give a brief account of its main incidents based on the narrative of Thucydides.

At the beginning of the winter of 429 a piece of good fortune seemed to be in store for the Athenians; Sitalces, king of Thrace, appeared on the scene. He advanced in a westerly direction with a powerful army, which Thucydides

estimates at 150,000 men. The origin of this campaign was as follows : Sitalces had acted as mediator between Perdiccas and the Athenians, and had left his old *protégé* Philip in the lurch, in return for which Perdiccas had promised him certain services. Perdiccas, however, did not keep his promise. Sitalces decided to punish him, and took this opportunity of holding out the prospect of the reconquest of Chalcidice to the Athenians. He had with him Philip's son, Amyntas. Sitalces marched first of all into upper Macedonia; he did not, however, advance far in this direction, but remained in Mygdonia, Cresthonia, and Anthemus, and finally reached Chalcidice. But there the campaign, which had aroused great expectations among the Greeks, with some in the nature of hope, with others of fear, came to a speedy termination. Not that the Thracians suffered reverses; their army simply vanished into space. The torrent swept by and left no trace behind it. The Macedonians had never taken this war seriously, and to prevent all possible mischief Perdiccas had enlisted Seuthes, nephew of Sitalces, on his side, and Seuthes must have contributed to the speedy withdrawal of the Thracian king. And there was no need whatever to be alarmed at a Thracian invasion of this kind. The Thracians were unable to attack cities; all they could do was to lay waste the country. If the Athenians had been on the spot at the right moment, something might have been made of the expedition; but they did nothing. In thirty days' time, of which eight were spent in Chalcidice, Sitalces was back at home again, and the enemies of Athens breathed freely once more. A winter campaign under Phormion in Acarnania proved also of no importance.

In the fourth year of the war (428) the Peloponnesians again carried out their usual invasion of Attica, which now made little impression, as everything that could be laid waste had been already destroyed. But it was extremely unfortunate for Athens that almost the whole island of Lesbos

(Methymna alone excepted) revolted from her, Mytilene taking the lead. In Mytilene the party hostile to Athens had been in power for a long time, but they had postponed the actual revolt until they were better provided with ships, fortifications, supplies, and the means of closing the harbour. But Athenian partizans betrayed the plot, Athens sent envoys to dissuade Mytilene from it, and on their mission proving unsuccessful a squadron of forty ships sailed to Lesbos with orders to surprise the Lesbians at the next great festival of the Malean Apollo outside the city, and if that were impossible, to commence open war. The plan for a surprise failed, as the Lesbians were warned of it, and war broke out.⁴ But the preparations of the Lesbians were not quite completed. An attack on the Athenians had some measure of success, but the Mytileneans did not venture to follow up their advantage and allowed themselves to be blockaded in the city. They hoped for assistance from the Peloponnese, and despatched envoys to plead their cause to the Greeks at the festival of Olympia. This was done, and Thucydides has reported what they were supposed to have said there. They felt it incumbent on them to justify their secession from the Athenian league—if Thucydides has not merely used this opportunity to give a connected account of the grievances of the allies. They stated that they had not joined the Athenian league in order to aid in enslaving other Greeks, but that this was the aim of the Athenians, who were now only waiting for a favourable opportunity to deprive the Mytileneans of their liberty as they had already done with others. A state of suppressed hostility, they said, had existed between Athens and Lesbos, and it was merely a question who should anticipate the other on the outbreak of actual war. The Peloponnesians admitted Lesbos into their league, but for the present did nothing to help the Lesbians; for with a fresh invasion of Attica on hand, which was not even popular with all the allies, the Lesbians were of little use to them. They made prepara-

tions, however, for the despatch of forty ships of war to the Aegean, an enterprise which never entered into the imagination of Pericles.

The Mytileneans were still able to fortify Antissa, Pyrrha, and Eresus, and to make an attack on Methymna. But the Athenians received reinforcements under Paches, and Mitylene was regularly blockaded by a wall with forts built round the city. The arrival of Salaethus, a Lacedaemonian, raised the spirits of the besieged. The Athenians had already been reduced to such straits by the war that they were obliged to supplement their resources by the imposition of an extraordinary direct tax (*εἰσφορά*), from which they expected 200 talents.⁵ In addition to this they now made the first of the subsequent series of expeditions to the coast of southern Asia Minor (Caria), for the purpose of raising money, which were more in the nature of predatory excursions than military campaigns; but Lysicles, the general in command, and part of his force perished near Myus.

In the fifth year of the war (427) the Peloponnesians made their usual invasion of Attica, and a fleet actually started for Mytilene. But all was over before it arrived. Mytilene had surrendered to the Athenians. Provisions were running short in the city, and Salaethus wished to make a sortie. To do this with greater effect he gave out heavy arms to the lower classes, who thereupon refused to obey their commanders and demanded a distribution of corn, threatening to come to terms alone with the Athenians if their request was not complied with. The nobles perceived that power was slipping from their hands, and thought it best to participate in the negotiations with the Athenians; they did not wish to be sacrificed alone, although this was ultimately their fate. Mytilene surrendered at discretion; Paches was to inflict no punishment until the Athenian people had pronounced the decision. The originators of the revolt fled, nevertheless, to the altars. Paches promised to do them no harm, and meanwhile con-

veyed them to Tenedos. The Lacedaemonians under Alcidas had arrived too late, and had not the courage to follow the advice of the Elean Teutiaplus and stir up the Asiatic cities against Athens. They returned with all speed to the Peloponnese, followed by Paches, who obtained possession of Notium, the port of Colophon, by a perversion of a promise made by him, not an uncommon proceeding among the Greeks. An Athenian colony was afterwards planted there. On his return to Mytilene he sent the leaders of the hostile party in chains to Athens with the greater part of his army. Salaethus was put to death at once on the spot, although he held out hopes of rendering the Athenians service in regard to Plataea if his life was spared. The people then decided to put to death not only the Mytileneans who were guilty of the revolt and who had been brought to Athens, but also all the grown men of Mytilene, and to sell the women and children into slavery. A vessel was despatched to Paches with the order to carry out the decision. But on the following day the Athenians repented, and assembled for a second deliberation on the same question. On this occasion speeches were made by Cleon and Diodotus, which Thucydides records, by the former for the ratification of the death sentence, by Diodotus in favour of clemency. We reproduce their main arguments, subject to the same proviso as above with regard to their accuracy. Cleon urged that all the Mytileneans were guilty, and that the Athenian supremacy could only be maintained by severe measures. Diodotus argued that the question was one of expediency only. Experience proved that severe punishments were in themselves useless. They never prevented a city from revolting, they only made would-be rebels more cautious. The people of Mytilene ought not to be punished, because it was precisely on the opposition between them and the nobles that the power of Athens rested. It would therefore be sufficient to put to death the men whom Paches had sent to Athens as the instigators of the revolt.

If Cleon's speech has not been garbled by Thucydides, with the object of presenting the speaker, whom he detested, in a bad light, it is characteristic of the boldness with which the people could be addressed in Athens, and of the pleasure which both orators and people took in long-winded periods. But even if Thucydides has invented some of it, the tone of the speech, combining impudence with a veneer of honesty, is probably Cleon's. In neither of the two speeches is reference made to the guilt or innocence of the Mytilenean people; the only question discussed is whether it is more expedient to kill them all or only some of them. Diodotus makes no attempt to prove the innocence of the Mytilenean Demos, or that it had only taken part in the revolt under compulsion. And in fact it looks as if the people of Mytilene were hostile to Athens, or Salaethus would not have placed good weapons in their hands. The surrender appears to have been due rather to the mutual jealousy of rich and poor in Mytilene than to the sympathy of any Mytilenean for Athens. Consequently if the Athenians displayed comparative clemency, they were really moved only by feelings of humanity, and not in the least by political considerations. A butchery such as Cleon demanded would certainly have been a useless crime.

The first resolution was rescinded, and another vessel started in all haste for Lesbos to convey the order to Paches not to carry out the death sentence. The rowers put forth all their strength so as not to arrive too late, and no doubt this was due not only to the high pay and abundant provisions given them by the Mytilenean representatives, but also to the conviction that the lives of thousands depended on their exerting themselves to the utmost. The second ship in fact arrived so quickly after the first that Paches had not had time to execute his ghastly commission. The Mytileneans, however, who had been sent to Athens were put to death, to the number of upwards of a thousand.⁶ The property of the

rebels was confiscated for the benefit of Athens. But the majority of the Athenian citizens who received grants of land in Lesbos did not go there. The land was relet to Lesbians at a yearly rent of 2 minas (about £8) for each estate. In this way 2700 new Athenian landed proprietors or capitalists were created, that is to say for as long as the arrangement lasted. The sanctuaries, evidently those of Attica, received 300 lots, a fine yearly income of about £2400 for the religious services of the Athenians. The Athenians now occupied the island of Nisaea off Megara, in order to be secure against surprises like that of 429.

This success of Athens at sea was, however, counter-balanced by a blow on land, which must have been expected for a long time. Plataea fell into the hands of the Peloponnesians. In the previous year the besieged had recognized the impossibility of holding out, and formed a plan for escaping to Athens. But only half the number, about 220 men, carried it out; the courage of the rest failed them at the last moment. They calculated the height of the Peloponnesian wall by the number of bricks, made ladders of corresponding height, scaled the enemy's wall on a stormy winter's night, got possession of the two towers commanding the entrenchment and escaped into the open. In order to mislead their pursuers, they at first took the road to Thebes and then turned southwards; 212 reached Athens in safety. In the year 427 those who had been left in Plataea began to suffer from famine. The Peloponnesians could have carried the city by storm, but they were averse to doing this for two reasons, of which Thucydides states only the second. The first was that it would have cost human lives, whereas with patience the city could be taken without bloodshed. The second was that if peace were concluded afterwards, it might be stipulated that all conquests should be restored. If Plataea were conquered, it would revert to the Plataeans; but if the Plataeans surrendered, the Boeotians would retain

Plataea. Consequently they must be induced to surrender, and to achieve this object it was desirable to inspire them with illusions as to their fate. The Spartans, therefore, who were completely under the influence of the Boeotians, told the Plataeans that if they would surrender they should be judged by Spartans and not by Boeotians. As a matter of fact, when the city surrendered five men did come from Sparta to sit in judgment on Plataea. But there was no real judicial enquiry; the proceedings resembled those of the revolutionary tribunal in Paris at its worst period. The wretched men were asked if they had done any service to the Spartans and their allies in the war; their answer to the question was a matter of indifference. As a special favour they were allowed to defend themselves at length, and they urged all that there was to be said. The Thebans then, according to Thucydides, had to make a reply, which, like Cleon's speech on the Mytilene affair, is a masterpiece of sophistry. The 225 men were all put to death, and the city of Plataea razed to the ground. Only the temple of Hera remained standing, and a large building was erected near it from the materials of the houses, to serve as shelter for people who wished to visit the temple. The land was taken on lease by the Thebans. There is no doubt that the slaughter of the Thebans in Plataea and of the Mytileneans in Athens was the cause of the execution of the Plataeans.⁷

The fall of Plataea was a matter of satisfaction for the Thebans, but gave the enemies of Athens no political advantage, for Athens had abandoned all idea of protecting the city. Her policy was to meet her enemies at sea only, and in this respect the west presented better opportunities of success than the east. The opposing factions met at Corcyra, and terrible scenes ensued. When the Corcyreans who had been taken prisoners in the naval battle were released by the Corinthians—with the object of bringing about what actually did take place—and had returned home, they set to work to

detach the island from the Athenian league. They forced their way into the council and killed about sixty democrats, among them the Athenian *proxenus*. At first Corcyra was declared neutral. But the Demos did not submit to its defeat. It seized the Acropolis and the port of Hylleia. The nobles on the other hand occupied all the houses in the market-place. The civil war continued in this confined space. Most of the slaves joined the Demos. The nobles, who were at a disadvantage, in despair set fire to their houses. At this point the Athenian Nicostratus arrived from Naupactus with twelve ships and effected the renewal of the alliance with Athens; he also made peace between the two parties. But the nobles had so little confidence in the peace that 400 of them fled to the Heraeum, whence they were removed to a small island close by. Meanwhile a Peloponnesian fleet arrived under Alcidas and Brasidas, who captured thirteen Corcyrean ships in a naval engagement, but did not venture to attack the city of Corcyra, and contented themselves with landing at the promontory of Leucimne and laying waste the country. The nobles were removed from the island and taken back to the Heraeum. Then sixty Athenian vessels arrived under Eurymedon, whereupon the Peloponnesian fleet withdrew in such trepidation that to avoid sailing round Leucas they dragged their triremes across the isthmus which at that time connected Leucas with the mainland. The Demos of Corcyra at once fell upon their enemies. Some were killed on the spot; fifty were persuaded to leave the Heraeum to have sentence passed on them and were put to death. Those who remained in the Heraeum heard of the fate of their companions, and put an end to their own lives rather than die by the hand of the executioner. In the city the massacre of the well-to-do inhabitants continued for seven days, in the presence of the Athenians and of Eurymedon. And, as Thucydides relates, the slaughter was not dictated solely by political motives; every evil passion was allowed full sway. Private hatred and

greed of gain inspired the murderous deeds of the real or supposed adherents of the democracy. Suppliants were dragged from the sanctuaries or slain in them; some were walled up in the temple of Dionysus; fathers actually killed their own sons. About 500 of the defeated party retired to the mainland and harassed Corcyra from there; afterwards they returned to the island and entrenched themselves on Mount Istone; we shall hear of their fate later on.⁸

Athens having thus secured her authority in Corcyra began her interference in Sicilian affairs in the autumn of 427. The principal point at issue there was the Straits of Messina, the possession of which was necessarily important to the Athenians for the maintenance of their maritime supremacy in the west. We propose however to relate what happened in that quarter later on, in connection with the second and greater expedition to Sicily, taking the achievements of the Athenian fleet on its voyage to Sicily in the first Sicilian war at an earlier stage.

The plague, which had lasted at first for two years and then abated for a time, reappeared at Athens in the following winter. On the other hand the Athenians had the satisfaction of being spared the usual invasion of Attica in the sixth year of the war (426), owing to the earthquakes which occurred in the Peloponnese before the army had got beyond the Isthmus.

During the continuance of the Sicilian campaign Athens managed to engage in other expeditions—a proof that, so far, in spite of the plague, the war had not greatly injured the Athenians, and that the policy of Pericles had not been a failure. Thirty ships under Demosthenes sailed round the Peloponnese, while sixty more under Nicias, who now assumed a more prominent position in the conduct of the war, proceeded to the island of Melos, to force it to join the Athenian league. But the plan failed, and Nicias sailed to Oropus, in order to make an attack on Tanagra in concert with troops marching direct from Athens. Was it intended to make

further conquests on the mainland? Would Tanagra have been easier to hold than Plataea? But although Nicias was victorious in the field, he failed to capture the town. On the other hand Sparta endeavoured to win fresh positions of vantage against Athens in the east. She complied with a request of the Trachinian Malians and of the Dorians, who were being hard pressed by the Oetaeans, and founded the city of Heraclea in the territory of the Malians, Heracles having ended his life in those regions. The Spartans hoped great things from this colony. It was intended to facilitate access to Thessaly and so to Thrace and at the same time to threaten Euboea. But if it had been possible to strike a blow at Euboea, the Boeotians would have done it long before. And the Spartan colony of Heraclea did not flourish. The Thessalians put every possible obstacle in its way, and the Spartan commanders displayed no ability to carry out a successful policy.

After sailing round the Peloponnese Demosthenes seized Leucas and then entertained an appeal from the Messenians of Naupactus, who wanted him to subdue the Aetolians, who certainly were very troublesome to the Naupactians, and consequently dangerous to Athens. It would not be a difficult matter, said the Naupactians, as the Aetolians were a scattered people, and had no fortified cities. Demosthenes' principal reason for embarking on this undertaking was that he believed it to be the initial stage of a really great achievement. His plan was to subdue the Aetolians, and then march through the territory of the Ozolian Locrians, surprise the Dorians, and afterwards, leaving Mount Parnassus on the right, to unite with the friendly Phocians, and attack Boeotia from the west and finally to enter Athens as a conqueror. The idea was a great one, and its execution not entirely out of the question, taking into consideration the grouping of parties among the Greek races of those districts. In Greece as a rule neighbouring states were at enmity with each other,

and this was especially the case in those parts. Ambracia was on the side of Sparta, Acarnania and Argos Amphilocheum on that of Athens. The Aetolians were favourable to Sparta, the Ozolian Locrians again to Athens. The Dorians of course belonged to the Spartan party. The Phocians, with the exception of the Delphians, were on the whole well disposed towards Athens. The hostility of the Boeotians to Athens is well known. We may add that the Malians were in favour of Sparta and the Oetaeans of Athens. Thus an Athenian army which marched through this country would always find friends again after a few days' journey. The passage through Boeotia would certainly be hazardous, for the Boeotian hoplites were more than a match for any troops which Demosthenes might have with him. On the other hand, a bold stroke of this kind might revive the courage of the friends of Athens even in Boeotia. Demosthenes, however, never had an opportunity of trying conclusions with the Boeotians ; his scheme fell through at the outset. He had the failing of energetic people of being occasionally too much in a hurry. On this occasion he did not wait for the Locrians, whose knowledge of the localities would have been extremely useful to him, but pushed on without their escort into the Aetolian territory. He was attacked near Aegitium by a superior force of the Aetolians who had taken up a position on high ground, was unable to advance and made his way into a forest to which the Aetolians set fire, and finally was obliged to retreat after heavy losses to Oeneum in Locris, whence he had set out. One hundred and twenty Athenian hoplites had fallen. He had now no desire to return to Athens ; he remained where he was, which proved of great advantage to Athens. For the Aetolians conceived the idea of making use of their victory to effect a complete revolution in western Greece. They applied for Spartan troops, which were sent under Eurylochos, among them 500 fighting-men from the new colony of Heraclea. The meeting-place of the allies marching westwards was Delphi. Eurylochos ordered

the Ozolian Locrians to join him, and the majority obeyed, especially the Amphissæans, who were neighbours of the Phocians, and therefore, according to the natural law prevailing in Greece, detested them. Some gave hostages, who were kept prisoners at Cytinium in Doris. The Peloponnesians and their allies marched through Locri against Naupactus, by the capture of which they hoped to take revenge for the campaign of Demosthenes. And the city would have fallen had not Demosthenes induced the Acarnanians, who were entirely devoted to him, to hasten to its assistance. The Ambraciots now wished to use Eurylochus and his troops against their hated neighbour, Argos Amphiloichicum, and Eurylochus proceeded to Proschium in Aetolia to make preparations for his expedition.⁹ The Ambraciots meanwhile began operations by invading the territory of Argos and occupying Olpæ which was close to the sea, whereupon the Amphilochians summoned to their aid Demosthenes and twenty Athenian ships which happened to be in Peloponnesian waters. The Ambraciots now besought Eurylochus for prompt assistance; he left Proschium and marched west of the Achelous through Acarnania northwards, and joined the Ambraciots at Olpæ. Here he fought a battle with Demosthenes, who won a complete victory over his opponents by means of an ambuscade. Eurylochus fell, and the defeated army was besieged in Olpæ. Menedæus, who succeeded Eurylochus, found that his position in Olpæ was untenable, as the place would soon be blockaded from the sea as well, and thinking that such valuable individuals as the Spartans and Mantineans with him deserved a better fate than to be cut down with semi-barbarians in a barbarian country, opened negotiations with Demosthenes, which had the desired effect. The Spartans and Mantineans marched out of Olpæ, alleging as a pretext that they were going to fetch wood and provisions, to prevent the Ambraciots from seeing what became of them. No doubt some mercenaries were left behind, probably Epirotes;

but they were of no account. The Ambraciots saw through the design and wished to escape as well ; but the Acarnanians of course would not allow this, and a hand-to-hand fight ensued, in which some Peloponnesians were killed, it being impossible to distinguish them in the confusion. Most of the precious Dorians, however, were saved ; those of the Ambraciots who escaped fled into the territory of Agræ. Meanwhile fresh troops arrived from Ambracia to assist their fellow-countrymen. They encamped upon one hill, another in the immediate neighbourhood (both bore the name Idomene) having been already occupied by Demosthenes without their knowledge. The Athenian general, who was a master of every stratagem, surprised the Ambraciots at daybreak by sending some Messenians to the front, whose Doric dialect made their opponents believe that the attacking party consisted of friendly Peloponnesians. They were thus totally routed ; only a few escaped to Ambracia. On the following day a herald came from the Ambraciots who had been conquered at Olpæ and had fled to the district of Agræ, with the customary request for permission to take up their dead. He was shown those which had fallen at Idomene, and was astonished at the large number. "How many," they asked him, "do you think there ought to be?" "About two hundred." "But those are the arms of more than a thousand." "Then they are not ours," he replied. "But you fought yesterday at Idomene." "Yesterday we fought no one," was the rejoinder. "But *we* conquered these men yesterday, when they came from Ambracia to the assistance of their countrymen." The herald then realized that the reinforcements from the city had been annihilated as well ; he uttered a loud cry and hurried away without bestowing another thought on the bodies which were lying there. Thucydides does not venture to state the number of the fallen Ambraciots, on the ground that it would have been pronounced incredible—a strange piece of timidity in a

historian. It is assumed that they may have amounted to 6000.¹⁰

The capture of Ambracia was now possible. But in that case Athens would have garrisoned the place, and this did not suit the Acarnanians. It would not do to let Athens become too powerful. Consequently a peace was concluded between the Ambraciots and Acarnanians, the terms of which were highly favourable to the former after the crushing blow which they had received. Ambracia retained her independence, and merely agreed not to assist Anactorium, on which the Acarnanians had designs. They wanted Anactorium because it was in their country; they cared little about Ambracia, which was far away on the other side of the gulf. With this state of things prevailing, every one thinking only of himself and his immediate advantage, and the allies of Athens being willing enough to make use of her, but taking very good care that she did not become more powerful, the political unity of Greece was certainly not likely to be realized.

In the following year (425) the Peloponnesians repeated their plundering march into Attica. But it did not last long. Events took place in the Peloponnese which caused the Spartans great anxiety, and made them abandon their predatory incursion in haste. A fleet of forty Athenian ships under Eurymedon and Sophocles sailed for Sicily, where Athens was engaged in the war which we shall describe later on; Demosthenes, who after his great victory over the Ambraciots had returned in triumph to Athens, was on board. He accompanied the fleet in a private capacity, but was specially authorized to employ it at his own discretion on the coast of the Peloponnese, a power the exercise of which required great ability, both in his dealings with the real commanders and as regards the enemy who was to be attacked. Demosthenes had definite plans, the success of which depended on their being carried out as a general surprise. His aim was to occupy Pylos.¹¹ The generals were

not in favour of his plan, but a storm compelled them to take refuge in the harbour of Pylos. Demosthenes again exhorted them to fortify the place, but they replied that there were many similar spots on the coast and that they could not all be occupied. They failed to see that the position of Pylos was an exceptionally advantageous one. It was a promontory which could be easily fortified, and close by there was a harbour, now called the Bay of Navarino, completely protected by the island of Sphacteria which lay opposite. It was also reputed to be the ancient home of Nestor, which would make it attractive as a place of refuge for all the Messenians and Helots as soon as it was fortified. Consequently it was the very place from which an immense amount of damage might be inflicted on the Spartans. But, according to Thucydides, at first no one in the fleet was inclined to follow Demosthenes' advice ; it was only ennui that induced the Athenians to bestir themselves in the matter. Their stay was prolonged more than had been anticipated owing to the continuance of the bad weather, whereupon the soldiers, in order to pass the time, took to fortifying the desolate heights of their own accord, and once the work had been begun it was prosecuted with enthusiasm. They had no iron tools for hewing stones, and therefore collected stones just as they lay ; they were also unprovided with vessels for carrying clay, and so piled it on their backs, and held it in a stooping position with their hands clasped behind them. The greater part of the old city required no fortifications, owing to the precipices which surrounded it. The Spartans, who were in Messenia and Laconia, took no heed of what was going on in Pylos ; they were apprised of it, but did nothing. Just at that moment they were celebrating a festival, during which they felt at liberty to disregard politics ; they thought that they could easily recapture the little fort at any moment. The Athenians completed their task in six days, left Demosthenes there with five ships, and then continued their voyage to Coreyra and Sicily.

Although the authorities in Sparta had allowed matters to take their course, the Spartan army in Attica took a serious view of the situation. Upon learning the news of the occupation of Pylos, they withdrew from the enemy's country, after a stay of only a fortnight. Pylos was to be retaken with all possible speed. Armed men hastily assembled from all quarters, and sixty ships of war arrived from the north. But Demosthenes had time to send word to Eurymedon, who was stationed at Zacynthus, about seventy miles off—less than the distance from Genoa to Leghorn—to come at once to his assistance. Meanwhile the Spartans thought they had devised a very clever plan in occupying both the entrances to the bay, the northern one close to Pylos itself and the southern broader one, with their fleet, and in disembarking 420 hoplites with their attendant helots on the island of Sphacteria which lay between. A landing being only possible in the harbour or on Sphacteria itself, they fancied they had by this means completely prevented the Athenians from disembarking troops. It does not seem to have occurred to them that the Athenian fleet would attack the Spartan ships, and yet this was the obvious course. When Demosthenes saw that the Spartans were preparing to carry Pylos by storm, he placed his worst-armed troops upon the better protected land side, and took up a position himself with sixty hoplites and a few archers on the side facing the sea, outside the wall and close to the steep shore, where there was room for only a few ships to lie to. It was necessary to defend the shore itself at this point, as if it were once carried the wall behind would be untenable. And the handful of Athenian troops actually repulsed every Spartan attack, notwithstanding that Brasidas urged on his men to the assault with great vigour from his own ship, and did not spare himself. He was wounded, and his shield which fell into the sea was picked up by the Athenians and erected by them as a trophy of victory. The attack was

continued for two days, and the Spartan leaders then sent to Asine for battering machines. The Athenian fleet, fifty strong, now arrived. The Spartans remained inactive, and their fleet was not in order even on the following day. No further thought was given to the blockade of the two entrances of the bay. Perhaps Brasidas had not yet recovered. The Athenians were thus able to sail into the gulf and capture five ships. The rest were beached and escaped. The Athenians were now masters of the bay, while the troops on Sphacteria, among whom were many Spartiates, were cut off. The Athenians did not venture to attack them, but kept on cruising round the island to prevent them from escaping. Meanwhile the whole Spartan levy had assembled before Pylos, but nothing could be done. The Spartans did not know how to capture a fortress, and saw that it was impossible to rescue the men on the island. The latter might be overpowered at any moment, and unfortunately there were so many Spartiates among them. It was therefore necessary to rescue them or place them out of danger, but how could this be effected? To attack the Athenian fleet was out of the question, for the Spartans shrank from an encounter at sea. The best plan would be to open negotiations for peace, during which their lives at all events would be safe; otherwise they were in constant danger, for the Athenians if they liked could kill all the Spartans on Sphacteria just as they had slain the Persians on Psyttaleia. The Spartans therefore made overtures for peace. In this way they gained time, which was the great object at that moment. An agreement was concluded with the Athenian generals in Pylos stipulating that in return for the surrender of the Spartan fleet, *i.e.* all the ships in Laconia, the blockaded party on Sphacteria should be provided with the means of subsistence, and that there should be a truce until the return of the Spartan ambassadors, who were to be sent from Pylos to Athens on board an Athenian trireme, to propose terms of peace. After

that the truce was to be at an end, and the ships were to be returned to the Spartans.

This embassy must have been received with great satisfaction in Athens—Spartans arriving at Athens in an Athenian war-ship and suing for peace! They declared that Sparta was prepared to make peace, and urged that Athens should not be too exorbitant in her demands, but rather earn Sparta's gratitude by a display of generosity; Sparta, they said, was ready to conclude an alliance with Athens, by means of which the two states would be able to control the whole of Greece. At Cleon's instigation the Athenians demanded in the first place the surrender of the men on Sphacteria, and secondly as a condition of peace the cession of Nisaea, Pegae, Troizene and Achaia. The ambassadors requested that Athenian commissioners should be appointed to consider these demands with them and come to a settlement. This proposal met with vehement opposition from Cleon. He said there was no need to appoint commissioners, that any reasonable proposal could be discussed in public, and that the object of the Spartans was to deceive the Athenians. Cleon was perfectly right. Negotiations by means of a commission, especially between two states, are an excellent means of gaining time, and this was precisely what the Spartans wanted, as we shall see more clearly presently. The ambassadors declined to make a public reply to the Athenian demands and departed. On their arrival at Pylos, they declared the truce at an end and demanded back their fleet. But the Spartans had already broken the truce by making an attack on Pylos, and consequently the Athenians declared that they were no longer bound by that stipulation. The Spartans protested and war began afresh.¹²

But matters did not progress as smoothly as had been anticipated in Athens. Sparta concentrated all her resources round Pylos, and at last prudently adopted the right policy. They managed to convey provisions to the imprisoned party

on the island, a task which was undertaken by helots in return for high pay and the promise of their liberty. The weather became bad. The Athenians saw that a time would come when storms would prevent them from blockading the island, and in that case the great prize of the undertaking, which was all the more welcome as it had been unexpected, the capture of the valuable prisoners, would be lost. Public opinion at Athens became unfavourable, and Cleon was upbraided with frustrating the peace. He replied with the assertion that the generals were neglecting their duty in failing to capture the force on Sphacteria. Nicias, the head of the board of strategi, was stung by this, and replied that it was not such an easy matter; if Cleon thought so, he might try it himself, and the board of strategi would place all that was necessary at his disposal. Cleon observed that he was not strategus, but the people insisted that he should make the attempt, and finally Cleon declared that he would do so without troubling the Athenian citizens, simply with a body of Lemnians and Imbrians, some peltasts from Aenus and 400 bowmen. He would bring the affair to a conclusion in twenty days, and if the Spartans were not prisoners by that time he would put an end to his own life. This announcement satisfied Cleon's opponents, especially the prospect of his having to keep the second of the two promises.

Cleon speedily completed his preparations, and chose Demosthenes, who was still in Pylos, for his colleague. He knew, writes Thucydides, that Demosthenes had long been planning a descent on Sphacteria. And we may supplement this brief statement of Thucydides as to the internal connection of events by some observations which the Athenian historian omits, because he confines himself on principle to recording facts and speeches. Demosthenes had evidently combined with the influential demagogue Cleon, because this was the only means of executing his well-conceived plan for defeating the Spartans, and with these two objects in view, firstly, that

an expedition should be sent to Pylos, and secondly, that a landing should be made on Sphacteria. Both were part of a concerted game between these two men. This supplies a complete explanation of Cleon's attitude towards the Spartan envoys. They came to Athens on board an Athenian ship, and Demosthenes had the means of sending a message to Cleon to insist upon the surrender of the men on Sphacteria, since they could easily be captured with a suitable force. Cleon therefore demanded their surrender and put an end to the truce, the prolongation of which into the bad season of the year would have prevented the Athenians from capturing them while the fleet could keep the sea, with the result that as soon as winter set in the Spartans would break off the negotiations and the men escape to the mainland. But the board of strategi under Nicias were not the men to take proper measures against Sphacteria. This could only be done by Demosthenes and Cleon. Cleon, however, could not put himself forward, or he would have been laughed out of court. He was bound to appear to yield to compulsion, and this he effected in a masterly way. Cleon's blunt exterior concealed great political astuteness. It was easy enough for him to boast, for he was backed by Demosthenes, who was the best qualified man for military operations of every kind.

No time was lost, and the moment was favourable for an attack. Sphacteria was covered with trees, and that was a great advantage to the defenders. In Aetolia Demosthenes had had to pay dearly for his blunder in losing himself in the forest, and his joy was great when he saw that, owing to the carelessness of the Spartans, the forest had been set on fire and burned down. The attacking party could now survey the ground. The enemy was exposed to view, and they could make their plans accordingly. The Spartan government having refused the demand of Cleon for the surrender of the men, Demosthenes proceeded to the attack after a day's rest.

He began by landing 800 hoplites during the night. The main body of the Spartans was stationed in the centre of the island near a spring of brackish water; a small force was posted upon the northern and steepest promontory, and there was a guard of thirty hoplites close to the landing-places. The latter was surprised and cut down. At daybreak the rest of the Athenians landed, and the attack on the Spartan main body began. Light-armed troops in parties of 200 were ordered to harass it on all sides without coming to close quarters. The Spartans were wearied by a struggle against an enemy with whom they could not grapple; the cries of their assailants made it impossible for them to hear their own words of command, and the ashes of the trees which were blown about by the wind prevented them from seeing clearly. The attacking party were themselves surprised at being able to make such an impression upon the dreaded Spartans. The latter now abandoned the centre of the island, and withdrew to the higher ground in the north, where they had a respite for the moment, but after a little while were obliged to yield, as there was no water there. Besides this, the leader of the Messenians offered to climb with some bowmen to a spot which commanded the Spartan position, and carried out his design. The Spartans were now confronted with the alternative of surrender or death. The Athenians of course desired the former, and summoned them to yield. The Spartans referred to their authorities on the mainland, who replied that they must do their best consistently with honour. They therefore surrendered. Of 420 hoplites 292 were left, among them 120 Spartiates.

Cleon had kept his promise in brilliant fashion. The affair naturally created a great stir. It was a novelty to find Spartiates who preferred life to death. People began to form a lower estimate of the Spartans. It is true that respect for the bravery of the Athenians was not increased by the event, for the assailants had managed to spare themselves. At

Athens, whither they were all conveyed, one of the prisoners referred to this in a manner which showed that at all events they had not lost their sense of humour. To the somewhat insulting remark that those who had fallen at Sphacteria must have been very brave men, he rejoined that "those must have been clever arrows which could single out the brave men." The most noticeable point in the whole affair is the ability of Demosthenes, who is one of the early forerunners of the experts in military science who distinguished themselves so greatly in the fourth century.

The only immediate result of the capture of the Spartiates was that the inroads of the Peloponnesians into Attica ceased. The Athenians declared that if they were repeated any prisoners made would be put to death. The Athenians valued their harvests just as much as the Spartans prized the lives of the Spartiates. In other respects the war went on as before, for Sparta was not as yet inclined to accept the Athenian terms. The Athenians made various descents on the country near the Isthmus, and occupied the peninsula of Methone near Troizene, fortifying the neck of land which unites it to the Argolic Acte with a wall. As Methone was opposite Aegina, the Athenians now had a ready-made passage for crossing over into the Acte, where they could put in an appearance at any time, and perhaps even conquer the old Ionic city of Troizene.

About this time the civil war in Corcyra terminated in the same spirit in which it had been hitherto carried on. The aristocrats who had entrenched themselves on Mount Istone surrendered, not to their fellow-countrymen but to the Athenians, who came from Pylos. The latter conveyed them to the island of Ptychia near Corcyra, on the understanding that if any one of them escaped all should be deprived of protection. An Athenian general ought never to have consented to such terms, which made the lives of the whole party dependent on the folly of an individual. It would thus

appear, if Thucydides was not misinformed, that the Athenians acted with evil intent. The result was such as might have been foreseen. The Corcyrean democrats persuaded some of the prisoners on the island of Ptychia to attempt to escape, and then denounced this breach of the agreement to the Athenians, whereupon the Athenian generals handed over the wretched men to their fellow-countrymen. Some were put to death, and the rest committed suicide. The Athenian generals wanted to leave for Sicily, and were not inclined to prolong their stay for the sake of Corcyrean aristocrats.

The Athenians achieved another success in this part of western Greece by joining with the Acarnanians and taking the city of Anactorium, which had been abandoned, as we saw above, by Ambracia. In the east they made a capture of a different kind. They seized a Persian nobleman named Artaphernes, who was on his way to Sparta, at Eion on the Strymon. They read his despatches, in which King Artaxerxes stated that he could not make out from the many Spartan embassies which had reached him what Sparta really wanted him to do, and that he therefore was sending Artaphernes with the request that the Spartans would order an envoy with clear instructions to accompany him to Persia. The Athenians sent Artaphernes back by way of Ephesus, under the escort of Athenian envoys, who, however, returned on hearing that Artaxerxes was dead. The mission of Artaphernes shows that the Persians did not think the time had come for active interference in the affairs of Greece; Athens was still too powerful for them. About this time the Athenians displayed their foresight in ordering the Chians to pull down their new city-walls; it was wise not to expose them to the temptation to which the Mytileneans had succumbed. But the war had made such inroads on the resources of Athens that the tribute of the members of the league was raised, in some cases to double the amount, in others to more. This measure must have been due to Cleon's

initiative, and it was probably he who raised the pay of the Heliastae to three obols at this time.¹³

In the beginning of the eighth year of the war, in March 424, the Lesbian fugitives took possession of Rhoeteum on the Hellespont near Troy, but surrendered it on receipt of a money payment and occupied Antandrus, opposite Lesbos, where they hoped to maintain their position. This part of the world, the borderland of Greece and Persia, was always a happy hunting-ground for adventurers. In many places the Greeks were probably supreme one day, and some one else the next. The power of Athens was not affected by incidents of this kind. On the other hand, a successful *coup* made by Nicias, who had been to a certain extent roused from his easy-going ways by Cleon's laurels, was of importance for Athens. With sixty ships and 2000 hoplites he attacked the island of Cythera, which was of the greatest value to Sparta, since it was an intermediate point for the trade of Laconia with Egypt and Africa, and protected or threatened Laconia itself, according as it was in the hands of the Spartans or their enemies. The Athenians first captured the seaport town of Scandia, and then advanced against Cythera, the inhabitants of which, who were Perioeci, surrendered. The Athenians next ravaged the coast of Laconia in the neighbourhood of Asine and Helus. On the Gulf of Boea, opposite Cythera, a Lacedaemonian contingent suffered a defeat, so that the Athenians were actually able to erect a trophy on Laconian soil. They then sailed round Cape Malea to the east coast of the Peloponnese, and took the town of Thyrea, in which the Aeginetans had settled. A Lacedaemonian force in the neighbourhood did not even venture to offer battle. The Aeginetans were brought to Athens and there put to death—a second wholesale massacre. The Cythereans joined the Athenian league; their tribute was fixed at four talents, about as much as was paid by the little island of Tenedos.

While the power of Athens thus made rapid progress in

southern Greece, her influence in Sicily was put an end to by the peace which the Greeks there concluded among themselves. It was a counterpart to that concluded between Ambracia and the Acarnanians, and shows how every increase of power on the part of Athens was regarded on all sides with fear and anxiety. The Athenians were now excluded from Sicily, and threw the blame on their generals, whom they punished.

By way of compensation, they achieved a partial success in an enterprise in their immediate neighbourhood. Just at this time the government of Megara was in the hands of a democratic party, which was on the whole favourably disposed towards Athens ;¹⁴ and as in addition to constant molestation from the side of Athens the position of Megara had become still more intolerable owing to the settlement of some of her exiled nobles at Pegae on the Gulf of Corinth, the democrats wished to hand over the city to the Athenians. But it was necessary to proceed with caution, because there was a garrison of Peloponnesians in Nisaea who could easily march on Megara, and because in Megara itself the general feeling among the democrats was not decidedly in favour of Athens. Operations were commenced by moving Athenian troops into the space between the long walls, so that the force in Nisaea was cut off from the city. Then the following plan was adopted for introducing the Athenians into Megara itself. The Megarian troops were to march out to attack the Athenians, and the latter were immediately to enter by the open gates. But this design failed, because the anti-Athenian party in Megara discovered it and opposed the march out. The Athenians thus only secured Nisaea, the garrison of which surrendered. Brasidas now intervened ; he happened to be at Corinth just then, organizing an expedition into Thrace. On receiving the news of the capture of the long walls of Megara he collected a small army and demanded admittance into the city. This was refused ; even the aristocrats were

opposed to it. It was not certain whether he was strong enough to bring matters to a decisive issue, and if he were not, he would only increase the confusion and might involve the aristocrats in misfortune. He gave, however, a proof of his capacity ; he prepared for battle, and the Athenians declined it, by which means they lost Megara. For now both the aristocrats and the democrats perceived that the Athenians were afraid of Brasidas, and the aristocrats admitted him into the city. The latter were strong enough to put to death about a hundred of the most objectionable members of the rival faction, in accordance with the fashion of those days. A strong partizan government was organized. The Athenians only retained Nisaea.

In the east Athens met with no success. It is true that what happened in Asia Minor was of little significance. The Athenians recaptured Antandrus from the exiled Mytileneans, and an Athenian fleet under Lamachus was destroyed by floods on the coast of Bithynia. But these incidents did neither good nor harm. On the other hand, Athens suffered severe losses in Thrace owing to the energy and skill of Brasidas. The latter had come to the conclusion that victory for Sparta could only be achieved by the destruction of the league, which was the basis of the Athenian power. The allies in Asia could not be touched, as the naval power of Athens was unbroken. There remained Thrace, which could be reached by land. He therefore requested to be sent thither with troops, and the Spartans consented, not because they were convinced of the importance of the undertaking, for since the time of Pausanias they had been averse to campaigns in that quarter, but because it was a means of getting rid of inconvenient individuals. They allowed Brasidas to take 700 helots as hoplites, besides 1000 Peloponnesian recruits. Since the occupation of Pylos and Cythera by Athens, the helots had been a source of anxiety to Sparta. Some time previously, as Thucydides relates, a mass of sus-

pected helots had been disposed of in the following summary manner. An official announcement was made that the helots who volunteered for service and displayed the greatest bravery should have their liberty; 2000 were selected and were led, crowned with wreaths, round to the altars and then taken out of Sparta. They were never heard of again, and must have been murdered somewhere. But all the helots could not be made away with in this manner, and many of them were good fighting material; a campaign in Thrace was the very thing for this purpose. If they were victorious there, so much the better for Sparta; if they perished, then their loss was not an irreparable one. And Brasidas himself belonged to the category of inconvenient persons who think they know everything better than their fellows. Let him try his luck in Thrace, at a distance from Sparta. Even on the march thither he proved himself a general of the first order. He succeeded in conducting his small force through Thessaly, which was amicably disposed to Athens, without any hostile demonstration.¹⁵ On the scene of action he displayed the same qualities, combining courtesy with energy, and winning the sympathy even of those who hitherto had not been well disposed towards Sparta. The Athenians were well known and so were their faults; the Spartans were strangers, and now the first Spartan statesman to appear in those regions was a man of unquestionable weight and capacity. No doubt it was not possible to establish perfectly satisfactory relations with Macedonia. Brasidas wanted to make use of Perdiccas, and Perdiccas to do the same with the Spartans. It was suggested that the latter should aid the king in subjugating Arrhibaeus, prince of the Lyncestae; but Brasidas had no inclination that way; it would not do to let the king become too powerful. Perdiccas had promised the Spartans to defray half the cost of the maintenance of their troops, but paid only one-third of it. Meanwhile Brasidas was thoroughly successful in his main object, in winning over the Chalcidians. He

persuaded the Acanthians in a very skilful speech, reported by Thucydides, to join the Spartan league as autonomous allies, and he was equally successful with the Stagirites. And while he gave more and more scope to his energies in Thrace, the Athenians received a heavy blow on their own frontier.

They had devised a not ill-conceived plan for obtaining possession of a portion of Boeotia.¹⁶ Demosthenes managed to open negotiations with some disaffected Boeotians, who held out a prospect of acquiring Chaeronea and Siphæ on the Corinthian Gulf. Chaeronea was near the Phocian border, and under the influence of Orchomenus, the ancient rival of Thebes. Thus it was conceivable that pressure might be exerted on Chaeronea by means of the Phocians, who were not unfriendly to Athens. In the year 447 the Theban party in Orchomenus and Chaeronea had defeated the Athenians at Coronea; now, in 424, the rival faction had evidently gained considerable strength in those cities. The plan was that on the same day the friends of Athens in Chaeronea should make themselves masters of this city, that Demosthenes should capture Siphæ by a descent from the sea, and—what was of special importance—that an Athenian army under the strategus Hippocrates should cross the Boeotian frontier at Oropus, occupy the sacred precinct of Apollo at Delium and fortify itself there. The last was not a great military feat nor of much importance in itself; it was intended merely to increase the feeling of insecurity among the Boeotians, who would thus be less able to ascertain in which direction the greatest danger lay and whither they ought first to turn. But the whole affair proved a failure. A Phocian who was loyal to Thebes betrayed the designs on Siphæ and Chaeronea; the anti-Athenians were on their guard, and when Demosthenes appeared before Siphæ he found the gates shut against him. A mistake was also made as to the day on which the simultaneous advance was to take place,¹⁷ and Hippocrates arrived at Delium after the attempt of Demo-

stheneas had miscarried. In spite of this he proceeded to entrench himself there. The Boeotians assembled in a high state of excitement under Pagondas at Tanagra, and offered battle to the Athenians, who were already on their return march after leaving 300 cavalry at Delium. The Boeotians had rapidly gathered an imposing force of some 7000 hoplites, 10,000 light-armed troops, 1000 cavalry, and 500 peltasts. The Athenians had as many hoplites as the Boeotians; the number of their cavalry is not stated, but in a pitched battle between Greeks only the hoplites were of consequence. The Athenians prepared for battle, partly because their honour forbade them to decline it, and partly no doubt because the large number of Boeotian light-armed troops would have seriously hampered their retreat.

The disposition of the Theban force was a peculiar one, and reminds us of the oblique order of battle employed subsequently by Epaminondas,¹⁸ as also of the Macedonian phalanx. While the Athenians and other Greeks generally drew up their hoplites eight deep, the Thebans at this period formed a line twenty-five deep. This involved many disadvantages. If the enemy had an equal number of hoplites it presented a longer front, and could attempt an outflanking movement. Besides, the rear ranks of such a deep mass could make their strength but little felt. The deep formation, however, possessed one great advantage. Two Greek regiments of hoplites meeting on the field of battle resembled two iron walls, which acted to a great extent by their weight and impetus. The fight in the first instance resolved itself into a contest of driving power; the enemy's ranks had to be forced backwards, and gaps had to be made in them so as to disperse them. For this a deep line offered considerable advantage. When a column twenty-five deep drove its opponents before it, the latter could not make a stand and were hopelessly beaten, whereas if both sides had lines of the same depth a return charge was possible. The thick mass acted

like a wedge, and, though it only made a gap at one spot, it broke up the whole line. And such was the result on this occasion. The Athenians defeated the other Boeotians, but gave way before the Thebans, and so the whole battle was lost. The Athenians fled in three divisions, to Delium, to Oropus, and to Mount Parnes. About 500 Boeotians and 1000 Athenians, among them Hippocrates himself, were left on the field. The battle was followed by a regular Greek quarrel on a question of principle, in which, however, the Athenians were also worsted, owing to the intervention of the Boeotians. The Athenians, in accordance with custom, requested the surrender of their dead. The Boeotians insisted that they should first evacuate the sacred precinct of Delium, which they had occupied in contravention of the laws of religion. The Athenians refused to admit that they had done wrong in occupying it, and each side persisted in its own view until the Boeotians cut the knot by capturing Delium. The Boeotians now delivered up the dead bodies, seventeen days after the battle. They had attained their object.

The defeat at Delium was a heavy blow to the Athenians. It proved that the Athenian hoplites were not only inferior to the Spartans, but also to the Thebans. They had encountered the Spartans with honour at Tanagra, and conquered the Boeotians at Oenophyta ; now they had been twice defeated by the same Boeotians, at Coronea and Delium. The Thebans at this period were already on the high road to the military ascendancy which they held in the fourth century.

The reverse at Delium was soon followed by an equally severe one in Thrace, where a change of monarchs had meanwhile taken place, King Sitalces having died and having been succeeded by his nephew Seuthes. Brasidas marched against Amphipolis, the importance of which was derived from its command of the roads across the lower Strymon uniting Thrace with Macedonia. The Argilians, who were colonists

from Andros, supported his undertaking. He first occupied the bridge over the Strymon, which was outside the fortifications of the city. His adherents in Amphipolis were ready to admit him, but could not carry out their intention immediately. The Athenian party in the city had time to concert with the Athenian commander in Amphipolis, the strategus Eucles, and send an appeal for prompt assistance to the other Athenian strategus, Thucydides, son of Olorus, the future historian, who was then at Thasos. But Brasidas heard of it, and at once offered the Amphipolitans such easy terms that all the inhabitants, even the Athenians in the city, accepted them, being convinced that Amphipolis could not hold out against a man of the stamp of Brasidas. Those who did not want to remain as free citizens of Amphipolis were allowed to depart with their belongings within five days. These were called favourable conditions in antiquity. Amphipolis surrendered, and on the evening of the same day Thucydides arrived at Eion and secured this important position for Athens. Brasidas occupied several other places in the neighbourhood. Perdiccas too put in a speedy appearance, and looked after his own interests.

The fall of Amphipolis made a great impression, and the tendency to revolt from Athens became general. Brasidas even built some ships on the Strymon, and sent to Sparta for reinforcements. But November had arrived, and nothing much could be done. Brasidas, however, captured a few places on the promontory of Mount Athos. Torone in Sithonia gave him some trouble, but he succeeded in taking it, and the Athenian garrison there escaped to their ships. Brasidas dedicated Lecythus, the citadel of Torone, to the goddess Athene, who had a temple there and who had, as he cleverly asserted, favoured his enterprise in a striking manner. If Athene no longer assisted the Athenians, on whom could they still rely?

As Amphipolis would certainly not have fallen if Thucy-

dides had been there on the morning of the day on which he entered Eion, he was impeached and condemned in Athens, probably at the instigation of Cleon. He did not return to Athens while the war lasted. After its conclusion he was allowed to re-enter the city. Whether he really neglected his duty, as has been so frequently asserted in modern times, it is impossible to say. It is difficult enough to apportion praise or blame satisfactorily in similar occurrences in our own day, and well-nigh impossible in the case of events which happened at such a remote period and are only related in a brief and matter-of-fact way by the person immediately concerned. There is little doubt that Thucydides was not a good general, but who was so at that time except Brasidas, and to a certain extent Demosthenes? This much is certain, that the Athenians in Amphipolis, officials as well as private individuals, were far more remiss in their duty than Thucydides.¹⁹

In the beginning of the year 423 the Peloponnesians and Athenians concluded a truce for one year. Both sides were weary of the war. In Athens the aristocratic party had paved the way for peace by attacks on the war-party, chiefly by the aid of the comic dramatists,²⁰ and probably many of the Spartans were tired of serving the interests of Corinth. It was hoped that a reasonable peace would be agreed to within the space of a year. But this result was not to be achieved so quickly. Thrace was still in a disturbed condition; the activity of Brasidas and, as we may conjecture, the exertions of the Corinthians produced fresh complications. Two days after the conclusion of the truce the city of Scione on the peninsula of Pallene revolted from Athens. When the Athenian and Peloponnesian commissioners arrived in Thrace they found Scione already occupied by Brasidas, and the Athenian Aristonymus declared that as Scione had revolted after the truce, it was not included in it, and that Athens would make war upon the city. But Mende also revolted, and Brasidas

took it under his protection as well. If a Spartan general could disregard Sparta's promises in this fashion, what was the use of a truce, and what must Athens have thought of Sparta's honesty? Other undertakings of Brasidas were not so successful. He conceived himself bound to do something for Perdiccas, who was Sparta's friend just then, and aided him against Arrhibaeus of Lynceus. But on the circulation of a report that some Illyrians had come to the assistance of Arrhibaeus, the Macedonians left Brasidas, who had taken the field on their account only, in the lurch. Meanwhile the Athenians retook Mende, where the Lacedaemonian garrison held out at first and then cut its way through the enemy's lines to the besieged city of Scione. Brasidas made a futile attempt to take Potidaea. Perdiccas now by way of a change completely abandoned the Spartan alliance, and used his influence to hinder the passage of Lacedaemonian troops through Thessaly. The continual change of front on the part of the Macedonian king is a curious spectacle, and completes the picture of the way in which the combatants behaved to each other. From the outset in the Peloponnesian War the Spartans proved more than a match for the Athenians in diplomacy, and pursued their own interests as a matter of course with a magnificent disregard of principle; but Perdiccas was even more naïvely unscrupulous than Sparta. In his eyes all treaties were good for the moment only, for just so long as they were of any use to him.

When the truce came to an end in the year 422 and no peace had been concluded, Cleon managed to secure his election as strategus and then initiated a campaign in Thrace, which he conducted in person. Nicias had been there in the preceding year; Cleon now wanted to show what he could accomplish. He set sail with thirty ships, and did not even take a large military force with him, but, what was worse, his soldiers were by no means devoted to him, and he was no general. He took Torone and then marched into the

neighbourhood of Amphipolis, where he captured Galepsus. Brasidas also arrived in those parts, and while Cleon made Eion his headquarters, his opponent with 1500 hoplites took up a position on the hill of Cerdylion west of Amphipolis, whence he could command the whole country; he left 500 hoplites with some Thracian and Edonian auxiliaries in Amphipolis under the Spartiate Clearidas. Cleon had come to Thrace in order to take Amphipolis, but as his troops, according to Thucydides, appear to have placed very little confidence in his military abilities, he may have thought himself all the more bound to make a display of energy. With his whole force, composed of Athenians, Lemnians, and Imbrians, he made a reconnaissance in the direction of Amphipolis, and encamped on an elevation to the east of the city. When Brasidas perceived Cleon's movement, he withdrew quietly into Amphipolis, and awaited a favourable opportunity for a sortie. No armed men were allowed to appear on the walls, and Cleon was at first so far misled that he regretted not having brought a siege train with him to attack the city at once. But he was soon undeceived, for he was told that an army was assembling in Amphipolis for a sally,²¹ and in fact there was not a soul to be seen on Cerdylion. He therefore returned to Eion. His road led past the walls of Amphipolis, and while the Athenian army was marching by Brasidas' troops burst out of the city gates into the Athenian line and routed it completely. The left wing fled to Eion, the right at first into the mountains and afterwards to Eion. Cleon, who was with the right wing, lost his life, as did 600 Athenians; on the Spartan side seven only fell, but among them was Brasidas. This neutralized the result of the victory—for the helots and Peloponnesian recruits were not of much use without Brasidas. And many Athenians regarded the death of Cleon as a personal gain; they had, as we saw, already hoped for it at Pylos. He ought not to have taken the field without Demosthenes.²²

On this occasion proof was given of Brasidas' great popularity in Thrace. The Amphipolitans transferred to him the heroic honours which had been hitherto enjoyed by the Athenian Hagnon, the founder of the community, and a grave was assigned to him in the city itself. A Lacedaemonian army, which had been despatched about this time under Ramphias and two other generals to Thrace, heard of the battle of Amphipolis at Heraclea, and at first continued their march, but then turned back, firstly, because the Thessalians barred their progress, secondly, because the Athenians after all had been defeated, and lastly and chiefly, because their general, like the majority of the Spartiates, took little interest in Brasidas' enterprises. Sparta had no appreciation of nor aptitude for such remote campaigns; men like Pausanias, Brasidas, Lysander, and Agesilaus were required to propose and execute schemes of this kind.

The desire for peace now became stronger on both sides. The Athenians perceived that the war was not taking the course which they had expected. The secession of the allies threatened to spread, and Cleon was no longer there to rail at the people for their love of peace. The Spartans too found that events had by no means turned out as they had fondly hoped. The series of invasions of Attica had proved futile, and now their own country was being devastated from Pylos and Cythera, and their helots tempted to revolt. The war had been begun for the sake of Corinth; they themselves had reaped no advantage from it. In the following year too the thirty years' truce between Sparta and Argos would come to an end, and if, as was to be expected, Argos took advantage of the situation to enter the lists against the Spartans, Sparta would be in a very awkward position. Lastly, the wish to recover the Spartiates who had been taken prisoners at Sphacteria was as strong as ever. The death of the two chief representatives of the war party, Brasidas and Cleon, brought matters to an issue. At Athens Cleon had been

succeeded by Hyperbolus, but the latter's influence could not compare with that of his predecessor ; on the contrary, Nicias was now the leading man in Athens. For the Athenian people were so constituted that they frequently attached more importance to persons than principles, and on the death of a leader of tried ability often followed, not one of his supporters, but the known chief of the rival party, who had hitherto stood second in public estimation. Thus after the death of Aristides, the aristocrat Cimon became of greater consequence than his younger democratic opponents, and in the same way after Cleon's death Nicias was duly appreciated. Nicias, however, wished to enjoy his acquired reputation in peace. In Sparta King Pleistoanax was regaining influence, the man who had been accused of taking bribes from Pericles in 445, and had been recalled in 427. But Sparta had not been more successful in the war since 427 than before that date, and some people thought that it was only bribery of the Pythia that had elicited the oracles in favour of his recall. If the war were to continue without any marked success, the result might be attributed to his presence in Sparta. Consequently he too desired the termination of the war.

Peace was actually concluded, but without the participation of the Corinthians, Eleans, Megarians, and Boeotians. The Megarians were dissatisfied because Athens retained Nisaea ; the Boeotians, because they had to restore the frontier town of Panactum ; the Corinthians, because Sparta did not oppose the retention of Anactorium and Sollium by the Athenians, who were thus left with considerable power in the West. The record of the peace, which was concluded for fifty years, began with the recognition of the neutrality and inviolability of Delphi and its oracle ; then followed the various stipulations. Athens was to receive, besides Panactum, the Thracian cities of Amphipolis, Argilus, Stagirus, Acanthus, Scolus, Olynthus, and Spartolus, which might preserve their autonomy on payment of the Aristidean tribute to Athens, or, if they

wished, become allies of the Athenians. Coryphasia (Pylos), Cythera, Methone, Pteleum (in Phthiotis), and Atalante were returned to the Peloponnesians. Mecyberna, Sane, and Singus were to retain their inhabitants. The Peloponnesian prisoners of Athens were to be set at liberty, that is, the men of Sphacteria and the Peloponnesian garrison of Scione, which was invested by the Athenians. Athens was free to deal as she pleased with the Scioneans themselves, the Toroneans, and the Sermylians. King Cleomenes had once left his Athenian friends in the lurch in the same way, and in 403 Sparta acted again in similar fashion to the survivors of the Thirty Tyrants. Seventeen men from each of the two cities of Sparta and Athens were to confirm the peace by oath, and this oath was to be renewed every year. Pillars inscribed with the text of the treaty were to be erected at Olympia, at Pytho (Delphi), on the Isthmus, on the Acropolis of Athens, and in the Amyclaeum at Sparta. Of the seventeen Spartans the kings Pleistoanax and Agis head the list, and then comes the first Ephor Pleistolas. Of the Athenians five only are not otherwise known; Lampon, the soothsayer and friend of Pericles, comes first; Nicias is the third, and among the rest are many soldiers of repute, including Demosthenes. The peace was commonly called the Peace of Nicias, for Nicias carried it at Athens. If we consider its terms, it will be seen that Athens made greater concessions than she obtained. She surrendered a number of important positions on the enemy's coasts to which she had unfettered access, and released the Spartiates besides. In return she received the revolted Thracian cities, to which Sparta could hardly send assistance, and which consequently were likely to be captured by Athens; but the most important of them, Amphipolis, was never made over to her. Plataea was not restored to her at all. And it would have been all very well if the peace had only been a universal one. But Boeotia, Megara, and Corinth continued to form a hostile ring round Athens.

It had been decided by lot that Sparta should commence the execution of the treaty. The Spartans therefore did what Athens particularly desired; they sent orders to Clearidas in Thrace to surrender Amphipolis to the Athenians. But Clearidas did not comply, and the envoys returned without accomplishing their mission. As the Peloponnesian representatives were still assembled in Sparta, the Spartans once more endeavoured to persuade them to accept the peace; but they refused. To prevent the Athenians from declaring the treaty broken, on the not unnatural supposition that it had only been a trap, the Spartans hit upon another mode of giving them satisfaction; they offered them a defensive alliance, but coupled with a proviso in Sparta's interests binding Athens to act against the helots as well. In this way the Athenians were to be encouraged in the belief that they would control the whole of Greece in concert with Sparta. Athens, led by Nicias, trusted the Spartans; the prisoners of Sphacteria were handed over, the alliance concluded, and Sparta attained her object by means of empty promises.²³

This was the end of the Ten Years' War, which since the time of Thucydides has been regarded as the first part of the war which lasted for twenty-seven years, and is known as the Peloponnesian War. No doubt there was a certain attractiveness in having a war which lasted the sacred number of 3×9 years. In reality the Fifty Years' Peace of 421 was just as much an interruption of a state of war as the Thirty Years' Peace of 445, and there would be no reason for viewing the war of 431-421 between Athens and the Peloponnesians as differing externally from the preceding wars of the same century, and for considering it as part of a longer war, were it not that the whole war of 431-404 possesses a marked internal unity in the rivalry between Corinth and Athens, which induces us to abide by the traditional view of Thucydides. If we felt inclined not to take this important consideration into account, we might adduce many reasons in favour of

regarding the war of 431-421 as a separate one. It is perfectly clear that the war which extended from 421-404 had a thoroughly special character given to it by the activity of one ambitious man, Alcibiades. For it was he who, as we shall see, first drew Athens into the energetic continental policy which ended disastrously at Mantinea, who then led his countrymen to Syracuse, where they met their death, and finally effected the union between Sparta and Persia, which resulted in the overthrow of Athens. Thus the periods of 431-421 and 421-404 have after all a perfectly distinct internal character.²⁴

However, in 421 the Athenians were at peace with Sparta for a time, and this was a source of great rejoicing. They could now live once more in the country, which they had not been able to do for so long, a privation which had given rise to such loud complaints on the part of the comic poets. The opinion has sometimes been expressed of late that the Spartan invasions of Attica not only inflicted temporary injury and great annoyance on individual Athenians, but did permanent damage to the whole state by destroying the class of peasant proprietors, and that this was one of the evil consequences of Pericles' war policy. But there is no proof of it. If it had happened one of two results must have followed, either the land would have gone out of cultivation or large estates would have been formed, as in Italy in later times when Rome lost her freedom. But in the fourth century B.C. we find, as is shown by the writings of the Attic orators, an agricultural middle class in Attica, just as in the fifth, and no abandonment of the country or *latifundia*, and yet Attica was badly ravaged by the garrison of Decelea as late as 413-404. It is true that many Athenians were impoverished by these devastations, but they did no permanent harm to the city. The prosperity of the citizens depended on its commerce, which revived after the war. Consequently the advice of Pericles to give up the country districts was founded on a correct view

of the situation. And the peace-at-any-price party, to which the comic writers belonged, forgot one point which after all is of considerable importance, viz. that there is something great in the conduct of a people which not only foregoes the comforts of life, but courts want and privation rather than part with its ideal possessions, or what it considers to be such. The Dutch in the sixteenth century had their crops destroyed by the Spaniards, and in the seventeenth century by the French. But they not only bore it in patience, they actually flooded the low-lying country of their own accord, in order to save their cities and so preserve their freedom. Pericles' resolve was an equally high one, but unfortunately in his general policy as in so much else he did not receive from his fellow-countrymen the measure of support which he deserved, and which the welfare of Athens and of Greece demanded.²⁵

NOTES

Authorities: Thucydides, with Plutarch and Diodorus. For the Athenian city-talk see Aristophanes, but for historical statements he, as well as the Scholia, can only be quoted with the greatest caution. —Of modern works treating chiefly of the internal history of Athens, cf. G. Gilbert, *Beiträge zur inneren Gesch. Athens im Zeitalter des peloponnes. Krieges*, Leipz. 1877; J. Beloch, *Die attische Politik seit Pericles*, Leipz. 1884; Müller-Strübing, *Aristophanes und die historische Kritik*, Leipz. 1873. For special papers by the same author see below.

1. For Nicias cf. G. Julius, *De Nicia demagogo et belli duce*, Utr. 1858; Gilbert, *Beiträge*, p. 146. Nicias represented mediocrity combined with obstinacy and irresolution. He trafficked in slaves, and therefore lived by trade, like Cleon and Hyperbolus. But while the two latter constantly had and still have their trade thrown in their teeth, and were called such names as tanner, lamp-maker, and cattle-dealer, because they were not of aristocratic extraction, no one calls Nicias a slave-owner, because he was a man of good family. But Nicias does not occupy a more exalted position because he was not on the spot to witness the drudgery of his slaves in the mines of Laurium, while Cleon no doubt was often present when his men were tanning his leather. The fact that Nicias is

still generally placed on a higher level than Cleon is due to the assumption that he and his equals in rank were more fitted by superior education to govern the state than an uneducated man like Cleon. It is, however, by no means certain that the education of the wealthy classes in Athens was better than that of the less well-to-do, while even the families of the old nobility did not always enjoy the privilege of a really superior education. Alcibiades, for instance, was allowed to play in the streets. Phrynichus was taken up by the oligarchs, although he was of low extraction. Cleon, Hyperbolus, and other democrats probably had the same education as Nicias and Alcibiades. I shall return to this question in Chapter xxviii., and will only remark here that no proof has been adduced that the State under Cleon and Hyperbolus fell into the hands of less educated men, as Thucydides and the comedy have led us generally to suppose.

2. Demosthenes has been unfairly condemned by Beloch, *Att. Politik*, p. 31. That it was Demosthenes who arrived on the wrong day in Boeotia, has not been proved; that the success in Sphacteria was due to him alone, is as good as certain; that he acted wisely at the siege of Syracuse, is evident. It is true that he was a friend of Cleon, and perhaps a democrat; but at all events he took Sphacteria in conjunction with Cleon, while with Nicias he was obliged to see an army of more than 40,000 men doomed to certain destruction on account of an eclipse of the moon.

3. For Cleon, cf. Antoine, *Cléon*, *Revue Histor.* 3-6; Emminger, *Kleon*, *Eichst.* 1882; Oncken, *Ath. und Hellas*, Bd. 2; and the special articles quoted by Gilbert, *Beitr.* p. 127. Cleon, as painted by Thucydides, is a conceited parvenu, who has a keen eye for the foibles of the aristocrats, and is blind to his own, otherwise he would not have allowed himself to be drawn into the last expedition to Thrace. But this much can be clearly gathered from Thucydides' hostile account, that Cleon's political ideas as regards the attitude to be observed by Athens towards Sparta were the only correct ones.

4. Cf. W. Herbst, *Der Abfall Mytilenes von Athen*, Köln, 1861. Again, as in the case of Potidaea, Athens arrives too late. No doubt it was difficult to govern such a large empire, but for Athens to plan a sudden attack in time of peace as the first measure against a suspected ally, as she did before against Samos (see Chapter xv.), proves that the state of affairs was unsatisfactory.

5. For the *Eisphora*, see Gilbert, *Beitr.* p. 128 seq.; he assumes that Cleon was the mover.

6. Müller-Strübing, *Thukydideische Forschungen*, Vienna, 1881, has attempted to prove that the account of the execution of more than 1000 Mytileneans is an interpolation in Thucydides. But

his reasons are not conclusive. Cf. Holzapfel, *Rh. Mus. N. F.* 37, p. 448 seq., and Bauer in the *Philol.* Bd. 43. In itself there is nothing extraordinary for Greeks to execute 1000 prisoners. As many as 700 Aeginetans were put to death between 490 and 480. The Athenians slaughtered so many communities that, if they interrupted the practice on one occasion, the display of clemency would have been remembered, whereas their severity, which always existed, made no particular impression. That is why the execution of the Mytilenean nobles has not been noticed by later writers.

7. Müller-Strübing (*Die Glaubwürdigkeit des Thukydides geprüft an seiner Darstellung der Belagerung von Plataea*, in the *Jahrb. f. Phil.* 131, pp. 289-348) has endeavoured to prove that Thucydides' account of the siege of Plataea is a piece of invention, written with the object of showing how sieges ought to be conducted. But he has not proved this. That a historian should draw on his imagination in order to explain how things ought to be done in particular instances, has been conjectured by Schubert in the case of Duris in his *Abh. über Plutarchs Quellen im Eumenes*, etc. (p. 770 of the ninth supplemental volume of the *Jahrb. für Phil.*), and it is not impossible in itself. The idea is more acceptable for the time of Duris, when the science of history had become saturated with rhetoric, than for that of Thucydides, when rhetoric was still a novelty and was applied almost entirely to actual speeches. In the special case of Thucydides a conjecture of the kind seems to me utterly inadmissible, in view of my remarks on his character in the next note to this chapter. Duncker (9, 491) agrees with Müller-Strübing in thinking that the account of the siege of Plataea contains impossibilities. I admit that much of what Thucydides states about this siege is extraordinary. This may be due to embellishments of the truth made by Thucydides' informants. What seems really inconceivable, as Müller-Strübing has pointed out, is that such a handful of men could have decided to defend the city at all, when the Peloponnesians could no doubt have easily carried it by storm. But the fact that no such attempt was made is explainable not only by the desire of the Thebans for a voluntary surrender, because that would serve their purpose when peace was concluded, but also by the value placed on the life of a citizen by the Peloponnesians and the Greeks in general. They were willing enough to fight in the open field, where bravery was of service, but the operation of scaling walls, in which hundreds of lives would have to be sacrificed, did not strike them as necessary, if the same object could be attained by starving out the garrison. For the relations between Plataea and Athens, especially in later times, cf. Szanto in the *Wiener Studien*, Bd. 6.

8. The events in Corcyra have been exhaustively treated by Müller-Strübing, *Die Korkyräischen Händel bei Thukydides*, in the *N. Jahrb. f. Phil.*, Bd. 133, pp. 585-648. In his view Thucydides' narrative of these occurrences is so full of impossibilities that it must be pure invention on the part of the historian. No doubt many details related by Thucydides are improbable, but it is notorious that nothing is so improbable as the reality on occasions, and after all every one is at liberty to believe as much as he thinks proper of Thucydides' story. Thucydides may have reproduced exaggerated accounts, but there is no valid reason for supposing that he indulged in wholesale invention. He is such a trustworthy historian in the main that falsifications of this kind are incredible. Besides, if Müller-Strübing is right, he would necessarily be a lover of detailed description; but he is not so, and shows that he is not precisely in this instance. He makes (2, 82, 83) the often-quoted remarks on the relaxation of all discipline and the deterioration of morals which accompanied the war. A lover of details, who goes so far as to invent them, would introduce particular facts to prove his point in a case of this kind. Thucydides confines himself to rhetorical variations on the theme, "Evil, be thou my good," in which of course some facts are bound to be mentioned, but he states them as far as possible in general terms. He remarks that this demoralization was the result of the Peloponnesian War, and modern writers repeat his statement. But cruelty in civil war was an old fault of the Greeks (cf. the treatment of Cylon's adherents and Herod. 6, 91), and such failings as were new, *e.g.* the palliation of evil, were the result of sophistry and rhetoric, and not of the war. And Thucydides, without being aware of it, was himself infected with rhetoric when he wrote chapters 82 and 83. He was also under the influence of rhetoric when he stated (3, 113) that he would not give any numbers, because he would not be believed if he did. A man who is so afraid of reproducing startling facts does not invent them, but he is capable of inventing speeches.

9. Ullrich, *Der Kampf um Amphilochien*, Hamb. 1863. About this time the Athenians carried out an important religious act, the complete purification of the island of Delos from all dead bodies; for the future no one was to be born or buried there, Thuc. 3, 104. In the year 422 they decided that the latter result would be attained with more certainty if the inhabitants were expelled altogether—which was doubtless correct—and they removed them to Adramyttium, Thuc. 5, 1. But in 421 they brought them back, Thuc. 5, 32. Curtius, *G. G.* 2⁶, 515, considers the removal of the Delians "an outrageous piece of trifling with religious ceremonial, carried out by the hostile party in mockery of the pious Nicias."

To me it appears to be only a perfectly natural consequence of the resolution of 425. Nicias himself was certainly capable of taking such extreme measures in the interest of religion. Plutarch's account (Nic. 3) of Nicias' brilliant management of the Athenian *Theoria* to Delos is no doubt rightly referred to what took place in the year 425.

10. Cf., however, Beloch, *Bevölk. der gr.-röm. Welt*, p. 193.

11. The history of the taking of Pylos, etc., has no doubt been accurately narrated by Thucydides, but we may make some supplementary conjectures as to the motives of the *dramatis personae*. The whole enterprise must have been planned by Demosthenes; Cleon then stepped in and made it a political possibility in Athens. Complete secrecy was necessary to ensure the success of the design on Pylos. Even after their arrival there the Athenians had to behave as if they had no particular desire to occupy the place, for a handful of Spartans might have dispersed them while they were constructing the fortifications. The whole business therefore was bound to have an improvised appearance. In the same way Cleon's mission must be regarded as the result of a stratagem of his own. Nicias would never have taken the island; Cleon had to get the supreme command into his own hands, but he would not have succeeded in this if he had let it be seen that he wanted it. He had to appear to accept it on compulsion, and this he managed very cleverly. The proposal to appoint a commission was a trap on the part of the Spartans. The affair of the Russo-Afghan frontier shows the result of appointing commissions. In this case the Spartan object was to delay matters until the storms of winter set in, and a commission was admirably suited for the purpose. That their only intention was to keep the Athenians dangling is shown by the fact that they did not make serious overtures for peace even after the capture of the men on Sphacteria. It is clear that Nicias neglected his duty. After all, Aristides had made short work of the Persians in *Psyttaleia*, and the Spartans on Sphacteria might also have been put to death at any moment, but Nicias was irresolute and did nothing. Cleon at all events was energetic. The Athenian mode of conducting the war depended to a great extent on which party was successful in the election of the strategoi. Gilbert and Beloch have discussed this point exhaustively in the works quoted above, to which we must refer our readers.—Here, too, it is possible to criticize the narrative of Thucydides in points of detail, and to pronounce portions of it to be inventions. Is it likely that the Athenians had no iron tools with them, and that the Spartans actually landed 400 hoplites on the island of Sphacteria? Of what use were they? Pylos could not have been captured from the island; if the

Spartans had been victorious, they would have taken the Athenians prisoners without this operation, and if they had been defeated the 400 would have been lost. How is it possible, therefore, that they could have acted so foolishly? The inference is that the details of the fighting at Pylos were, as some one has remarked, invented by Thucydides as a counterpart to Plataea, in order to show how a place ought not to be besieged.

12. Curtius (G. G. 2⁶, 482 seq.), who considers Cleon "rough" and behaving with "irresponsible frivolity," calls the refusal to deliver up the fleet an "arbitrary act which might be excused at a pinch on the ground that the Peloponnesians on their side were supposed to have violated the terms of the truce." But the Spartans never disputed the fact that they had broken it (the protest does not prove the contrary); we must therefore assume that they did so. The Athenians were thus actually and formally in the right, and need no excuse for their conduct. Barefaced non-compliance with treaty stipulations did occur in the Peloponnesian War and on the Spartan side; the failure to carry out the stipulations of the Peace of Nicias with regard to Amphipolis was a piece of sheer illegality committed by Sparta. Consequently if the Athenians chose to stand upon their rights, there is no reason to blame them, even if these rights were defended by democrats of a somewhat coarse stamp, which is not the case in this instance, for Cleon at that time had nothing to do with the conduct of the war.

13. The document fixing the assessments has been reconstructed from numerous fragments by Köhler, and belongs to Ol. 88. 4 (τάξις φόρον), C. I. A. 1, 37; cf. Köhler, *Urk. und Unters.*, etc., p. 142 seq., and Gilbert, *Beitr.* p. 185. Endeavours were made at this time to obtain contributions even from the cities of the Pontus (Bus. 2, 541), and Lamachus sailed into the Pontus for that purpose, Thuc. 4, 75.—For the increase in the pay of the Heliastae, cf. Gilbert, *Beitr.* p. 188. Cleon, who looked well after ways and means to enable the Athenians to carry on the war, and even appears to have made an attempt at this period to get Argos on the Athenian side (Gilbert, *Beitr.* p. 189 seq.), was ridiculed in the year 424 by Aristophanes in the *Knights* as a wretched Paphlagonian.

14. These occurrences in Megara show that the position of parties (aristocracy or democracy) was not the principal factor in deciding the question whether a city was favourable to Athens or Sparta, but many other considerations, first and foremost fear or material interests.

15. The Duke of Alva acquired a reputation in the same way by his march from Italy to the Netherlands in 1567.

16. The expeditions on land which Athens had abandoned since the Thirty Years' Peace were thus resumed and failed once more, as they had formerly done, owing to the valour of the Boeotian troops, which the Athenians were evidently inclined to underestimate.

17. Thuc. (4, 89) does not say who was to blame; Curtius, G. G. 2⁶, 493, and Beloch, Att. Pol. pp. 31, 32, assume as a matter of course that it was Demosthenes, because he arrived too soon. But this is not proved.

18. Cf. Bauer, Griech. Kriegsalterthümer in I. Müller, Handbuch der klass. Alterthumswiss. 4, 298. Socrates distinguished himself by his steadfast bravery at Delium. The special attention paid to their naval power by the Athenians of course interfered to a certain extent with the development of their hoplites; the battle of Marathon was probably a victory of hoplites, but not over hoplites. The old Greek method was to let the issue be decided by a hand-to-hand fight on level ground, cf. Her. 7, 9; Polyb. 13, 3; this was always a contest between hoplites. Hence the dislike of the Spartans, who clung most faithfully to the old Greek ways, to besieging fortified places, the reduction of which presented less scope for personal bravery.

19. For the question as to whether Thucydides was to blame or not, cf. Classen, Thuk. vol. 4, appendix. If it were not a Thucydides, no one would care to waste a single word on the responsibility of the person concerned in a case of this kind and in view of our complete ignorance of the actual circumstances. Discussions of this sort lead to no result. And after all those who value Thucydides as a historian cannot regret that he gave up the office of general just then, for it was only this that enabled him to devote himself entirely to the composition of his history. Athens could find a dozen generals of the calibre of Thucydides every year, but she never possessed a historian of his stamp either before or after him.

20. In 426 Aristophanes brought out his *Babylonians*, in which he commiserated the members of the league, and made an attack on Cleon; in 425 he extolled the blessings of peace in the *Acharnians*; in 424 he endeavoured to annihilate Cleon in the *Knights*; on this occasion the poet Eupolis assisted him in the plan of the work. In the *Clouds* too (423) he has a hit at Cleon now and then. These attacks no doubt helped to make Cleon an object of contempt in Athens and to undermine his authority as a general, a result for which Athens had to suffer afterwards at Amphipolis, although it is true that the death of Cleon was a source of satisfaction to the oligarchs.

21. The soldiers' feet were seen underneath the gates. What kind of gates can they have been, or is it an invention of Thucydides with the object of making Cleon's rashness appear greater than it was? I do not think so, as my comments above indicate, but it is one of those facts recorded by Thucydides which can be used against him.

22. Cleon was a clever statesman, but evidently no general. It soon, however, ceased to be necessary in Athens for the same man to be at once statesman and general; but at this period the leader of the people had to be prepared to take command of an army. Thucydides has probably represented the battle of Amphipolis to Cleon's disadvantage, but it must in the main have followed the course described by him, and Cleon must have really committed the imprudence of marching past the gates of a hostile city.—For Brasidas, whom the Greeks compared with Achilles, cf. Pöppelmann, *Brasidas*, Siegburg, 1863; Hengstenberg in the *Festschrift für Creelius*, 1881; Oncken, *Histor. Zeitschrift*, 10, p. 289 seq.

23. It is a striking fact that Athens paid so little attention to Thracian affairs after the death of Cleon. Nicias pointed this out to the Athenians, Thuc. 6, 10. Perhaps, however, Thucydides has not mentioned everything that Athens did in Thrace. Cf. Gilbert, *Beiträge*, p. 163, and Busolt, *Forschungen*, 1, 119.

24. The expression "Peloponnesian War" is not quite appropriate even from an Attic point of view, because it was not the only war with the Peloponnesians. It probably originated with Ephorus, and is found in Diod. 13, 38, Plut. *Per.* 29, and Strabo, 13, 600. Thuc. (5, 28) calls it ὁ Ἀττικὸς πόλεμος from the Peloponnesian point of view.

25. In criticizing the war from a technical point of view, Sparta appears almost a *quantité négligéable* for the first part of it. Spartan strategy consists simply in making inroads into Attica, and welcoming allies of Athens who wish to revolt, without being able to assist them. This mode of conducting a war does not indicate any special premeditation. Athens on the other hand proceeds on a sensible plan, but does not observe consistency in details. At the outset Athens' plan is based on the policy pursued by Pericles after the peace of 445, i.e. to have no inhabitants of the interior, but only sea-coast and island people as subjects. But this plan was not strictly carried out. For in the first place, Pericles soon died, and after that every plan was modified by circumstances and by the operations of the enemy. The situation in the west involved modifications of this kind. Coreyra and Naupactus led to the expeditions in Acarnania and Aetolia, and finally to that in Boeotia, consequently to a renewal of the Athenian policy previous to 445.

Demosthenes, who soon joins hands with Cleon, takes the lead here. But the undertakings are not successful, and with the defeat at Delium Athens reverts to the position at the Thirty Years' Peace, extensive territorial acquisitions in Greece being avoided. Before this, however, she had achieved success in Pylos and Cythera, enterprises which were quite in accordance with the policy of Pericles. On the other hand, the Peace of Nicias was a great act of folly from the Athenian point of view, for in concluding it Athens sacrificed her most important advantages to the illusion of a Spartan alliance. The disappointment which followed this peace aided the ambitious designs of Alcibiades, who interfered in every quarter without any fixed principle and accomplished nothing. From 413 onwards the whole position changes; Athens is forced to act on the defensive, and ceases to have an independent war policy, while Sparta skilfully assumes the offensive. The policy which in the Archidamian War was only a personal enterprise on the part of Brasidas, viz. to attack Athens in her weak points, was now initiated for Sparta by Alcibiades, approved of by Sparta herself, and skilfully and successfully carried out by Lysander.

CHAPTER XXIV

GREECE FROM 421 TO THE SICILIAN EXPEDITION

THE peace and especially the alliance between Sparta and Athens excited great discontent among the old allies of Sparta, who feared that, if it were taken seriously, it would be carried out at their expense. The Corinthians, who had been the cause of the whole war, were the greatest malcontents, and they made overtures to Argos. Argos had always been ill-disposed towards Sparta, and was besides under a democratic form of government, although she too possessed a Laconian party which had shortly before this been influential enough to persuade the city to renew the peace with Sparta, on condition of the restoration of Cynuria to the Argives. Argos had greatly increased in prosperity owing to the long peace which she had alone enjoyed in Greece, and during which she obtained almost the exclusive control of the trade with the interior of the Peloponnese. Her hopes rose of at last securing the hegemony of the Peloponnese which she had always claimed. The proposals of the Corinthians were therefore acceded to in Argos, and an extraordinary committee of twelve men was elected, with power to conclude alliances in the name of the state, excepting with Sparta or Athens, which was reserved for the people themselves. They were actually joined by the Mantineans, who had extended their influence during the war, and feared that the Spartans might now curtail it again. Besides, a democracy had come

into power in Mantinea. The whole Peloponnese was thus in commotion. People thought that the alliance between Sparta and Athens meant the oppression of all the smaller states.

This aroused the anxiety of the Spartans; they would gladly have converted the Corinthians, who were the most influential. They told them that after all it was right that the wishes of the majority of the allies should be observed. True, replied the Corinthians, but the treaty says that the will of the majority shall not prevail if there is an impediment proceeding from the gods or the heroes, and this is so in the present case, for they had sworn not to desert the allies in Thrace. If that held good, no peace with Athens was possible. Thus the reconstitution of parties in Greece proceeded on perfectly elementary lines, prospective advantage being the guiding principle of attraction. The Eleans, among whom a democratic party had also been formed, had quarrelled with Sparta about Lepreum, and therefore joined the Argives; the Corinthians, who had set the ball rolling, did the same in concert with their allies the Chalcidians of Thrace. The Boeotians and Megarians cordially detested Athens, but in spite of this would have nothing to do with the new league because it was an alliance of democratic communities.

The Corinthians and Argives attempted to persuade Tegea to revolt from Sparta, but were unsuccessful. In the first place, the democratic party in Tegea was not supreme, and secondly, there was always a certain jealousy between Tegea and Mantinea. The Corinthians began to have misgivings; they felt isolated and consequently insecure as against Athens, and thought that if they could be on the same footing with Athens as the Boeotians, it would be to their advantage. There was a truce between Boeotia and Athens determinable at ten days' notice, and the Corinthians requested the Thebans to help them in securing similar terms. The Athenians,

however, declined the proposal, the result of which was that Thebes and Corinth did not form a really close alliance. War now broke out between Sparta and Mantinea, in which the Mantineans were worsted and lost the territory of the Parrhasians.

Meanwhile differences of opinion arose between Sparta and Athens as to the execution of the treaty of peace. The Thracian cities persistently refused to be parties to it and Amphipolis would not surrender; the Athenians consequently would not make over Pylos, although they so far complied with Sparta's wishes as to remove the Messenians and helots from the fortress. Sparta, on the other hand, who was to blame for the non-fulfilment of the conditions, gave vent to her scarcely veiled hostility towards Athens in other quarters. In the winter of 421-420 the new Ephors approached the Boeotians in order to arrive at a treaty with Argos through their aid. As soon as peace was made with the Argives, they could of course renew the war with Athens. But these attempts, in which each endeavoured to outwit and take advantage of the other, met with no success. The Boeotarchs had with an excess of cunning omitted to tell the governing bodies of Boeotia that the Argives and Corinthians also wished to be on good terms with the Boeotians in the interests of Sparta, and so the people of Boeotia, thinking that Sparta was still on bad terms with Argos and Corinth, concluded an alliance with Sparta but not with the two other powers (Feb. 420). The result was that not only was the special object which the Spartans had in view frustrated, but their relations with Athens were altered to their detriment. For the alliance between Sparta and Boeotia was a grave insult to Athens, because Sparta and Athens had agreed not to make any independent alliances. The government of Argos now became uneasy, and wanted to ally itself with Sparta, but the Argive people withheld their consent, as the Athenians put obstacles in the way.

The democratic party in Athens at that time was led by Hyperbolus,¹ like Cleon engaged in trade (a lamp-maker), and a man who excited the special resentment of the aristocrats. But in personal importance he could not compete with Alcibiades, the son of Clinias,² a young and extremely handsome man, of high birth and brilliant talents, who had been brought up under the supervision of his relative Pericles, which had not prevented him from leading the dissolute life of a spoiled young man of fashion. He had, however, come into close contact with Socrates, and had managed to ingratiate himself with him, as in fact he won the affections of all who knew him. All his actions had a dash of originality and genius. His conduct was regulated solely by his own good will and pleasure. Even in his youth his defiant nature, the charm of which was enhanced by his seductive manners, enabled him to carry his point in cases where others would have had to yield. His ambition was to rule, and not in Athens alone. He was an Alexander in the wrong place, just as Athens was a premature Macedonia. His family connections brought him at first into contact with the democratic war party, which he used in his own interests. But he was never a true democrat. Disappointed ambition was the principal motive which now made him assume the leadership of the discontented faction. His grandfather had been Proxenos of the Spartans, but had resigned the position. Alcibiades, in order to regain it, had shown a marked interest in the prisoners of Sphacteria. Notwithstanding this Sparta had relied more on Nicias than on himself in the peace negotiations, and consequently his object now was to show the Spartans what they had lost in him. He therefore endeavoured to persuade Argos to join Athens instead of Sparta. The Argives listened to him, and delayed the ratification of their treaty with Sparta. Whilst the Argive ambassadors were in Athens, envoys came there from Sparta to counteract them; but according to Thucydides they were grossly deceived

by Alcibiades.³ The negotiations, however, were not completely broken off. Nicias went to Sparta, but did not bring home any reassuring news. The Spartans did not surrender Amphipolis, and although their alliance with the Boeotians was contrary to the terms of their peace with Athens, they would not abandon it.

The Athenians therefore took an independent course by concluding an alliance with Argos, Mantinea, and the Eleans, the text of which has been preserved by Thucydides and in an inscription.⁴ It was an attempt to supplement the Athenian naval league with a continental one; but the utility of the latter depended on the goodwill of the members of it, for the Athenians could use compulsion towards maritime cities, but not towards places inland. The treaty with Sparta was not regarded as cancelled on that account. On the other hand, the Corinthians who were allied with Argos took no part in the new league. Owing to the highly elastic character of Greek international law a state could be the enemy of a friend's friend, and at the same time also have a brush with its own ally. Nearly all the treaties of alliance were designed to meet a special case.

In the summer of 420 the exclusion of the Spartans from the Olympic festival by the Eleans constituted a small interlude somewhat in the nature of a Satyric drama. The reasons were an alleged violation of the festal truce, and the refusal of Sparta to pay the fine of 2000 minae imposed for it. Thirty-three talents and a half were certainly no trifle in those days. A Spartan named Lichas, who had competed and won as a Boeotian, and then had the hardihood to get himself proclaimed as a Spartan, even received a beating from the managers of the festival. The anti-Spartan Alcibiades was the hero of the festival and made a great display. Meanwhile the Boeotians made a show of upholding Spartan interests in the north by occupying, of course for their own benefit, the city of Heraclea on Mount Oeta, which had

been founded by the Spartans, and now fell owing to its isolation.

A journey of Alcibiades into the Peloponnese in the spring of 419 had more serious consequences. He tried to make an impression in Achaia, and actually induced the inhabitants of Patrae to build long walls down to the sea, but was prevented from constructing a fort on the promontory of Rhium by the Corinthians and Sicyonians. It would have been of more importance to Athens to have fortified positions on the Argolic Acte. Pericles had in vain endeavoured to take Epidaurus; the Argives themselves now thought of doing so. They discovered a suitable pretext for breaking the peace—the Epidaurians had not offered the necessary sacrifices to Apollo Pythaeus of Argos. The Argives marched into Epidaurian territory. The Lacedaemonians took the field under Agis to help the Epidaurians, but returned very soon because the sacred month Carneus was impending, in other words they received hints of a change in the political situation. A peace congress was assembling at Mantinea on the invitation of Athens, where Nicias consequently was once more in the ascendant, and the Spartans therefore lost their interest in Epidaurus and suddenly remembered that the month Carneus was close at hand. The congress, however, effected nothing, and the Argives, to whom the month Carneus might after all have proved inconvenient, never began to keep the month at all, but calmly continued the preceding one. Thus the war went on without offence to religion.⁵ In the winter of 419-8 matters proceeded in the same way. The Spartans sent troops to Epidaurus by sea. But this was a crime in the eyes of the Athenians. They put an inscription on the Spartan pillar to the effect that the Spartans had broken their oath. The argument was as follows: the Spartans were at liberty to kill the friends of the Athenians on land, that was of no consequence; but sending soldiers by sea to Epidaurus was a violation of Athenian territory, for the

Athenians considered the Aegean Sea as their own property. This interpretation is on a par with the postponement of the Carneus; but the hair-splitting Greeks took a serious view of these matters. The Athenians now conveyed helots to Pylos again, but took no further steps.

In the summer of 418, Alcibiades not having been re-elected general and consequently an energetic policy on the part of Athens not being likely, the Spartans made a great effort to restore their somewhat dwindled reputation. Agis led the whole Spartan levy and a number of allies, 5000 hoplites, 5000 light troops, and 1000 Boeotian cavalry, into the plain of Argos and surrounded the Argive army on two sides. But things took an unexpected turn. Two leading Argives, Thrasyllus and Alciphron, arranged a four months' truce with Agis, who returned home with his army. This result gave satisfaction to nobody. The Argives were dissatisfied because they maintained that they and not the Spartans had the best of the situation, and that they would have had an easy victory. The allies of Sparta were not pleased, for they were always discontented if Sparta acted with little energy. Finally, Sparta herself was not content, for Agis, contrary to the usual custom, had not consulted a single Spartiate.

The Spartans having thus made a move on Argos, the other side began a counter-demonstration after their retreat. A thousand Athenian hoplites had arrived under Laches and Nicostratus, and the Argives took Orchomenus. This was a great success, as the line of Argos, Mantinea, and Orchomenus interrupted communication between Sparta and Corinth. But before long this unity among the allies came to an end. A decision had to be taken on the future course of action. The majority of the allies were in favour of an attack on Tegea. This was good policy, for it inflicted the most injury on Sparta. The Eleans, however, wanted to secure a special advantage for themselves, and held that Lepreum ought to be recovered for them first, and when the allies refused to do

this, they simply returned home—another proof of the small value of such alliances.⁶

The Lacedaemonians now bestirred themselves once more. They were enraged with Agis, and wanted to demolish his house and fine him 100,000 drachmae;⁷ nevertheless they let him take the field again as general. He led the whole Spartan force into the territory of Mantinea, whither the Argives had marched with their allies. After some counter-marching on the part of the Spartans, who thus secured an advantageous position, a battle was fought at Mantinea. Thucydides describes the excellent order of the Spartan army on this occasion,⁸ and relates how they advanced at the commencement of the battle with a slow and uniform step to the music of the flute. In point of tactics the Peloponnesians did not particularly distinguish themselves in this battle. Two subordinate commanders, Spartiates into the bargain, failed to carry out a movement to the left which they had been ordered to execute, and in consequence the Mantineans, who were posted opposite the Spartan left wing, were at first enabled to break into the Spartan line.⁹ But in the centre and on the right wing the Spartans defeated the Argives and Athenians so speedily and so completely that the issue of the whole battle was decided by it. The Spartans did not continue the pursuit far. On the vanquished side 700 Argives, 200 Mantineans, and 200 Athenians with both their generals are said to have fallen, and only 300 Spartans on the other. Sparta had thus wiped out her disgrace at Sphacteria in a brilliant way.

The battle of Mantinea had several important results. In Argos the Spartan party now gained the ascendancy, and in spite of the opposition of Alcibiades the Spartan envoys managed to persuade the Argives to conclude peace with Sparta; this soon grew into an alliance for a term of fifty years, which, it is true, was not of a very close character, and was destined to operate more by negotiation and intrigue

than by war. The new friends soon directed their attention towards Thrace. The Thracian Chalcidians renewed their alliance with the Peloponnesians, and Perdiccas seceded from Athens and proclaimed his Argive descent (as a Heraclid); small attentions of this kind did not prevent him from throwing over Argos shortly afterwards. Another result of the battle of Mantinea was the raising of the siege of Epidaurus, which the Athenians had hoped to take by building a wall round it. The retreat was so skilfully managed by Demosthenes that Athens lost no prestige by it.

It was probably at this time that a peculiar change of affairs took place in Athens. Hyperbolus, it seems, thought he could seize the opportunity to rid the state of one of the two powerful rivals, either Nicias or Alcibiades, and he brought forward the question (probably in 417) whether any one should be ostracized. The people answered in the affirmative, but the two men who were thus threatened now united to effect the overthrow of the popular leader, and Hyperbolus was banished. He went to Samos, and was murdered there on the occasion of the outbreak of the oligarchical reaction in 411. This was the last case of ostracism in Athens.¹⁰

In 417 a change took place also in Argos. The Demos regained the ascendancy, put to death or banished the aristocrats, made a fresh alliance with Athens, and with the help of Athenian masons began to build long walls; but these were soon afterwards destroyed by Agis in the winter of 417-16, while they were in an unfinished state. The Argives by way of retaliation laid waste the territory of Phlius. In the summer of 416 Alcibiades took 300 hostages from Argos and conveyed them to various islands under the control of Athens.¹¹ The Athenians punished Macedonia by blockading the coast.

The chief event of the war of 416 was an undertaking of Athens which brought her little profit or honour. She despatched a fleet of thirty-eight ships under Cleomedes and

Tisias, of which six were Chian and two Lesbian, with 2700 hoplites and 320 archers, to reduce the island of Melos to subjection.

The Melians were regarded as Lacedaemonian colonists; they were the only inhabitants of the Cyclades who had not joined the Athenian league. This seemed a disgrace in the eyes of the Athenians, and they decided that the Melians should submit. To induce them to do so the Athenian general proposed a conference, which was so conducted—at least according to Thucydides, who here again probably appears more as an artist than as a historian—that every point raised was separately discussed in a dialogue. The Athenians rejected all appeals on the score of justice. Talk about right, they said, comes only from those who have no might. The Melians must submit, otherwise Athens will be regarded as weak by the rest of Greece, and that she cannot tolerate. Athens is not afraid of the indignation of others at the wrong done to the Melians. The Melians must not hope for aid from man or from the gods—to the latter the Athenians refer with intentional vagueness—and Sparta is powerless at sea. The Melians remained firm, and had to yield to force. All the men were put to death, and the women and children sold into slavery. The land was distributed among 500 Athenian cleruchi.¹²

The conduct of the Athenians was cruel, their arguments are pitiful and sophistical. They set up interest as the only guiding rule of public life, and discard law and religion. The worst principles are paraded by them as approved truths. It is a case of logic degraded to the service of egotism.

Grote has rightly remarked that this revelation of the worthlessness of the Athenians places their defeat in Sicily in the light of a just punishment. Thucydides had to relate the Sicilian expedition almost directly after the conquest of Melos. He was an artist in point of composition, but on this occasion all he had to do was to follow the course of history

in order to exhibit the tragedy of events by recording the punishment immediately after the crime. For the rest, the treatment of Melos is a fitting conclusion to what is narrated in this chapter and in the 5th Book of Thucydides; it is simply a picture of universal intrigue, of attempts made by each and all to outwit every one who stands in their way, of endless and shameless tergiversation. These episodes convey the impression that Perdiccas had become the ideal of a Greek statesman.

NOTES

Authorities: Thucydides 5, 27, to the end of the Book; Diod. 12, 75-82 (in ch. 82, fierce inroad of the Byzantines, Chalcedonians, and Thracians into Bithynia in 416); Plutarch, Nicias and Alcibiades. Modern authorities: G. Busolt, *Der argeiische Sonderbund* 421-418, in the *Forschungen zur griech. Gesch.* I, Bresl. 1880.

1. For Hyperbolus, cf. Gilbert, *Beitr.* p. 209 seq. He had frequently appeared as *συνήγορος* in public prosecutions of persons who had defrauded the State, and by this defence of the public interests against prominent but dishonest citizens had earned the hatred of the aristocrats, who wished to use the State for their own advantage. It was for this reason that he was attacked by the comic poets, by Eupolis in 420 in his *Marikas*, by Hermippus in the *Artopolides*, and by the comic poet Plato in a piece called *Hyperbolus*. This ridicule and invective was subsequently transformed by the erudition of the Scholiasts into a sketch of his life, which is given, for instance, in the article in Pauly's *R. E.*, vol. III., with references to the various authorities, but has no historical value. What is really known of Hyperbolus, his championship of the State against the frauds of individuals and his death at the hands of oligarchs, place him in the light of a worthy successor to his companion in misfortune, Ephialtes. Aristides as a good democrat had already protected the State against similar malpractices. Ephialtes at all events commands general respect; Hyperbolus has had the misfortune to be described only by opponents and personal enemies.

2. For Alcibiades, cf. esp. G. F. Hertzberg, *Alkibiades, der Staatsmann und Feldherr*, Halle, 1853; Deimling, in the *N. Schweizer Museum*, III.; W. Vischer, *Alkibiades und Lysandros*, in his *Kl. Schr.* I.; Philippi, in the *Rh. Mus.* N.F. Bd. 41. The anecdotes of his youth are found chiefly in Plutarch. I cannot consider the recently attempted rehabilitation of Alcibiades by

Fokke as a success. Opponents of the democracy, like Aristophanes and Plato, may have been attracted by the natural gifts of the man ; but when we consider that in his youth he simply followed his own caprices with absolute disregard of scruple, and that his political career brought nothing but ruin and misfortune, firstly on his native city and then on himself, we cannot but regard him as a concentrated embodiment of the brilliant talents and startling defects of the Athenians in the second half of the fifth century, and must pity him as well as the State which had to make the best of such a citizen. There is truth in the maxim of Montesquieu that democracy reposes on the principle of honesty and exists by means of it. Hyperbolus may be considered a better Athenian than Alcibiades.

3. Thuc. 5, 45. If the story were true, it would be a proof of the impudence then prevailing in public life and of the simplicity of the Spartan envoys. But is it true ? The Spartans gave their consent to nothing, not even with Nicias ; is it not possible that they were speaking the truth when they asserted that they had not full powers ? Thucydides was not in Athens at the time : he may have been misled by incorrect accounts, *e.g.* of the envoys themselves, who wished to lay the blame on other people.

4. Thuc. 5, 47. Inscription in C. I. A. I. Suppl. 46^b ; cf. Kirchhoff, in the *Hermes*, 12, 368 seq. The text of the inscription contains no material discrepancy ; cf. Busolt, *Forschungen*, 1, 143.

5. Thuc. 5, 54. This corresponds with the usual Greek fashion of treating religion as a formal observance. Cf. Leucippus in *Metapontum*, acc. to Strabo, 6, 265. Cf. Bus. *Forsch.* 1, 154, and *Laked.* 1, 429, on similar cases. For omissions of Thucydides see Müller-Strübing, *Die Strategie des Demosthenes im 14. Jahre des peloponnesischen Krieges*, N. Rhein. Mus. 33.

6. Busolt, *Forsch.* 1, 175, quotes Th. 1, 141, very appropriately. Matters are much the same in modern days. We need only recall the Wars of Liberation, the Crimean War, and the difficulties which Eugene and Marlborough experienced.

7. Consequently a Spartiate might possess 16 $\frac{2}{3}$ talents !

8. Thuc. 5, 66 seq.

9. Thuc. 5, 72. This recalls the incidents of the battle of Plataea. It would seem that, good as was the discipline of the rank and file in Sparta, that of the higher officers was sometimes very unsatisfactory.

10. For the last ostracism see Plut. Nic. 11, Alcib. 13, Arist. 7. Our date follows Beloch, *Att. Politik*, p. 339, in opposition to Kirchhoff, Gilbert, and Busolt, who place the incident before the battle of Mantinea. Cf. Gilbert, *Beitr.* p. 228 seq. ; Zurborg, *Der*

letzte Ostrakismos, Hermes, 12 and 13 ; Seeliger, *Der Ostrak. des Hyperbolos*, N. Jahrb. f. Phil. Bd. 115 ; Kubicki, *De Phaeacis contra Alcib. testul. contentione*, Glatz, 1881. The tradition relating to this ostracism has the peculiarity that, according to Theophrastus (quoted in Plut. Nic. 11), it was not Nicias but Phaeax who was the rival of Alcibiades. For Phaeax, cf. Gilb. 234.—This was the last case of ostracism, not, as the comedians hinted, because the people considered it was desecrated by having been applied to an unworthy person, but because they perceived that it might be used to deceive the people, an innocent man instead of a dangerous one being made the object of it by means of a coalition of parties. Thuc. 8, 73 brings most serious charges against Hyperbolus, but gives no proof of them. It is not credible that any one was banished because he was a disgrace to the city ; it was due to political reasons. It is true that Hyperbolus was a *κακός* in the eyes of a *καλὸς κάγαθός*. Thucydides would perhaps have altered this passage if he had made a final revision of this Book. For ostracism generally cf. the exhaustive treatise by Valetón, *De Ostracismo*, in the Dutch periodical *Mnemosyne*, 1888.

11. The oligarchic revolution in Argos is also in Diod. 12, 80 ; the democratic in Paus. 2, 20, 2. Classen (Thuk. 5, p. 24) justly remarks that Müller-Strübing ought not to bring forward details given by Pausanias to contradict Thucydides. Thucydides is certainly not so interesting in the 5th Book as in the others ; but that is due to the wretched nature of the subject. At its conclusion he attains a dramatic elevation. We should be glad enough to dispense with the miserable details of the intrigues of 421-416 if we could exchange them for some more information about the history of civilization in that period. But Thucydides wished to write for the instruction of statesmen, and in point of fact there is much that is instructive in Book V., for it teaches us how politics should not be carried on.

12. This again is a case of surrender at discretion. According to Plut. Alc. 16, Alcibiades instigated the execution.

CHAPTER XXV

THE POLITICAL HISTORY OF ITALY AND SICILY IN THE FIFTH CENTURY

ATHENS had held her own well in the first part of the Peloponnesian War ; in the second she plunged into misfortune by undertaking the expedition to Syracuse. Before we relate this, we must give the reader a brief sketch of the state of western Greece in the fifth century, and of Sicily in particular.

In Italy and Sicily we have noted several groups of states, which are geographically distinct. In the fifth century they became somewhat more closely fused together, yet not completely so ; still their mutual influence was greater than it had hitherto been. The state which exercised the greatest influence on all the rest was Syracuse, which displayed its power in the Tyrrhenian Sea, and even gained a prominent position on the coast of Campania, where Cyme had declined and Neapolis at no time played a part in politics. On the Ionian Sea Taras alone was of importance ; even if it did not rank as a military power of the first order like Syracuse, it managed to maintain its position.

In Syracuse, after the death of Hieron in 467-6 B.C., his younger brother Thrasybulus assumed the government, but really only on behalf of Gelon's son. Thrasybulus was an incapable man, and the people of Syracuse, supported by the other large cities of the island, which were no longer under

the rule of tyrants—Gela, Acragas, Selinus and Himera—expelled him, and he withdrew to Locri. In consequence of this revolution the tyrannis ceased to exist in Messana and Rhegium as well. But the change did not restore order at once in Syracuse. The tyrannis had become too deep-seated for that. The tyrants had often deprived the older inhabitants of their property for the benefit of the mercenaries; a fresh settlement had to be made of these matters, and many quarrels resulted, in which the aborigines of Sicily, the still vigorous Sicels, took an active part. Finally the tenure of property in eastern Sicily was settled by a congress of deputies from the cities concerned (461 B.C.), and on this occasion Camarina also was restored to the position of a free city.

But the political leadership of the whole of Sicily still remained, as far as was possible, in the hands of the Syracusans. In spite of internal convulsions, which resulted in the introduction of petalism, an institution similar to ostracism but which proved futile, the Syracusans managed to assert their authority at a distance by devastating the Etruscan island of Aethalia (Elba) and even overrunning Corsica (453). In western Sicily the Acragantines fought with success against hellenized barbarians, the inhabitants of Motye.

For a brief space, however, it seemed as if the aborigines of Sicily would be able to wrest the supremacy of the island from the Greeks. A man of mark arose among the Sicels, Ducetius, whose career extended from 461-440. Having first displayed capacity as a ruler on a small scale, in 453 he brought about an alliance of the Sicel communities against the Greeks, conquered the town of Aetna, the modern Paternò, and then made the Acragantines feel his power. In the west the fortress of Motyon fell into his hands (451). The Syracusans, however, now took the field against him and defeated him. Deserted by his followers he hastened to Syracuse, and taking his stand at the altar in the market-place begged his enemies for protection. The Syracusans sent him to Corinth. But

he did not remain there long. He was allowed to collect comrades in Greece and with their aid to found the city of Calacte on the north coast of Sicily, a counter-demonstration to the founding of Thurii, which took place about this time, and in which the Ionian influence of Athens prevailed, just as the Dorian element of Corinth and Syracuse did in Calacte. The Acragantines were enraged at this activity on the part of the Syracusans and began a war against them, but were defeated at the river Himera in 446 B.C. Ducetius engaged in plans for another Sicilian league, but died in 440, before he had time to carry them out. His cities fell into the hands of the Syracusans. It may be assumed that he devoted himself mainly to their interests after his return from Greece. Although the Sikel nationality continued to exist, it dwindled considerably in importance after this, and Greek culture spread over the whole island, as the coinage proves. The Syracusans built a fleet of 100 ships of war. Their power pressed upon all the other cities in the east of the island, Chalcidian cities like Leontini, Catana and Naxos, and semi-Chalcidian like Messana, and this state of affairs led to the intervention of the Athenians.

We have now to deal with Italy. In Chapter vi. we referred to the unsuccessful war which Tarentum waged against the Iapygians with the support of Rhegium. Soon afterwards fortune changed, at least the Tarentines claimed to have defeated the Messapii and sent a great work of art as a dedicatory offering to Delphi, representing horses and captive Messapian women, a production of Ageladas. As Ageladas is supposed to have been Phidias' teacher, we may assign the victory of the Tarentines, of which we possess no other record, to the age of Cimon, consequently to the sixties of the fifth century B.C. A victory over the Peucetii and the Iapygians, which the Tarentines immortalized by a Delphic offering executed by Onatas and Calynthus, probably took place about the same time.¹

The ancient peoples of the Messapii and Iapygians no doubt gave the Tarentines much trouble, but they never became dangerous to the Greeks in general. The Italian peoples who finally annihilated the power of Greece in the peninsula were already rising in importance in the fifth century, but had not reached the summit of their power. The Greeks were still able to fill up the gaps caused by hostile attacks and internal dissensions, at least on the Ionian Sea. Unfortunately the chronology of this period is very vague, especially as regards the city of Metapontum. According to Strabo² it was destroyed by the Samnites, and the deserted site was subsequently occupied by Achaeans at the request of the Sybarites. The mention of the Samnites, who could not have exercised any influence on this region before the fifth century, might lead to the assumption that this incident did not take place till the fifth century; but how could the Sybarites, who were unable to help themselves at that period, be in a position to look after other people? In the fifth century it was rather the district of Siris, which is known to have been devastated in the sixth century, that invited occupation, and it was actually occupied after the founding of Thurii. The unsatisfactory notice of the foundation of the new city in the Siritis runs thus in Strabo:³ "Antiochus, however, states that the Tarentines, when they fought with the Thurians and the general Cleandridas, who had fled from Lacedaemon, concluded a treaty with them concerning the Siritis, and that they founded the city in common, but that it was regarded as a Tarentine colony, and afterwards called Heraclea, the name and site having been changed." A similar account is given by Diodorus, who puts the war in 444-3 and the founding of Heraclea in 433-2. The modern name is Policoro, which lies south of the mouth of the river Agri. Heraclea Trachiniae was founded somewhat later by Sparta, the parent-city of Tarentum. Strabo mentions another war waged by the Tarentines against the Messapii for Heraclea, but we do not

know when it took place.⁴ The Italian Heraclea minted some splendid coins.

If very many details of the history of Lower Italy in the fifth century are thus quite uncertain, on the other hand one important fact bearing on the history of civilization is perfectly clear, viz. that in Magna Graecia, just as in Sicily, the Dorian element predominated over the Ionian, in spite of all the efforts of the Athenians and of their exertions in the founding of Thurii.

Diodorus relates that in the year 435 the inhabitants of Thurii,⁵ who were a medley of many Greek races, disagreed as to which should be their parent-city and whom they should honour as their founder. The Athenians claimed the honour for themselves, but the Peloponnesians in Thurii would not concede it to them. An appeal was made to the Delphian Apollo, who said that he himself wished to be regarded as the founder of the city. Athens had thus exerted herself for the benefit of others, for the Delphian Apollo was at that time a Dorian partizan. This was also soon proved by the fact that Cleandridas, when banished from Sparta, became general-in-chief of the Thurians. He had evidently not lost his Dorian sympathies, and his son Cylippus subsequently broke the power of Athens at the siege of Syracuse. In the first years of the struggle between Athens and Syracuse Thurii was by no means friendly to the Athenians. And if the Athenian colony of Thurii was semi-Dorian, of course Heraclea, an offshoot from Tarentum, was completely so. The result therefore of the exertions of Athens in Italy during the fifth century was that the place of the Ionic cities of Sybaris and Siris in those regions was taken by the almost or wholly Dorian communities of Thurii and Heraclea, and that Metapontum was the only ally of the Athenians on the Ionian Sea.⁶ There is nothing to be said of the political tendencies of the cities on the Tyrrhenian Sea, as their history at that period is almost unknown. In the second half of the fifth

century Campania had to suffer at the hands of the Samnites (of Campania), who conquered and occupied Cyme in 421.⁷ Many Cymeans fled to Neapolis, which at that time was not able to do much more than look after its own safety. Of the history of Elea we only know that the philosopher Zeno is said to have been cruelly put to death by a tyrant of that city, which does not appear to have had any political relations with Greece. In the same way nothing is known of Poseidonia. That Athens did not abandon her attempts to maintain her influence in Italy and Sicily in spite of all obstacles, is shown by the treaties which she concluded with the cities of those parts, of which we have some though unfortunately very little information from inscriptions and fragmentary records.⁸

But the diplomatic attempts of Athens bore no visible fruit, and she therefore had recourse to force as soon as the opportunity seemed favourable. After some hesitation as to where she should strike, she selected Syracuse for her antagonist, the strongest city of the west, and a thorn in the side of the Athenians owing to its firm support of Corinthian commerce in those waters, especially since the Corinthians had brought the whole Peloponnesian league into the field against them. But this undertaking, of which we shall shortly give a brief account, failed, and it was principally in consequence of this failure that the whole war with the Peloponnesians proved unsuccessful in the end for Athens. At the same time the issue of this war was due to more deeply-seated causes. One of them was the tendency of Athenian character and Athenian policy as compared with that of Sparta. While strict discipline prevailed in Sparta, the individual being accustomed to render unreflecting obedience to the commands of his superiors, in Athens the principle of *laissez-faire*, which Thucydides has described so seductively in the mouth of Pericles, generated a certain weakness in the individual. But this difference of national character does not account for everything. Syracuse exhibited far less discipline than

Athens and yet conquered the Athenians. A more important and more decisive factor was that Athens, while treating her own citizens with so much indulgence, apparently and to a certain extent in reality represented the principle of despotism to outsiders. When common undertakings were in question the allies had to obey, and the object and scope of these undertakings were determined by Athens alone. This ran counter to Greek feeling. In point of fact the Athenian league consisted almost entirely of cities which might be considered either directly or indirectly as colonies, especially of Athens. The old Greek states were unwilling to join an alliance of this kind, but feared that Athens would force them to do so, and therefore sided with Sparta, who allowed the members of her league to join in her deliberations, listened to their rebukes, and seemingly and sometimes even actually yielded to their influence. It is true that only a league like that of Athens could create anything novel or important. But Sparta's sole object was to maintain existing institutions, she turned her back on all innovations, and the Peloponnesian league sufficed to carry out a policy of this kind. Consequently if this league, the constitution of which satisfied its various members, happened to possess good generals, and the Athenian league, which was irksome to its members, had bad ones, or if Athens was incapable of using her good generals, then Athens was bound to fall.

But the fall of Athens was also due to the fact that she, more than other ancient Greek states, followed a new movement, which unfortunately for Greece had come into vogue in the fifth century. We shall endeavour to explain its nature and to discuss at the same time the general intellectual condition of Greece in the three last decades of the century.

NOTES

The authorities for the statements regarding Sicily in this chapter are to be found in my *Geschichte Siciliens im Alterthum*, Bd. I. By way of addition to the contents of that volume I give here a brief survey of the coinage of western Greece, which explains many of the currents of civilization in those regions. I have attempted to supplement the conclusions arrived at by Head, Imhoof, and others.

The following is a sketch of the history of the coinage in question.

Western Greece, *i.e.* the Greece of Italy and Sicily, is divided into several groups corresponding to the position and origin of its communities, and these groups also possess a special character from a numismatic point of view.

One group is formed by the Chalcidian cities in Italy and Sicily, from Cyme to Naxos and Himera; a second by the Achæan cities in Lower Italy, with which Taras was associated for a time in point of coinage; a third by Taras and Heraclea; a fourth by the Campanian cities and Hyle (Elea); a fifth by the whole group of cities in Sicily up to about the end of the fifth century B.C. The first and second groups precede the third, fourth, and fifth in point of time. To these we shall add some remarks on the Etruscan coins, which are dependent on the Greek.

(1) In Cyme, Rhegium, Zancle, Naxos and Himera we find coins weighing 92 grains, which may be styled didrachmae of the Aeginetan standard. These cities, however, are of Chalcidian, consequently of Euboean origin; how is it that they coined on the Aeginetan standard and not on the Euboic? Head is inclined to explain this striking fact by the theory (pp. xlix. and 99) that the majority of the colonists came to these cities not from Euboea, but from the Greek mainland, and from the Cyclades, where the Aeginetan standard was used, *e.g.* from Naxos. This view is certainly well worthy of consideration. At the same time Imhoof has pointed out that the coins are also thirds of a tetradrachm according to the Euboic standard (consequently Euboic eight-obol pieces) and that this division into three was a very natural one owing to the close relations existing between these cities and Corinth, where the division was popular, the stater being divided into three parts. Hence the drachma of these Chalcidian cities corresponded alike to two Corinthian thirds of a stater and one Aeginetan drachma. The connection with the Aeginetan standard may have been useful to those cities which properly speaking

should have followed the Euboic standard, for the reason that the Aeginetan was in vogue in Corcyra (Head, 275), which necessarily had so many connections with Italy and Sicily, and which we shall mention presently, and because the Aeginetan system prevailed in Cephallenia, Zacynthus and Elis, which also had relations with the West. This system comes to an end in Cyme, Rhegium, Naxos and Himera about the beginning of the fifth century B.C.

(2) Another system prevailed in the Achaean colonies. We are here speaking firstly of the older cities on the Ionian Sea, Siris, Metapontum, Sybaris and Croton, then of Caulonia, and lastly of the colonies of the former on the Tyrrhenian Sea, of which Pyxus was connected with Siris, Poseidonia and Laos with Sybaris, and Temesa with Croton (Head, 80). Coins were minted here in the sixth century; they are very thin, and as a rule have the same type on the obverse and reverse, the former in relief and the latter incuse. The standard is the Corinthian, with staters of 130 grains and thirds of staters (small drachmae) of 44 grains. Head (p. li.) attaches so much importance to Fr. Lenormant's ideas regarding the influence of the Pythagoreans, that he considers this coinage as an expression of the power of the Pythagorean brotherhood. But when we bear in mind that Sybaris, which minted these coins, would have nothing to do with Pythagoras, this explanation must be rejected. In another point too it is impossible to agree with Head. The fact that the standard of coinage in these cities was the Corinthian leads him to the conclusion that the trade between Sybaris and Miletus went over the Isthmus of Corinth, "not in a direct line from Sybaris to Miletus" (p. lii.); but on p. li. he himself says: "The Milesian trader unloaded his ship in the port of Sybaris." He would thus assume that the Milesians sailed direct to Sybaris, but the Sybarites only as far as Lechaeum. Why? If the Milesians came to Sybaris they could export the merchandise of Italy to Asia, in fact they were obliged to do so, in order not to return without a cargo, and if the Sybarites sailed into the Gulf of Corinth, they did not do so in order that the goods they brought might be transported to Asia by the Corinthians. But did the Sybarites sail to Corinth? The upshot of modern research is precisely that the Sybarites devoted their attention only to the land transport between the Ionian and Tyrrhenian Seas, and were not sailors at all. Consequently the presence of the Euboic-Corinthian standard in the Achaean cities may probably be explained by the fact that the Achaeans originally were only able to come to Italy in Corinthian ships. This connection with Corinth was subsequently maintained by all the other Achaean cities, with the exception of Sybaris, which got on without Corinth, opened up direct

communication with Miletus and thus placed itself in opposition to Croton. Pythagoras of Samos came to Croton, and Samos was on close terms of friendship with Corinth. In explaining the presence of the Corinthian standard in Lower Italy we must therefore leave Sybaris out of account, and consider the fall of Sybaris rather as the result of the commercial jealousy of Corinth, Samos and Croton.—The flat coins with incuse reverse and of Aeginetan weight also occur in Rhegium (Head, 92); the coins of Thurii on the other hand are divided into thirds and have the ordinary shape (Head, 71).

(3) The third class is formed by Taras and Heraclea. Tarentum, which at first adopted the Achaean system (Head, 44), abandoned it both as regards shape and division of the coins. Like Athens, it divided the Euboic-Corintho-Attic stater, somewhat reduced in weight (from 130 to 125 grains), into 2 drachmae, and Heraclea, the colony of Tarentum, did the same (Head, 59).

(4) The Campanian cities changed their standard several times. According to the generally received opinion Cyme, as we have seen, at first adopted the Aeginetan standard, according to Imhoof, the Euboic standard with division into thirds; she was in close relation to the Chalcidian colonies of Rhegium, Zancle, Naxos and Himera. About 490 all these cities adopted the pure Euboic-Attic standard with division into halves under the influence of Syracuse, Cyme thus remaining in close connection with them. But a change soon took place. The influence of Hyele replaced that of the southern Chalcidian cities and of Syracuse. Hyele, a colony from Phocaea, had a stater of 118-115 grains (approximating to the Phoenician standard, the Attic being about 130 grs.), and this standard was adopted in the fifth century by Poseidonia and the Campanian cities of Cyme and Neapolis. Afterwards Poseidonia changed to the Achaean standard, while Hyele remained in connection with Campania. (Some very small coins of the fifth century found in Spain, near the mouths of the Rhone, and at Volterra also have the Phocaeen standard, a proof of the relations of Massalia; larger Massalian coins first appear about 350 according to Head, 7; for the former see Head, *ibid.*) As regards the types, it is worthy of note that the head of Pallas with an Athenian helmet appears on the coins of Neapolis, Nola, Hyele and Thurii, which is interpreted by Beloch as an indication of the predominating political influence of Athens in these cities. At the same time the head of Pallas is also found when there is no trace of such influence. The position of Poseidonia is peculiar (Head, 67). It minted at first thin coins in the Achaean style (relief and incuse) but on the Phocaeo-Campanian standard (stater = 118 grs.), afterwards thick coins but with

the division into thirds in the Achaean fashion (126 and 42 grs.) The explanation is that the commerce of Poseidonia followed land routes, partly across Italy to Sybaris and Thurii, partly across the Silarus and Sarnus to Neapolis.

(5) In Sicily about 490 the Chalcidian cities adopted the Euboic-Attic standard, which already prevailed in Syracuse and now became prominent throughout the whole of Sicily. Rhegium too followed the lead of Sicily.

(6) We now come to Etruria. Here in the fifth century there were two standards of coinage (Head, p. liv.), the one with pieces of 260, 130, and 65 grs., the other with pieces of 354, 177, and 88 grs. The former is of course the Euboic-Attic; the latter is usually considered to be Persian, on account of the relations between Etruria and the East. Head, however, regards it, and no doubt rightly, as the Aeginetan, which must have come to Etruria from Corecra across Italy. The fact that Corecra adopted this standard is attributable to its rivalry with Corinth, and its endeavours to maintain convenient relations with the Greek continent, where the Aeginetan standard was prevalent. This standard was also in vogue in Thessaly, Elis, Cephallenia and Zacynthus, and in the Corecraean colonies of Epidamnus and Apollonia to the north; while on the other hand Acarnania, Anactorium and Leucas were under the influence of Corinth and minted on her standard. It now appears that, before the Celts became powerful in the valley of the Po, the Corecraeans had intercourse with Etruria *via* Hatria and Spina, and introduced the Aeginetan standard there. Thus, by combining other information respecting the commerce of Etruria with the results of researches on the coinage, we arrive at the conclusion that Etruria came into contact with Greece from at least four different quarters: (1) by sea from Sicily, especially from Syracuse, hence its Euboic-Attic standard, which is also accounted for (2) by the direct relations of the Etruscans and Athens; (3) by land across Italy from Corecra; (4) by sea and land *via* Poseidonia from Sybaris and Miletus.

We have described the coinage of these countries in detail, because the science of numismatics throws a strong light on the history of civilization. For the Etruscan coins cf. Deecke, *Etruskische Forschungen*, II. 1876. The Locrian coins of the fifth century mentioned by Fr. Lenormant, *Gr. Gr.* 2, 34, do not exist.

1. Dedicatory offerings of the Tarentines, Paus. 10, 10, 3, and 10, 13, 10; Lorentz, *Vet. Tar. Res. g. I.* p. 6.

2. For Metapontum see Str. 6, 264.

3. For Heraclea see Str. 6, 264. Diod. 12, 23, places the war in 444-3 and the founding of Heraclea in 433-2 (*ibid.* 36). Some

particulars of the constitution of Heraclea are to be found in the inscriptions of the *Tabulae Heracleenses* belonging to the fourth century, C. I. Gr. 5774. For Heraclea, its position, etc., cf. Lenormant, *Grande Grèce*, 1, 166 seq.

4. War of the Tarentines against the Messapii on account of Heraclea, Str. 6, 280. Lorentz, *Vet. Tar. Res. g. I.* p. 16, shows to how many different periods this war has been assigned by different writers. Trustworthy data are almost always wanting in the history of *Magna Graecia*.

5. For *Thurii* cf. Diod. 12, 35.

6. *Metapontum κατὰ τὸ ξυμμαχικόν* friendly to Athens, Th. 7, 33, 57.

7. Diod. 12, 76 ; Dion. Hal. 15, 6.

8. Treaty with Rhegium C. I. A. 1, 33 = Hicks 39 and Dittenberger 24 ; treaty with Leontini, C. I. A. 4, 33 a = Hicks 40 and Dittenberger 23 ; cf. Th. 3, 86. Both in Ol. 86, 4, or 433-2 B.C. Alliance with Segesta, Th. 6, 6, with Metapontum, Th. 7, 33, 57. Athenians settled in Neapolis, Str. 5, 246. The *δρόμος λαμπαδικός* in Neapolis established in honour of Parthenope by Diotimus, who came to Neapolis as general of the Athenians, ὅτε—ἐπολόμει τοῖς Σικελοῖς, Tz. ad Lyc. 732, from Tim. (fr. 99).—Of Massalia, the commerce of which was of great importance, we know scarcely anything before the fourth century. It had relations with Rome, for the Romans deposited their Gallic spoils in the treasure-house of the Massalioes at Delphi. The discoveries of coins mentioned on p. 420 throw some light on its other connections. According to Lenormant, *À travers l'Apulie*, 2, 396, these small coins are Phocaean.

CHAPTER XXVI

THE NEW CULTURE

IN the second half of the fifth century B.C. a remarkable change takes place in the whole inner life of the Greek people. The spirit of free inquiry into every subject of human interest, of emancipation from every kind of authority, asserts itself with extraordinary force in theory, and endeavours, with some measure of success, to obtain control of practical life as well. The possibility of such a rapid conversion of theory into practice is characteristic of Greece. It is due in the first place to the innate love of novelty of the Greeks, in the second place to the absence of religious dogmas, and lastly to the fact that Greece was split up into a number of independent states, the existence of which enabled an individual who was unsuccessful or not tolerated in one city, to take refuge elsewhere and find a fresh field for the dissemination of his ideas.

The principle of free inquiry had arisen long before this, as early as the sixth century, but at that time it did not spread into Greece proper, and it was besides limited to a particular district. The Ionian philosophy had confined itself to explaining the phenomena of nature. No doubt even at that early stage a code of practical ethics existed. But it assumed the garb of authority and not of investigation. The Seven Sages and the Delphic Oracle propounded maxims without proving their truth, leaving not only the demonstra-

tion but sometimes the actual meaning to the sagacity of their hearers. It was not till the fifth century that people went a step further and engaged in the examination of the theoretical bases of practical life.

This inquiry and its practical application were carried out mainly under the wing of two new sciences, rhetoric and sophistry, the second of which, if it deserves the name of science at all, did not long preserve its distinctive character.¹ Sophistry was only an ephemeral phenomenon; rhetoric is still in existence. The conception of rhetoric requires no explanation; the term sophistry denotes a special form of the philosophy of the intellect, which prevailed in the fifth century, before Socrates disseminated his teachings, and which chiefly pursued practical objects. At their start both these sciences had much in common. Both rhetoricians and sophists advanced the proposition that mankind may be made fit for practical life by theoretical instruction, in fact better than by mere practice. The modern world admits this too, but in another sense, as applied to a course of specialized study. But the rhetoricians and sophists placed a different construction on their theory. They held that the main point was to have certain rules of a perfectly general character, to which the particular case could be affiliated. They maintained that the essence of wisdom resided in beautiful language reposing on a foundation of ingenious thought. They owed their enormous success with the people to the fact that they instilled into it the belief that their instruction would ensure every man practical ability in every walk of life. This was what the people aimed at, and any one who helped them to realize it rose high in their estimation. The idea was expressed in its crudest form by the sophist Hippias of Elis; he asserted that he not only knew how to govern states, but also how to achieve success in every condition of life, and he proved it at Olympia by stating that he had made everything which he had on, clothes, shoes and rings. He thus pro-

pounded the new science as a charlatan, but its fundamental idea even in his case was not without a certain grandeur, viz. that nothing is unattainable by man, and not only by mankind in general, but by each individual, if only his natural powers are developed by means of sound instruction. Sophistry thus held out the prospect of the triumph of the individual, which was sure to attract the public. Every man, it was said, might attain to such a degree of power by means of theoretical instruction. One had only to listen and learn to become an adept in everything. People were seized with a mania for education; we know what this means in these days of popular books and lectures, and can understand how it was that a regular craze took possession of men's minds.

Of the leaders of the movement those who called themselves rhetoricians professed to teach oratory, those who aspired to the name of sophists, wisdom. In both instances the aim was ability in practical life, and the difference between the two was rather of theoretical than of practical importance. Moreover the same men, with but few exceptions, were styled at one time rhetoricians at another sophists, according as the form or the matter of the subject taught was kept in view. The chief point with both was dexterity, in oratory with the rhetoricians, in logical demonstration with the sophists. Knowledge of the subject was relegated by both to a subordinate position. The result was that not only did rhetoric apparently devote itself more to the semblance than the reality, which is intelligible enough in itself, but that sophistry also, which properly speaking is the teaching of wisdom, came to be regarded as the science which qualified its adepts, not to produce conviction, but to dazzle and stupefy the public. For at the outset sophistry and philosophy were identical, and the invidious signification of the term sophist was simply a consequence of the righteous crusade of Socrates and his school against sophistry. In their origin rhetoric and sophistry did not intrinsically aim at appearances but at

practical success, which of course is only too often attained by specious pretence. Moreover both rhetoricians and sophists often laboured to advantage, as is shown by the teaching of Prodicus of Ceos, whose allegory of the choice of Heracles could not but have a beneficial effect. Besides this, the doctrines of the prominent rhetoricians and sophists had a philosophical basis, with which we must make ourselves acquainted if we wish to avoid underrating their importance.

The Greeks, as we know, cultivated the philosophy of nature before that of the intellect; the transition from the former to the latter was effected in a peculiar way by the Eleatic school,² which was founded by Xenophanes. His disciple was Parmenides of Elea, who laid special stress on the conception of the unity of all existing phenomena. Exclusive contemplation of existence led him to deny the possibility of change and decay, and he asserted that all these manifestations, including the variety of existing phenomena, rested merely upon a deception of the senses. Existence and thought were one and the same thing to him. This devotion to the objects of thought, however, did not make Parmenides wholly neglect the study of the real. He called warmth the existent, and cold the non-existent, and consequently conceived cold as something negative. Zeno, who was also a native of Elea, was somewhat younger than Parmenides; he is supposed to have flourished about the 80th Olympiad (460 B.C.) His title to fame is due chiefly to his attempt to support the Eleatic doctrine of the non-existence of change by an argument in which he endeavoured to prove that the conceptions of number, parts and motion were irrational. Zeno was consequently regarded by the ancients as the inventor of dialectic, which, as we know, was one of the main supports of rhetoric and of sophistry. His Achilles was famous, the proof that the swift-footed hero could never overtake a snail which had got the start of him. This and similar alleged proofs of Zeno are characterized by an attempt to prove away something

that was self-evident, such as motion. If this could once be removed, then there was nothing which could not be shaken by dialectic. Everything would become uncertain, except the talent of the thinker, and one of the objects of sophistry was precisely to bring this into relief.

If in this way sophistry derived advantage from the method of one of the chiefs of the Eleatic school, it also received support from the rival doctrines of Heraclitus. Heraclitus said: everything is in a state of flux, nothing is permanent. This furnished a clever rhetorician or sophist with a scientific basis, by means of which he could present things as he liked, without fear of refutation, for the opposite of his assertion was just as devoid of certainty. One of the most prominent sophists, Protagoras of Abdera, arrived at his theory from this standpoint. He enunciated the famous proposition that man is the measure of all things, *i.e.* everything is as it appears to the individual, which pointed to the further conclusion that there was no fixed standard of good and evil or right and wrong. Protagoras might of course have deduced the subjectivity of ideas just as easily from the opposite Eleatic teaching, according to which the perceptions of the senses, from which abstract ideas are formed, are not what really exists, just as his great contemporary in the art of rhetoric, Gorgias, was led by the Eleatic doctrine to precisely similar results. Protagoras lived in Athens for a time, but the Athenians expelled him, not because he was a rhetorician or sophist, but on account of the atheistical nature of his philosophic teaching. He lived probably from 480-410.

Although Protagoras came from eastern Greece, from Thrace, which was so prolific in great men, such as Paeonius, Polygnotus, Alcamenes and Democritus, to which Thucydides himself to a certain extent belonged, yet he spent some time in the west, which was the natural home of the new art, so far as regards the form given it by rhetoric. He took up his abode in Sicily. Of the more famous rhetoricians and sophists

Gorgias of Leontini and Polus of Acragas were natives of this island, while the celebrated Prodicus came from the island of Ceos near Athens. Rhetoric is in its essential nature entirely a product of Sicily.

The Sicilian Greeks were remarkable for the acuteness of their intellect. In the beginning of the fifth century many factors combined to foster the growth of rhetoric in Sicily as a separate art or science, the character of the poetry which was most in vogue at that time, the philosophy that was taught and encouraged there, and finally the political condition of the largest cities in the island.

The most popular branch of poetry in Sicily at that period was the comic drama, as created by Epicharmus, a native of Cos. It was, however, strongly infected by philosophic ideas, and the ancients remarked that Epicharmus was the first to introduce a conclusion in the form of a parody of sophistical arguments, which consequently must have been known in Sicily in the time of Hieron, before the word sophist had acquired its specific meaning. This was the so-called *λόγος ἀνξάνόμενος*, according to which man, in consequence of the continual change of his being, is not the same to-day as he was yesterday. In this way it was possible, as has been rightly conjectured, for one of the characters in a comedy of Epicharmus to say that he need not pay his debts, for he had ceased to be the individual who had contracted them. But besides the comic drama the philosophy of Sicily participated in the invention of rhetoric, the philosopher Empedocles, to whom we shall refer directly, being generally considered one of its founders. Lastly, in Sicily practical life contributed to the rise of rhetoric, and of a highly sophistical kind of it, in the following manner.

The first teacher of eloquence is said to have been Corax of Syracuse, who was already in repute at Hieron's court, and gained a still greater reputation after the expulsion of Thrasybulus and the restoration of liberty (466 B.C.) The chaotic

condition of this transitional period often furnished him with an opportunity of displaying his skill in public speeches upon questions of law and property, and he resolved to impart the secret of his success to all who wished to know it, *i.e.* to give instruction in eloquence. This was the first application of the principle of the new science, that the master's instruction guarantees success. His chief pupil was Tisias, with whom he had the famous lawsuit about his fees. Tisias had promised to pay for his instruction as soon as he had learned the art, that is, had achieved success by his oratory. When the course of lectures was finished he refused to pay, and let his instructor bring a suit against him. In court he maintained that he was not bound to pay, for if he lost his case then Corax had not taught him the art, and if he won it he was relieved from liability. This story exhibits the character of the new sciences of rhetoric and sophistry, which aimed at success and were supported by fallacies ; it is well suited to the age in which Zeno denied the existence of motion, and shows clearly enough what a thoroughly naïve delight people then took in the theoretical and practical application of the intellect.

Empedocles of Acragas is styled the second father of rhetoric, but he was still more famous as a philosopher. He attempted to explain the origin of existence, and in doing so hit upon an idea which has influenced science down to modern times, *viz.* that there are four elements, fire, water, air and earth, which are intermingled by two forces, love and hatred, afterwards called attraction and repulsion, and thus produce separate entities. This conception and the mode of its demonstration was a great achievement, for which the ancients lauded him to the skies. He was besides distinguished as a statesman and in every respect worthy of esteem. But his demeanour in public shows that even he was infected with the mania of producing an effect, which characterized his scientific contemporaries who were engaged in rhetoric and

sophistry. He travelled about in great state, and posed before the public as a miracle-worker. At the same time he was useful to his fellow-men in a variety of ways, as an engineer and physician as well as a teacher, and apparently did not demand money for his services, which distinguished him from the ordinary sophists. The practice of taking money was what the opponents of the new art chiefly threw in the teeth of its representatives. It is true that the latter could not dispense with payment if they were poor and wanted to travel about giving instruction. Still it was a novelty to accept payment for theoretical instruction. It was usual for physicians to take fees; Democles, for instance, was highly paid. But medical assistance was of a practical kind, and therefore entitled to payment. Poets also were paid; Simonides received large sums of money. But then their creations were works of art, and works of art were paid for. Teaching seemed to come under a different category. Homer does not recognize the status of a teacher among the demiurgoi; teachers were members of the household. In spite of this the rhetoricians and sophists persuaded the Greek public to pay them very high fees, and they succeeded in this by making the public believe that they could enable their pupils to acquire honour, power and wealth.

High fees were paid to Gorgias of Leontini, who was one of the most eminent representatives of the new science. He, however, claimed the title of rhetorician, not sophist, because he knew and also thought proper to declare that the art of oratory could be learnt, but not wisdom.⁸ He is one of the most prominent figures of the fifth century B.C., and has perhaps been pushed too far into the background by the Socratic school. He had the makings of a great critical philosopher. As such he endeavoured to prove the three following propositions: (1) that nothing exists, (2) that if anything does exist, it is unknowable, (3) that even if it is knowable, it is incapable of being expressed. The first proposition is a fallacy according

to the teaching of Gorgias himself, for the man who, on his own confession, cannot know anything, does not know whether anything exists or not. As compared with this the Socratic disclaimer of knowledge was a great step in advance. But the second and third propositions contain a truth too often ignored, which Kant was the first to reinstate in its place of honour, that the subjective element of our knowledge is so indissolubly connected with the objective, that the object as such does not exist for us. These propositions possess a far greater scientific value than the polemical trifling of Zeno. Gorgias, however, did not wish to devote his life to philosophy, which was condemned and annihilated by his own maxims and in his own eyes. If theory is useless, then we must try and master practical life. Gorgias was qualified for this by his natural abilities, which did not fit him for the vocation of natural philosopher or scientific expert, like Empedocles, but only for giving instruction in the art of speech. He therefore confined himself to the career of a rhetorician. And he was probably a better master of rhetoric than any of his successors. He defined the nature and object of oratory with precision, and gave the best practical rules for the suitable composition of speeches. As regards form, he was guided by the peculiar principle that great regularity must be given to the expression of thought by means of a harmonious division of periods. This attempt to make prose rhythmical is certainly justifiable, and testifies to the penetration of its author. The scene of Gorgias' labours was not merely Sicily but also Greece proper, in various districts of which he enjoyed high repute, and finally Thessaly. He is said to have prolonged his life to more than 100 years by practising great regularity of diet.

The rhetoric created by Gorgias attained to extraordinary importance among the Greeks and among the Romans who were imbued with Greek culture, an importance which it fortunately does not possess with us. The Greeks were only too ready to regard everything from the point of view of

form; but affairs of state did not always prosper after it became necessary for speeches to be composed with elegance. The Romans managed to do without rhetoric, so long as they retained their grandeur and seriousness of character. Gorgias is generally supposed to have written in the Attic dialect; his writings are probably the earliest example of the use of this dialect outside Attic territory, the first step in its successful career. Herodotus and Hippocrates wrote their scientific works in the Ionic dialect about the same time. And it certainly was not the political importance of Athens alone which prompted Gorgias to write in Attic; the influence of Athens could not have been so predominant in Sicily. He must therefore have preferred the Attic dialect because he considered it especially suited for the construction of periods in his own style. And finally something may have been due to the idea that the genius of the Athenian people had many characteristics which harmonized best with the nature of rhetoric as he conceived it. As a matter of fact rhetoric and sophistry were most at home in Athens, and a few remarks will show that the soil there had been particularly well prepared for them.⁴

The Athenians were distinguished more than the other Greeks by great quickness of apprehension, similar to that possessed by the Sicilian Greeks. This was seen in the theatre, where subtle allusions and even mere eccentricities of pronunciation were immediately noticed. Their sense of the ridiculous was developed to an extraordinary degree. Even in the Assembly they went so far as to bandy jokes with one another. The Athenian citizen was a keen critic. He was quick to notice anything out of the common and prompt to ridicule it. But he was also capable of enthusiasm for what was great. He gladly recognized excellence in achievement, and placed a high value on moral worth. This is best proved by the respect which Aristides enjoyed towards the close of his life. But the Athenian would

go to the opposite extreme with the same rapidity which he had displayed in his approbation. He persecuted his great men just as readily as he had applauded them. With his natural acuteness he quickly discovered their weak points, and was highly pleased when they were exposed in public. This accounts for the great popularity which the comic stage enjoyed in Athens. Another characteristic of the Athenians was their strong love of art, and not only love of it, but also their sound and refined artistic taste. The perfection of architecture and sculpture in Athens can only be explained by the existence of a specially refined taste in the whole people. Side by side with this, however, the Athenians exhibited a characteristic which is not always taken into sufficient account, an attachment to their ancient religion, to its meaning, and, what was the main point in religion with the Greeks, to its form. The active nature of the Athenian mind did not interfere with this feeling of attachment, a fact which is comprehensible enough, as the Greek religion did not require belief in dogmas, but only faith in the efficacy of certain ceremonies.

Taking him altogether, the Athenian of the fifth and also of the first half of the fourth century is a highly peculiar phenomenon. Much of what we have just enumerated, his rapid apprehension, his love of ridicule, his capacity for enthusiasm and his tendency to hasten to pull down his idols from their pedestals, he has in common with the inhabitants of modern capitals. There are many similar traits in the character of the population of Berlin and of the Parisians, although it cannot be asserted that they possess the high degree of refinement and the acuteness of perception which characterized the Athenians of that age. But the two last-mentioned traits, the highly-developed taste for art and the marked pietism, are very far from being as characteristic of the inhabitants of modern capitals as they were of the Athenians, and it may be said generally that a people which combined acuteness, sprightliness of mind, fickleness, artistic

taste and pietism, as the Athenians did, was destined to be unique in history. It is not true, as is asserted in some quarters nowadays, that the intellectual level of the ancient Athenians was on an average the same as that of our modern working classes.⁵ In point of positive knowledge they were not even so far advanced as the children in our elementary schools. But in other respects circumstances were far more favourable for the Athenians. The existence of a slave class freed the citizens from a great deal of labour that wearies out the modern workman. What most cripples the intellect in these days, the never-ending repetition of mechanical work in factories, fell to the lot of slaves only. The poor freeman might at the worst be a small artizan, and occupation of this kind has, as is well known, never paralyzed the mind. On the other hand it is true that many, because it suited them, preferred the ease of being supported by the State to the happiness of earning their own living; but even in many modern civilized states the subordinate official does not work harder than the paid Athenian citizen did. Finally, from an intellectual point of view, the distinctions which separate the various classes nowadays did not exist then; the means of education were more generally accessible to all than they are now. The average Athenian citizen was consequently on a higher intellectual level than the average inhabitant of a modern capital.

This made Athens a highly suitable field for the new arts and sciences. Rhetoric and sophistry satisfied the acuteness, the vivacity and the artistic feeling of the Athenians, and never came into conflict with religion, as might so easily happen and actually did happen in the case of the exact sciences and of all pursuits in which the subject-matter and not mere form is the main point. Besides, rhetoric and sophistry were all the more useful to the Athenian statesman, because the power of free speech was becoming more and more the basis of the Athenian state, which in fact was ruled by it. Thus it is known that Parmenides and Zeno resided

in Athens, that Protagoras came there and was expelled the city, not because he was a rhetorician, but because he said that he did not know whether the gods existed, consequently on a charge of atheism. We know that Tisias, the pupil of Corax, stayed in Athens, and that Gorgias was in great vogue there. Besides this, the fact that Athens had had the largest share in the founding of Thurii and remained for a time closely connected with it, promoted the rise of rhetoric in the former city. For many Sicilians who were influenced by the new culture came to Thurii, and also leaders of it, such as Empedocles and Tisias. On the other hand some Athenians migrated from Athens to Thurii, among them the orator Lysias, who was descended from a Syracusan family.

Pericles and Thucydides have been included among the pupils of Gorgias. This statement cannot be taken literally, for at the time when Pericles was in a position to form a style of popular oratory Gorgias was unknown in Athens, and if Gorgias did not come to Athens till 427 B.C., which is by no means certain, Thucydides' education must have been completed long before his appearance there. The eloquence of Pericles, according to the accounts of the ancients, was of such a thoroughly business-like kind that it could not have derived its real merit from rules promulgated by a man of the stamp of Gorgias. It is, however, probable that Pericles, as well as Thucydides, so far profited by the new art that they were confirmed in the practice of laying special stress upon beauty of form and harmony of periods, as is evidenced in the case of Pericles by the fact that he never delivered a speech extempore. The possibility of employing such a deliberate form of oratory is accounted for by the peculiar position of an Athenian speaker as compared with that of a modern one. The orator, while he delivered his speech, was performing a religious function; consequently he could not be interrupted, as is the practice in modern parliaments, and therefore readiness in debate was not so much required.⁶ The speeches reported by Thucydides,

especially those of Pericles, bear evident traces of the file, and the frequent use of antithesis may be regarded in particular as a mark of the rhetorical school. Thucydides, however, was certainly a pupil of Antiphon, if not of Gorgias; Antiphon was an Athenian statesman and rhetorician, who is credited with some extant speeches which are also antithetical in form, and may probably be considered as written in the style of Gorgias. It was quite possible for this style to have been known in Athens before Gorgias himself had visited the city.

If the style of Thucydides was influenced by the rhetoric of the age, which can hardly admit of a doubt, yet his own intrinsic merit is quite independent of it and is undeniably great.⁷ Thucydides came of a wealthy family, and owned gold mines in Thrace not far from Thasos. His father's name, Olorus, which was also the name of the father-in-law of the famous Miltiades, seems to indicate that he was related to Thracian princes, as well as to Cimon; his father, however, was an Athenian citizen. Thucydides was probably born about 470. We know nothing whatever of the period of his life anterior to the Peloponnesian War; of the subsequent period all that is known with certainty is what we have related in the history of the war, that he was unsuccessful in his capacity of general in Thrace, and in consequence had to live out of Athenian territory during the remainder of the war. This gave him an opportunity of making inquiries among foreigners as to the truth of the events which he had to relate. It is possible that he visited Syracuse; at all events his description of the siege of that city is marked by such topographical accuracy that it points to a personal acquaintance with the locality. Thucydides says at the beginning of his history that he set to work to relate the war at its very commencement, that is, to collect the materials necessary for the composition of the history. He did so, he says, because he foresaw that this war would be of immense importance. He lived to see its close, and was recalled from exile after the fall

of Athens. But he was unable to complete his work ; he was murdered on his Thracian estate at Scaptehyle. Not only is the conclusion wanting, the history of the years 410-404, but the events recorded in the eighth Book referring to the period after the Sicilian War are not narrated in the earlier style, none of the *dramatis personae* being introduced as speaking in the first person.

Thucydides prefaces his work with an introduction, in which he endeavours to show the importance of his subject and thence to prove that the war which he narrates was of greater interest than any other war waged by the Greeks. In doing this he obviously invites comparison with Herodotus, whom he more than once attacks without mentioning him by name. This antagonism is alluded to in the famous passage that his work was to be one of permanent value and not an ephemeral performance, as he considered Herodotus' history to be. Thucydides tries to magnify his subject as much as possible, and with this object enumerates various reasons intended to prove that the Peloponnesian War was the most important of all wars. These reasons are characteristic of the intellectual bias of the man. While, he says, the greatest of the earlier wars, that with the Persians, was decided quickly in two naval and two land battles, the Peloponnesian War was of very long duration, and inflicted more injury on Hellas than it had suffered in any previous equal period of time, by means of destruction and devastation of cities, butchery of their inhabitants, earthquakes, eclipses of the sun, drought, famine, and lastly the terrible plague. As regards his treatment of the subject he says that he does not reproduce the reports of others, but gives the results of personal investigation, that his aim is not to compose a pleasing and interesting story, but to relate facts which may be of use for posterity, for a similar state of things might easily recur in history. Thucydides' point of view is here revealed in both its strength and its weakness. He has not the sweeping glance

of Herodotus, which ranges over epochs and countries. He fails to grasp the importance of the Persian Wars, and confines himself to externals in comparing it with the Peloponnesian War. Devastation of cities, plagues and earthquakes absorb the interest of contemporaries—that is intelligible enough, and a good annalist must not neglect incidents of this kind. But was there anything in the Peloponnesian War really on a par with the devastation of Athens by the Persians? The point is a doubtful one. When, however, Thucydides drags the number of battles in the Persian Wars into his argument, he figures as a sophist, whose sole object is to create effect.⁸ For there were not merely two naval and two land battles in the Persian Wars, but three of each. And he cannot have meant merely 480 and 479 (in that case too his statement would be incorrect), for even the Peace of Nicias is not an interruption of the Peloponnesian War in his eyes. From this point of view the battle on the Eurymedon, the engagement off Cyprus, and all the sanguinary struggles in Egypt ought to be included in the Persian Wars. In the face of such a sophistical argument as this Herodotus would have been perfectly justified in styling his rival's work an ephemeral performance. As a rhetorician Thucydides displays more refined and we may say more impressive qualities not only in the introduction of speeches into his history, in which he has been imitated by later writers, but also in the thoroughly artistic arrangement of the first Book, a point which would seem not to have been adequately appreciated hitherto, and which we have endeavoured to elucidate in the notes to this Chapter.⁹

Apart from the narrowness of his horizon, or perhaps for that very reason, Thucydides possesses the greatest merits. The more limited his view, the greater his accuracy. In his judgment the historian's task consisted in relating the events of the present, *i.e.* those concerning which he could procure trustworthy information, laying stress on the more important

and most recent occurrences. Attempts have been made to convict him of serious inaccuracies, but without success. On the other hand, the writer of this work is able to state that he has followed him topographically for the greater part of the sixth and seventh Books, consequently for nearly a fourth of the whole history, and has found that the more carefully his words are weighed and the more accurately the ground is studied the clearer both text and events become, and this is certainly high praise. Thucydides avoids everything in the nature of anecdote; on one occasion only (iv. 40) he has not been able to resist relating a story illustrating the character of the Spartans, in which a blow is indirectly aimed at Cleon, whom he detested. Sketches of character, with the exception of those of a few individuals, such as Cleon, are conveyed almost entirely by means of speeches, and not in the author's words. The speeches to a certain extent re-echo each other, and are consequently rhetorical compositions of the historian. Although Thucydides was more closely connected with the oligarchic than with the democratic party, it is from him that we obtain the best information concerning the misdeeds of the Athenian oligarchs. His sympathies are mainly with Pericles and his policy, his eulogy of which he has compressed into the funeral oration delivered by Pericles over the Athenians who fell in the first year of the war.

We have, however, another work belonging to the period in which Thucydides wrote, the last three decades of the fifth century, which throws light on the seamy side of the Periclean democracy. This is the treatise on the Athenian State,¹⁰ ascribed to Xenophon but not really from his pen. It is true that the name of Pericles is not mentioned in it, and besides Pericles was dead when it was written, but the political system described is that of Pericles. It does not discuss this system from an ethical point of view, but from a purely practical one, of the kind which predominated in the minds of politicians at the time of the Peloponnesian War, as appears by the speeches in

Thucydides. The whole treatment of the subject is utilitarian. The one ethical consideration which occurs in the treatise is such in appearance only—all aristocrats are good, the people are bad. These are the old epithets given to the nobles and the common herd, which had no moral significance. The author of the work, a thorough oligarch, only discusses the fitness of the democratic institutions of Athens. He is forced to admit that they are distinguished by consistency and wise forethought, for everything is arranged at Athens so as to ensure the continuance of the democracy. The good, that is, the rich, of course suffer under the system prevailing in Athens, and they cannot be blamed for wishing it at an end. But the author of the treatise himself does not assert that the régime of his own party would last, even if it was introduced. He is a pessimist to the backbone, and the ill-success of the attempts made by the Four Hundred and the Thirty proved him to be right in the end. There is nothing rhetorical in the style; it is the quiet conversational tone of a man of good family. There is a complete absence of attempts to instruct or to propound general maxims, which are so common in the speeches of Thucydides. In the treatment of the subject, however, the uncompromising way in which all ideal considerations are excluded indicates that the corroding acid of sophistical rationalism had completely penetrated the upper classes in Athens. In the aristocratic party as well as elsewhere everything turns on utilitarianism.

The method of reasoning practised by the sophists also exercised very considerable influence upon poetry, especially on tragedy, of which Euripides was the representative.¹¹ Euripides was a great poet; he was strongly influenced by the new movement, but he was not completely under its spell. He was a little younger than Sophocles, born, according to tradition, in the year of the battle of Salamis. At the age of five-and-twenty he began to write for the stage, and 92 dramas are attributed to him, of which 17 have come down to

us. With the Athenian people and the judges of dramatic competitions he did not enjoy the popularity which fell to the lot of Sophocles. This was due to the fact that he displayed great independence of character, and was not above using certain elements of culture which were not to the taste of the Athenian people, such as philosophy. He led a very retired life, allowed politics to run their chequered course without sharing the ambition of Sophocles to see his name on the list of strategi, and sought intellectual stimulus in books and in intercourse with philosophers. He was a pupil of Anaxagoras and frequented the society of Socrates, both of whom were objects of extreme suspicion to the Athenian people. But the more profound thinkers in Athens and the cultured classes abroad prized him highly. In Sicily he had enthusiastic admirers; the Syracusans were not, like the Athenians, prevented by hereditary pietism from valuing him as he deserved. At the close of his life he went to the court of Macedonia, and he died in Thrace in the year 406.

Euripides discarded the presentment of any special grandeur in the character of the heroes. He looks on them as men, of the stamp that one meets in everyday life. Even if his predecessors in tragedy had not pictured them as a higher order of beings, yet they had as a rule invested them with superior dignity. This is not the case with Euripides; he treats them as any chance contemporaries. And it cannot be asserted that in doing so he stepped outside the sphere of the Greek mind. Every poet paints the past with the colours of the present. The Homeric figures, gods and demi-gods, are human beings with all the attributes of human beings. Pindar in his religious lyrics was the first to introduce a tone of sublimity, not always present in contemporary life, into the heroic world, while Aeschylus, inspired by the lofty mood of the great age of the wars of liberation, transferred this tone to the dialogues of tragedy. This was approximately, but in a less marked degree, the practice of Sophocles, who also aspired to the

character of a religious teacher of the people. Euripides abandoned this point of view. It was all the more permissible for him, because his predecessors' more ideal presentment of the gods had after all not brought them nearer the aim which they set before themselves, that of harmonizing polytheism with a purified moral consciousness. Euripides simply reverted to the Homeric standpoint, but with this difference, that what was naïve in Homer is matter of reflection with him, and therefore does not produce the same effect. Euripides reduced the free and easy life of the Homeric gods to a system. According to the Homeric theology, whoever resisted a god was exposed to the risk of destruction, however virtuous he might be. Euripides admits this and enunciates it with clearness. In his *Hippolytus* he represents the goddess Artemis as inculcating the doctrine that the gods do not interfere with one another, and that therefore it is possible for a just man to perish if he resists a god too strongly. This was precisely what the people thought, for sacrifices were offered in order to reconcile gods with one another. And it was not this conception of religion which made the Athenian people look askance at Euripides, but the habit of reasoning introduced in all his pieces, which gave offence when it led to utterances that came in conflict with the foundations of the State. When Euripides made Hippolytus say that his lips had sworn but not his heart, people were offended, for they considered it equivalent to a justification of perjury.¹² And the Athenians who held this opinion were not wrong, if it was the province of the stage, as a teacher of good morals, to express only virtuous sentiments. But if Euripides thought himself entitled to put an occasional impious utterance into the mouths of his *dramatis personae*, provided it was in keeping with their character and surroundings, can we say that he was wholly in the wrong?

Euripides, however, did not aim at conveying instruction directly but only indirectly, by inviting reflection, and by

endeavouring to represent life as it is. But in doing so he founded a new school of dramatic poetry, the productions of which occupy a middle place between tragedy and comedy—using these words in the modern sense—and to a certain extent approximate to the middle-class dramas of the eighteenth century. The ideas of fate and of the arrogance which plunges the hero and his family into misfortune, found in Aeschylus and Sophocles, were often inadequate. If tragedy was still to exist, it was necessary that every kind of excess caused by the defects or the waywardness of mankind should become the subject of it, and this was the task which Euripides endeavoured to accomplish. Even passion has its sophistical side. Hence Euripides with his treatment of the heroic characters appeared just at the right moment; what he had learnt from the sophists interested the people, even if it sometimes annoyed them. It is not the chorus but the characters in the play who now discuss in dialogue the problems which engage the attention of the people. This gives the actors an opportunity of indulging in brilliant tirades, in which more is said than the action of the piece requires. But people in those days liked general observations, even if they were not to the point, as appears by the public speeches in Thucydides. In the main morality and a right conduct of life mostly interested the public of that age; that is why Euripides makes the reflections of his characters turn on these problems. They seek to justify their actions, and in so doing go into greater detail than is necessary. If we consider the final result as approved by the poet, it comes to nothing more than what the Greeks had said from the beginning. Euripides' advice is, like that of the elegiac poets before him, to accept without a murmur the vicissitudes of fortune and the mixture of good and evil, of happiness and misfortune which goes by the name of the world, to discover an element of good even in suffering, to reflect that the endurance of it calls forth the exercise of our powers, and

under all circumstances to observe the golden mean. His plays contain a number of sayings, which owing to their perfection of form easily impressed themselves on the memory, and which contributed greatly to the mental education of the Greeks. Sayings of this kind have consequently been preserved from a number of his lost plays. In the hands of Euripides tragedy still continued to instruct the people, but after a different fashion. Hitherto tragedy had sought to perform its task by inspiring the public with respect for grandeur and sublimity; it now performed it by indicating a method of ordering one's life in accordance with the dictates of reason.¹³ It was the method of Prodicus applied on a large scale.

It is a singular contrast that Sophocles, who was engaged in active politics, never came into conflict with the feelings of the Athenian people, while Euripides, who lived in retirement and exclusively for his studies and his art, at the close of his life responded to a summons from abroad, although the subjective movement, of which he himself was a strong adherent, was in full swing in Athens precisely at that time. The reason, however, is evident. To Sophocles life and art were two distinct things; the former he took in a highly realistic way, by sharing in all the pleasures offered by Athens, in the latter he was an idealist, without, however, wishing to exert a direct influence on the present. Euripides, on the other hand, lived a life of retirement, but was desirous of seeing his ideal realized. Thus, although he agreed in many points with the views of the Athenians, it was easy for him to offend their prejudices in particular instances. Nations do not always appreciate what individuals do for them. Otherwise the Athenians would at all events have shown gratitude to Euripides for his constant endeavour to glorify Athens, which (in the extant plays) is specially prominent in the *Supplices*, where Athens enforces the burial of the fallen Argive heroes, in the *Heraclidae*, where she defends the children of Heracles

against Eurystheus, and in the *Ion*, a piece which honours the eponymous ancestor of the Ionic Athenians as a genuine son of Attica.

The works of Euripides that have come down to us are: the *Hecuba*, which relates the fortunes of the old queen after the destruction of Troy; the *Orestes*, who is condemned to death by the people for the murder of his mother; the *Phoenissae*, a description of the war of the Seven against Thebes; the *Medea*, who kills her own children; the *Hippolytus*, the virtuous son of Theseus; the *Alcestis*, a drama of family life, to which Euripides gives a touching and effective conclusion—Heracles brings Admetus another wife to replace the one who is dead, and Admetus refuses to take her until he recognizes her as his own Alcestis; the *Andromache*, the fortunes of Hector's widow in her captivity; the *Suppliants* (*v. sup.*); the *Iphigenia in Aulide* and the *Iphigenia in Tauris*; the *Troades*, a description of the fall of Troy; the *Cyclops*, a Satyric drama; the *Bacchae*, the story of Pentheus; the *Heraclidae* (*v. sup.*); the *Helena*, who did not go to Troy but stayed in Egypt and was saved by Menelaus; the *Ion* (*v. sup.*); the *Hercules Furens*; the *Electra*; and lastly, the spurious *Rhesus*, a dramatic version of the Homeric Doloneia.

Now that we have seen the way in which the new culture influenced Athens, let us consider to what extent the first city in Greece resisted its encroachments. We noted in the Athenian character a combination of acuteness, love of novelty, appreciation of genuine and lofty art, and strong attachment to the old gods and the old worship, with the natural result that in the different strata of society first one and then the other gained the predominance. The new culture was congenial to the Athenians, because it provided ample material for their love of novelty and their critical acumen. But it was disliked by many of them because it undermined the old-fashioned pietism. This category included in the first place those who had official or unofficial connection with

public worship, and as the priestly offices were filled mainly by popular election,¹⁴ and for a definite term only, the majority of those who took an interest in the old religion and its maintenance consisted not merely of priests in office, but of men who had been priests, and who now devoted themselves in an amateur way to matters connected with religion, for instance, to the art of ascertaining and interpreting the will of the gods. The opposition of all these people was of course chiefly directed against the natural philosophy of Ionia, and Anaxagoras was consequently a mark for their zeal. But sophistry and rhetoric, the sciences of Thrace and Sicily, were also not to their taste, because they inculcated a method of shaking the foundations of every institution and principle. Euripides more than once took an opportunity of emphasizing the futility of divinations; the orthodox party was bound to put that down to his debit. The history of the expedition to Sicily will show what harm these people could do to the State. Pericles endeavoured to neutralize them by making use of Lampon, who was certainly the most intelligent of them all, but hardly the most influential; for the party in spite of this attacked Pericles by means of Diopieithes. And with regard to sophistry, justice compels us to admit that not only fanatical and narrow-minded persons had good cause to dislike it; entirely unprejudiced people, whether pious or not, were perfectly justified in sharing this sentiment. Who could say whether sophistry might not undermine the whole civic life of the nation as well as religion? It was only necessary to consider one particular point. What was the basis of the security of civic existence in the various states, of peace and of amicable relations between state and state, but the sanctity of an oath? And sophistry endangered even this by setting up private interest as the standard of every action. The care of religion was the principal preoccupation of the Athenian state; Anaxagoras, Protagoras, and Phidias were impeached in the

interests of religion ; sophistry was generally an object of suspicion as the enemy of religion.

But the crusade against the new culture was not conducted merely by means of accusations in a court of law. Literature was encountered with its own weapons, and the writers who made attacks on the new element in culture combined with them an assault on the new tendencies in politics. The chief representative of a new kind of poetry became also the chief opponent of the two last-named movements. This new branch of poetry was the comedy.¹⁵

The history of the comic drama is even less accurately known than that of tragedy. The Dorians as well as the Athenians had comedies. In the Peloponnese and especially in Sparta short comic scenes were performed by strolling players, while in Tarentum and Lower Italy they were arranged on a regular plan, and developed into small farces. In Sicily these farces gave rise to a particular class of literature, of which we unfortunately possess only meagre remains. Its chief exponent was Epicharmus, who, like so many of his countrymen, migrated to the west and put his plays on the stage in the Sicilian Megara as early as the year 500 B.C. These productions, which sparkled with wit and were saturated with philosophy, described the life of the Sicilian Greeks, and also parodied the mythology. Somewhat later, in the time of Euripides, the Syracusan Sophron flourished, who became famous for his comedies, or mimes, which Plato himself appreciated and is said to have used as models for the form of his dialogues. This branch of art was continued by Xenarchus, son of Sophron, but not after his time, evidently because the widely-spreading fame of the Attic comedy eclipsed the interest of the Sicilian comedy in the island itself, and also because the troubles which broke out in Sicily shortly afterwards violently revolutionized all existing institutions. The impulse in the development of the Attic comedy is said to have been given by that of the neighbouring Megara, where

its leading representative was Susarion; nothing definite, however, is known of the Megarian comedy.

In Attica comedy, like tragedy, was an offshoot of the rural festivals of Dionysus. But it did not form part of the worship to the same extent as its elder sister, although the external accessories and the mode of dovetailing the plays into the festivals were the same. In both we find the chorus provided by a choregus, a fixed number of characters, and competition by the poets for the state prizes. But comedy had a special part, the parabasis or address of the leader of the chorus to the public. A comic writer did not enjoy the respect paid to a tragedian. Comedy assumed a definite shape later than tragedy, not till the 80th Olympiad (460 B.C.) The earliest comic poets mentioned are Chionides and Magnes; then comes Crates, who gave this branch of art the form which it retained during the period of the old comedy. The most famous of the old comic poets was Cratinus, who must have appeared somewhere after 460. He took the political and social aspect of Athens for the subject of his ridicule. Eupolis and Phrynichus were the most famous of those who competed somewhat later with Aristophanes. Aristophanes, the only comic poet whose complete works have come down to us, began to produce his plays in Ol. 88, 1 (428 B.C.) His active career extended over forty years, up to 388 B.C., when he brought out his *Plutus*; but his best period coincides with the time of the Peloponnesian War, and he is an extremely valuable authority for our knowledge of the condition of Athens and the feelings of the Athenians during that age.

The importance of Aristophanes in political history consists in his having been the mouthpiece of the opposition to the dominant régime, and to the men who were in power. In the Athens of that age the comedy filled the place now occupied by newspapers and caricatures. Aristophanes was the spokesman of all those who were dissatisfied with existing institutions, which consisted firstly of a pronounced form of

democracy, and secondly of the new culture in its two branches, the material one represented by the natural science of Ionia, and the formal one by the sophistry and rhetoric of Thrace and Sicily. It is in the nature of comedy to be in opposition. Its immediate object is to raise a laugh, and laughter conveys censure and not approval. The more interesting the subject of ridicule, the more interesting is the satire. Attempts to excite laughter at trivialities are productive only of boredom. The comic stage must attack people in power whenever it can. In Athens the chief object of interest was public life and the proceedings of the people and its leaders. Democracy and a passion for education were the dominant forces; the comedy was therefore obliged to attack both if it wished to command attention. An effective opposition, however, must be inspired by some principles. Hence a comic writer, if he has no principles, must at all events pretend to have them. Consequently the comedy, if it wanted to gain a hearing, was forced at that time to be on the aristocratic side; it had to praise the good old times and the old simplicity of life. It may appear strange that a public institution, such as the comedy was, should have ventured to satirize a constitutional government, but the solution of this difficulty lies in the connection of the comic poets with the orthodox party, whose religious aspirations commanded the entire sympathy of the Athenian people, and who were thus able to make the people receive the attacks on the demagogues with laughter.

Aristophanes does not, as many have supposed, write as a censor of morals, who is superior to parties; he writes as a partisan, whose main object is to provoke laughter. We may take all that he says in a serious tone just as coolly as Theognis has always been taken. This enables us also to gauge the value of all his vituperation and invective. Its authority is not higher than that of a modern comic paper. Quite apart from the opinions which he expresses and which no one need

adopt, even the facts stated by him are not necessarily true. It is enough to bear in mind that his Socrates has no resemblance to the real Socrates to make us consider more important facts alluded to only by him as doubtful until confirmed by further evidence. His jokes about the origin of the Peloponnesian War ought never to have been utilized for history. The Athenians were to be made to laugh, whether at truth or falsehood was a matter of indifference, preferably if a grain of truth could be distorted into an amusing untruth. Thus he was able to provoke much merriment by his skilful misrepresentation of Aspasia's character. Still less can Aristophanes rank as an authority for charges against the Athenian democracy. He is not a more vehement assailant of the way in which the Demos was led than Dickens is of the English political system. Even if the descriptions of the parliamentary elections and of the law courts in *Pickwick* and of the public administration in *Little Dorrit* are taken as accurate pictures of the facts, we need not condemn the English institutions of the period previous to 1850, and no English reader of Dickens has been prejudiced against parliamentary government in England by them. In the same way Aristophanes proves nothing against the Athenian democracy. He does not even prove anything against Cleon. Cleon no doubt was an objectionable individual in the eyes of people of quality, but it does not follow from this that his political views were wrong. A coarse man is not necessarily a bad one.

Aristophanes is a great poet, with an immense deal of wit, inventive power and mastery of style, but he is anything but a man of lofty ideals. To be that it is not sufficient to praise the good old times. Eulogy of the past has always been a cheap commonplace; the man who expresses it skilfully commands applause, and the recognition of such skill cannot be withheld from Aristophanes. But in order to pass as an exponent of lofty aims it is necessary to champion them in daily life, and this Aristophanes did not do. He

endeavoured to disparage Socrates and Euripides with the Athenians, and yet Socrates' aspirations were invariably of a noble kind, and those of Euripides almost always so. In making these attacks, however, he may have acted in good faith; but this excuse will not serve him when he encourages immorality in his praise of the good old days. He cared nothing whatever for the good old days. The view which was popular for a time that Aristophanes aimed at promoting morality is now generally abandoned; but his patriotism is as a rule taken seriously and placed on a high level. His defence of the peace in the *Acharnians* is favourably contrasted with the apparently unprincipled action of the war-party led by Cleon. In reality the blessings of peace which he commends are of such a character that a would-be writer of a bitter satire on the peace-party could not be more successful than Aristophanes in the *Acharnians*. If the contemporaries of Miltiades, whom Aristophanes praises, had had the same ideals as the peace-loving Aristophanes, there would have been no need for them to fight; the kind of life which he wished to see his fellow-citizens enjoy was guaranteed by the Persian king to each and all of his subjects. Aristophanes had evidently no conception of the ideal blessings which may be at stake in a war, and for which the Athenians drew the sword. Consequently if we consider that Aristophanes attacked the very things that contained a germ of fruitfulness, the philosophy of Socrates and the tragedy of Euripides; that he had a low idea of the dignity of his native city; that he looked on the peace merely as an opportunity for the coarsest forms of self-indulgence; that with the exception of his aristocratic friends and of Alcibiades, whose forte certainly did not lie in Athenian patriotism or good morals, every one was the butt of his mockery—we arrive at the conclusion that the harangues on the simplicity of the good old times, which are always quoted in his praise, are merely poetical and rhetorical flourishes, and that he himself was a great artist in point of

form only, a great satirist devoid of personal morality. No doubt the Athenian state in that age often moved on wrong lines; but Aristophanes did not point the way to any better; he never knew why the times were out of joint.

His extant plays are divided into three groups. The first extends from 425-414 and comprises the *Acharnians*, the *Knights*, the *Clouds*, the *Wasps* and the *Birds*; the second includes the *Lysistrata* (411), the *Thesmophoriazusae* and the *Frogs* (405); the third, which belongs to the period after the Peloponnesian War, embraces the *Ecclesiazusae* (392) and the *Plutus* (388). In the first group the political allusions enhance the interest for students of antiquity; in the second the *Frogs* possesses a permanent value as a literary satire on Euripides; in the third a decline in the poet's power seems to be clearly discernible. Aristophanes is, like Alcibiades, but with different tendencies, a type of the Athenian of that age, especially as regards the foibles of this highly-gifted race, for he commends art, wit, old-fashioned piety and a life of pleasure, and derides science, free thought, and an energetic one-sided devotion to political life, such as we see in Cleon.

If Aristophanes opposed the new-fangled culture in a perverse fashion, Socrates combated it in the right way, although he was condemned to death by the Athenians for his pains. The fundamental ideas of the sophists were as follows, and we must bear them in mind if we wish to understand Socrates' work:—Everything is teachable and knowable, if pursued with skill; hence practical ability and capacity for government can be attained by instruction in sophistry. Ideas of a higher or more universal kind do not exist; truth consists of what the individual person thinks of a thing. This involved facilities for deceit. For a clever man can seemingly assent to the ideas of others, while giving their words a different meaning, and afterwards maintain, if he should dissent from them, that he was speaking the truth in the first instance. Conduct of this kind had been usual in Greece before this, for the Greeks

attempted to practise such deceit on one another even with oaths, long before the sophists appeared. But this made the sophists all the more dangerous, because they humoured the propensities of the people. Lastly, the sophists took money, and generally large sums, for their instruction, which was given chiefly by means of carefully-prepared lectures. Socrates set his face against all this. We propose to consider him here from the point of view only of his work and character, deferring the consideration of his personality until the occasion of his death, which can only be fully explained in the light of it.¹⁶ He maintained in the first place that he knew nothing himself, that it was impossible to instil into others anything that was not in them already, and that truth was not something subjective, dependent on the circumstances and the advantage of the individual, but the sum total of the actual relations of things, a clear idea of which could be attained by reflection directed to the particular case. He never taught by means of connected speeches, like the sophists, because he disclaimed the possession of knowledge himself; he extracted the truth in the course of dialogue, and he never took money. He did not try to impart capacity for practical life; his aim was simply to indicate the means of arriving at right and proper action, that is, by gaining insight into the real nature of matters. He assumed the virtues to be as accepted by the general consent of mankind, and when the sophists asserted that moderation, gratitude, justice and all the other virtues, whatever their names, need only be practised when they do not conflict with the momentary advantage of the individual, Socrates was at pains to explain that the practice of virtue is, by universal consent, the most beneficial thing for mankind, if life is to be taken (as it must be) as a whole and not merely with reference to the individual case. As therefore man can only act rightly when he is prompted to action by reflection, so it is reflection which leads to virtue. Virtue is not the result of an impulse which a man is forced to obey, it is the product

of intellectual enlightenment. Thus the knowledge which Socrates had been obliged to deny at the outset in the sophistical sense eventually regains its true position with a deeper meaning.

We must not regard the teaching of Socrates as one of the systems classified by the philosophy of the schools. The predicates subjective, objective, ideal, real, eudaemonistic, or whatever else they may be called, are no aid to a criticism of it. The importance of Socrates is not that of a man who propounds theories and invents formulas intended to express in brief the nature of the universe, as numbers with Pythagoras, atoms with Leucippus, and ideas with Plato—a process which leads to the substitution of words for things, and makes the disciples of the great discoverers believe that the language of the masters contains a recipe for every evil. On the contrary, he was a man who reminded a world filled with intellectual pride and intoxicated with phrases that it was better to collect one's thoughts and to inquire, with the help of others and by means of conversation, in which one man corrects another, what the real meaning was of all the fine words which everybody made use of, and then, after calm reflection on the true significance of the thoughts and aims discussed, to order one's life on a rational basis. Socrates' most famous pupil, Plato, afterwards reverted to the old method and constructed a philosophical system. Socrates himself was a practical teacher.

His position in Athens was not a favourable one. His behaviour was quite different to that of those who enjoyed repute with the Athenians. They flattered or censured the people, and tried to exert a direct influence on them. Socrates had no single definite aim in view; he did not even care if he was successful or not. He merely did what he considered right and his duty, and if he referred to the advantages which might accrue, they were not very perceptible in his own case. This made him an eccentric individual in the eyes of the

Athenians, and more and more an obnoxious one as time went on. For he took very little interest in politics, which were so much to the taste of the Athenians. He even laid a finger on the foundations of existing institutions in holding that government, like every other special pursuit, ought to be the product of judgment and clear reflection, and should therefore only be entrusted to those who possess the requisite insight. Certainly he was not of opinion that the will of a chance majority ought to be law, and for this reason some of the democrats considered him as their enemy. But they were wrong, for he was just as loath to leave government in the hands of the rich, or to tolerate a tyrant. He took no interest in these matters; he was not a politician; his sole aim was to remind his fellow-men that they must think if they wished to act aright and be happy. He occupied a comparatively isolated position, surrounded by a handful of enthusiastic disciples, an object of wonder to the many but not understood by them.

Socrates was able to drive sophistry out of the field but not rhetoric. The latter gained more and more vogue in Greece and did a vast deal of harm. But a leaven of sophistry also remained in Greece. Educated Greeks of later times were, if heathens, only too frequently rhetoricians, and if Christians, unfortunately often sophists.

And the new culture to a certain extent brought about the defeat of Athens in the struggle of the fifth century B.C., because by emphasizing the intellectual rights of the individual, who was to be made capable of attaining everything, it inspired every citizen with a wish to remodel existing institutions on new lines, and in accordance with his own ideas. The new culture had a dissolvent force, and this was doubly dangerous in a democracy. A disintegrating method of criticism was applied to conventions sanctioned by religion, and asserted itself amid violent conflicts. The clever people, who had learnt too much from Gorgias and not enough from

Socrates, were just as much the cause of the fall of Athens as men like Nicias, whose defect was an excess of piety.

Our view is that at least six different intellectual tendencies, which had been long in preparation, may be discerned among the Greeks of the three last decades of the fifth century; some of them just come in contact with one another, others are blended, and each proceeds from a distinct geographical centre. We have first the old Ionic culture, which had shed such a lustre on Greece in the heyday of epic and elegiac poetry, and afterwards created natural science (with its offshoot of speculative philosophy), history and geography, and at the time of which we are writing gave the Greeks a Herodotus, a Hippodamus, an Aspasia, and the great physician to whom we shall refer immediately. Sculpture also owed its first stimulus to Ionia, and its subsequent development to the Ionian islands of the Aegean Sea. Devotion to the real is the fundamental trait of Ionic aspiration. A second species of culture, affiliated to the Ionic, but of a different nature, is the Aeolic, which culminated in lyric poetry. Sometimes this poetry has a purely personal character, as in Alcaeus and Sappho, sometimes it ennobles its subject with profound thought, as in Pindar; it also enjoyed the favour of Doric Sparta in the case of Aleman. In Crete, Sparta and Sicyon the plastic art made great progress, while in the Argive sculpture this genuinely Doric art was on a level with the best civilization of the age which we are now discussing. If at this point it becomes difficult to say whether the Aeolic and Doric culture are to be considered as separate or as blended with one another, on the other hand it is not easy to ascertain the special characteristic of the next sphere of culture, the geographical limits of which can be accurately determined. We refer to the Thracian cities, to which we assign the geographical boundaries of the Athenian tributary district of that name, from the borders of Thessaly to the Pontus, from Pydna to Byzantium. In these regions culture had a twofold origin;

it came over the sea from Ionia and the Cyclades, and also from the interior, which was by no means so barbarous as is generally supposed, a fact proved by the early coinage of Thrace and Macedonia with Greek inscriptions on the coins. We have more than once drawn attention to the high standard of art in the Thracian cities, which is exhibited in Polygnotus, Paeonius and Alcamenes, and in the coins, some of which are of great beauty. Their art must have come to them from Asia Minor; so must their philosophy, which found brilliant representatives in the atomic theorists, especially the great Democritus, and in Protagoras. Under the pen of the Thasian Stesimbrotus Ionic historical literature degenerated into malicious gossip, but it becomes all the more pregnant with thought in the semi-Thracian Thucydides. Another connection of the Ionic culture with the Thracian is supplied by Hippocrates of Cos, who belonged to the Asclepiad family, but had acquired much from the learned physician Herodicus of Selymbria, a Thracian city of the Propontis, and resided more in the north, in Thessaly and especially in Thrace, than in other parts of Greece. He was probably in Athens during the Peloponnesian War; he then retired to Thessaly, where he died. He was on intimate terms with Democritus of Abdera. Finally, we may appropriately point out here that Aristotle, the greatest and the most universal of ancient inquirers, who was equally distinguished in philosophy, natural science and history, came from Thrace. We are therefore inclined to consider the Thraco-Greek culture as a more serious and more solid type of the Ionic, in art, in philosophy, in history and in natural science. Poetry, strange to say, seems to have been little cultivated in Thrace.¹⁷ This difference between the Thracian and the Ionic culture must, since the population of the Greek cities of Thrace was mostly of Ionic descent, have been due partly to the nature of the country, partly to the character of the people of the interior. The climate of Thrace is more inclement and of a more con-

tinental type than that of Asia Minor, and the Thracians and Macedonians were more warlike than the Lydians and Phrygians. The culture of the Greek cities of Thrace in the fifth century contains an element which is a forerunner of the peculiar features of the later Macedonian civilization.

We now turn to the west, where we are confronted by two distinct cultures, that of Italy and of Sicily. The former has a twofold aspect; it is extremely mundane and extremely spiritual, not to say ecclesiastical, somewhat as in the present day, self-indulgence and piety being found there side by side in the same districts. Self-indulgence is represented in the sixth century by Sybaris, in the fifth by Tarentum, which continues the luxurious traditions of Sybaris; piety is represented by Pythagoreanism, which was seemingly suppressed about the year 500 B.C., but lived on in silence and revived in Tarentum in the fourth century. Elea is the home of another philosophy, of a more critical description. To all these different tendencies in the life of Lower Italy we have clear testimony. But there is less satisfactory information as to the purely mystic and superstitious movement, which must have been widely diffused in Magna Graecia, as is shown for instance by the small gold plates with invocations found in tombs in Petelia and Thurii. Art flourished in Magna Graecia, but of poetry the farce appears to have been the branch which was most cultivated. Sicily exhibits a totally different character. Poetry had been cultivated there from an early age; Stesichorus and Ibycus were famous as lyricists; art created magnificent temples, which still command our admiration; the acuteness of the Siceliotes was manifested in the fifth century by the introduction of the comedy and the mime due to Epicharmus and Sophron, by the philosophy of Empedocles, and the rhetoric and sophistry of Gorgias.

These five centres of culture, the Ionic, the Aeolo-Doric, the Thracian, the Italian and the Sicilian, exercise a varied influence on the sixth, the Attic, in which the intellectual

force of Greece is concentrated. From the Ionic, the Aeolic and the Thracian Athens adopts poetry and art, and brings them to a higher pitch of perfection; from the Sicilian she borrows rhetoric; her attitude towards the natural science of Ionia is one of reserve, partaking rather of rejection than of cordial reception. From Lower Italy she takes but little, for the Pythagorean philosophy was not to the taste of the Athenians, and they had no need to go abroad for mysteries, which were a state institution in Athens. The Athenian genius, which eschewed all extremes, selected such elements of foreign culture as had the least taint of one-sidedness. In the intellectual sphere Athens herself is undeniably great, but we must not slur over her glaring defects, or forget that without the other centres of culture which we have indicated we should be a long way from possessing all the grandeur and beauty which Greece now presents. The Ionic culture is marked by a spirit of curious inquiry; the Aeolo-Doric possesses depth of thought and feeling; the Thracian is scientific; the Lower Italian touches the extremes of self-indulgence and self-renunciation; the Sicilian is acute and satirical. Athens assimilated something from each of them, but least of all from that of Lower Italy.¹⁸

NOTES

1. For the history of rhetoric, cf. Blass, *Die attische Beredsamkeit*, vol. 1, 2nd ed. Leipzig, 1887; Volkmann, *Die Rhetorik der Griechen und Römer*, 2nd ed. Leipz. 1885 and his article in I. Müller's *Handbuch der klass. Alterthumswissenschaft*, vol. 3, Nördl. 1885. —For the history of sophistry see Zeller, *Die Philosophie der Griechen*, vol. 1, and his article *Sophistae* in Pauly's *R. E.* vol. 5, 1; also Geel, *Hist. crit. Sophistarum*, Utr. 1823, and Baumhauer, *Quam vim Sophistae habuerunt*, etc. Utr. 1844. For further comments on the sophists and rhetoricians, Sittl, *Gesch. der griech. Litteratur*, 2, 12 seq. with the references to the literature of the subject, p. 13. The accounts of the sophists and rhetoricians are not quite impartial owing to the polemics of Plato.—According to *Plat. Protag.* 349, Protagoras was considered the earliest sophist, because he was the

first to style himself σοφιστής and to accept pay for his instruction ; see Sittl, 2, p. 14 seq. Protagoras promised τοὺς ἀνθρώπους βελτίους ποιεῖν and to make them intelligent in domestic and public affairs. He studied grammar. He was first accused of promising τὸν ἥπτονα λόγον κρεῖττονα ποιεῖν, Sittl, 2, 20. He used dialectic in such a way as to first prove and then refute the same proposition. The exercise of intellectual acuteness began in that period also with the interpretation of Homer.—For Hippias of Elis see Sittl, 2, 29 ; his practical attainments, Plat. Hipp. min. 368. Hippias studied the peculiarity of sounds. Sittl, 2, 31, calls him the “first book-worm” and the first “closet-scholar,” probably not quite correctly, to judge by his appearance in public ; Welcker has written of Prodicus of Ceos as the “forerunner of Socrates,” Rh. Mus. 1832 and 1836 (Kl. Schriften, II.) He did not aim at elegant but at accurate expression (Synonyms). Cf. Sittl, 2, 26 seq.

2. For the Eleatic school see Zeller, Die Philos. der Griechen, I. ; Sittl, 3, 23 seq. ; for Zeno, who “paved the way for literary dialogue,” Sittl, 2, 271. The work of the Samian Melissus was also written dialectically ; he knew Themistocles and commanded the Samian fleet against the Athenians in 440 (Sittl, 2, 272). Parmenides expounded his system in hexameters.

3. For Gorgias cf. Sittl, 2, 33. The same writer discusses the rhetoricians and the earliest orators in the following divisions : (1) the older masters of declamation, Gorgias and his school, especially Polus and Licymnius, (2) the teachers of forensic eloquence, Corax and Tisias, Thrasyarchus of Chalcedon, who resided permanently in Athens, and was at any rate of an earlier date than Lysias ; he gave instruction in effective delivery, ὑπόκρισις, the art of producing emotion, etc., (3) Theodorus of Byzantium, (4) the beginnings of political oratory, especially Pericles.

4. In antiquity, as in our own day, wherever it is taught, rhetoric of course represented the science of style, the written word being merely the substitute of the spoken one. In Greek literature the rhetorical side gradually gained a marked predominance over every other factor which should have been of importance in prose ; form drove matter into the background. Thus even history was far too much influenced by the rhetorical art, at first in externals only, as regards arrangement of material and choice of language, but subsequently as regards the subject-matter itself, so that truth suffered in the process. The object of rhetoric is to persuade, or at best to convince ; the function of scientific prose is simply to communicate facts.—Rhetoric devoted itself so exclusively to Athens, that only speeches written in the Attic dialect were preserved. The Athenian character as described by us is an exag-

generation of an important aspect of the Greek character in general, which, as we have often seen, delighted in ingenuity and subtlety.

5. This is the opinion of Beloch and others; see his *Die attische Politik*, p. 9, where he attacks "Grote and his disciples." He also refers (p. 7) to the "childish idea" that "all mechanical work in Attica was done by slaves, and therefore the whole body of citizens formed a kind of aristocracy." The idea that slaves did all the mechanical work would certainly be childish in a scholar, but outside the ranks of the unlearned public hardly any one has probably entertained it. But that the whole body of citizens formed "a kind of aristocracy" is a perfectly correct view, the significance and importance of which are emphasized in this volume.

6. Ancient and modern political speeches differ, like the ancient and modern drama. In antiquity the people do not in either case assume the importance which we assign to them. In ancient tragedy the actors are few in number and deliver set speeches; on the political platform even a Cleon prepares his speeches and communicates them beforehand to his friends.

7. For recent criticism of Thucydides, besides the introduction to the edition of Classen, cf. Sittl, 2, 401 seq. and Christ, pp. 259-265. The difference between Herodotus, who relates past history, and Thucydides, who relates contemporary history, does not necessarily involve the progress which Sittl (p. 401) perceives in Thucydides. For Thucydides also was obliged to rely on the accounts of others for almost everything that he narrated, only it was easier for him to find trustworthy informants, because there were plenty of eye-witnesses of the events still living. Xenophon's *Anabasis* is the first instance of a narrative of personal experiences, eye-witness and writer being combined in one person. In Thucydides as well as other writers the nature of his sources of information has to be taken into consideration, a point which is often lost sight of. When Thucydides records improbabilities many people assume that he must have invented them, as if plenty of exaggerated statements had not reached his ears.

8. In the beginning of c. 23 Thucydides is the sophist, who endeavours τὸν ἥττω λόγον κρείττω ποιεῖν.

9. After Thucydides has briefly illustrated (in c. 1) the importance of the war which he intends to relate, he describes the epoch previous to its outbreak with special reference to the power of the various states (cc. 2-21), in order to prove that Hellas was not so important before its commencement as during its continuance. In doing this he points out that his object is not to entertain the reader, but to record the truth (c. 22). He then enumerates the causes of the war (cc. 23-87), firstly the incidents affecting Corcyra

(cc. 23-55), and then the quarrels about Potidaea (cc. 56-66). The Corinthians now make overtures to the Spartans for a war against Athens. Then follow negotiations in Sparta (cc. 67-87). But these were only the external causes of the war. The real reason was that the power of the Athenians had become too great in the eyes of the Peloponnesians. Thucydides therefore reviews the history of the growth of this power during the half-century from 479-431 (cc. 88-118). The interrupted story of the negotiations which led to the war is now resumed. The allies are consulted in Sparta. After war has been decided upon (cc. 119-125), several proposals are made to Athens; the banishment is demanded of those who are stained with the crime against Cylon's adherents (cc. 126, 127). But the Athenians present a counter-claim for the outrage committed on Pausanias, whereupon Thucydides relates the story of Pausanias (cc. 128-134). Themistocles, however, was involved in the case of Pausanias. Thucydides therefore relates the closing scenes of Themistocles' life (cc. 135-138). We now return to the quarrel between Sparta and Athens. The historian narrates the final negotiations in Athens (cc. 139-145). We have here an interweaving and alternation of the present and the past: first a sketch of the growing power of the Greek states, then the causes of the war and the first negotiations in Sparta; then the real causes of the war, which we found in the former history of Athens; next the second negotiations at Sparta; then, harking back to the past, the stories of Pausanias and Themistocles; and after this the decision arrived at in Athens. If we denote the history of the past as *a* and that of the present as *b*, *a* and *b* alternate as follows: *a* = 1-22; *b* = 23-87; *a* = 88-118; *b* = 119-125; *a* = 126; *b* = 127; *a* = 128-138; *b* = 139-145. Two different principles underlie this: firstly, the dovetailing of the history of the past into that of the present, an old epic and Herodotean process, and secondly, the alternation of past and present in virtue of the rhetorical principle of antithesis; *a* (the past) embraces 22 + 31 + 1 + 11 chapters, total 65; *b* (the present) includes 65 + 7 + 1 + 7 chapters, total 80. The first Book of Thucydides is a unique example of artistic arrangement. L. Holzapfel, *Die urspr. Stelle der Pentekontaetie im Thuk. Geschichtswerk*, in the *Philol.* 47, 1, thinks that it was originally meant to have been narrated in cc. 2-19 instead of c. 18. Thucydides is thoroughly dramatic in his speeches and replies. Herodotus concentrates action (cf. the Scythian expedition), Thucydides speeches. Thucydides fights shy of details, cf. c. 23; he aims at generalities. Xenophon's *Anabasis* is the first example of a genuine historical authority.

10. Much study has been devoted of late to the treatise on the

Athenian State. The text has been corrected by A. Kirchhoff (Berl. 1874) and C. Wachsmuth (Gött. 1874), who have also discussed the work itself, as have G. Faltin, M. Schmidt and Müller-Strübing. The treatise, the author of which is entirely unknown, was probably written before the expedition of Brasidas to Thrace. It reminds us of another essay on the constitution of Athens, which was discovered not long ago in Egypt; it is now in the British Museum, and has been edited by F. G. Kenyon. The two treatises differ greatly from one another, and yet have some points of resemblance. That of the fifth century is a pamphlet, written for the purpose of influencing contemporaries; that of the fourth is a scientific dissertation, divided into two parts, the one historical and the other statistical. But the political standpoint of both writers is the same. They are both aristocrats, and the constitution of the Four Hundred is their ideal, which for the one represents the future and for the other the past. The treatise of the fifth century is written with greater freshness than that of the fourth, which breathes a spirit of resignation. It is remarkable that, while the fifth century treatise was, no doubt wrongly, attributed to Xenophon, many critics are not inclined to ascribe the authorship of the other to Aristotle, to whom, however, the great number of quotations seems decidedly to point.

11. For Euripides cf. the *résumé* in Sittl, 3, 310 seq., who in conclusion (362-63) correctly points out that the greatest poets of modern times and other men of commanding genius have placed a very high value on Euripides, *e.g.* Erasmus, Melancthon, Hugo Grotius, Milton, Racine, Corneille, Goethe and Schiller. In the case of Euripides too we see how little depth there was in the criticism of Aristophanes.

12. Eur. Hipp. 612; cf. Sittl, 3, 318, who quotes Ar. Rhet. 3, 15 to show that Euripides did not defend the introduction of the remark by pleading the objective treatment of the character. As a matter of fact the remark is not necessary there and not even much to the point.

13. There are maxims in Sophocles as well. In devoting greater space to discussions Euripides only follows the taste of the age. There was a time with us when no novel was complete without discussions on literature, politics and social questions; this is why Euripides is able to discourse on the rights of women. The fact that he makes the heroes speak in this way did not affect the ancients, who had no notion of historical colouring. The heroes of Aeschylus speak in the style which was admired at Athens in the time of Aeschylus, and the heroes of Sophocles and Euripides follow the same rule. But the rationalizing tendencies in Euri-

pides present a somewhat more marked contrast to the prevailing ideas as to the character of earlier antiquity, which tragedy affected to represent.

14. For the Athenian priestly offices cf. Martha, *Les sacerdocees Athéniens*, Par. 1882.—Those who blamed Euripides for his low opinion of omens should have borne in mind what Homer had already said: *εἰς οἶωνός ἄριστος ἀμύνεσθαι περὶ πάτρης*.

15. Our imperfect knowledge of the history of comedy as compared with that of tragedy is due to the fact that for a long time its creations had no claim to descend to posterity. They were more or less improvised farces. For this reason it is impossible to give precise definitions of locally distinct kinds. We cannot assert that comedy had a particular character in Megara and another in Tarentum. We know only the comedy of Aristophanes and a few fragments of that of Syracuse, and nothing of the rest. The most modern authorities are: Zielinski, *Die Gliederung der altattischen Komödie*, Leipz. 1885; Denis, *La comédie grecque*, 2 vols. Par. 1886; Sittl, *Gesch. der griech. Litteratur*, 3, 389 seq.; Christ, p. 216 seq. The observations of Bernhardt (II. 2), although he estimates Aristophanes too highly in the old-fashioned way, and the article in Pauly's *R. Enc.* I. 2, still possess considerable value.—Vischer, *Ueber die Benutzung der alten Komödie als geschichtliche Quelle*, Bas. 1840, and Müller-Strübing, *Aristophanes und die historische Kritik*, Leipz. 1873, have drawn attention to the danger of using Aristophanes as an authority for criticism of contemporaries. Aristophanes was the organ of the anti-democratic opposition. The party could make good use of a man like him, who by satirizing the palpable weaknesses of the democracy distracted attention from the far more dangerous intrigues of the oligarchic Hetairiae.—As regards the attack made by Aristophanes in his *Babylonians* on the democracy of Athens, cf. Gilbert, *Beiträge*, p. 148 seq.—In power of satire Aristophanes is about on a par with Rabelais, but the Frenchman is superior to the Athenian in his insight as to what deserved a future and his commendation of it. The value attached by Plato to Aristophanes only proves that he had a liking for him as an artist and an opponent of the democracy.

16. For the relations of Socrates to the sophists cf. Zeller, *Die Philosophie der Griechen*, vol. I. There can be little doubt that Xenophon alone gives a complete picture of the real Socrates, and that in Plato only his demeanour and mode of speech are true to life, while the doctrines, where they differ from Xenophon, must be regarded as Platonic and not Socratic.

17. On the other hand there were Homeric rhapsodists in Thasos and Homer was studied there, Sittl, 2, 23.

18. It seemed to me of importance in my treatment of this question, firstly, not to allow the influence of Greece on the culture of the age to be so completely identified with that of Athens as is generally done, and secondly, to emphasize the significance of the different geographical centres in the history of civilization, by way of contrast to the prominence usually assigned to the racial characteristics of the Dorians and Ionians. As regards the first point, the fact that the literary creations of the Athenians are in a better state of preservation than those of the rest of Greece has had a marked effect. It cannot, however, be denied that of the three great branches of poetry only one attained perfection in Athens. In art too the splendour of the Athenian Acropolis has to a great extent thrown the achievements of the other Greek cities into the shade. In grouping the intellectual efforts of the Greeks according to their geographical centres the novelty of the subject prevented this sketch from being more than a first attempt.

CHAPTER XXVII

THE ATHENIANS IN SICILY

WE now return to the history of political events, which we left at the commencement of the great expedition against Syracuse. This expedition was the culminating point of the display of Athenian power in the Peloponnesian War. Its preparation, its execution and the manner in which its consequences were borne, revealed alike the defects and the greatness of Athens.

The Athenians had at an early stage thought of obtaining a footing in Sicily. In the year 433-2 (Ol. 86, 4) they concluded alliances with the people of Rhegium and Leontini. Just as the Peloponnesians at the outbreak of the war turned their thoughts to enlisting the aid of the Dorians in Sicily, so it was a point of importance to the Athenians to attach the Chalcidians of the island to their cause and make use of them. The latter for their part stood in considerable need of Athenian help. Since the beginning of the fifth century the Ionian element in the island had been more and more pushed into the background. There was a marked preponderance of Dorian cities, as we have already seen in Chapter xxv. Gelon and Hieron had already overpowered the neighbouring Chalcidians; the republican Syracuse soon pursued the same policy. In the first years of the Peloponnesian War a struggle arose between Syracuse and Leontini; in 427 the latter city was so sorely pressed that she appealed for help to her

Athenian allies by means of an embassy, the spokesman of which was Gorgias. Athens determined to support Leontini, in the same year that she subdued Mitylene.

In doing so she was influenced not so much by considerations of nationality as by political motives of a general character. Athens, whose supremacy was unquestioned in the Aegean, had to reckon in the Ionian Sea with the hostility of Corinth, who possessed a strong support in Syracuse. If the latter were to continue to increase in power, the final result might be that Athenian ships could no longer reach the Tyrrhenian Sea in safety. Hence it was of great importance for the Athenians to check the excessive growth of the power of Syracuse. Thucydides states that Athens also wanted to prevent the importation of corn from Sicily into the Peloponnese.

In 427, however, only a small fleet under Laches and Charoeades was despatched to Sicily. The war was not conducted with much energy, descents being made here and there, which effected no permanent result. Messana, it is true, went over to the side of Athens, an event of great importance, for by it Athens secured the passage through the straits. This was in keeping with the policy of Pericles, who even after the Thirty Years' Peace with Sparta wished to see the Athenian empire confined to islands and maritime territory. In spite of this the Athenians did not consider that the generals had done their duty, and they therefore recalled Laches to justify his action. They sent an additional fleet of forty ships under Sophocles and Eurymedon to Sicily; but these were delayed by the occupation of Pylos, and before they arrived Messana had seceded once more to the Dorians, and the Athenian fleet had sustained a defeat in the straits. The new Athenian generals accomplished nothing, and in the end the Sicilian allies of Athens broke off their connection with that city and came to terms with their fellow-countrymen. This took place at Gela, at a congress presided over by

the Syracusan Hermocrates, who laid stress on the solidarity of all the Sicilian Greeks as opposed to the Athenians, who were regarded as foreigners. In consequence of this peace (425 B.C.) the Athenian forces returned home, and the people put these generals too on their defence.

But the union of the Sicilians was not of long duration, and Athens found a fresh opportunity for interfering in the affairs of the island. The aristocrats of Leontini came to an understanding with the Syracusans, overpowered their fellow-citizens, destroyed the city and migrated to Syracuse. They soon, however, grew tired of their new position and left Syracuse. They settled in the district of Leontini, and even occupied a part of the city. This induced the Athenians to send Phaeax with two ships to Sicily in the year 422. Phaeax, however, found that, although many people in Sicily were dissatisfied with the supremacy of the Syracusans, nobody was much inclined to invoke the aid of the Athenians. In 421 peace was concluded between Athens and Sparta, and so for the moment it was impossible for the Athenians to recommence hostilities in Sicily.

Six years later, however, matters reached that point. The alliance with Sparta proved to be very unreliable; the Athenians felt themselves strong, and among them was an ambitious man, whose hopes in the Peloponnese had been disappointed, and who now wished to attempt greater things. At last a pretext was found for a military expedition to Sicily. A small community in the island applied to Athens for help. Segesta was not infrequently at loggerheads with her neighbour Selinus, which as a Dorian city was supported by Syracuse. Between Segesta and Athens, however, there was an alliance similar to that between Leontini and Athens. The Segestean, therefore, after appealing in vain to Carthage, applied to Athens, and envoys from Leontini backed up the request, which was directed specially against Syracuse. The Segestean asserted that they were wealthy enough to provide

for the maintenance of an Athenian army, and misled the Athenian envoys as to the extent of their resources. The latter consequently made a favourable report, and took back with them sixty talents to Athens. The Athenian Assembly determined, in consequence of these representations, to interfere in favour of Segesta and Leontini, and selected Alcibiades, Lamachus and Nicias as generals. Alcibiades had been in favour of the campaign; Nicias, however, was against it, and he persuaded the people to reconsider the question whether the expedition should be really undertaken. But the only result was that it assumed still greater dimensions. A fleet of 100 triremes was equipped, and the expedition became more popular than any previous enterprise. The excitable Athenian people had never, it would seem, been seized with such a frenzy. Hopes were raised to the highest pitch; people indulged in dreams of empire in the west, which was the Eldorado of the Greeks.

But the start was delayed for a time by a mysterious occurrence.¹ One morning in May 415 nearly all the Hermae, which stood in such large numbers in the streets of the city of Athens, were found to be damaged or mutilated. This was a crime against religion. We have seen how pious the Athenians were; this accounts for their excitement developing into paroxysms of rage when the perpetrators remained undiscovered. For a single individual could not have committed so much damage, and if it had been done by more than one and they remained undetected, what might not happen next in Athens? Might not men who outraged religion with impunity also conspire with equal success against the safety of the State and against the democracy? A proclamation was therefore issued that every citizen should denounce all crimes that had come to his notice and the authors of them. Pisander, who afterwards became famous as leader of the oligarchical party, was appointed president of the commission of inquiry; at that time he must have

belonged to the democratic party. Information was received that Alcibiades had burlesqued the mysteries at private entertainments, and rumour added that he had also instigated the outrage on the Hermae. The accusations against him were brought forward by the democrat Androcles and the aristocrat Thessalus, the son of Cimon. Alcibiades of course was an object of suspicion alike to the genuine democrats and the regular aristocrats. He demanded an immediate inquiry. This was to his interest. He was the leader of the expedition which the people had set their hearts on, and did not wish to see delayed. If the charges against him were investigated at once, the presumption was that he would be acquitted. His opponents, however, wished to adjourn the inquiry for that very reason. They openly alleged the reasons which were in Alcibiades' mind, but emphasized them still more strongly. Any investigation, they said, would delay the expedition. They carried the postponement of it until after his return, and the fleet set sail.²

Corcyra was the rendezvous for the fleet, and 134 triremes assembled there, of which thirty-four were from the allies; there were 5100 hoplites on board, but only thirty cavalry, which were conveyed in a special vessel; thirty ships were laden with provisions; one hundred other transports, hired by the state, accompanied the force; lastly, there were a number of trading vessels, sent by the owners at their own expense. The total number of combatants may have amounted to 36,000 men. Athens had seldom collected a fleet of this magnitude.

But what was the real object of the campaign? The Athenian people wished for conquest on as extensive a scale as possible; the nominal goal was Segesta and Leontini, but Syracuse was the centre of the enemy's power. The generals had therefore to come to a decision themselves according to circumstances. After news had arrived from Segesta that instead of the promised treasures only a sum of thirty talents

was forthcoming, which would provide pay and food for the army for about a week, a council of war was held in Rhegium. Complete discrepancy of views prevailed. The practical Lamachus proposed that they should attack Syracuse at once; Nicias took his stand on the ostensible motive of the war and advised that, as Segesta had proved unreliable, an attempt should be made to do something for Leontini, and failing this that they should return home. Alcibiades, the real author of the campaign, declared that they ought first to obtain allies and then march on Syracuse. But if Syracuse was to be attacked at all, Lamachus' advice was the best, for Syracuse could only be captured by cutting off its supplies, and a prompt attack could alone prevent the adoption of appropriate defensive measures. Alcibiades' plan was only a good one in case the idea of taking Syracuse was abandoned and the Athenian supremacy at sea was assured in Periclean fashion by winning over important maritime cities; but as Alcibiades' intentions went further than this, his scheme was a bad one, and he only proposed it because it enabled him to display his diplomatic talents from the outset, which would have had less scope in the siege of Syracuse. As he was commander-in-chief, and his plan was a compromise between the other two, his proposals were carried out. But hardly anything was achieved by this means. Catana was surprised—not even this Chalcidian city joined Athens of her own accord—and just as an attempt was being made to gain Camarina Alcibiades was recalled. His enemies had after all managed to commence the prosecution against him during his absence. The investigation of the outrage on the Hermae had been in progress. Certain statements made by an informer, which proved to be false, had produced the greatest excitement, and a number of persons were executed, whom Andocides, afterwards famous as an orator, had accused in order to save himself. This allayed the public apprehension, but the people were anxious to ascertain the truth of the charge

against Alcibiades, and the state-vessel Salaminia was sent to Sicily to fetch him, in order that he might defend himself in Athens. Alcibiades followed on board his own vessel, but escaped on his arrival at Thurii. The Athenians condemned him to death. But he took signal revenge on his fellow-citizens. His frustration of the impending secession of Messina to the Athenians by means of a traitorous communication to the hostile party in that city was the first but not the smallest injury which he inflicted on Athens. Nicias now had the chief conduct of the war, and he acted as cautiously as possible. He sailed to the north-west of Sicily, where Hyccara was captured, and then returned to the camp at Catana, part of the forces marching by land.

The Athenians were now an object of ridicule to the Syracusans, who even attacked the Athenian camp at Catana. The Athenians availed themselves of this frame of mind of the enemy to resort to a stratagem. They spread abroad a report that their camp was carelessly guarded, which tempted the Syracusans to surprise them one morning. They ascertained on what day the attack was to take place, and when the Syracusans arrived at the camp, the Athenians had transported their whole force to the great harbour of Syracuse, where they entrenched themselves south of the mouth of the Anapus. But the position was not close enough to the city for the construction of a wall of circumvallation, without which Syracuse could not be taken. They therefore returned to the camp at Catana after a successful engagement.

Autumn had now commenced (415 B.C.), and both sides desisted from hostilities and devoted their attention to preparations for the campaign of the ensuing year. The Syracusans extended the line of their fortifications on the land side, appointed new generals, of whom Hermocrates was the most important, and appealed for help in all quarters, especially in the Peloponnese. The Athenians made vain endeavours to gain Messina and Camarina; on the other hand

many Sicels joined them. The most important incidents, however, were the steps taken by Sparta on the advice of Alcibiades, who placed himself entirely at the disposal of the Spartans, thus giving them what they most needed, a clear head thoroughly acquainted with the weak points of Athens. They fortified Decelea in Attic territory, and placed in it a garrison which was a constant menace to Athens; they also sent an able general, the Spartiate Gylippus, to Syracuse. A man of this stamp was all that the Syracusans wanted; they did not always obey their own generals. By these two pieces of advice Alcibiades paved the way for the ruin of his native city; we shall soon see how he completed it.

In the spring of 414 the Athenians (to whom Aristophanes, in his fantastic *Birds*, had presented a picture of creatures who turn the world upside down, and attempt to press gods and men into their service),³ took energetic and skilful measures against Syracuse. They landed unnoticed in the bay to the north of the city, at the foot of the plateau where the mainland portion of the city extends in a westerly direction, and occupied the plateau. This was the point from which a blockade of the city from the land side could be effected. The Syracusans ought not to have allowed this plateau, which was called Epipolae, to fall into the hands of the Athenians. It was easy of defence, being surrounded by steep cliffs; but the Syracusans were so careless that they did not think of fortifying it until it was too late. Here the Athenians entrenched themselves. They first built the fort of Labdalum on the northern edge of the plateau, in order to secure the ascent from the sea. They then erected a circular fort in the centre of the plateau, from which point they began to construct a line of walls in both directions, northwards towards the open sea, and southwards to the great harbour; these walls were intended to cut off Syracuse completely from the country lying to the westward. As Athens commanded the sea, Syracuse would, if the plan of circum-

vallation succeeded, he obliged in the end to surrender. Hence the object of the Syracusans was to prevent the completion of the walls, that of the Athenians to accelerate it as much as possible. The Syracusans might have attacked the enemy while engaged in building the walls or in the open field; but they had not the courage for this and adopted another method. They built a counter-wall, which started from the Syracusan city-wall, and cut the line of the Athenian wall at the point where it was not yet built, and thus made the continuation of it virtually impossible. The first of these walls was actually completed, as the Athenians also lacked the courage to attack the enemy at their work; but they afterwards captured it by means of a clever surprise. The Syracusans now began a second counter-work in the low ground between Epipolæ and the great harbour; it was merely a ditch, as the swampy soil would not allow of the erection of a wall. The Athenians carried this work as well, but Lamachus perished in the engagement, and this was an irreparable loss for the Athenians. He was the real military expert among the generals and had conducted many operations with great cleverness. After this a policy of inactivity and procrastination prevailed, which was in keeping with Nicias' character, and led to the failure of the expedition and the destruction of the Athenian army. For a time things went well. The Syracusans began to lose courage. Nicias ought now to have rapidly completed the whole line of wall. But he stopped the construction of the northern end, and erected a double wall to the south instead. Gylippus effected an entrance through the gaps in the north. To avoid capture by Athenian ships on the direct voyage to Syracuse he had landed at Himera on the northern coast of the island, and made his way by land to the besieged city. He not only raised the courage of the Syracusans, he disciplined them as well; a Spartiate was a born leader for all who aspired to the name of Dorian. He defeated the Athenians in the open

field ; it was now impossible for them to continue the construction of their wall. He took Labdalum. The Syracusans now mustered sufficient courage to encounter their enemy at sea and they equipped ships for this purpose, the besieged Syracusans thus actually pitting themselves against the Athenians, who were masters of the sea. Nicias now occupied the peninsula of Plemmyrium, which lies opposite Ortygia and with it commands the entrance of the great harbour ; but Gylippus met this move by beginning a third Syracusan counter-wall, which was intended to cut off the northern side of Epipolae from the southern half occupied by the Athenians, and so make the completion of the circumvallation an absolute impossibility.

The tide had now turned decidedly in favour of the Syracusans. But Athens persisted in her attempt. Nicias would have preferred to retreat ; but he did not dare to take the army home without express permission from Athens. When the fair season of 414 came to an end he merely sent a message to Athens giving a clear account of the position of affairs. He told the Athenians plainly that they must either abandon the undertaking or send a new fleet and a new army. He himself begged to be recalled on account of the state of his health. He was not recalled, but Eurymedon and Demosthenes were sent to his support and a new expedition fitted out. But before Nicias received reinforcements he had sustained a severe reverse. The Syracusans ventured on a naval engagement (413), which had some measure of success and was attended with a disastrous result for the Athenians. The Syracusans captured the Athenian works on Plemmyrium, which not only gave them possession of the material of war stored there, but offered them the possibility of blockading the entrance of the great harbour in which the Athenian fleet was anchored near the camp, and of thus cutting off the Athenian retreat. They resumed their attacks on the Athenian fleet. In a fresh battle the Athenians, with only seventy-five

against eighty Syracusan triremes, lost seven ships and were obliged to retire behind a palisade. If succour did not arrive they were lost, for they could not leave the harbour.

But help came with Demosthenes, who brought seventy-three triremes with 5000 hoplites and a number of light troops. Demosthenes proposed to avail himself of the favourable opportunity and at once carry the position, the possession of which could alone ensure the capture of Syracuse. The plateau which extended westward of Syracuse had been already occupied by Nicias. But by means of his wall across it Gylippus had confined the Athenians to the southern part of the plateau, and the Syracusans had free communication with the interior by the northern half. To make a direct attack on this cross-wall was not in accordance with the cautious policy of the Greeks; it was necessary to try and take it by a surprise. This could only be done by getting behind it at night and driving the enemy into the city. It could then be quickly pulled down. The cross-wall extended to the western end of the triangular plateau. The plan of Demosthenes, who was a master of all kinds of stratagem, was as follows. They were to go round the base of this projection at night and then ascend the plateau from the north. They would then be inside the wall and would be able to surprise the defenders at a point where they were not expecting an attack. But the attempt resulted in the defeat of the assailants. The Syracusan garrison was more on its guard than the Athenians had expected. The uncertain light of the moon misled them on strange ground. The Boeotian auxiliaries checked their advance, and they were obliged to retreat; the retreat became a rout; they were hurled down the precipices, and lost in this one night about 2500 men, who, it appears, were all killed.

It was now impossible to take Syracuse, as every sensible man saw. The only course open therefore was to return with all speed to Athens. Nicias, it is true, was of a different

opinion. He persuaded himself that their position was not so bad after all, but that Syracuse was very critically situated, and that there was an Athenian party in the city who would deliver it up to them. This might be true to a certain extent, but this party could only assert itself if the Athenians proved the stronger, and now their power was at an end. Nicias was afraid of the public inquiry which he would have to undergo if he had returned to Athens. But he assented to a compromise proposed by Demosthenes. The plan was to withdraw the army to Catana and then see what could be done next. But on the 27th of August, 413, there was an eclipse of the moon, and Nicias delayed his departure for thrice nine days on account of this inauspicious omen. The Syracusans did not require so much time to annihilate their enemy. With seventy-six ships they offered battle to the eighty-six Athenian ships and defeated them; Eurymedon was slain. The Syracusans now blocked the exit from the harbour by a line of ships fastened together with chains, and when the Athenians attempted to break through this obstruction the decisive struggle took place, the issue of which was awaited with intense anxiety by the population of Syracuse and the two armies. If the Athenians burst the chain of ships and defeated the Syracusan fleet, they could embark their troops and sail to Athens or Catana. They succeeded in breaking through, but the battle ended in favour of the Syracusans. Some of the Athenian ships were captured and some driven on shore.

Demosthenes now proposed a last expedient which might perhaps present the possibility of escaping with honour. The Athenians had sixty ships left, the Syracusans only fifty; they might try their fortune once more in a naval engagement. Nicias agreed, but the crews refused to fight. The ships were then burned and a retreat by land was decided on. This should have been carried out in one and the same night; for in that case the Syracusans would not have been ready to block the road by land. On the other hand, it was to the

interest of the Syracusans that the enemy should delay their retreat; much might be done in the way of occupying the roads in the space of a day. Hermocrates sent word to the Athenians by supposed friends of theirs that at present the roads were guarded but that they would be free in a day's time, and the Athenians were foolish enough to act upon this hint.

On the second day after the naval engagement the Athenians began their retreat, not to Catana, as the Syracusans expected, on which account they had occupied all the roads leading thither, but into the interior, in hopes of reaching some other friendly city. The force presented a pitiable spectacle—a slowly-advancing mass of 40,000 men, many of them wounded, under the burning summer's sun, ignorant of the roads, and constantly harried and attacked by the enemy. Their immediate destination was the highlands of the interior, to the west of Syracuse, where they would be more unfettered in their movements. To get there they had to pass through one of the defiles which penetrate into the face of the plateau. But the attempt failed. They advanced so slowly that the Syracusans outmarched them in every direction. On the first day they travelled five miles only, and on the following days still less. The ravine by which they attempted to climb the plateau ended in a precipice, the Acraeum Lepas, so called because the path over it led to Acrae (now Palazzolo). But this precipice was occupied by the Syracusans, and the Athenians were unable to storm it. During their retreat through the same ravine they were nearly cut off and made prisoners; but they managed to gain the open plain by the shore and continued their march there in a southerly direction, hoping to find a better ascent by another ravine. They proceeded in two divisions, Nicias in front, Demosthenes in the rear. For a brief space of time they eluded the enemy by this change of direction. But they were soon overtaken, first Demosthenes, who was forced to surrender in an orchard surrounded by a

wall, into which he had led his troops, and then Nicias, who, pressed on all sides by the enemy and unable to storm the southern bank of the river Assinarus, surrendered with the remains of his army in the river to Gylippus.

Nicias and Demosthenes were put to death. The rest were taken to the quarries of Syracuse, the large depressions in the natural rock, which now resemble gardens, but were then devoid of vegetation, a sort of natural prison, easily guarded and under the eye of the population, where they languished for some months in the heat and cold and filth and then died. Those who survived were sold as slaves. A few succeeded in escaping during the retreat, and some of these afterwards fell once more into the hands of the enemy. Some were saved by kind-hearted country folk, and the story goes that fugitive Athenians were given shelter and protection because they could repeat verses from Euripides, of whose plays the Sicilians were enthusiastic admirers. An Athenian, who perhaps even knew Euripides personally, was after all a being who deserved better treatment. "He is dead, or a teacher in Sicily" was afterwards said in Athens of those who had joined the expedition and whose fate was unknown.

It was a defeat similar to that which the Athenians had sustained in Egypt, but with more serious consequences, because it happened at a more critical time. There was now no general like Cimon, no statesman like Pericles. The people were not what they had been ; the new culture had enervated them. And yet they themselves had the smallest share of responsibility for the calamity. The army probably did its duty in the main ; Lamachus appears to have been the only general who did his ; it was only during the retreat that Nicias displayed dignity and firmness.

The dreams of world-wide sway, in which the Athenians had indulged for a time, were gone for ever. It is true that a democracy would have found it no easy matter to rule an empire as large as the Athenian would have been with the

addition of Sicily; only aristocratic republics are equal to such a task, as is proved by the examples of the Roman and Venetian republics. But it was now no longer a question of empire for Athens; her existence itself was at stake.

NOTES

For this chapter Thucydides is practically the only authority. For the first Athenian expedition to Sicily see Th. 3, 86, 88, 90, 99, 103, 115, 116; 4, 1, 24, 25, 58-65. Cf. Holm, *Gesch. Sic.* 2, 4 seq. and 404; also G. M. Columba, *La prima spedizione Ateniese in Sicilia*, Pal. 1887 (*Arch. Stor. Sic. an. xi.*), a very judicious paper.—For the despatch of Phaeax, cf. Thuc. 5, 45, and Holm, *Gesch. Sic.* 2, 405.—The treaties of Athens with Rhegium and Leontini, Dittenb. Nr. 23 and 24.—The treaty with Segesta, Th. 6, 6. According to the fragments of an Attic resolution of the people, published by Köhler, *Mitth. des deutschen archäol. Instit. in Athen*, 4, 29 seq., earlier relations had probably existed between Athens and Segesta. Still the year 454 is not so certain as Curtius assumes (*G. G.* 2⁶, 837).

1. Authorities for the history of the events connected with the mutilation of the Hermae, Th. 6, 27, 29, 60; Plut. *Alc.* 18 (probably following Ephorus); Andoc. *De myster.* 36 seq. and *De re ditu*, 8. Of modern writers—Droysen in the *Rhein. Mus.* 3, 2, and 4, 1; Goetz in the 8th supplementary volume of the *Jahr. f. klass. Phil.*; Gilbert, *Beitr.* p. 250 seq. Whoever may have been the authors of the mutilation of the Hermae, a point which is uncertain, it is evident that many democrats under the leadership of Pisander (who was then still ostensibly a democrat, but was perhaps already working in the interests of the oligarchs, whom he afterwards joined) and of Andocides, utilized the occasion to overthrow Alcibiades, whom they could not forgive for his share in the banishment of Hyperbolus and for his imperious temper; and the aristocrats under the leadership of Thessalus gladly joined in the attack.—Cf. Beloch, *Att. Politik*, p. 60, and Philippi, *Ueber einige Züge aus der Geschichte des Alcibiades*, *Histor. Zeitschrift*, 1887.—For the confiscation of the property of the so-called Hermokopidae cf. fragments of the inscriptions of the *πωληταί*, Hicks, No. 55 = Dittenb. 37-40 and 41, also the publication by Köhler in the *Hermes*, 23 (1888), p. 392, where frag. 3 deals with the property of Alcibiades.

2. The history of the Athenian war in Sicily 415-413 rests almost entirely on the authority of Thucydides, whose 6th and

7th Books are a model of accuracy as regards topography as well as other matters. I may refer here to my *Geschichte Siciliens im Alterthum*, vol. 2, where the subject is treated in detail, and also to the *Topografia archaeologica di Siracusa eseguita per ordine del Min. della P. Istr. da S. Cavallari, Ad. Holm e Cr. Cavallari, Pal. 1883*, 4 vols. with atlas of 15 plates in large folio, of which *Die Stadt Syrakus im Alterthum*, Strassb. 1887, by B. Lupus, is an excellent revised German version, with all the maps (most of them on a well-executed reduced scale) and vignettes of the original. The retreat of the Athenians ending in their annihilation on the Assinarus has been described in a paper read by me at the Philologenversammlung of Carlsruhe in 1882. The identity of the defile leading to Acraeum Lepas with the Cava di Spampinato or Culatrello, first suggested by Italia-Nicastro, was confirmed by me after personal investigation of the district. I may therefore refer the reader to these works for all points of detail.

3. I do not consider the *Birds* either a satire or a eulogy of any particular political movement in Athens at that time, but a poetical expression of the feeling which animated every Athenian at the moment, viz. that some great and unprecedented achievement could and must be attempted.

CHAPTER XXVIII

THE LAST YEARS OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR

THE Athenians were now in a most lamentable position, due not only to the terrible disaster in Sicily, but in a marked degree to the internal condition of the city, and the energy displayed by the Spartans at the instigation of Alcibiades.

When Alcibiades escaped on the return journey to Athens, and was condemned to death in his absence, he stayed at first in Thurii, and then sailed to Cyllene in Elis, whence he proceeded to Sparta at the invitation of the Spartans. He had let it be understood that he was ready to serve Sparta, and the Spartans were glad to make use of the clever renegade. He managed to get Gylippus sent to Sicily, and it was by his advice that Decelea in Attica was fortified and garrisoned, a position which commanded the land communications of Athens with Euboea. The Spartans caused the actual outbreak of war between Athens and Sparta by making an inroad into Argive territory. The Athenians came to the rescue of Argos, and in doing so laid waste a bit of Laconian territory, which was of course a direct violation of the peace. The Spartans consequently set to work to fortify Decelea with a clearer conscience. This took place in March 413. The Laconian garrison in Decelea inflicted immense injury on the Athenians as time went on. It prevented the cultivation of the land, a great number of slaves (in the end 20,000 were missing) went over to the enemy, and Athens could now only communicate with Euboea by sea.

But all this only made itself gradually felt. At the outset the embarrassments of Athens were of a financial nature. The want of money had become so great that a change was made in the system of taxation. The tribute paid by the members of the league was abolished and replaced by a tax of 5 per cent on all sea-borne trade. This measure was not only intended to ensure a supply of money, but no doubt also had a political significance. For the new tax was paid by the Athenians as well as by the allies, and the innovation consequently made the latter more favourably disposed towards them. A feeling appears to have prevailed at the time that the Athenian rule ought to assume a somewhat milder character, and people talked of linking the Ionians by closer ties to the parent-city. But of course no one knew how this was to be effected.¹ The real danger for Athens began on September 413, when the news of the destruction of the Athenian army in Sicily reached Greece. The enemies of Athens—which meant pretty nearly all the Greeks, her own allies to begin with—breathed again. So long as Athens was formidable no one had stirred; now that her power seemed broken, she was attacked. Agis, who had established a kind of independent government in Decelea, tried to find money and allies in eastern Greece; in Sparta people aspired once more to the idea of an allied fleet, which on this occasion was fixed at 100 ships only, and of which the Boeotians and Spartans were to provide twenty-five each, and the Corinthians, Phocians and Locrians fifteen each. A graver symptom was that a regular rush in the direction of revolt took place among the members of the Athenian league. It is true that they could not do much by themselves, although Athens had been obliged in a great degree to relax the severity of her control; but they applied to Sparta, and as the latter now possessed a fleet, there was a possibility of obtaining help. The Euboeans and Lesbians communicated with Agis, Chios and Erythrae with Sparta. Samos remained loyal and became the centre of Athenian

operations. But the most serious blow of all was that Persia now intervened, not with troops, but with money. Tissaphernes, satrap of Sardis, supported the petition of the Chians and Erythraeans in Sparta; he asserted that he had received orders from the king to collect the tribute of the cities on the coast, which had not been paid for nearly seventy years, and besides he hoped by means of Peloponnesian aid to facilitate the subjection of Amorges, son of Pissuthnes, who had revolted from Persia. Pharnabazus also, the satrap of the province of Dascylium in the north, endeavoured, at the instigation of a Megarian and a Cyzicene, to win the favour of the Spartans; he had the cities on the Hellespont in view. Thus Sparta's alliance was courted all of a sudden in consequence of the events in Sicily. Sparta was determined to avail herself of the resources placed at her disposal. She had no patriotic scruples on the score of surrendering Greek cities to the barbarians. Her sole preoccupation was where to begin, as she could not intervene at every point. Which quarter presented the greatest advantage? A diplomatist was needed to take stock of the situation and turn it to account, and at that time Sparta had none among her own citizens. At this juncture Alcibiades threw all the weight of his dexterity and experience into the scale. It was he who cemented the relations between Sparta and Persia, and thus prepared the great defeat of the year 404 for his native city. On the advice of Alcibiades the Spartans decided in favour of Tissaphernes and Chios.²

At first, however, everything proceeded very slowly (412). The Peloponnesian fleet in the Gulf of Corinth was transported to Cenchreae, for the purpose of proceeding to Chios. But the Corinthians wished to postpone the commencement of the war on account of the approaching celebration of the Isthmian games, and the Athenians, who had made the Chians contribute some ships, in order to secure a pledge of their loyalty, got wind of the project at the festival, and prevented the fleet which had been brought over to Cenchreae from putting to

sea. The Spartans were inclined to abandon operations, but at Alcibiades' instigation sent five ships under Chalcideus to Ionia, where the speedy revolt of Chios, Erythrae, Clazomenae and Teos was followed by that of the most ancient of the Athenian colonies, Miletus, in consequence of the machinations of Alcibiades, who had gone to the Asiatic mainland. A treaty was now concluded between Tissaphernes and the Spartans, in which the Greek cities on the Asiatic coast and the adjoining islands were recognized as belonging to Persia. After some unimportant skirmishes, in which the Spartans were on the whole successful, Lebedos also revolted; Teos, however, was recovered. The Athenians gained a marked advantage by the overthrow of the oligarchy in Samos and the accession to power of the Demos; Samos thus remained the stronghold of the Athenians in the East.³ The Chians proved zealous adherents of the new cause; they induced Methymna and Mitylene to revolt, and had the satisfaction of witnessing the arrival of the Lacedaemonian admiral-in-chief, Astyochus, who captured Eresus; but the Athenians reconquered Mytilene and Clazomenae, and under the leadership of Diomedon and Leon did much damage to the Chians, who since the time of the Persian Wars had not known what it was to have their own land laid waste by the enemy.⁴

In September 412 a larger army of Athenians, allies and Argives at last arrived in Ionia, consisting of forty-eight triremes and 3500 hoplites; they defeated the Milesians in a battle on land, and were on the point of commencing the siege of Miletus, when fifty-five Peloponnesian ships under Therimenes suddenly hove in sight. The Athenian general Phrynichus thereupon abandoned the expedition against Miletus and sailed for Samos, against the wishes of his colleagues and of the Argives, who returned home in high dudgeon. Some operations of less importance followed. The Peloponnesians took Iasos, where they secured a rich booty and captured Amorges, whom they delivered up to the

king.⁵ But it was not all plain sailing on the Peloponnesian side. Differences arose between them and Tissaphernes respecting the amount of pay to be contributed by the king, the Peloponnesian claim being upheld with energy by the Syracusan Hermocrates. The satrap in the end agreed to another treaty somewhat more advantageous to the Peloponnesians. But there was no satisfactory union among the Peloponnesians themselves; they had no commander-in-chief invested with real authority. The Athenians meanwhile pressed Chios hard, made some futile attempts on Miletus, and fought a battle at Cnidus; they consequently endeavoured to maintain their position on the whole coast line. A fleet of twenty-seven fresh Peloponnesian ships now arrived on the scene and engaged twenty Athenian vessels off Syme; the result was indecisive, but the Peloponnesians persuaded the cities in the island of Rhodes to revolt from Athens. There was now not much more left for the Athenians to do in the south, and they concentrated their forces at Samos.

Matters might have gone on in this way for a considerable time, the Athenians, whose pecuniary resources continually dwindled, undergoing a process of gradual exhaustion, had not Alcibiades, who had plunged Athens into misfortune, brought about a complete change in his own interests, a change which, it is true, was not of a permanent character.⁶ He had shot his bolt in Sparta. He had incurred the enmity of King Agis by seducing his wife Timaea and boasting of it in public, and so it was natural that the influence of Agis, whom Alcibiades had eclipsed for a time in the sphere of politics as well, should in the end prevail over that of the foreigner, who had done what lay in his power by giving advice and by initiating the alliance with Persia, and had now become simply obnoxious to the Spartans. Alcibiades fancied that his life might be in danger; he left the Peloponnesian camp and went to Tissaphernes, with whom he ingratiated himself, just as he had formerly done with the Spartans. He suggested to him

pretexts for cutting down the pay of the Peloponnesians, and explained to him that it was to his interest not to favour them so much as the Athenians, who were not so anxious to liberate the Asiatic Greeks, as their attention was more directed towards maritime affairs. By this means the Spartans were actually brought under suspicion of being infected with Hellenic patriotism. Tissaphernes gave a ready ear to Alcibiades, and reduced the payments made to the Peloponnesians. Alcibiades' object in these intrigues was to make himself acceptable in Athens. He was not a Pausanias nor a Themistocles ; he did not aim at a despotism like the former, nor had he the cool calculating mind of the latter. He wished to remain an Athenian, and had set his heart on returning once more to the capital of Greece, to his birthplace, to which he was after all fondly attached. He had shown Athens what harm he could do her ; he would now prove that he was in a position to render her equally good service. He wanted to be recalled, but this was not an easy matter after all that had happened ; he was therefore obliged to have recourse to exceedingly crooked measures. He judged, and rightly, that he could not maintain his position permanently in Athens unless he brought the Athenians not only security abroad, but the safety of the democracy at home. He might hold out a plausible prospect of the former by means of his connection with Tissaphernes ; but if the latter was to be due to his influence, it was necessary that further revolutions should take place in Athens, for his enemy Androcles was now leader of the people. But the democracy was seriously menaced ; if it were overthrown and then restored by his agency, his fortune was assured. Alcibiades could not afford to wait for others to overthrow it ; he was bound to do this himself. If after that he could re-establish it, his object would be gained.

Domestic affairs at Athens were unfortunately in so lamentable a condition, that such an unprincipled policy had some chance of success. The democratic constitution had lasted a

long time, in reality nearly a hundred years, since the legislation of Cleisthenes. But there had always been people in Athens who opposed it to the best of their power, and, when opposition was impossible, at all events cordially detested it, cherishing the hope that it would be overthrown in the end. That the people knew of the existence of such a party and dreaded it, is proved by their conduct on the occasion of the mutilation of the *Hermæ*. What the men of oligarchic tendencies thought of the people, is shown by the treatise on the Athenian state discussed above, in which democrats and bad men are convertible terms. And although many of the oligarchs could not help admitting that these were meaningless phrases, which had no significance even in the time of Theognis, still there were undoubtedly men of that class even in Athens, who, by dint of hearing themselves continually called beautiful and good, at last actually arrived at the conviction that they were superior to Cleon or Hyperbolus.⁷ But these oligarchs were not all nobles. Nobles did not exist in such numbers in Athens; even one of the leaders of the oligarchs, Phrynichus, was not of aristocratic birth. The oligarchs were the rich and their friends, and among their friends were those who provided the rich with the ideas in which they are sometimes deficient; they were the theorists of the party. These people thought that public affairs were in a bad way, because every one had a right to express an opinion and record his vote; they held that the number of those who had a voice in the government must be reduced, and that the privilege should only attach to persons of old family or large fortune. Their arguments in support of this demand were not that these persons were more intelligent or better educated—for the education of all Athenian citizens was pretty much the same, and the principal source of education was the theatre, which was frequented by everybody—but merely that the rich bore nearly all the burdens of the State in the liturgies, and consequently ought to possess greater

political influence than the rest.⁸ This point is emphasized by the author of the treatise on the Athenian state. But was it a fact that the poorer classes did nothing? On the contrary, they did good service, on board ship and in the ranks of the army. And had not the rich even in democratic Athens some compensation for their heavier outlay? Was the honour paid them in the city and the influence they enjoyed among the allies of no consequence? Trierarchs must often have secured more personal advantage in the islands than was within the reach of the common seaman. They had a certain satisfaction too in seeing their own names figuring on tripods and in resolutions. Moreover, all the advantages which fell to the lot of the well-to-do classes were theirs only because the Athenian empire existed, which had been founded by the democracy and was in the main supported by it. And after all even in the democracy individuals took the lead. Consequently the rich only needed to be skilful orators to acquire influence even in a democratic state. Of course it was not to be expected that they would acknowledge all this. They had got it into their heads that they did not possess the influence which was their due; their object was to obtain it, and they therefore began by forming secret societies bound together by an oath, which would not only be useful at elections and in legal proceedings, but would also pave the way for a change in the constitution.⁹

The assertion of these people, that the democracy had proved a failure, was to a certain extent borne out by the facts. After all, the disaster in Sicily had happened because the expedition had been undertaken without sufficient reflection—at all events this view could be maintained. Steps should therefore be taken to ensure more careful previous consideration in the future. The preliminary deliberation in the Council was evidently inadequate; hence after the defeat in Sicily a body of older men was appointed, probably ten in number, who no doubt were the *probuloi* mentioned elsewhere.¹⁰

But this in the opinion of many was only a feeble attempt at reform, and in point of fact proved of no importance. Many people held that the State would be better governed if the Assembly were differently organized. The only question was to discover the proper form of organization.

One particular reproach might with some show of justice have been made against the democracy, that it occasionally paid more respect to persons than to principles. The history of the last ostracism is fresh in our minds. Was it right of the people to sacrifice the genuine democrat Hyperbolus to the egoist Alcibiades and the aristocrat Nicias?

This state of public feeling and the position of affairs in Athens were turned to account by Alcibiades, in the year 411 B.C. He represented to the oligarchic generals and officers in Samos that he could secure Athens an alliance with Tissaphernes, and that this was the sole means of saving the city, because the Peloponnesians could only maintain their fleet by means of Persian money. But Tissaphernes, he added, would have nothing to do with the democracy; it was necessary that Athens should introduce an oligarchy. This view commended itself to most of the oligarchic officers, the wish being father to the thought, and Alcibiades appearing sincere in their eyes, because he had been banished by the Demos. Phrynichus, who was as cunning as Alcibiades and just as unscrupulous, was the only one who was sceptical; he held, and rightly, that it was a matter of indifference to the Persians how Athens was governed. He also discredited the assertion that Athens under an oligarchy would have more loyal subjects than Athens under a democracy. The object of the allies was to obtain their freedom. The other oligarchs, however, would not listen to him, whereupon he communicated the whole design to the Spartan Astyochus, simply in order to frustrate Alcibiades' plans.¹¹ If Phrynichus was a traitor, Astyochus was a fool. He repeated the information to Tissaphernes and Alcibiades. Thereupon Phrynichus, in

order to win the game of intrigue at all hazards, went a step further. He offered Astyochus to make over Samos to Sparta. But, fortunately for Athens, Astyochus was characterized by a childlike simplicity. He communicated this offer also to his good friends Alcibiades and Tissaphernes. Phrynichus now appeared in another character. He at once proposed to his colleagues to strengthen the fortifications of Samos; if the army heard of his offer to Astyochus, he could reply that it was a calumny, invented with the sole object of ruining a brave patriot. A deputation of officers under Pisander, a *ci-devant* democrat,¹² now proceeded to Athens in order to carry out the change in the constitution involving the return of Alcibiades. Nothing could be done by open violence. But the people might be compelled by underhand means to give their consent. The Hetairiae had organized their reign of terror well. Influential people received a hint that the members of the secret societies would shrink from no act of violence,¹³ and as the flower of the democracy was in the army at Samos, the intimidation practised at Athens was successful, and assent was given to a proposal, which after all, as people thought, would perhaps not turn out so badly, viz. that Pisander and others should return to Asia to conclude an agreement with Tissaphernes and Alcibiades. But nothing was accomplished. Alcibiades made demands on behalf of Tissaphernes which put an end to all negotiation, firstly, that Athens should surrender Ionia, the islands and "everything else" to Persia, and secondly, that the king should have the right of sending his ships of war in every direction. The envoys rightly came to the conclusion that they had been duped and returned to Samos. Tissaphernes, however, concluded a fresh agreement for subsidies with Sparta, on the same lines as the old one. Thus ended the first act of the drama of intrigue which Alcibiades had put on the stage with as much cunning as unscrupulousness.

While the war proceeded as before, but always with a

slight preponderance of advantage to the Peloponnesians—the Boeotians captured Oropus by treachery, the Chians held their own in a naval engagement, Abydos and Lampsacus revolted from Athens, but Lampsacus was retaken by Strombichides—the ball which had been set rolling in Athens continued its course. If Alcibiades could not help them, the oligarchs might effect their purpose without him. There was always money enough forthcoming for an enterprise of this kind, although on other occasions they pretended that they were impoverished by their contributions to the State, and they had evidently gone too far in their preparations to turn back.¹⁴ Pisander returned to Athens for this purpose, while others proceeded to the allies in order to commend the introduction of an oligarchy to them also. It happened, however, that Thasos, as Thucydides relates with a touch of irony, revolted from Athens immediately after the introduction of an oligarchy. Phrynichus was in the right. In Athens the ground had been well prepared for the revolution. The Council and the Assembly still met as usual, but only to carry the measures of the conspirators. Resistance was punished by death. The demagogue Androcles was the first to suffer; others met with a similar fate, and soon no one dared disobey the orders of the oligarchs; people did not even venture to utter their complaints, as no one was certain whether the confidant whom he had chosen was one of the conspirators or not. Pisander carried out the abolition of the democracy in the following manner. The people were persuaded to entrust the preparation of the proposed reforms to a committee of ten. When the latter had finished their task the people were summoned outside the city to Colonus; the ten, in accordance with the requirements of the constitution, first carried a resolution making it legal to bring forward any proposals, and then the following motions were put and approved: that all paid offices should be abolished, that five men should be chosen with power to elect one hundred, that each of this hundred

should nominate three others, and that these Four Hundred should carry on the government, and, when they thought fit, convoke an assembly of five thousand well-to-do citizens to ascertain their opinion. This plan was carried into execution by Pisander, but its real author was Antiphon, a man whose profession was to write speeches for other people, to be delivered in the law-courts, or the Assembly, but who had hitherto not personally taken part in public life. He was a man of some standing, suspected by the people, but, according to Thucydides, "second to none in point of ability."¹⁵ His most prominent colleagues were the above-mentioned Phrynichus, a man of low birth, cunning and unprincipled, and Theramenes, the son of the *probulus* Hagnon, and, in the opinion of Thucydides, an eloquent and intelligent man, who, as we shall see, was always ready to go over to the other side when he was dissatisfied for any particular reason with his own. The conspirators proceeded to the council-chamber, where the Five Hundred were assembled, announced to them their dismissal, and gave them their pay for the year; the latter dispersed quietly to their homes. A few more democrats were put to death and others banished. The first political act of the new government was to make overtures for peace to Agis; a longing for peace prevailed, as is shown by the *Lysistrata* of Aristophanes, which was performed in the year 411, a feeling which Aristophanes encouraged in his own fashion. But Agis remained unmoved; he would have liked to conquer Athens. The Athenian government then despatched envoys to Sparta with the same object. They also sent a mission to Samos to induce the Athenian army there to recognize the revolution. But that, as they were well aware, was a difficult matter. For the Athenians in Samos consisted for the most part of the "sailor-rabble," as Thucydides calls them, *i.e.* people who were not rich enough to be interested in an oligarchic revolution. Among the Samians themselves three hundred oligarchic conspirators came to the front; firstly, to serve their Athenian

employers, they murdered the Hyperbolus who had been banished by ostracism, a "bad" man, as Thucydides calls him, and then attacked the democratic government of Samos. But the Samian Demos had joined hands with the numerous democrats in the Athenian army, the "sailor-rabble," especially with Thrasybulus, a trierarch, and Thrasylyus, a hoplite belonging to the state-ship *Paralus*, the crew of which consisted of staunch democrats, and thus the Demos succeeded in overpowering the conspirators. Some of them were slain and others expelled the island. The *Paralus* conveyed the news of this to Athens, where, however, the oligarchic revolution had just taken place, with the result that Chaereas, the commander of the vessel, was made prisoner. He, however, escaped and brought word of what had happened to Samos. Thrasybulus and Thrasylyus exhorted their fellow-countrymen to be united, and Athenians as well as Samians swore to resist Sparta and the oligarchs. They declared themselves to be the real Athenian republic and chose new generals, among them Theramenes and Thrasylyus, who expressed the opinion that Alcibiades must be recalled. It may appear strange that the man who had just been posing as an oligarch should now be hailed as a leader by the democracy; but we must assume that a general conviction prevailed that there was no safety for Athens without Alcibiades, who seemed to have the disposal of Persian subsidies. The Samian army, which had been joined by the Athenian fleet in the Hellespont under Strombichides, decided to invite Alcibiades to come to Samos.

He came there at once and persuaded the army to forego its wish to sail to Athens and reinstate the democracy there forthwith. This was a wise and safe policy. He then went to Tissaphernes, to influence him in favour of Athens; and while he was in Samos the envoys of the Four Hundred arrived, who were to persuade the army to declare for the oligarchy; but the army decided that the democracy must be reinstated in Athens.

Meanwhile the Spartans made no further progress in Asia. They came to an understanding with Pharnabazus, and Clearchus sailed to the Hellespont, but he only managed to take Byzantium, which was not enough to satisfy the Peloponnesians. In consequence great dissatisfaction with Astyochus broke out on board the fleet, the Syracusans and the Thurians distinguishing themselves by their courageous plain-speaking. Astyochus was relieved of his duties as admiral-in-chief by Mindarus, and was accompanied home by Hermocrates, the Syracusan leader, by some envoys of the Milesians who were dissatisfied with Tissaphernes and an envoy from Tissaphernes himself, who all went to Sparta to indulge in mutual recriminations there. Tissaphernes, the supposed friend of Sparta, had really not done his duty. There were 147 Phoenician vessels lying off Aspendus, which were at his disposal. The Spartans naturally expected that they would be used in their interests; but Tissaphernes did not send for them, although he went to Aspendus. Alcibiades, however, to show his countrymen how influential he was with the Persians, proceeded to Phaselis, where he was close to Aspendus.

When the messengers of the Four Hundred returned to Athens after a bootless errand, the oligarchs lost heart. The wildest members of the party deserted it, among them Theramenes and Aristocrates; others, such as Phrynichus, Aristarchus, Pisander and Antiphon persisted in their design and fortified Eetionia, the point at the western end of the Piraeus, so as to be able to admit a Peloponnesian fleet into the harbour at any moment. Some of them, notably Antiphon and Phrynichus, went to Sparta to obtain some practical help for their cause. Theramenes now openly declared against them; he asserted that a fleet which was then assembling on the Laconian coast was destined for the Piraeus; and in this he gave a correct indication of the wishes of his colleagues. The crisis now arrived. For after all there were not many Athenians who wanted to see the Spartans in Athens. The oligarchs

were defeated with their own weapons. On his return from Sparta Phrynichus was assassinated in the crowded market-place a few paces from the council-house, and the murderer remained undetected for a time.¹⁶ The hoplites engaged in the fortification of Eetionia left their work and made a prisoner of their strategus Alexicles. Theramenes egged them on to armed resistance. The fortress on Eetionia was pulled down. The hoplites withdrew from the Piraeus into the city and encamped in the Anaceum near the market-place. The Four Hundred agreed with them that negotiations for an understanding should take place in the theatre of Dionysus. But just as they were beginning the news spread that the forty-two Peloponnesian ships, which had so long been talked of as bound for the Piraeus, had arrived off Salamis. The population hurried to the Piraeus and the hostile fleet sailed round Cape Sunium to Oropus. The Athenians collected thirty-six ships, with which they attacked the Peloponnesians, but were defeated, and lost twenty-two of their fleet. The Eretrians had rendered assistance to the enemy. Soon afterwards Euboea revolted from Athens, with the exception of the cleruchia of Oreos, so that the Spartans now had easier access to Euboea than the Athenians. Athens herself would have been lost, if the Spartans had been more energetic; but, as Thucydides remarks, they did not display the energy which enabled the Syracusans to gain their victory.

In an assembly, which was held as before in the Pnyx, the Athenians placed the government in the hands of the Five Thousand who had never been convoked by the Four Hundred; they were to include all citizens who could equip themselves as hoplites at their own expense. Thus only the three first Solonian classes retained their political rights. Paid offices were abolished; Nomothetae were also appointed to work out the details of the constitution. Thucydides declares this to have been the best constitution which Athens enjoyed in his time.¹⁷ Theoretically that might have been the case, although

this is open to grave doubt; but in practice it was not a success, and it only lasted so long as the "sailor-rabble" was occupied elsewhere. One result of the movement was that Aristarchus, one of the chiefs of the Four Hundred, handed over the frontier fortress of Oenoe to the Boeotians, telling the garrison that Oenoe had been ceded to the Boeotians by the Athenians. He was afterwards put to death in Athens.¹⁸ Of the rest Pisander, Alexicles, and others fled to Decelea, Archeptolemus, Onomacles and Antiphon were accused of high treason, on which occasion Theramenes displayed his oratorical skill against his former friends. Onomacles escaped, the other two were condemned and executed. Participation in the embassy to Sparta was one of the principal charges brought against these men.¹⁹

The war was now continued in the north of Asia Minor, in the territory of Pharnabazus. In this quarter the import of grain was at stake, a question of vital importance for Athens. Mindarus sailed for the Hellespont. Thrasyllus and Thrasybulus intended to prevent him from entering the straits, but were detained at Lesbos with the siege of Eresus, and Mindarus actually entered the Hellespont. Thus the very existence of Athens was threatened. Some Athenian ships which were lying off Sestos attempted to escape into the Aegean, but four of them fell into the hands of the Peloponnesians. Mindarus now proceeded to Abydos, while the Athenians sailed from Eresus to Elaeus, which was situated on the southern point of the Thracian Chersonese. Thus the Spartans occupied the Asiatic, the Athenians a portion of the European side of the Hellespont. Five days afterwards a battle was fought off the headland of Cynossema, the Athenians with seventy-six and the Peloponnesians with eighty-six ships, and the Athenians were victorious. Cyzicus, which had just revolted, in consequence of this went over again to the Athenian side for a short time; Athens also retained Parium on the Asiatic coast.²⁰ Tissaphernes considered these events,

which took place within the jurisdiction of his rival Pharnabazus, of such importance that he once more drew nearer to the scene of action and proceeded first to Ephesus. The Athenians won a fresh battle off Abydos, Alcibiades fighting on the one side and Pharnabazus on the other from the shore, and thereupon Tissaphernes had Alcibiades arrested, to prevent the superiority of the Athenians from becoming too great. But the wily adventurer made his escape (410 B.C.) The Athenians now collected a fine fleet of eighty-six ships and sailed against the Peloponnesians, who were off Cyzicus under the command of Mindarus, Pharnabazus being close at hand with an army. Thrasybulus, Theramenes and Alcibiades surprised the enemy's fleet, which numbered sixty ships, and captured them all, except the Syracusan vessels, which were burned by the crews. Mindarus himself fell (410). This victory gave Athens many advantages. Cyzicus, Perinthus and even Thasos once more became Athenian, and although Byzantium remained hostile, the Athenians still held the opposite coast of Asia, and established a custom-station at Chrysopolis, all ships coming from the Pontus having to pay a tenth of the value of their cargo, a tax analogous to that mentioned at the beginning of this Chapter. Raising money was now one of the most important duties of the Athenian generals.²¹ As no tribute was being paid, they had to procure funds as best they could, a state of things which naturally did not improve the general feeling towards Athens. The Peloponnesians were much better off; the Persians supplied them with money, and Pharnabazus now gave them wood from Mount Ida, with which they built fresh ships. What was the good of all their victories to the Athenians if the Lacedaemonians had an inexhaustible supply of money and ships?

Of course it was impossible to rely on the Persians for any length of time. Would it not be better for Sparta if the war were brought to a close? Agis had recourse to force, but

his attempt to surprise Athens miscarried ; at Sparta, where diplomacy was used, it was decided to offer Athens peace on the basis of the *status quo*. But the Athenians declined the proposal on the advice of the leader of the democracy, Cleophon,²² and Thrasyllus actually made some way in Asia in the beginning of 409. He took Colophon and fought with success against Miletus, but accomplished nothing against Ephesus. In Europe the Spartans lost their colony of Heraclea Trachiniae to the Achaeans.

But all this was of slight importance. The main question continued to be : what was Persia's attitude ? For Athens could hardly withstand Persia and Sparta combined. When the war first extended to Asia the decision as to the policy to be pursued rested with the satraps ; but the longer it lasted, the more attention was paid to it in the interior, and the necessity was felt of laying down a definite policy for the satraps, to prevent one from thwarting the policy of the other, a state of affairs which was in keeping with the character of these officials, who detested one another and did their best to injure each other. It is impossible to follow all the windings in the policy of Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus ; but it is certain that, after the former had been apparently friendly to the Athenians for a time, Pharnabazus promised them twenty talents, expressed his readiness to give Athenian envoys an escort to Susa, and agreed that Chalcedon should pay taxes to Athens (409-408). Some Argive envoys accompanied the Athenians, but Hermocrates joined them too, of course with the object of intriguing against Athens. The party of Greeks, who were enemies at home, actually travelled peaceably together in the Persian empire. Meanwhile the Athenians had a striking success. The Spartan Clearchus, who was in command at Byzantium, left the city to fetch money and ships from Pharnabazus. Byzantium was blockaded and surrendered to the Athenians under pressure of famine. By way of compensation Sparta had the satisfaction of seeing Athens lose Pylos and Nisaea.²³

Thus fortune hung in the balance, and Athens would still have had some chance of being saved if Persia had not definitively declared in favour of Sparta. But when the Athenian envoys were in Gordium with Pharnabazus in 408—the wily Persian had delayed the journey as much as possible—they met the Spartan envoys, who were on their return from the Persian court with an answer. Sparta had won the day. Cyrus, son of King Darius, in his capacity of governor “of the men assembled in the Castolian plain in Lydia” (consequently of Lydia, Phrygia and Cappadocia), was ordered to take measures for the support of Sparta. Pharnabazus now detained the Athenian envoys, who did not get away until the expiration of three years. The mutual hostilities of Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus came to an end, as did the influence of Alcibiades. Cyrus was well disposed towards Sparta, and soon met with a Spartan who knew how to manage him properly.

It seems strange that Alcibiades should have returned to Athens at the very moment (408 B.C.) when the Athenian cause was taking a turn for the worse. But he evidently was anxious to gain a firm footing in his native country just at the time when his position was shaken in Asia. In the same way he had found a refuge in Sparta against Athens, and in Asia against Sparta. It was possible to do something with Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus; they could each be played off against the other; with Cyrus, whose sympathies had been enlisted, we do not know how, in favour of Sparta, all intrigue was lost labour. Thus Athens still remained to Alcibiades, and he took care not to return with empty hands. He collected 100 talents in the Ceramic Gulf in Caria, made a demonstration of Athenian power with twenty ships in Paros and at the Spartan arsenal in Gytheum, and sailed thence to Athens. He had been appointed strategus in conjunction with Conon, who now appears on the scene for the first time, and Thrasybulus, who had meanwhile restored Athenian supremacy

in Thrace and in Thasos, which had revolted again.²⁴ The day on which he entered the Piraeus was that of the Plynteria (end of Thargelion, May), when the sacred image of Athene on the citadel was veiled and no business of importance could be transacted in Athens—an inauspicious omen for him. He had been under the apprehension that his enemies would attack him on his arrival. But all passed off well. He administered his office in Athens admirably, and a great impression was made upon the whole people when he conducted the sacred procession to Eleusis in the month Boedromion (end of September) under the escort of the army; this was the first time it had gone by land for several years, having been sent on board ship on account of the presence of the Spartans in the country. It was evident, thought the people, that the story of his having offended the goddesses was not true. Moreover Agis seemed to be in dread of him. After equipping 100 ships he sailed by way of Andros to Samos. He was not destined to see Athens again.

In 408 the new Spartan admiral-in-chief, Lysander, a capable general and an extremely astute statesman, arrived in Asia; he immediately went to Cyrus and got on friendly terms with him. Cyrus declared in true oriental style that his father had given him 500 talents for the service of the Spartans, that if this proved insufficient he would spend the money destined for his own private use, and finally, if need be, would break up the gold and silver throne on which he was sitting and devote it to the cause. But when it became a question of deeds he failed to produce the daily pay of one drachma, which the Spartans wanted for each man in their force, and at last, as an extreme concession to his dear friend Lysander, he consented to give them four obols a day. In spite of all this, however, the turning-point in the war was brought about by the Athenians themselves, who in their present position could not afford to commit any mistakes. In the absence of Alcibiades, his second-in-command Antiochus, in contravention

of the orders given him, attacked the Peloponnesian fleet to the north of Ephesus, off Notium, was defeated and lost fifteen ships (407). The Athenians, in consequence of the speeches of a certain Thrasybulus, laid the blame on Alcibiades, and did not re-elect him general.²⁵ Alcibiades did not return to Athens but retired to his fortress in the Thracian Chersonese. He had good reason for thinking his life unsafe in Athens. After this everything turned out badly for the Athenians. It is true that in their fits of excitement they ill-treated their good generals and trusted incapables and knaves. The result was that Athens had to succumb in the end.

In 406 Lysander was succeeded by Callicratidas, a man of vigorous character and—a rarity in those times—of genuine hellenic feeling. He could not endure to have to beg the promised pay of the Persians, and dance attendance in the prince's antechamber, and he announced that on his return to Sparta he would do his best to bring about an understanding between Sparta and Athens. He began his military operations in brilliant style. After a contribution had been levied from the Milesians, he took Methymna and forced Conon to take refuge in the harbour of Mytilene. With 170 ships he defeated the seventy ships of Conon, captured thirty, and pursued the rest up to the walls of the city, where they were safe for the moment, but were short of provisions, while the Spartans had everything in abundance. Callicratidas also captured ten of Diomedon's twelve ships. The blockade, however, was not strict enough to prevent an Athenian vessel escaping from Mytilene and bringing news of Conon's peril to Athens. The Athenians put forth all their strength. In thirty days 110 ships were equipped, and all who were of suitable age, slaves and freemen, embarked and set sail. At Samos they were reinforced by ten ships and more than thirty of the other allies. The Athenian generals thus arrived off Mytilene with a fleet of more than 150 ships. Callicratidas left fifty to mount

guard over Conon, and sailed with 120 to meet the Athenians, who completely defeated him near the Arginusae islands. Callicratidas fell; the Athenians lost only twenty-five ships, the Spartans seventy. After the battle a storm arose, which prevented Theramenes and Thrasybulus, who were sent with forty-six ships to rescue the men left on the wrecked Athenian vessels and collect the Athenian dead, from carrying out their orders. Conon was now free, and sailed out to meet the victorious fleet (Sept. 406).

The victory, however, was followed by proceedings of a shocking character in Athens.²⁶ The generals, who ought to have been thanked for saving their country, were deposed and impeached, one of them, Erasinides, for embezzlement, and all of them collectively for not having rescued the sufferers and brought away the dead. The chief instigator of this was Theramenes, who was afraid of being called to account himself. The generals were not clever enough or not base enough to lay the blame on Theramenes and Thrasybulus; they maintained that no one was to blame, because the storm had prevented any action being taken for the recovery of the men. Theramenes and his party had recourse to the usual tricks adopted in the courts for arousing public feeling, and a certain Callixenus then demanded on behalf of the Council an immediate vote on the punishment of the generals. This was illegal; the constitution prescribed that each man should have an opportunity of answering the charge against him, and Euryptolemus accused Callixenus of violating the provisions of the law which precluded the taking of a summary vote on his proposal. But the people in their excitement insisted on Callixenus' motion being put, and the Prytanes were weak enough to comply, although one of them, the philosopher Socrates, declared that he would have no part in their decision. Euryptolemus now proposed that the generals should be put on their trial separately, in accordance with the psephisma of Cannonus, but his proposal was

rejected and that of Callixenus adopted. The six generals who were in Athens, Pericles, son of Aspasia, Diomedon, Erasinides, Thrasyllus, Lysias and Aristocrates, were handed over to the Eleven, and met their death by drinking the cup of hemlock. Theramenes had saved himself. Callixenus, who had played such an infamous part, became an object of universal detestation when the people were seized with remorse afterwards, and starved himself to death.

The condemnation of the generals is a proof of the hopeless demoralization which prevailed in Athens at the time. From a moral point of view it was highly honourable that the Athenians should regard neglect of duties prescribed by religion and humanity as a crime worthy of death. But it was open to them to proceed by due course of law, and this was all the more imperative in the case of men who had just saved the State. It was not only most inhuman to break the law in this way, but also in the highest degree unwise. In future victory would not be so much an object for a general as the necessity of ingratiating himself with a mob of agitators. If the inviolability of religion was of greater importance to the Athenians than the safety of the State, then the State was lost. Apart from the exaggerated respect paid to religion, the proceedings were due, firstly, to the morbid excitement of the people, who were placed in such a difficult position, and instead of being controlled by a vigorous dictator, which was what they needed, were kept in a continual state of apprehension by the intrigues of the oligarchs, and secondly, to the conduct of Theramenes, which was certainly unpatriotic, and, if we consider his whole career, probably criminal.

But Athens had such a reserve of strength that she did not fall immediately after these events.²⁷ On the contrary, the Peloponnesians, who were concentrated at Chios under Eteonicus, were in a bad way, suffering from want of money and provisions. They came to the conclusion that Lysander was the only man who could bring about a change, and peti-

tioned the government for him. Sparta sent him out, not as admiral-in-chief, because this office could not be held twice by the same person, but as epistoleus, or lieutenant, with orders to command the fleet (405). Lysander immediately obtained money from Cyrus and, after an expedition to the south of Asia Minor, proceeded to the Hellespont, where the Athenians were lying. He captured the city of Lampsacus. The Athenians drew up their fleet of 180 ships at Aegospotami on the opposite shore. The cleverness of Lysander combined with the folly of the Athenian generals brought matters to an issue here. Lysander allowed himself to be challenged for several days in succession without leaving his position. This increased the confidence of the Athenian generals and made them think that he was afraid of them, in spite of a warning from Alcibiades, who was living close by, and although one of their generals was the capable Conon; but the majority of the others were inefficient and one of them undoubtedly a traitor. On the fifth day the Athenians repeated their challenge with the same result and returned to Aegospotami, where they landed in scattered parties to procure provisions, without thinking of the safety of the fleet. Lysander stood out to sea, surprised the Athenians, who had no time even to form for battle, and annihilated the whole fleet. Conon managed to escape with eight ships, which he brought to a place of safety in the territory of the Cypriote prince Evagoras.²³ The Paralus, which also escaped, conveyed the bad news to Athens. The prisoners were all executed by Lysander, with the exception of the general Adeimantus, ostensibly because he had opposed the proposal of one of his colleagues to cut off the hands of the Peloponnesian prisoners, but in reality because he had a traitorous understanding with Lysander.

Athens was lost; she had no more ships, and no means of building new ones. But Lysander decided not to attack her; the Spartans did not understand how to capture cities. His

plan was to starve her into surrender. He forced all the old allies of Athens which were still on her side, such as Byzantium and Chalcedon, to surrender—Samos alone held out—and sent all the Athenians whom he could find, amounting to many thousands, chiefly cleruchi, to Athens, to swell the crowd of starving inhabitants. He then sent word to Agis at Decelea and to the Spartan government that he was coming to blockade the Piræus with 200 ships, and that they should attack Athens with their whole force from the land side. This was done, and the Peloponnesians encamped in the Academy outside the Dipylon gate. Lysander first reinstated the remaining Melians and Aeginetans in their possessions, and then made his appearance off the Piræus.

The oligarchic party had now to continue their work, a by no means easy task, as the armed populace was still master of life and death, and any premature action might cost the oligarchs their lives. First of all the democrat Cleophon was murdered.²⁹ This made a certain impression, and the people informed Agis that they were ready to join the Spartan league if Athens might retain her walls and the Piræus. Agis replied that they must send envoys to Sparta. The envoys, however, were stopped at Sellasia, and told that they must come with more acceptable proposals. But the Athenians were unwilling to pull down their walls; they feared that this and even worse might be demanded, and were in a state of great disquietude and uncertainty. It would be a relief if they could only find out what the Spartans wanted. Theramenes offered to ascertain this, if the people approved. He was sent on a mission, but remained with Lysander for three months without sending any report. Finally, when the spirit of the Athenian people was still further broken by waiting, he announced that it was necessary for him to go to Sparta as the terms to be imposed on Athens would be settled there. He was consequently sent as plenipotentiary to Sparta. At Sparta, Corinth and Thebes voted for the destruction of

Athens. But Sparta declared that a city which had rendered such signal service to Greece ought not to be annihilated. It was decided that Athens should pull down the Long Walls and those of the Piraeus, surrender all her ships except twelve, re-admit the men who had been banished, and submit to the Spartans by land and by sea. Theramenes reported these terms and the Athenians accepted them. Lysander therefore entered the Piraeus on the 16th Munychion, and the Athenians and their enemies joined in pulling down part of the Long Walls to the music of the flute; "this," said the conquerors, "is the beginning of freedom for Greece."

The Spartans treated Athens with a fair amount of consideration. She was not even obliged to accept a Spartan garrison. Her subjects had disappeared; if she had not given up the Long Walls, she would have lost nothing. But this clemency reveals its origin. The oligarchs had betrayed Athens on condition of being left in possession of a city which they could control and use for their own objects. This cannot be proved by documentary evidence; but if we consider the battle of Tanagra, the mutilation of the Hermae, the events which happened under the Four Hundred, the naïve unscrupulousness of Phrynichus, the conduct of Theramenes after the battle off the Arginusae islands, the treatment of one of the generals at Aegospotami, and the mission of Theramenes to Lysander, we arrive at the conclusion that Athens fell because her fall at last offered the oligarchs the opportunity, for which they had long waited, of obtaining supreme power for themselves and for Sparta. No doubt the Athenians themselves were to blame, but they would not have been Athenians if their love of novelty had not led them to undertake more than they could accomplish, and if their fear of offending the gods had not made them neglect the dictates of prudence.

NOTES

Authorities : Up to the latter part of the summer of 411, Thucydides, Bk. viii., which as an authority may claim to possess the same value as the other books, as its credibility could not have been enhanced by any finishing touches. From the end of the summer of 411 Xenophon's Hellenica, Bks. I. and II., cc. 1 and 2. As regards the value of the Hellenica as a historical authority I entirely agree with the views of L. Breitenbach, and refer for the reasons which support them to his excellent Introduction to the 2nd Ed. of the Hellenika, Berlin, Weidm. 1884. I find no trace of bias against the democracy in Xenophon's narrative, and he is therefore deserving of credit as the only contemporary authority. After him come Diodorus, 13, 34 seq., and Plutarch in the biographies of Alcibiades and Lysander. For an analysis of the former I would refer to Volquardsen's Untersuchungen, etc., Anhang III., and Breitenbach's Bemerkungen in the Introduction just quoted (p. 70 seq.), from which it would appear that for 411-404 (13, 42-14, 10) probably to a great extent Theopompus, and for 404, 403 (14, 11-33) probably Ephorus was his authority, that Theopompus is under suspicion of partiality for Alcibiades, the favourite of his master Isocrates, and that Diodorus contributes little that is new or useful to this section ; cf. esp. Breitenbach, p. 79. For Plutarch's Alcibiades we have the work of Fricke (Quellen, etc., Leipz. 1869) ; for his Lysander, Stedefeldt, De Lysandri Plutarchei fontibus, Bonn, 1867 ; and Breitenbach's criticism of the merits and defects of Plutarch's narrative in general is very sound (p. 72 seq.) Plutarch gives highly instructive pictures of the times and of individual character.—The chronology of the period with which Xenophon deals is uncertain, because he is not accurate in his dates ; there are two opposing views among modern critics, the one, of which Beloch is the exponent, places many events a year later than that represented by Breitenbach (pp. 80-84) ; I have decided in favour of the latter.—For the final events, after the battle of Aegospotami, some speeches of Lysias are a supplementary authority, but not of an entirely impartial character ; Breitenbach, p. 68.

1. Th. 7, 28 describes the taxes *εἰκοστὴ τῶν κατὰ θάλασσαν*. It was thus a duty on imports (and exports ? Gilbert, Beiträge, 286, thinks so decidedly) in all the ports of the Athenian Empire. The collection of these supplies was entrusted to the board of ten Poristae ; cf. Beloch in the Rh. Mus. 1884, p. 249. Aristophanes (Lys. 582 seq.) refers to the closer union with the Ionians, which

Beloch, *Attische Politik*, p. 67, interprets as an actual attempt to extend civic rights to all the allies. The same writer (in the *Rh. Mus.* 1885, p. 44) considers the substitution of the duties for the tribute as a great advance in the direction of unity. If unity could be created by equality of burdens this view would be correct.

2. Just as the Spartans under Brasidas had attempted to shatter the Athenian league in Thrace towards the close of the so-called Archidamian war, and had used the Macedonians for this purpose, so the cities of the league in Asia were the objects of their attacks in the Deceleian war, when they had become more enterprising at sea. The Persians now occupy the place of the Macedonians in the calculations of the Spartan statesmen, and this policy was more successful now than ten years before, for the Persians had money and the Macedonians none; besides the cities on the coast of Asia, especially those in the Hellespont, were of more importance to the Athenians than the cities of Thrace. The tergiversation of Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus recalls that of Perdiccas; in the main the Persians were more reliable than the Macedonians. If the advice which Alcibiades gave the Spartans, to take Chios from the Athenians and not to attack them in the Hellespont, may be interpreted as indicating a wish to humiliate Athens but not to annihilate her—an assumption which may after all be made to his credit—it is permissible to say that he suggested Tissaphernes and Ionia as objects of Spartan policy, because Ionia and Caria were not such weak points for Athens as the Hellespont. So far as I am aware this has not been hitherto pointed out.

3 Th. 8. 21. The encomiums passed by the Athenians on the Samians, in a fragment of a psephisma (*C. I. A.* 1. 56), are referred to this.

4. Th. 8. 24 has some very characteristic remarks on the wisdom of the Chians, to which as may be supposed (Thucydides thinks and says so) the revolt really did little credit, because it resulted in injury to them; but, observes Thucydides, they did not revolt until the power of Athens had fallen so low that the Athenians themselves could not help despairing of success, while the Chians had plenty of friends to rely on. The Chians, therefore, concludes Thucydides, cannot be reproached with want of good sense. There is no question of right or wrong here. The point of view of the Chians was the same as that of the Lesbians, who under similar circumstances only considered their own advantage. There is nothing strange in this; the only noteworthy point is that Thucydides conceives himself under an obligation to defend the Chians against the reproach of having acted foolishly. Defence of revolted allies against a charge of this kind is out of place in a

history of Greece. Thucydides' usual practice is only to record facts. The passage is evidently the germ of a speech which, in the final revision of the 8th Book, would have been delivered by a Chian in justification of the course adopted by his fellow-citizens. Observations of this kind are only to the point in the mouth of a Chian.

5. According to Deecke (Berl. phil. Woch. 1888, No. 26) the expedition against Iasos is the subject of the Lycian inscription (M. Schmidt, *Lyc. Inscr.* I.-VII, 1-4), in which the French savant Imbert has discovered the name Amorges, and Deecke those of Pharnabazus and Athens.

6. Th. 8, 45. Cf. Herbst, *Rückkehr des Alkibiades*, Hamb. 1843; Nikolai, *Politik des Tissaphernes*, Bernburg, 1863. Gilbert also (*Beiträge*, p. 300, following Wattenbach, *De Quadringentorum Athenis factione*, Berol. 1842) apparently assumes that Alcibiades enticed the oligarchs into a trap.

7. There are instances of this narrow-mindedness even in Thucydides, who relates facts in such an impersonal way; Cleon is objectionable in his eyes, Hyperbolus (8, 73) is *μοχθηρός*, he reproaches him with *πονηρία*; while he has a word of commendation for Phrynichus as *οὐκ ἀξύνετος*. Fortunately by not stating any specific instances of *πονηρία* in the case of Hyperbolus and by relating the knavery of Phrynichus in a perfectly dispassionate way, he has enabled us to form an opinion ourselves.

8. Curtius, G. G. 2⁶, 592, asserts that the democratic leaders like Hyperbolus "had not a spark of moral elevation," that they were deficient in everything which the Athenians understood by *μουσική*, and lacked the advantages of a liberal education and of sound early instruction in the arts and sciences. In reply to this it may justly be urged that Athens is the very place where there are least traces of distinction in the training of rich and poor, as is proved, for instance, by the case of tragedy and comedy, which supplied all classes indiscriminately with every kind of mental *pabulum*, of the most refined as well as of the coarsest description. There was not, as there is with us, one literature or art for the cultured, and another for the uncultured classes—a fact which is not generally noticed. The conclusion, however, is that a "liberal education" was not the privilege of the rich, and also that we make a mistake in adopting the prejudices of Thucydides, Aristophanes, Plato and Theopompus, and in considering Cleon, Hyperbolus and other democrats as less educated than a man like Nicias. See note 1 to Chapter xxiii.

9. Th. 8, 54 *ξυννομία ἐπὶ δίκαις καὶ ἀρχαῖς*. Cf. W.

Vischer, *Die oligarchische Partei und die Hetairien in Athen*, Bas. 1836, reprinted in his *Kl. Schriften*, I.

10. Probuloι, Th. 8, 1, without using the term *πρόβουλοι*; Diod. 12, 75, evidently refers to them, but places them wrongly in the year 421; Bekker, *Anecd.* 1, 298; mentioned in the *Lysistrata* of Aristophanes, 467; cf. Gilbert, *Beitr. etc.*, p. 289. Of the probuloι, Hagnon and Sophocles (probably not the poet) are known to us.

11. Th. 8, 50. For Phrynichus, see Gilbert, *Beitr.* p. 297; cf. *Ar. Pol.* 5, 5, 5.

12. For Pisander, cf. Gilbert, *Beitr.* p. 254 seq.

13. It was the method of secret intimidation which not long ago played an important part in Lower Italy and Sicily under the names of *Camora* and *Máfia*.

14. Cf. Büttner, *Geschichte der politischen Hetairien in Athen*, Leipz. 1840; Scheibe, *Die oligarchische Umwälzung zu Athen am Ende des pelop. Krieges*, Leipz. 1841; Wattenbach, *De Quadringentorum Athenis factione*, Berol. 1842.—Revolt of Thasos, Th. 8, 64.—The lamentable condition to which the oligarchs had reduced Athens is very well described by Th. 8, 66.

15. For Antiphon, Th. 8, 68. Cf. Blass, *Athen. Bereds.* I., cc. 3 and 4, who thinks (p. 85) that ἀρετή in this passage of Thucydides means more than mere practical capacity. We should certainly not style a revolutionary leader who gains his ends by assassination as virtuous. He was one of the doctrinaires who afterwards, when it is a case of action, are indifferent as to means. Robespierre too has been called virtuous. For Antiphon, cf. also Hermann, *Staatsalt.* § 166, and Gilbert, *Beitr.* p. 308.—For Theramenes, cf. Pöhlig in the 9th supplemental volume of the *Neue Jahrb. f. Phil.* p. 227 seq., and Gilbert, *Beitr.* p. 311. Curtius, *Gr. G.* 2⁶, 733, Beloch, *Attische Pol.* p. 76, Mahaffy, *Social Life in Greece*, p. 141, and others take the quotation from Aristotle in *Plut. Nic.* 2 to mean that Theramenes was one of the three best Athenians, a statement which would of course make an impression on us moderns as well, but this view is due simply to a wrong interpretation of the word βέλτιστοι. Aristotle says that there were three aristocrats (βέλτιστοι) in Athens who had a πατρικὴ εὐνοία for the δῆμος, Thucydides, Nicias and Theramenes, the latter, however, not so much as the others, because he had been reproached with δυσγένεια (i.e. he was not a genuine βέλτιστος) and was besides a shifty politician. The passage therefore tends to depreciate Theramenes.

16. For the assassination of Phrynichus, Th. 8, 92. Cf. *Lyc. Leocr.* 112; *Plut. Alc.* 25, who in mentioning Hermon is probably

confusing the above passage of Thucydides. Lysias 13, 71, attributes the murder to the Calydonian Thrasybulus, which was unknown to Thucydides.—Reward paid to the murderer, Inscr., Hicks, 56 = Ditt. 43.

17. Praise of the constitution, Th. 8, 97. For its duration, cf. Vischer, Untersuchungen über die Verf. Athens in den letzten Jahren des pelop. Krieges, Bas. 1844, in his Kl. Schr. I. For the Nomothetae, Gilb. Beitr. p. 326.

18. Fate of Aristarchus, Lyc. Leocr. 115.

19. For the fate of Antiphon, see Th. 8, 68, and Plutarch's Vita Antiph.; cf. Blass, I.

20. The cities in Asia were continually changing hands at this time, and we cannot completely follow the course of events; Cyzicus and Thasos are cases in point. The battle, Th. 8, 103-107. Thucydides concludes his work with the journey of Tissaphernes to Ephesus, 8, 109. The battle related in Xen. Hell. 1, 1, 3 seq. is a fresh one. Xenophon continues Thucydides' narrative without a break. The chronology now becomes more difficult. I differ from Beloch, Philologus, 43, 2, p. 261 seq., and adopt the calculations of Breitenbach, Einl. zu Xen. Hellen., Berl. Weidmann, I. p. 80 seq. I can only construe Xenophon's reference to the *ἐνιαυτοὶ τρεῖς* (Hell. 1, 4, 7), which is of importance, as a contrast to *τέως μὲν* (1, 4, 6); in that case it only applies to the period of the envoys' imprisonment, which lasted three years, and this is decisive against Beloch's chronology. There remain certain difficulties raised by Beloch (duration of the nauarchia), which however must be dismissed.

21. The battle of Cyzicus, Xen. Hell. 1, 1, 14 seq. The famous despatch to Sparta:—*Ἐρρει τὰ καλὰ. Μίνδαρος ἀπέσσυα. πεινῶντι τῶνδρες. ἀπορόεμες, τί χρὴ δρᾶν* in Xen. Hell. 1, 1, 23.

22. Sparta's proposals for peace, Diod. 13, 52, 53, and from the same source Nep. Alc. 5; Just. 5, 4, 4. Xenophon does not mention them. Cf. Grote 4, 403 seq. in defence of the attitude of Cleophon; Gilbert, Beiträge, p. 336 and Beloch, Athen. Politik, p. 76 seq. In his unfavourable criticism of Cleophon, who was also persecuted by the comedy as a democrat, Diodorus merely echoes Theopompus. According to Lysias 19, 48 Cleophon was a man of honour. Cf. also Lallier, Cléophon d'Athènes in the Revue historique, 2^e année, I, 5. Vischer and others following him place Demophantus' psephisma relating to the oath to maintain the democracy (preserved in Andoc. de myst. 96 seq.) in 410-409, as the democracy may have been completely reinstated at that time. Cf. Droysen, De Demophanti, etc., populiscitis, Berol. 1873, and Gilbert, Beitr. p. 340. Positive accounts of the return to a com-

plete democracy are not to be found in the historians. A fresh list of the laws was compiled at this time by *συγγραφεῖς* and subordinate *ἀναγραφεῖς*, C. I. A. 57, 58, 61 (the latter = Hicks 59 and Ditt. 45). Cf. Schoell, De extraordin. magistrat., etc., in the Comm. in hon. Th. Mommseni, Berol. 1877, p. 451 seq.

23. Byzantium went over to the Athenians, Xen. Hell. 1, 3, 19; owing to this the Byzantine Anaxilaus was accused in Sparta, but was acquitted; Pylos and Heraclea, Xen. Hell. 1, 2, 18. Nisaea, Diod. 13, 64, 65.

24. Thasos, etc., Athenian once more, Xen. Hell. 1, 4, 9, on one occasion previously, Xen. Hell. 1, 1, 32.—Simple account of the return of Alcibiades in Xen. Hell. 1, 4, 12; much exaggerated in Diod. 13, 68 and Athen. 12, 535. Cf. Plut. Alc. 32-34; the exaggerations come from Theopompus and Duris. A Lacedaemonian embassy to Athens for the purpose of ransoming prisoners, attested by a recently-discovered fragment of Androtion (restored by Usener in the Jahrb. f. kl. Phil. 1871, p. 311 seq.), is attributed by Gilbert (Beitr. p. 361) to the period when Alcibiades was in Athens.

25. Whether Alcibiades was formally deposed or merely not re-elected is uncertain. Gilbert, Beitr. p. 366, assumes a charge against Alcibiades of *προδοσία* by Cleophon, who was then *προστάτης τοῦ δήμου*.

26. The prosecution of the generals who commanded off the Arginusae, Xen. Hell. 1, 7. Diodorus' account of the battle and the prosecution, 13, 97-102, is to a certain extent rhetorically embellished; the mention of Cyme in c. 97 suggests Ephorus as his authority to my mind. Of modern writers cf. Herbst, Die Schlacht bei den Arginusen, Hamb. 1855, who takes a different view from Grote, the latter having endeavoured to show that the generals were not active enough in their search for the shipwrecked crews. It is true that the generals did not behave as piously as Nicias according to Plut. Nic. 6, but it was in obedience to such sentiments that Nicias lost his army at Syracuse. The conduct of the Athenians cannot be defended. The attitude of Socrates shows that they were technically in the wrong. On the merits of the case there is absolutely nothing to be said for them. Whether Athenian generals should pay the penalty of death for neglecting to rescue shipwrecked men, was for the Athenians to decide; they were at liberty to push their respect for religion as far as they liked. But there is no proof forthcoming for us that the generals neglected their duty and not Theramenes. On the contrary, the conduct of Theramenes on other occasions leads to the conclusion that he was the guilty person. He helped to establish the Four Hundred, and to over-

throw and impeach them ; he did the same with the Thirty ; and before he failed in his last attempt to secure his own safety, he had earned the nickname of Cothurnus, or buskin which fits either foot, *i.e.* time-server. It is therefore probable that on this occasion as well he ruined others in order to save himself. Theramenes never disputed the fact that he had received orders to save the shipwrecked crews ; he was consequently liable to punishment if he failed to execute them. Beloch, *Att. Pol.* p. 87, in order to exculpate Theramenes, comes to the conclusion that the generals ought not to have entrusted such an important mission to two "subordinate officers" (†). That may be ; but it is plain that this did not justify Theramenes, firstly, in disobeying orders, and secondly, in hounding his superiors to death. It is also alleged that it was Callixenus and not Theramenes who was subsequently prosecuted and disgraced. But this proves nothing as regards Theramenes. Callixenus was responsible as proposer of the motion according to Athenian ideas ; Theramenes took good care only to egg others on.—It is pronounced absurd to detect oligarchic intrigues in this prosecution, but which party was naturally inclined to lay stress on the importance of religious ceremonies ? Which party was led by Theramenes ? And which party profited by the prosecution ? To all three questions there is but one answer : the oligarchic party.—In recent times 'A. 'Ιδρώμενος, ἡ δίκη τῶν ἐν Ἀργινοῦσαις στρατηγῶν, *Κερκ.* (quoted by Landwehr) has endeavoured to show that the charge referred only to the neglect of the ἀναίρεσις τῶν νεκρῶν. It is true that this particular point constituted the offence against religion.

27. After the battle of Arginusæ, as well as after the battle of Cyzicus, the Spartans made an attempt to obtain peace on the basis of the *status quo* ; the Athenians, however, on Cleophon's advice, once more declined the proposal. This is stated by Aristot. in the *Schol. Ar. Ran.* 1532 ; in the *Frogs*, produced in 405, Aristophanes attacked Cleophon among others. Grote, it is true, does not believe in this attempt of the Spartans, on the ground that the statement may only be due to a confusion of the battle of Arginusæ with the battle of Cyzicus. In the year of the battle of Arginusæ Athens was in such difficulties that according to *Schol. Ar. Ran.* 720 seq. she had to melt down the golden images of Nike. The Poristæ referred to above had plenty of work to do at this time.

28. Lysander's stratagem was a repetition on a large scale of that employed by the Syracusans against the Athenians, *Th.* 7, 40. The battle of Aegospotami is related in *Xen. Hell.* 2, 1, 20 seq. Lysias, *Speech* 21, refers to three other vessels as having escaped, which makes twelve in all.—As regards the treachery Grote, 4², 481, also thinks that Lysander probably had recourse to bribery.

For the events subsequent to the battle cf. Luckenbach, *De ordine rerum a pugna apud Aegosp. commissa usque ad xxx. viros institutos gestarum*, Strassb. Diss. 1875.

29. According to Xen. Hell. 1, 7, 35, the death of Cleophon took place in a *σπάσις*. According to Lys. Agor. 15, 16, 37 and Nicom. 13-17 he was executed.

The destruction of the walls took place on the 16th Munychion (end of April) 404, Plut. Lys. 15.

CHAPTER XXIX

SICILY FROM 413-404

THE course of events in the west presented a parallel to that in the east after the expedition to Sicily.

After their victory over the Athenians the Syracusans remodelled their constitution on a democratic basis. Public offices were in future to be filled by lot. The laws were drawn up by Diocles, who had already distinguished himself during the war. The chief of the aristocratic party, the deserving patriot Hermocrates, was banished. But the democracy did not last long, because the speedy outbreak of war with Carthage threw everything into confusion. The causes of this war were as follows.

The Eggesteans were once more engaged in a quarrel with the Selinuntians, and on this occasion they had no one but Carthage to apply to for help. It was of great importance to the Carthaginians to prevent the Sicilian Greeks from becoming too powerful, and the latter would have obtained the supremacy even in the west of the island if Segesta had fallen into the hands of the Selinuntians. Besides this, the Carthaginians had not yet avenged their old defeat of 480. Finally, they could not help seeing that the great defeat of Athens was really a humiliation of Greece, which in the eyes of foreign countries was mainly represented by the Athenians, and that, just as the Persians were assuming the character of arbitrators at the request of Sparta in the east, and preparing to recover

all the ground they had lost since the time of Themistocles and Cimon, so in the west also the time had come for those whom the Greeks styled barbarians to make their power felt. It is significant that, just as the Persians and Carthaginians assailed the Greeks simultaneously in the year 480, so now these two powers both interfered in Greek affairs almost at the same time.

The Carthaginian preparations were on a highly comprehensive scale. At first, however, they did not display their full power. The Egesteans had pleaded their cause with the Syracusans also, whereupon Carthage went so far as to invite Syracuse to arbitrate between Segesta and Selinus. The Syracusans, instead of attempting to mediate, adopted the meaningless decision to remain at peace with Carthage and keep on good terms with Selinus, evidently in view of a war between Carthage and Selinus, in which they hoped, in regular Greek fashion, to be able to assist Selinus without becoming actual enemies of Carthage. It is not likely that the Carthaginians had much appreciation for these subtleties of Greek international law.

Some slight assistance rendered to the Egesteans by Carthage only had the effect of increasing the irritation of the Selinuntians. In the year 409 the enormous preparations of Carthage were completed, and a force of at least 100,000 men, supplied with abundant material of war, was conveyed on board 1500 transports and sixty ships of war to Sicily. The command was entrusted to King Hannibal, grandson of the Hamilcar who fell at Himera in 480. The Carthaginians immediately attacked Selinus; they used all the resources of the art of war to make a breach in the walls, and took the city by storm after a siege of only nine days' duration. The Greeks, as we know, hardly ever stormed a city, because they were careful of human life. But individuals were of little value in the eyes of the Orientals, and were sacrificed without compunction, especially when they were mercenaries, as in the present

case. Selinus was plundered and burnt to the ground. The beautiful temples of the city were damaged to such an extent that what remained standing was easily overthrown by earthquakes in later times.

The Carthaginian army now marched on Himera. This city had really given the Carthaginians no immediate occasion for war, but Carthage was aiming at the destruction of Greek rule in Sicily. While the help of the allies came too late in the case of Selinus, in the case of Himera it came in time, but with an inadequate force. Diocles arrived with 4000 Syracusans, and the Syracusan fleet, which had been in Asia, also put in an appearance. The Greeks fought an unsuccessful engagement outside the gates of Himera, and the Syracusans hurried home under the influence of a rumour that the Carthaginians intended to leave Himera and attack Syracuse with their fleet. The Himereans now lost heart and surrendered the city of their own accord. But before the last men had withdrawn the Carthaginians, led by the Iberian mercenaries, had obtained possession of the city, and many Himereans fell into their hands. The men were put to death, the women and children sold into slavery ; the Greeks did just the same among themselves. The city was destroyed. Henceforth there was a Carthaginian province in Sicily.

The Sicilian Greeks had so far not made much of a resistance to the Carthaginians. At this point Hermocrates, who had not been recalled from exile by his native city, arrived in Sicily with some money given him by Pharnabazus and with a fleet, and began a war on his own account against the Carthaginians, whose main army had withdrawn. The position on the Graeco-Carthaginian frontier now resembled that on the Graeco-Persian frontier in Asia Minor ; enterprising Greeks assumed an almost independent position. Hermocrates occupied and fortified a part of Selinus. He then brought the abandoned bodies of the Syracusans who had fallen at Himera to the gates of Syracuse, in the hope that this signal

service would bring about his recall. Greek feeling in these matters was shown by what took place in Athens after the battle of Arginusae two years later (406). But even this was of no avail. Thereupon, unable to endure his exile any longer, he staked everything on one throw of the die, and forced his way into Syracuse. But he was slain by the people in the market-place with the majority of his followers.

In the meanwhile the Carthaginians had resumed their operations. In the north they endeavoured to secure their newly-acquired territory by founding the city of Thermae close to the sea and not far from the ruins of Himera. The city flourished but soon assumed an entirely Greek character (now Termini Imerese). In the south, however, they continued their conquests. Acragas was now the point of attack, the wealthiest and most powerful city of Sicily next to Syracuse. Acragas was ill prepared to resist such a vigorous and unscrupulous enemy. Their wealth had made its citizens so luxurious that stories were told of them which vied with those told of Sybaris. The most famous citizen of Acragas was the wealthy Gellias or Tellias, who entertained and gave presents to every stranger who came to the city and had no other friend to receive him. His cellars consisted of 300 vats cut in the rock, each containing 100 amphorae, or 900 gallons, making altogether 270,000 gallons of wine. When another Acragantine, Antisthenes, married his daughter, he entertained all his fellow-citizens and the bride was escorted by 800 chariots; when the bridal procession started, great fires of wood were lighted at the same moment on all the altars and in every street of the city.

The war against Acragas was not such an easy undertaking for the Carthaginians as that against Selinus or Himera, because the position of the city was very strong; it was too large to be easily invested, and the Acragantines had had time to prepare for the war. The Carthaginians brought at least 120,000 men on board 1000 transports. Forty Carthaginian

ships of war were defeated by an equal number of Syracusan vessels off Eryx; but when Carthage sent over fifty fresh ships, the Syracusans gave up all further resistance at sea. And Acragas itself had no fleet at all. The Carthaginians first attempted to make a breach in the walls, but without success. Disease broke out in the camp, and Hannibal, the commander-in-chief, died. He was succeeded by his cousin Himilcon. The Syracusans came to the assistance of their sister-city with a land force, and their general Daphnaeus defeated the Carthaginians; but this victory was not so decisive as it should have been, because the Acragantines had not the courage to support the Syracusan attack on the Carthaginians by a sortie at the right moment. The siege therefore continued. Scarcity, however, prevailed in the Carthaginian camp, a serious drawback in an army of mercenaries, with whom next to rich booty good living is the chief object. The mercenaries began to grumble. Himilcon, however, came to the rescue. He heard that Syracusan ships with provisions were on the way to Acragas, and he attacked the ships and took them. Abundance now prevailed in the Carthaginian camp, and scarcity in Acragas. There were mercenaries on that side also, and Himilcon employed the means which are usually effective with people of this kind. The Campanians deserted to the Carthaginian camp for a sum of fifteen talents; another fifteen convinced the Spartan Dexippus—a Spartan was of course equal in value to several thousand Campanians—that the city was too badly provisioned to be defended, and he induced the Italiotes in the city to withdraw. The Siceliotes also now came to the conclusion that the provisions were insufficient and departed. All this is intelligible enough. But the decision of the Acragantines themselves to abandon the city exceeds every instance of cowardice recorded in antiquity, and shows that the inhabitants were no great loss to the world. Even the aged and sick were left behind, for the reason that they might have

delayed the march of the able-bodied men. Gellias was a brilliant exception ; when he saw that the temple of Athene, in which he had taken refuge, afforded him no protection, he burnt himself with the temple and its treasures. The Carthaginians made enormous booty in Acragas, and destroyed the city, as far as it could be destroyed.

If the Acragantines lost their heads completely, the only excuse that can be made for them is that the other Siceliotes did not display much more courage. The Syracusans had behaved the best. But the people of Syracuse were by no means satisfied with the achievements of their generals in this war. Syracuse rightly regarded herself as the real bulwark of the island. The Syracusans were responsible for the safety of Sicily. What was Syracuse to do now? Who was to blame for all these disasters? A brilliant success had been achieved against the Athenians. No doubt it was all due to bad generalship, to incapable or negligent commanders. That was the general opinion, and it was publicly expressed by a young man, Dionysius, who had been a friend and comrade of Hermocrates. He came forward in the popular assembly and declared that the mistake had been to consider birth rather than capacity in electing the generals, and he managed to get new ones elected, he himself being among the number. But his colleagues were not the right kind of men either in his opinion, and he held aloof from them. On his motion the citizens who had been banished were recalled. He then had himself sent to Gela, the city next threatened after the fall of Acragas, where Dexippus, no doubt an untrustworthy individual, was in command. At Gela Dionysius overthrew the ruling aristocracy and paid the mercenaries, who had as yet received nothing, with money obtained by confiscations. All of a sudden he returned to Syracuse, accused his colleagues as traitors in presence of the people, and procured their deposition and his own election as sole general with absolute power. The soldiers were to receive double pay.

Dionysius had thus obtained the powers of a tyrant, but not the necessary bodyguard. This he procured by means of a trick, of the kind which was usual in similar circumstances in antiquity. He happened to be engaged in some military manoeuvres with the armed Syracusans at Leontini. In the night he rushed out of his tent, crying out that some one had tried to murder him, and fled to the acropolis of the city. On the following day the Syracusans, who acted as representatives of the will of the Syracusan people, offered him a bodyguard of 600 men, which he accepted and increased to 1000. With this he made his entry into Syracuse. In this way Dionysius became tyrant of the city, with the consent of the Syracusans, in the eyes of whom he assumed the character of a saviour of the state. And it is evident that the Sicilian Greeks required a capable leader at that juncture. The Carthaginians owed their successes to their unscrupulousness, to the concentration of their whole force on the particular point which was of importance at the moment, and to the rapidity and decision of their movements. It was necessary to confront them with a single man, and not a board of generals. If it were possible to find a lover of freedom who possessed prudence, resolution and popularity, so much the better ; if not, and the safety of the city was still an object, then they must put up with an unscrupulous egoist who was a capable ruler as well. Dionysius was a man of this stamp, and he eventually did what was expected of him.

At first the tyrant's performance was of a very unsatisfactory character. In the spring of 405 Himilcon marched out of the ruined Acragas and began the siege of Gela. The citizens defended themselves well, in the hope that Dionysius would make his appearance. He did so, but his plan of campaign did not meet with the success anticipated. The idea was to carry the Carthaginian camp to the west of Gela by means of five simultaneous attacks. Three divisions of infantry were to march from the east, one along the seashore,

another through the city, and the third north of the city, and deliver an assault at the same moment, which was to be supported by the fleet and cavalry, the latter advancing across the plain to the north. But attacks of this kind frequently fail owing to the difficulty of carrying out the movements at the time agreed upon, and such was the case on this occasion. The Carthaginians were able to defeat the assailants one after the other, with the exception of the division led by Dionysius, which was never engaged, because the tyrant would not risk a battle after the defeat of the others. Dionysius evacuated Gela, took the inhabitants with him, and left the Carthaginians the empty city. An ordinary board of generals might have done as well as this ; it was not worth while sacrificing their liberty for such a result. The Syracusans even suspected Dionysius of treachery ; but this is hardly probable, for after all a general usually prefers victory to defeat.

After the battle Dionysius also sent the inhabitants of Camarina to Syracuse, where he intended to concentrate all the Greek forces, and then went there himself. But his enemies in the city almost succeeded in putting an end to his rule. The cavalry, composed of young men belonging to aristocratic families, hurried on in advance, forced an entrance into Syracuse, plundered the tyrant's treasures and subjected his wife to such ill-treatment that she died shortly afterwards. The city was apparently free. But Dionysius quickly pursued them into Syracuse, and defeated them in an engagement in the market-place. He was now once more master of the city.

There could now be no question of a mild government, even if Dionysius had ever contemplated it. The citizens hated him and had a poor opinion of his generalship, but they dreaded his unscrupulousness, and so he continued to maintain himself in power by a régime of terror. This régime was only interrupted for a brief space of time and under circumstances of a special nature.

Himilcon could now advance on Syracuse. But a plague broke out in his army, which crippled its efficiency. He agreed to the terms of peace which Dionysius offered him. They were as follows :—The Carthaginians retained their old territory in western Sicily, and the Sicani in the west were placed under their rule ; the inhabitants of Selinus, Acragas, Gela, Camarina and Himera were allowed to return to their cities on condition of paying tribute to Carthage. The citizens of Leontini and the Sicels retained their independence ; Syracuse remained subject to Dionysius. The Carthaginians, who had lost half their army by the epidemic, sailed back to Africa.

These incidents took place in 404, the year in which Athens had to submit to Sparta.

The parallel between the course of events in the east and in the west is obvious enough. The Persians and the Carthaginians, the former partially and the latter completely, achieved what they had failed to accomplish in the year 480. The Persians recover the tribute of the Ionian cities, while the largest Greek cities of Sicily, Syracuse excepted, become tributary to the Carthaginians. Athens and Syracuse both succumb to a despotism, the one with the co-operation of the Persians, the other with that of the Carthaginians. But the danger and the internal difficulties were less marked in the east than in the west. In the east the Persians derived their strength solely from the want of union among the Greeks, who were intrinsically far superior in power to the Persians. In the west, on the other hand, the Carthaginians won the day, because the Greeks as a whole were weak and to a certain extent even deficient in courage. The absence of union might be only temporary, but the want of energy was hard to overcome and in fact never was overcome. The result was that liberty showed her face once more in the east, and the Greek communities there continue to present a record of highly honourable achievement, whereas in the west Greek civiliza-

tion was only maintained by tyrants and mercenaries. The brief and brilliant intervals of freedom which Sicily subsequently enjoyed were due chiefly to the influence of eastern Greece.

We now return to the east, where, after a period of deplorable confusion, we have at length to record the welcome termination of the great conflict which had so long divided Greece.

NOTE

Authorities : Diodorus, 13, 43, 44 (410 B.C.), 54-63 (409 B.C.), 79 (407), 80-96 (406), 108-114 (405). Cf. Holm, *Gesch. Siciliens*, 2, 77-101, also 417-430, and Meltzer, *Gesch. der Karthager*, I. Berl. 1879, pp. 256-280 and 509-511. The topographical questions, so far as they relate to Syracuse, are exhaustively discussed in the *Topografia archeologica di Siracusa* (cf. the notes to Chapter xxvii. of this volume). The best proof that Gela was really near the modern Terranova and not near Licata, as Schubert has once more recently conjectured in his history of Agathocles, is that the necropolis of Terranova, where vases are constantly being found, cannot be ascribed to any other city of antiquity but Gela.

CHAPTER XXX

THE THIRTY TYRANTS AND THE RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF THE DEMOCRACY IN ATHENS

LYSANDER had the additional satisfaction of forcing Samos to surrender. The Samians were allowed to withdraw with the clothes on their backs ; the rest of their property they had to leave behind in the city, into which the former citizens, *i.e.* the members of the oligarchic party, made their entry. Lysander then returned home, like a *triumphator*, taking with him the ornaments of the ships, as a token of his victory over the greatest naval power of Greece, all the vessels which had remained in the Piraeus, except the twelve which had been left to Athens, and 470 talents, which he had saved out of the Persian subsidies, and which were now at the disposal of Sparta. Sparta was thus at the zenith of her power. Lysander set up a memorial of his victory at Delphi ; on it were placed the statues of the victorious generals as well as his own. But in the main honours were paid to him alone and to an unprecedented extent. Hymns were composed in his honour ; the Ephesians erected his statue in the temple of Artemis, the Samians set it up at Olympia, and even gave the name of Lysandreia to their ancient festival of Hera.¹ In short, Lysander was honoured as a god, and it is not surprising that he became arrogant. These proceedings present an alarming example of the disintegration which the new culture

had produced in the old-fashioned morality of the Greeks. The substitution of Lysander for Hera by a Greek community marked the commencement of the worship of human beings, which was more pointedly expressed in the Macedonian age, and brought to such a melancholy pitch in the Roman empire. Lysander not only received the honours of a god; for a considerable time he was master of the whole Athenian league by means of the governments which he had appointed; and if his head was not turned by all this good fortune, as was the case with Pausanias seventy years previously, this proves that Lysander was the stronger man of the two.

In many of the communities which had once belonged to the Athenian league Lysander had installed boards of ten men (*Decarchiae*) at the head of affairs; in Athens their number was thirty, and they were appointed ostensibly "to make a list of the laws of the city according to which the state was to be governed." Among them of individuals already known to us was Theramenes; but Critias was of still greater importance,² a man of noble family, a Medontid and consequently a relation of Solon, possessed of a high degree of culture, due to the instruction of Gorgias and to intercourse with Socrates. He had formerly attracted notice by his support of the democratic party, his opposition to Phrynichus and his advocacy of the recall of Alcibiades; he was well known as a poet, philosopher and orator. After Sparta had obtained a guarantee of the good behaviour of the Athenians by the appointment of the Thirty, Agis withdrew from Decelea. The Thirty were now sole masters of the situation.

They, however, did not trouble themselves much about making a list of the laws; they governed Athens and appointed a Council and other bodies as instruments of this government. Some of their first measures met with general approval, especially that which condemned sycophants, or

professional informers, to death ; afterwards, however, they took a step which showed that they were not disposed to govern in accordance with public opinion. They asked Lysander for some soldiers, who arrived under the command of the Harmost Callibius. In this way Athens received a Spartan garrison, and the Thirty became neither more nor less than tyrants. And they acted as such. They arrested people from whom they apprehended resistance. But dissension soon sprang up among themselves. Theramenes was in favour of a milder rule ; Critias was for excessive severity ; he held that the people ought to be kept down by main force. His conduct recalls that of Antiphon. Doctrinaires are not infrequently more cruel than practical politicians, who have learnt by more constant intercourse with their fellow-men that theories can seldom be pushed to their logical conclusions. In consequence of the opposition of Theramenes political power was outwardly at least placed on a wider basis, three thousand citizens being recognized as privileged members of the state, *i.e.* entitled to bear arms and to exemption from summary condemnation to death. Theramenes had many objections to make to the number three thousand as an arbitrary one ; but he had himself as a member of the Four Hundred recognized five thousand privileged persons, which was quite as arbitrary, especially if the privileges of the individuals chosen were not respected, as was the case under the Four Hundred and under the Thirty. After this apparent concession the despotism of the tyrants became worse than before. They selected prosperous citizens and *metoeci* and condemned them to death in order that they might confiscate their property. This brought the quarrel between Critias and Theramenes to a head. For on the latter being asked to nominate suitable persons who might be plundered in this manner, he refused, saying that such conduct would be worse than that of the sycophants, for the latter had only taken money and had left their victims their lives. Critias now,

with the consistency of the doctrinaire, came to the conclusion that Theramenes was the real obstacle to the attainment of the best form of constitution, and must therefore be got rid of at once. The Council was summoned and young armed men were kept ready in case of need. Critias accused Theramenes of having betrayed his colleagues in this instance as he had formerly done when member of the Four Hundred and in the case of the generals at Arginusae, and demanded the punishment of death. Theramenes defended himself, saying that it was not he who injured his party, but those who persecuted the innocent. What, for instance, had Niceratus, son of Nicias, done to deserve death? Critias saw that Theramenes' arguments were making an impression on the Council and proceeded to the last resource of open violence. After consulting with his own adherents, he declared that a vote of the Council was certainly necessary to execute one of the Three Thousand; but, he continued, this is not required in the case of Theramenes, for we Thirty simply strike him off the roll of the Three Thousand and condemn him to death. This was simple and logical enough. The members of the Council did not raise a finger to check the outrage and did not even protest. Theramenes leaped on the altar which should have protected him and cried, "Help yourselves, not me!" But no one took his part. The Eleven, the well-known public executioners, appeared on the scene, and their chief Satyrus with his assistants pulled Theramenes down from the altar. He screamed and resisted as he was dragged across the market-place. "It will go badly with you," cried Satyrus, "if you don't keep quiet." "Will it go well with me if I do keep quiet?" answered Theramenes. And when after drinking the hemlock there were some dregs left in the cup he dashed them to the ground, as was done in the game of *cottabus*, and exclaimed: "This to the health of the gentle Critias," thus cleverly retaining his humour to the last. It is a pity that his conduct was not more satisfactory in the earlier

part of his career, and then one could have more sympathy for him now that he was put to death by members of his own party — without a shadow of legality, it may be said, but the same power which had elected the Three Thousand could also remove them. Theramenes was treated like certain revolutionists of 1790-92, who were naïve enough to imagine that the bloodshed in which they had been accomplices was bound to cease when they themselves thought the right moment had come for its cessation. Critias behaved like Robespierre, who also was of opinion that it is mere sentimentality to attach importance to the lives of individuals when principles are at stake, and that sentimentalists of this stamp are the most dangerous of men in critical times, men who must be removed at all hazards. This was the fate of Danton, whose protests were silenced by the minions of the men in power just like those of Theramenes, and in whose condemnation the forms of the law which he had helped to create were outraged in precisely the same way as at the death of Theramenes. Not that Theramenes is to be compared with Danton in personal character, Danton's nature was a passionate one, that of Theramenes calculating and egoistic; but Critias and Robespierre have many points of resemblance; both were cruel from a spirit of doctrinaire fanaticism.

After the death of Theramenes the Athenian reign of terror pursued its course, like the French after the death of Danton. Those who did not belong to the Three Thousand were hounded out of the city, and their property confiscated by the Thirty. Many fled, first to the Piræus, afterwards to Megara or Thebes.

Among the latter was Thrasybulus, who left Thebes with seventy friends and occupied the little mountain fortress of Phyle in the Parnassus range, at a point where a number of ravines and passes met, which made the position one of great importance for commanding the communications with Boeotia.

The Thirty took the field with the Three Thousand and the cavalry and attacked Phyle, which had become more and more a rendezvous for the enemies of the tyrants, but they were defeated. They then proposed to take the fortress by the favourite method of circumvallation. But there was a heavy fall of snow in the night (Phyle is 2100 feet above the level of the sea) and the noble warriors preferred to keep warm in Athens. They sent the Laconian mercenaries and two divisions of cavalry to attack the fortress, and the troops encamped at a distance of 15 stades from Phyle. Thrasybulus made a sortie, surprised them, and slew more than 120 hoplites and three noble horsemen. The Thirty now began to be uneasy themselves; they foresaw the time when they would no longer be safe in Athens, which now had no fortress of its own, and they conceived the idea of obtaining one in Eleusis. With this object they proceeded thither, made prisoners of the suspected Eleusinians by means of a stratagem, and then condemned them to death by public vote in the Odeum at Athens and had them executed; there were about 300 of them. By this means Critias and his gang had obtained a citadel; but fortunately it was of no use to them.

Thrasybulus, whose following had meanwhile increased to 1000 men, took possession of the Piraeus. It was necessary for the Thirty to dislodge him, or they would soon be deserted by everybody. Thrasybulus occupied the heights of Munychia to the east of the city; the Thirty assembled their followers in the Hippodamian market-place below. To drive the democrats from their stronghold they had to storm the heights. The path was narrow; they formed a line fifty deep, and the democrats were only ten deep; but the defenders had the advantage of position. Before the battle Thrasybulus reminded his men of the goodness of their cause, to which the gods had hitherto shown favour. Their soothsayer declared that they would conquer, but that he himself would

fall, and so it happened. He was the first to rush into the ranks of the enemy and was slain, but the democrats were victorious. Critias himself met his death in the battle. Cleocritus, the herald of the mysteries, who was on the side of Thrasybulus, a man with an extremely powerful voice, made an impressive speech to those who had flocked out of the city and to the troops of the Thirty, urging them not to obey the tyrants, who had killed more Athenian citizens in less than one year than the Spartans had in ten years. "Be assured," he concluded, "that many of those whom we have just slain have been mourned as much by ourselves as by you." There is a healthy ring about these two speeches, a tone of conviction and of simple feeling, which is highly refreshing after all the clever orations to which Thucydides has treated us. The heart speaks once more, and not the intellect with its cool calculation of advantages and pride in its own cunning. One might almost say that the terrible experiences to which Athens and Greece had been subjected, had to a certain extent acted like a thunderstorm which clears the air. It is a remarkable fact that it is not the clever people who had been educated by the rhetoricians, not the nobles who had elaborated artificial constitutions, like Critias or Antiphon, who appear to advantage, but those whose sole pre-occupation was to put an end to the hypocritical villainy of the oligarchs and to replace everything on its old footing—the government of the people by the people. This was not the aristocratic point of view, but a truly conservative one for Athens.

The reign of the Thirty now came to an end. In Critias they had lost the life and soul of their party. The more reasonable oligarchs would have nothing more to do with the unserviceable remnant of this board, but deposed them and elected a new body of ten men. The tyrants, who were thus left in the lurch, retired to their citadel in Eleusis. The Ten, however, wished to do something to prove that they were

not quite superfluous. They therefore continued the war against Thrasybulus, the cavalry behaving with great cruelty, and, what was more to the point, they obtained powerful aid from Sparta. Lysander was sent as Harmost to Athens, and his brother Libys was despatched as admiral-in-chief with forty ships. The Piraeus would have been taken from the democrats, but for the existence in Sparta of influential people who were not inclined to let Lysander's power increase indefinitely. King Pausanias managed to get sent to Attica himself, and the Harmost had to submit to the king. Pausanias wanted to come to an understanding with the Athenians, which would remove one of the chief sources of Lysander's power. But the feeling of the Spartan allies had become so hostile to the former policy of Sparta, which seemed to culminate in the personal aggrandisement of Lysander, that the Thebans and Corinthians, usually the bitterest enemies of Athens, refused to enter Attica under Pausanias because they thought that the result would be once more a triumph for Lysander. Pausanias, however, brought everything into its proper groove. After an engagement which turned out unfavourably for the Peloponnesians, and in which some noble Spartans fell, he won a victory over the democrats, and could now, as Sparta's honour was saved, quietly act as mediator between the contending parties in Athens. Both sides, the oligarchs in Athens and the democrats in the Piraeus, declared themselves ready to conclude a truce and send envoys to Sparta to obtain a decision. This was done, and fifteen men were despatched from Sparta to Athens, where with the co-operation of Pausanias they delivered an award that everybody might return to Athens with the exception of the Thirty, the Eleven and the Ten, who had ruled for a time under the Thirty in the Piraeus.³ Any persons who were afraid to remain in the city might live at Eleusis. The Thirty were thus thrown over by the Spartans. The others became really reconciled, and the man of the day, the saviour of Athens, was Thrasybulus. Pausanias disbanded

his army, and the citizens from the Piraeus marched into the city under arms and offered sacrifice to Athene on the citadel.⁴ When they had descended, Thrasybulus delivered a speech, in which he pointed out to the oligarchs that they were less strong than they had thought, not so strong as the Demos, whom they had not been able to conquer, and he reminded them that even the Spartans had not protected them, but had treated them like snapping curs who have to be chained up; he then exhorted the democrats to keep the oath which they had taken. The old democratic constitution was now once more put in force. When the new rulers, however, heard that the oligarchs in Eleusis were hiring mercenaries, they marched out against them, slew the generals, who had come out of the city to negotiate, and persuaded the rest to return to Athens, and "having sworn that they would bear them no grudge, they live together up to this day in the same city, and the Demos keeps the oath"—with these words Xenophon closes his narrative of these events.

This amnesty is a fitting conclusion to the history of the lamentable troubles of the fifth century, and the passage quoted from Xenophon is the more honourable a testimony to the Athenian democrats the further removed the writer himself is from the democratic standpoint.⁵

NOTES

Authorities: the same as for the end of Chapter xxviii.

1. Paus. 6, 3, 6.

2. For Critias see Blass, *Griech. Bereds.* Bd. I. and Schleicher, *Kritias*, Rostocker Diss. Wurzen s. a. His family (the Medontidae) belonged to the liberal party, to which he had devoted his energies as well. His conduct after the establishment of the Thirty must also be explained by the fact that he was a renegade, and, as people of this kind usually do, now championed his new convictions with all the more violence. His command of all the resources of the culture of the age materially facilitated his task.


3. For these Ten see Xen. *Hell.* 2, 4, 19, and Plut. *Lys.* 15.

4. According to Plut. glor. Ath. 7, it was on the 12th Boe-dromion, September 21, 403.

5. Xen. Hell. 2, 4, 38-43, a fitting conclusion of the second Book. For the so-called amnesty see G. Luebbert, *De amnestia a. ccccxiii a. Chr. ab Athen. decreta*, Kil. 1881. The amnesty seems to have been confirmed and extended on several occasions.

END OF VOL. II





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